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Introductory Note
; \ MONG the multitude of conflicts principles that,
according to various claims, should determine the
law applicable to all contracts, only two have resisted the test of critical analysis. These, indeed, form an
adequate groundwork. First, the freedom of parties to
choose the law applicable to their contract must be recognized as a general rule without petty restraint. Second, in
the absence of such agreement, a contract should be governed by the law most closely connected with its characteristic feature.
The first proposition is essential to the second. To deny
party autonomy means rigid conflicts rules created by some
superior authority. A scholastic doctrine may invest the
law of the place of contracting with ineluctable force; a
state may forbid stipulations for a foreign law. However,
our modest task requires but a reasonable choice of law
advisable for average use by courts and legislatures. This
cannot aspire to ascertain more than subsidiary rules. It
is not possible to achieve anything practical by attempting
to coerce the parties into an inexorable law of our creation. This conception is perfectly consistent with a considered regard to the large significance of public law at the
present time. It even allows and facilitates a line of thought
leading to the subsidiary application of the private law of
that state which, by its administrative law, preponderantly
regulates certain kinds of business. This will appear in such
contracts as maritime carriage of goods, employment, and
msurance.
It has been further explained, in virtual agreement with
a growing volume of authority, that, for our purpose, more
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specific conflicts rules should be devised with local connections corresponding to the different types of transactions.
The usual types, especially of business contracts, therefore,
must be studied one by one. The characteristics of these
contracts should be ascertained by comparative investigation of their economic and legal structure in the various
countries and of their function in international life.
Part Nine is an attempt to demonstrate that this method
leads to some definite and many suggestive conclusions.
In a few matters such as money obligations, sales of goods,
and workmen's compensation, excellent work has been accomplished by treatises, drafts, and even treaties, establishing a new range of observation on the international
level. In others, much confusion must be cleared up, and
some topics are full of difficulty. It may be well to reemphasize that merely partial research is submitted here.
The method followed in this work requires strict avoidance
of the generalizations which are all too familiar in this
branch of law. In the very first topic of this volume, it will
only be possible to state that no sure conflicts rule can be
formulated.
In such and in atypical cases, the courts must refer back
to the general principle and weigh the individual circumstances and stipulations of the contract. Categories of
transactions insufficiently treated here ought to find more
competent and detailed consideration than I have been able
to devote to them.
Whether localizing an individual contract or a type of
contract, we do, of course, survey the multiple territorial
connections involved (domicil, place of contracting, place
or places of performance, etc.) and decide which is the
most important. But, as said before/ scarcely any of these
"criteria" from which courts have deduced in particular
1
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cases specific choices of law, command respect in themselves,
and no general evaluation of them, hence, will be undertaken.
But should not one exception be advisable with respect
to a criterion almost unchallenged in the civil law countries?
I am referring to the contracts baptized by Saleilles 2 as
"contrats d' adhesion." Carriers, banks, insurance companies,
warehouses, manufacturers, traders, buying departments
and many other enterprises establish standard forms or use
forms drafted by organizations, for contracting with an
indefinite number of persons. In these cases, the enterprise
offers a ready-made contract, which the other party simply
accepts by "accession."
The customer has little opportunity to bargain for conditions anu none at all when the enterprise, by its own
resources or through a cartel, enjoys a monopoly. This wellknown fact of modern commercial life, the object of many
discussions, leads in conflicts law to the conclusion that the
customer who simply "adheres" to the offer, ought to
understand that the contract has to serve its purpose on a
single legal basis, irrespective of nationality and domicil of
the customer. Hence, the law of the domicil of the enterprise, or of the branch concluding the transaction, is regarded as tacitly agreed upon, or at least presumably intended. The German courts have constantly argued to this
effect, the French courts often, and the C6digo Bustamante
has formally adopted this as the rule. 3
2 SALEILLES, De Ia declaration de volonte (Paris 1901) 229. For a survey
of the rich French and Italian literature on the nature and interpretation of
these transactions, see DI PACE, "II negozio di adesione nel diritto private,"
39 Riv. Dir. Com. (1941) 34-47. For a comprehensive theory, LUDWIG RAISER,
Das Recht der allgemeinen Geschaftsbedingungen (Hamburg 1935).
3 Germany: For a list of cases, see NussBAUM, D. IPR. 23 I n. 2; BATIFFOL
102 §§ II5-II9 adopts the German view. Switzerland: BG. (Nov. 2, 1945) 71
BGE. II 287. Codigo Bustamante, art. 185: in the absence of an express or
tacit intention, in contracts of adhesion the law of the party offering or
preparing them is presumed to be accepted.
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No such rule, however, exists in the United States.
American courts rather seem inclined to react against the
preponderance of one party by protecting the other and
granting him the privilege of his own domiciliary law,
directly or in the guise of the law of the place of contracting. On the subject of carrier's liability and life insurance,
this phenomenon is particularly strong. We are thus warned
not to presume generally that the law of the party issuing
a form should govern.
Of course, the Continental argument is not valueless.
Obviously, an enterprise of the kind mentioned is vitally
interested in a secure, uniform basis on which to deal with
an international public, and the latter profits by the more
favorable conditions offered on such basis.
Also, the Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that a finance corporation in Pennsylvania lending
funds in other states on standard terms at a rate of interest
permitted at its place of business was not guilty of usury. 4
Precisely for small loans issued in mass, the argument has
an inevitable bearing. A good case may further be made out
for the law of the business place where a bank provides
professional services of all kinds to private customers, and
an especially strong case for the law of the business place
from which an insurance company delivers its policies. But
in contrast to the sweeping statements in Europe and Latin
America, we should not acknowledge an automatic subjection of mass contracts to the domiciliary law of the
enterprise.
In Part Ten, the questions concerning modification and
discharge of obligations are selected with regard to the
interest they enjoy in conflicts law. Accordingly, the problems
of performance do not appear in this Part, their relevant
topics having been treated in Chapters 30 and 35.
4 Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co. ( 1927) 274 U. S. 403; see Vol. II
p. 409.
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On the other hand, the conflicts of law respecting negotiable instruments are too complex and important to be
investigated before property law will be examined in Volume
Four.
In sending out the present volume, I do not ignore the
fact, emphatically stressed by some writers, that in this
postwar period the organization in which international business thrived before and even after the First World War,
has undergone very conspicuous changes. No one knows
how much of the transformation is unrepealable, and where
it will end. But after as much inquiry of American trade
experts as was feasible, I am fairly satisfied that at this time
our critical survey of past and present conflicts doctrines and
the outlook for their reasonable progress ought not to be
disturbed by the fear that it may shortly become obsolete.
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Money Loans and Deposits
I. MoNEY LoANs
I.

Municipal Differences 1

N THE systems of private law, rather by historical
accident than on rational grounds, certain contrasts
in construing a loan contract have survived. Thus, the
Roman requirement of actual delivery of the res, that is,
coins or their equivalent, persists in laws still considering
loan to be a "real contract," the mere promise being only
a preliminary agreement (pactum de mutua dando) .2 At
common law, the promise to pay money in consideration of
the borrower's return promise forms a perfect contract. 8
This result agrees with the modern construction of loan as
a contract by mere consent. 4
The common law doctrine that the creditor of a fixed
sum of money cannot claim damages beyond the amount
of the loan and interest, is followed by few foreign codes ;5

I

1

VoN SCHWARTZKOPPEN, 2 Rechtsvergl. Handwiirterbuch 640.
France: C. C. art. I892.
Germany: BGB. §§ 607 par. I, 6Io.
Italy: C. C. (I865) art. I8I9.
Spain: C. C. art. I753·
And most other eodes.
s JENKS, I Digest § 462.
4 Switzerland: C. Obi. art. 3IZ; nevertheless the pact preliminary to loan
has some role, C. Obi. art. 3I5.
5 England: JENKS, I Digest §§ 284, 465.
Brazil: C. C. art. 106 I ; C. Com. art. 249.
Denmark: Law of April 6, I855, § 3, see Die Handelsgesetze des Erdballs,
Vol. IO, Das Handelsrecht und Konkursrecht Danemarks, p. 67.
The Netherlands: C. C. art. u86.
2

3
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modern laws allow recovery of special damage. 6 The main
field for choice of law is furnished by the immense variety
of usury laws. But time of repayment, burden of giving
notice of termination, and the amount of interest due by
force of law are also variously regulated.
Contracts involved. Conflicts rules concerning loans include ordinary agreements for opening of credit and principal debts secured by suretyship or pledge.
Rights involved. The usual problem raised in this subject
matter deals with the law under which the duties of payment of interest and of repayment arise and are performable. Of course, the obligation, assumed by the potential
creditor in a pactum de mutua dando or consensual loan,
of delivering the promised value likewise needs determination. But the conclusion will become obvious after the main
discussion.
Connecting Factors

2.

(a) Place of contracting. Many American decisions have
determined the validity of loan contracts according to the
law of the place of contracting. In most cases, however,
no other localization was in question. 7 A similar practice
is observed in France. 8 The only conclusion to be drawn
is that the law of the forum has no imperative force. 9
Again, where both parties are domiciled in the state of
contracting, this state, of course, determines the law. 10
(b) The debtor's domicil. In a view that has found
Germany: BGB. § 288 par. 2.
Italy: C. C. (1942) art. 1224 par. 2 replacing old art. 1231 which was
disputed, see DE CuPrs, II danno {Milano 1946) 189, 217.
Switzerland: C. Obi. art. 106.
7 For closer analysis, see BATIFFOL 203 §§ 229, 230.
8 Cass. req. (June 10, 1857) D. 1859·1.194, S. 1859.1.751; lower courts, see
BATIFFOL 210 § 236.
9 BATIFFOL id. n. 3·
1 Canada: Stuart & Stuart, Ltd. v. Boswell (1916) 26 D. L. R. 7II {English
Money Lenders Act applied).
6
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expression in the Polish law, unilateral contracts are governed by the law of the domicil of the debtor. 11
The same rule has been adopted by the Swiss Federal
Tribunal in a case where the sum of money was expressed
in the currency of the debtor's state. 12 Likewise, the French
Court of Cassation applied the law of Ecuador to determine the rate of interest due from a borrowing company
domiciled there; the loan was to be utilized in the company's
operation in the same country, although the lender was
domiciled in Paris and made the funds available there. 13
(c) Place of repayment. Many American decisions have
resorted to the law of the place where repayment is due 14
because the creditor's claim is deemed to be centered in this
place. In some cases, the court presumed a corresponding
intention of the parties/ 5 or the place coincided with the
debtor's domicil and the place of his use of the money. 16
As a result, the place held decisive has sometimes been
the domicil of the debtor, but in the great majority of cases
the business place of the lender. 11 It is scarcely feasible to
explain all these decisions on one ground. But we may suggest that, whether the decisions say so or not, preferably
the loan was localized with the lender when the lender was
a credit institution operating from a central place of business on a uniform basis in several states.
11 Proposals by WALKER 406 § 5 (r) and (2), though with some qualification.
Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. 9 No. r; applied in Polish S. Ct. (Nov. r8,
1936) 4 Z. osteurop. R. \r937) 380, though the money had been sent to another
country.
Same proposal, NIBOYET, 33 Annuaire (1927) III 222.
12 BG. (Oct. 8, 1935) 6r BGE. II 242, 2+4. In this suit, the parties invoked
the German law, but this is only an auxiliary instance following the prevailing practice.
13 Cass. req. (Feb. 19, r89o) Gaz. Pal. r890.r.46o, Clunet r89o, 495·
14 List of cases: BATIFFOL 199 n. r.
15 Nakdimen v. Brazil (1917) 131 Ark. 144, 198 S.W. 524.
16 Potter v. Tallman (r86r) 35 Barb. S.C. r82; Lyon v. Ewing (r863)
17 Wis. 6r; 2 BEALE II70 n. 3; BATIFFOL 200 n. I.
17 See BATIFFOL 201 n. 2.
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In the German practice, the place of repayment is emphasized on the general principle of lex loci solutionis. 18
But before any choice of law, the lex fori states for the
purpose of this choice where the money should be repaid. 19
This means normally the domicil of the debtor. 20 By the
same method, the domicil of the creditor should be decisive
in Switzerland. 21
Recent advocates of lex loci solutionis recommend it as
respects repayment of the loan 22 and the payment of
interest. 23
(d) The creditor's domicil. Some writers have urged
the law of the lender. 24 A rational attempt has also been
made to infer this approach from the situation of the
parties. The creditor is menaced by specific dangers, such
as the debtor's insolvency, money depreciation, and difficulty of legal enforcement, whereas the borrower may use
the funds at his pleasure and should mitigate possible
damage; the risk of the creditor should at least be measured
under his law. 25 However, this is scarcely a consideration
within the contemplation of the parties.
(e) Place of using the money. Certain French decisions
have applied the law of the place where the loan should be
urialise. 1126 The writers question what this means, viz.,
18

RG. (Sept. 30, 1920) 100 RGZ. 79; (March 12, 1928) JW. 1928, II96.
See Vol. II p. 471.
20
RG. (Feb. 16, 1928) IPRspr. 1928 No. 35; (Jan. 14, 1931) id. 1931 No.

19

30.
21

BG. (Nov. 7, 1933) 59 BGE. II 397, 398; but see Vol. II p. 471 n. 168.
BATIFFOL § 238.
2 3 HAMEL, 2 Banques 452 n. z § 920.
24 2 MElLI 55; NOLDE, Draft, 33 Annuaire ( 1927) II 9+0; OsER-SCHOENENBERGER Nos. II7, II8.
25 HERZFELD, Kauf und Darlehen 75·
26
Cass. civ. (Dec. 21, 1874) D. 1876.1.107, S. 1875.1.78, Clunet 1875, 353;
Cass. req. (Feb. 19, 1890) Clunet 1890, 495; see supra n. 13; Cour Paris (May
23, 1912) S. 1913.2.21, Gaz. Pal. 1912.2.13 commented upon by BATIFFOL 212.
As an additional element for applying German law to a loan granted by
a Swiss institution to a German brewery, the Swiss Federal Tribunal stressed
the purpose of the loan, viz., for installations in the factory. BG. (Sept. 18,
1934) 6o BGE. II 294, 301.
22

MONEY LOANS AND DEPOSITS

7

whether the courts point to the place of utilization or consumption of the loan or to the place where the money is
delivered. 27 The latter opinion emphasizing the place where
the money is in fact delivered to the borrower has been
explained by the technical construction of loan in French
law as a real contract; the contract is completed only by
delivery. But the point is obscure. It should be noted in
addition that the cases dealt only with the scope of a French
Law of September 3, 1807, on the legal rate of interest
and reached the result that it was confined to "civil," i.e.,
noncommercial, loans contracted and consumed in France.
Hence, the ordinary conflicts rule was not necessarily
concerned.
3· Rationale
Loans may be granted either by financial institutions on
a large scale to an indefinite number of customers or in
isolated cases on individual terms. Each of these types
requires separate discussion, although perhaps not different
conflict rules.
(a) Individually determined loans. It may be taken for
granted that no one objects to the law of a place at which
both parties have their domicils and make the contract.
Furthermore, the place where the loan is to be repaid,
according to express stipulation or an unequivocal business
usage, may be rega-rded as a characteristic localization of
the only obligation flowing from a completed loan.
The same cannot be said of a place of repayment solely
determined by law, since this very law ought to be selected
and the municipal laws are far from agreeing where the
payment is "performable."
·
In the civil law codes, with some difficulty, a common
21 For the first interpretation, BATIFFOL 211 § 237 n. 2 against SAVATIER in
Planiol et Ripert, II Traite Pratique 431 § 114-9 and authors cited by the
latter.
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denominator may be found. The money is either to be paid
to the creditor at his residence as of the time of contracting, 28 or it is to be sent to him at the debtor's risk and
charge, although the "place of performance" may remain
at the debtor's domicil. 29 It may therefore be suggested that
the creditor's country should prevail. 30 This conclusion
appears weak, however, if confronted with the common
law. The principle that the debtor must seek the creditor,
strong as it has remained, has no bearing since it is
limited to places within the realm, or in the United States,
within the debtor's state. If a contract has been made
outside this state, American courts consider payment
due at the place of contracting, unless the creditor designates an authorized agent in the state of the debtor. 31 In
interstate and international contracts this conception seems
to exclude the law of the creditor's place.
In conclusion, there is no general conflicts rule for a
loan individually contracted between private parties.
(b) Mass operation by financial institutions. The operation of banks and loan or savings associations necessarily
involves central organization and conditions in which business is conducted and planned substantially for all the
territory to be embraced. Despite concessions that may have
to be made to the diverse state laws, it is vital for such
institutions to base calculations and forms on one given
law. Commonly, the borrower not only does not care what
law may apply, but he does not expect his own domicil to
28

The Netherlands: C. C. art. 1429 par. 2.
Switzerland: Rev. C. Obi. art. 74·
Japan: C. C. art. 574, cf. 484.
29 Austria: A1lg. BGB. § 905; A1lg. HGB. art. 325·
Germany: BGB. § 270.
30 The result would agree with the writings cited supra ns. 24, 25, but is
opposed to the prevailing German doctrine regarding§ 269 BGB., see Vol. II
p. 471 n. 166.
31 United States: Chase, J., in Weyand v. Park Terrace Co. (1911) 202
N. Y. 231, 241, 95 N. E. 723; WILLISTON, 6 Contracts § 1812; 40 Am. Jur.,
Payment§§ 16-19.
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be taken into account in this connection. This is manifest
if he sends his application for credit to the address of the
company in another state or deals with a company representative who only solicits applications, action on which is
understood to be left to the central office. Not because the
last act of concluding the contract occurs in the state of the
company, but because this locality is prominent in the
contemplation of the parties, does it determine the law
applicable. The result agrees with the bulk of the cases,
which stress either the place where the transaction is concluded by the company's consent, or the place of repayment, or in Europe and under the C6digo Bustamante the
mass character of the operation. 32
It follows, however, that this approach has definite
limits. A significant divergence occurs when the foreign corporation operates through a permanent agency in the state
of the borrower, which issues loans in the name of the company. In this case, the contract has a local center. It should
not make any difference that the agent may have to ask for
the assent of the central office, where this appears as a
matter of internal administration. Nor should the fact in
itself that the company is considered to do business in the
state be decisive, although many legislators think otherwise. State supervision over loans cannot be compared in
intensity and importance with state intervention in such
matters as insurance or utilities. The vague and inclusive
concept of what the states mean by doing business does
not present a sound basis for choice of law. It should be
noted, moreover, that even in the case where the customer
32 Germany: ROHG.
(Jan. 13, 1877) 21 ROHGE. 288; Bay. ObLG.
(March 17, 1928) 28 Bay. ObLGZ. 259; OLG. Konigsberg (Feb. 14, 1902)
57 Seuff. Arch. 345 (bank deposit).
Switzerland: BG. (Nov. 22, 1918) 44 BGE. II 489; HERZFELD, Kauf und
Darlehen 61.
C6digo Bustamante, art. 185.

IO
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deals with an agency or branch, it is this and not his own
residence that is significant.
As a result, it is always the place of business of the lender
that localizes a loan of money to be repaid in kind. If a
branch or agency of the lender negotiates the contract, the
question to be asked is not where, but by which office,
functioning as a party to the contract, the loan is issued.
This fact may at times be doubtful, but no more than in
other cases of agency. A presumption would be helpful in
the case of foreign corporations advertising offers of small
loans with reference to their local agencies, that the agent
is authorized to contract, and therefore the local law is
implied.
4· The Obligation to Give the Loan

Whenever a loan or credit is promised by a finance corporation, the place of its establishment has a double function: it figures as the domicil of the promisor and as the
center of the obligation of repayment. It does not seem
doubtful that a bank credit is governed by the local law of
the bank. For isolated contracts between private parties,
again, no general rule is needed or possible.
II.

BoNDS (DEBENTUREs)

International credits are created by the most varied
methods. 33 We are not dealing here with credit operations
between sovereign states, nor with state guarantees for
bolstering the credit of other governments or of individual
borrowers, lately much discussed in public international
law. 34 The loans expressed in partial obligations, however,
33 For a general survey, unfortunately little documented, see LEON MARTIN,
"Les emprunts internationaux," Nouv. Revue 1943, 229-276, 525-571.
34 J. FISCHER WILLIAMS, 34 RecueiJ ( 1930) 81, 137; LAUTERPACHT 5; MANN,
"The Law Governing State Contracts," 21 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1944)
I I If.
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which form our subject matter may be contracted by states
or other public entities as well as by private persons.
(a) American loans of the 1920's. After the First World
War, during the great wave of private American loans to
European states, municipalities, and corporations, the usual
type of loan conformed perfectly to the technique used in
large domestic loans by New York banks. It has been said
that most debentures and bonds of this group contained
an express submission to the law obtaining in the state of
New York. Such a clause, more or less clearly drafted, at
any rate, 35 was frequently inserted in the "Trust Deed,"
if not in the text of the bond. But even without stipulation,
the transaction was commonly impregnated by the unmistakable style of New York. As a German court described
such a loan, 36 the bonds were issued by a New York bank;
the sums expressed in the currency of the United States;
the external appearance, form, and text of the securities
as well as the concepts and stipulations of the debenture
conformed to the habits, views, and needs of the American
finance and monetary market; everything was calculated
for admission to the stock exchange of New York. Also,
the trust deed was usually agreeable to the American standard and modified only with respect to foreign mortgages
to meet local exigencies.
This characterization corresponded with the distribution
of economic power :
"When the post-war loans were floated, the American
bankers were largely in a position to dictate the terms; and
the loan agreements were usually drafted in New York and
merely passed upon or modified abroad." 37
(b) Decisive connection. This transaction as well as the
ensuing negotiable instruments were· doubtless centered in
35 HAUDEK 105

n. 3·
OLG. Kiiln, Senate of Saarlouis, JW. 1936, 203.
37 QUINDRY and FEILCHENFELD1 2 Bonds and Bondholders (1934) § 634.
36
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New York. The purely American character of the contract
created obligations, naturally governed by American law,
between the parties and their successors deriving rights
from the original transaction.
The law of the place of contracting, in such cases, can
certainly not govern on its own merits. Nor has the debtor's
domicil any importance. Also, the places of payment available to bondholders should not be overemphasized. It is
true that in the loan contract, during the period between
the two world wars, the debtor, whether a private or
municipal corporation or a state, usually undertook to place
all sums due for principal, premium, or interest on deposit
with the bank in Manhattan charged with the service of
payment, in immediately available funds, several days before the respective date. Thus, the debtor is significantly
bound to the main place where payments are due. But this
is only characteristic of the market at which the bank is
located.
The lessons of experience point to two conclusions. In
the first place, the most vital principle for every sound
treatment of debenture rights is the economic and legal
equality to be enjoyed by all holders of the same bond issue.
Bonds are not so much characterized by the individual position of the particular creditor in relation to the debtor, as
by the conditions appearing in the fundamental contract,
defining the total claim of which the bondholder possesses
a part. The serial number indicates this part of the debt;
conditions of payment, redemption, conversion, and notice
are agreed upon in the debenture. The total debt is also
affected by such events as moratorium, mortgage foreclosure, consolidation, amortization, and premature repayment.38 The modern laws for the protection of bondholders
as Swiss BG. {Nov. 10, 1923) 49 BGE. III 185.
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contemplate associations or trustees acting in their common
interest, et cetera.
In the second place, if the creditors of a bond issue are
to be treated on the same footing, the applicable law can be
chosen only once and for all on the basis of the original
contract. This conclusion is probably universally recognized,
but exactly what local contact it indicates has scarcely been
discussed.
It has been correctly stated in France, however, that
where the place of issue, the currency, an,d the place of
payment coincide, neither the debtor's nationality nor
domicil-as once was claimed39-nor the purpose or place
of use of the money is material. 40 Likewise we may agree
with a Canadian decision that where a bond issue was made
in British Columbia, the debtor being there at the time, the
mortgage being there situated, and the bulk of the provisions performable there, it did not matter that the three
trustees named in the deed were residents of Oregon. 41 In
a typical case of an internal American bond indenture, an
Ohio corporation was the borrower, the mortgaged property was in Ohio, and the deal for the sale of the bonds was
closed in New Y o'~k, whereas an Ohio bank was named the
trustee for the security of the loan and the service for
payment was stipulated simultaneously through the participating banks of New York and Ohio. 42 Clearly in that
case, the New York market was looked to, if not for the
volume of trade, at least for the leading significance of its
quotations. Indeed, if similar combinations appear in international finance, it would seem that the main emphasis,
39

2 BAR 135; 2 MEILI 274; 2 FRANKENSTEIN 354·
LAPRADELLE, Note, Nouv. Revue 1941, 204. '
41 British Columbia: Harris Investments, Ltd. v. Smith [ 1934] 1 D. L. R.
748, 48 B.C. 274.
42 Republic Steel Corporation to Central United National Bank of Cleveland and H. R. Harris Trustees, Purchase and Improvement Mortgage,
Nov. r, 1934.
40
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despite multiple connections, always rests on the market
on which the issue principally relies. This market should be
selected as the decisive factor if a neat rule is desiredY
Hence, special rules are needed if the issue is distinctly
divided into partial u tranches" to be placed on several international markets and the creditors are granted choice of
currency (to be discussed in the next chapter). That issues
of bonds may be subject to protective administrative regulation at any place involved, 44 is important but should not
affect choice of law.
III.

LOANS TO STATES

Practice and discussions of the difficult border line between international public law and the private law, in the
writer's opinion, converge in the result that loans made to
a state by a private money lender in another country are
subject to private law. This law, in the case of a private
lender, moreover, is a particular state's law; it is not international law as ascertained by consulting the general principles of the civilized nations. 45 Whether the debtor state
nevertheless enjoys exemption from suit is another, and a
jurisdictional, question.
The main question is whether the governing law is regularly that of the debtor state, a view generally assumed
and the one adopted by the World Court. 46 The difficulties
that this court immediately encountered and failed to master47 show that the rule is no longer tenable. It is likewise
confusing to believe that, because one party to the contract
43 Possibly, NussBAUM, D. IPR. 331, referring in an undefined manner to
the "issue" or the placing of securities on public sale, has the same result in
view.
44 FICKER, 4 Rechtsvergl. Handwiirterbuch 473 f. No. 9·
45 See LAUTERPACHT 5·
4 6 Brazilian and Serbian loans, Publications Permanent Court (1929)
Series A, Nos. 20/21; German RG. (Nov. 14, 1929) 126 RGZ. 196.
4 7 Cf. the literature referred to supra n. 34·
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is an international person, the contract loses its national
character and becomes delocalized and internationalized. 48
The Supreme Courts of Austria, Denmark, England,
Norway, and Sweden had no hesitation in subjecting the
American loans to their respective governments to the
abrogation of the gold clause by the Joint Resolution of
Congress of June 6, 1933 ;49 a national law of the debtor
country, on the contrary, would not have had the power to
reduce the debt with international force. The Swedish
tranche of the international Young Loan to Germany was
determined under Swiss law by the Swiss Federal Tribunal. 5°
In the future, of course, a fair protection of an investment may be accomplished by treaty through the efforts
started before the last war, 51 and if high hopes are fulfilled,
by an international judicial forum. "Some day," it has been
said, "we shall be led to create a veritable international
law of business but this will be a future very remote." 52
48 Thus, MANN, "The Law Governing State Contracts," 21 Brit. Year
Book Int. Law ( 1944) II, 31, whose tendency seems to be approved by
JESSUP, A Modern Law of Nations (1948) 139 n. 39, 141.
49 Austria: OGH., Opinion de pleno (Nov. 26, 1935) 9 Z.ausi.PR. (1935)
891.
..
Denmark: S. Ct. (Jan. 1, 1939) Vereeniging voor den Effectenhandel a
Amsterdam v. Ministre des Finances, 40 Bull. Inst. Int. (1939) 284.
England: Rex v. International Trustee for the Protection of Bondholders
A. G. fr937l A. C. 5oo-H. L.
Norway: S. Ct. (Dec. 8, 1937) Norwegian Government (Ministere des
Finances) v. Stavanger Sparekasse etc., 38 Bull. Inst. Int. ( 1938) 71.
Sweden: S. Ct. (Jan. 30, 1937) Skandia Insurance Co., Ltd. v. Swedish
National Debt Office, 18 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1937) 215, Clunet 1937,
925, 4 Nouv. Revue ( 1937) 402.
5 0 BG. (May 26, 1936) 62 BGE. II 140, Revue Crit. 1937, 138; (Sept. 28,
1937) Clunet 1939, 192.
5 1 See Int. Law Association, 40th Report (1939) 192 ff.; Report of the
Committee for the Study of International Loan Contracts (Geneva 1939)
League of Nations C.145.M·93·1939 II A 10; Draft of Uniform Preliminary
Rules Applicable to International Loans, Institute for the Unification of
Private Law in Rome ("L'Unification du droit") published by this Institute
(1948) 223·
52 CASSIN, in r Travaux du comite fran~ais de droit international prive
(1934) 97·
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MoNEY DEPOSITS

The old controversy whether or to what extent a deposit
of fungible things, to be acquired by the depositary and
to be returned by him in unascertained equivalents of the
same class (depositum irregulare) should follow the municipal rules of loan, 53 has produced a contrast among the
national laws. However, a money deposit with a bank ought
to be considered a loan everywhere. 54 Moreover, there is
no reason to establish different rules for the choice of law
because of such variations.
A deposit of money, whether as a sum or in specie, is
naturally bound to the place of the bank or savings institution to which it is entrusted, 55 on the double ground that
the money is brought to that place to be conserved and
repaid there and that the transaction is one of a mass of
similar deals by the institution. Storage or warehouse contracts and agreements for the custody of valuable objects
by innkeepers are similarly localized.
Even though, exceptionally, a deposited object may be
recoverable at a place different from that of the domicil
of the depositee or bailee, the contract will be most conveniently determined by the law of the latter place.
In general, it seems settled that the customer of a branch
of a bank is to be treated under the law of the branch rather
than that of the principal establishment situated in another
country. In English decisions, repeatedly a bank debt has
been regarded as tied primarily to the branch where the
account is kept, for the purposes of legal representation,
collection, administration, and redelivery. 56
53 See VON SCHEY, Die Obligationsverhiiltnisse des osterr. allg. Privatrechts
(1890) 55, (1895) 351.
54 See HAMEL, 2 Banques 95 ff. §§ 752, 753 on the contrast between French
and German construction.
55 3 FIORE § 1204; NoLDE, Draft, 33 Annuaire (1927) II 941 No. 14;
FEDOZZI-CERETI 748 shuns any rule.
56 Rex v. Lovitt [ 1912] A. C. 212, 219; Frankman v. Anglo-Prague Credit
Bank [ 1948] 2 All E. R. 1025, 1030, C. A., per Lord Goddard, C. J.
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A question different from that of the applicable law is
whether the customer may or must sue the bank at the
place of its branch; he has been required to do so as a
measure of convenience for the administration of bank
business, so long as he has no prevailing contrary interest. 57
57 England: Clare & Co. v. Dresdner Bank [ I9I5] 2 K. B. 576; see N.
Joachimson v. Swiss Bank Corp. [ I92I] 3 K. B. no, I27; only in the case
of nonpayment has the customer the right to sue the bank at its head office,
apparently for damages rather than debt, see Hill, J., in Richardson v.
Richardson [ I927] P. 228, 232, 234· From Maude v. Commissioners of Inland
Rev. [I940] I K. B. 548, KAHN-FREUND in Annual Survey of English Law
I940, 255 concludes that the customer may pay at the bank's headquarters,
but the bank owes him at the place of the branch.
United States: Note, "Branch Banks," so A. L. R. I340, I357·
Germany: RG. (June 25, I9I9) 96 RGZ. I6I (semble).
For details, see RABEL, "Situs Problems," II Law & Cont. Probl. (1945)
at 130.
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Special Problems of Money Obligations

T

HE extreme instability of the monetary systems in the
entire world has caused a great number of difficulties
involving conflicts law. Recent writers have felt compelled to devote a separate chapter to money obligations.
Fortunately, one principle may be claimed to prevail
over occasional objections: the law of the contract governs
the amount due. The special law of the place of payment
has influence only on the "mode of performance," while
exceptions to the principle may be made for the sake of
public policy.
I.

MUNICIPAL LAWS
A. NOMINALISM

1.

Devaluation

A monetary sign has the value printed on its face. This
is the nominalistic principle. In the discharge of obligations,
1 Selected literature, including comparative
research: United States:
NusSBAUM, Money in the Law (1939); WEIGERT, "The Abrogation of GoldClauses in International Loans, and the Conflict of Laws," Contemporary
Law Pamphlets, Ser. 4 No. 4 (1940); FREUTEL, "Exchange Control, Freezing
Orders and the Conflict of Laws," 56 Harv. L. Rev. ( 1942) 30; RASHBA,
"Foreign Exchange Restrictions and Public Policy in the Conflict of Laws,"
41 Mich. L. Rev. (1943) 777, 1089.
England: F. A. MANN, The Legal Aspect of Money (1938).
Continental laws: NussBAUM, "La clause-or dans les contrats internationaux," 43 Recueil ( 1933) I 559; RABEL, "Golddollar-Anleihen mit Vereinbarung des New Yorker Rechts," 10 Z. ausl. PR. (1936) 492; HAMEL, "L'application des lois monetaires annulant les clauses-or et les principes des conflits des lois," Nouv. Revue 1937, 499; BAGGE, "L'effet international de Ia
legislation americaine clause-or," 64 Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (1937) 457,
786; DOMKE, "Die Amerikanische Goldklauselgesetzgebung," 13 Annuario
Dir. Comp. ( 1938) I 209; id., "Les efforts legislatifs tend ant a restreindre Ia
validite de Ia clause-or," Revue Crit. 1938, 22.
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no heed is given to the oscillations of monetary value that
continually accompany international financial intercourse.
In periods where a currency is stable, fluctuating within a
small margin in a free exchange market, nominalism has
a sound inner foundation. Throughout history, however,
innumerable embarrassed rulers have enforced the principle
in the wildest crises by manipulating the weight and metal
composition of their stamped coins and, in more recent
times, under the modern pattern by releasing floods of
paper money from their printing presses. A quite different
devaluation in the United States has accomplished the same
result by making a dollar of IS sfzr grains of nine-tenth
fine gold the same legal tender as the former dollar of
2 5 8 j I o grains, and by legally equalizing a dollar bill to a
gold dollar coin. "
When in November, I92J, the German "mark" was
degraded to one billionth of its former value, the German
Supreme Court could no longer restrain its rebellion against
the rule that "mark" is equal to "mark." The Second World
War has left all of Europe in the clutches of inflation, which
in the case of Hungary for a time reached the proportions
of quintillions.
Inflation and its opposite, deflation, when carried to such
extremes, are sooner or later adjusted by stabilization of
the nominal money values or ended outright by a new currency. The rules that in such cases determine the relation
between the old and new monetary units pertain to domestic
public law, but imply a change in the rules of domestic
private law. Consequently, the conflicts problem arises:
to what persons and obligations do the latter rules apply?
Some old codes, 2 reflecting the sentiment of natural justice, have expressly put the losses suffered through debasement or alteration of coined money on the borrower. The
2

E.g., Austria: Allg. BGB. § 988 in fine.
3
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creditor should receive exactly the value represented by
the indicated sum of coins of a certain standard, weight,
and fineness. Thus, nominalism has been partly replaced by
a "metallistic" doctrine. In the United States, since the
monetary catastrophes of the Civil War, a highly stereotyped stipulation has served in place of such a rule. In
present legislation, the nominalistic doctrine is firmly and
universally settled. In a vain effort to draw an analogy, a
few writers, in the desperation of inflation, invoked the old
rules regarding the loan of coined money.
2.

Protective Stipulations 8

Gold coin clause. Customary usage has produced various
formulas. In the United States, the clause generally employed before 1933 read: "to pay X dollars in gold coin
of the United States of, or equal to, the standard of weight
and fineness existing on (the day of contracting)." The
analogous clause in France and Germany more briefly stipulated for X francs in gold or X marks in gold or in ReichsGoldwiihrung, or the like.
Thus, in the "gold coin clause," clause especes-or, clausula
curso-oro, Goldmiinz-Klausel, the debtor promises to pay
gold coins of the currency specified. But although this suffices
so long as gold coins are available in addition to depreciated
bills, a crisis usually tends precisely to chase the precious
metal out of circulation, often causes prohibitions of gold
exportation and trade, and sometimes leads to seizure by
the state, as happened in the Roosevelt era.
In one opinion, the doctrine of impossibility was employed; the requirement of paying in gold coins was considered a frustrated specification of the modality of per8 For literature, see NussBAUM, Vertraglicher Schutz gegen Schwankungen
des Geldwertes (Beitrlige zum ausllindischen und internationalen Privatrecht,
Heft I) (I928); NUSSBAUM, Money 30I n. I.
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formance; hence, the debtor could simply discharge his
obligation in bills of the stipulated currency. 4 This leaves
the clause ineffective in the very case where it is most needed
and makes it almost senseless. In the words of the World
Court, "The treatment of the gold clause as indicating a
mere modality of payment without reference to a gold standard of value, would be, not to construe but to destroy it." 5
The highest courts of almost all countries 6 have finally
rallied to the view that gold coin clauses induce a tacit additional agreement that in any event the creditor should
receive in actual currency the value embodied in the original
amount, or, in other words, imply a gold value clause, as
described hereafter.
The House of Lords, then, construed a promise to pay
100 pounds "in sterling in gold coin of the United Kingdom
4 United States: Irving' Trust Co. v. Hazlewood (I933) I48 Misc. 456, 265
N. Y. Supp. 57·
Australia: Jolley v. Mainka (I933) 49 Commw. L. R. 242.
Belgium: Cass. (June 12, I930) Pasicrisie 1930.I.245; (April 27, I933)
Clunet I933, 739·
England: Feist v. Societe Intercommunale Beige d'Electricite [I9331
Ch. 684-C.A. (reversed).
Germany: RG. (Jan. 11, I922) I03 RGZ. 384; (March I, I927) I07 RGZ.
370; (May 24, I924) Io8 RGZ. I76 (overruled}.
Switzerland: Fed. Council (Jan. IS, I924) 20 SJZ. 309.
5 Publications Permanent Court ( I929) Series A, Nos. 2o/2I at 32; Clunet
I929, at 996.
6 Most decisions, it is true, wind up by declaring the clause invalidated by
the Joint Resolution of Congress.
England: Feist v. Societe Intercommunale Beige d'Electricite [ I9341 A. C.
I6I-H. L.; New Brunswick Ry. Co. v. British· and French Trust Corp.
[ I9391 A. c. I-H. L.
Austria: OGH. plenary decision of the "large senate" (Nov. 26, I93S)
Clunet I936, 442, 7I7; OGH. (June I, I937) 37 Bull. Inst. Int. (I937) 245·
Czechoslovakia: S. Ct. {Dec. IO, 1936) Prager Archiv I937, I067; (June
II, I937) id. I937, 2088.
Denmark: S. Ct. (June 2I and Oct. 6, 1933) Ugeskr. Retsv. I933, 703, 1028,
7 Z.ausl. PR. (I933) 960, 962.
Germany: RG. (May 28, I936) JW. I936, 2058.
The Netherlands: H. R. (March 13, I936) two decisions, W. I936 Nos. 280,
28I, 34 Bull. In st. Int. ( I936) 304, one of which, the Royal Dutch case, applies
Dutch Jaw, see infra n. 49·
Sweden: S. Ct. (Jan. 30, 1937) Scandia Ins. Co., Ltd. v. The Swedish
National Dept Off., 64 NJA. (1937) I, 11 Z.ausl.PR. (I937) 286.
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of or equal to the standard of weight and fineness extstmg
on September I, 1928," as though the clause ran thus: "pay
in sterling a sum equal to the value of 100 pounds if paid
in gold coin of the United Kingdom of or equal to the
standard, etc.m
Gold value clause (clause valeur-or, Goldwert-Klausel).
Earlier American contracts expressly provided for payment
alternatively of gold coins or of the amount in paper necessary to purchase the gold at the place of payment. 8 In
modern practice, the same result, thus reached directly, is
generally obtained by a promise to pay a quantity of money
determinable according to the value of gold coins of a certain currency: gold pounds, gold dollars, etc. These expressions and the implied meaning of gold coin clauses just
mentioned have dominated the documents of loans and insurance in recent decades. Hence, the often emphasized
difficulty of discerning the exact nature of a gold clause has
no longer any considerable practical importance.
Commonly the unit referred to in the first place belongs
to a certain currency, English pound, Argentine peso, etc.,
but during the German crisis of 1923 the clause was usually
based on a purely imaginary unit, the "gold mark," equal to
I0/42 United States dollars. It was held that this clause
was not linked with the American currency and that therefore after as well as before the devaluation in the United
States, it meant an obligation to pay a sum of German money
equivalent to the value of the original gold dollar. 9
Analogous decisions were rendered in other countries. 10
Feist Case, supra n. 6, per Lord Russell of Killowen, at 172.
NUSSBAUM, Money 307.
9 RG. (Dec. 14, 1934) 146 RGZ. x, 5; (July 5, 1935) 148 RGZ. 42, 44;
Clunet 1936, 412; cf. STOEBER, 52 Z.int.R. (1938) 240.
10 Belgium: PIRET, Les variations monetaires et leurs repercussions en droit
prive beige (1935) 256 ff.
Czechoslovakia: S. Ct. (Oct. zz, 1937) 4 Z.osteurop.R. (1938) 467.
Sweden: S. Ct. (April 27, 1935) 33 Bull. Inst. Int. (1935) 278.
Italy: App. Milano (July 19, 1934) 9 Z.ausi.PR. (1935) 201, but contra:
Cass. (Jan. 10, 1936) 34 Riv. Dir. Com. (1936) II 386.
7

8
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Gold bullion clause. The early protective clauses, as well
as recent attempts to avoid the dangers of money claims,
resorted to plain obligations to pay a quantity of fine gold.
In an American case of 1936, an ancient contract of long
term lease fixed the yearly rent at 55 7, 2 So grains of pure
unalloyed gold. The court held that this clause did not fall
within the Joint Resolution of June 5, 1933, since no reference was made to American currency. As delivery of gold
bullion was impossible, the equivalent in paper dollars was
awarded as damages. 11 The Supreme Court of the United
States, however, dealing with another lessee's promise to
pay "a quantity of gold which shall be equal to $1500 of
the gold coin of the United States, etc.," held the Joint
Resolution applicable on the ground that the contract intended the payment of money rather than the delivery of a
commodity. The lessor was a corporation which had nothing to do with gold transactions and wanted simply a safe
amount of money. 12 This decision, despite the difference in
the clauses, overrules the first case and leaves open, as mere
commodity obligations, only those stipulations of a quantity
of gold that treat gold as merchandise for industrial or
dental purposes, or presumably, those concluded between
gold dealers.
The French Code and several followers have recognized
loans given in bars (!ingots) as independent of money
changes. 13 Apart from this special and rare case, no authority
in Europe is known to treat the question. In the writer's
opinion, the Supreme Court of the United States has evidently found the right solution. 14

.

11
Joint Resolution of June 5, 1933,48 Stat. n2, 31 U.S. C.§ 463; Emery
Bird Thayer Dry Goods Co. v. Williams (D. C. W. D. Mo. 1936) 15 F. Supp.
938.
12
Mr. Justice Cardozo in Holyoke Water Power Co. v. American Writing
Paper Co. (1936) 300 U. S. 324, 336.
13
French C. C. art. 1896; Italian C. C. (1865) art. 1823, repealed in C. C.
(1942); Spanish C. C. art. 1754 (2); the Netherlands C. C. art. 1795.
14
See supra n. 12. Contra, as it seems, MANN, Money 55 n. 2 (i); M.
WoLFF, Priv. Int. Law 475 n. 2.
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Other clauses. Commodities such as wheat, rye, coal, and
kalium have temporarily been used as objects not susceptible
of devaluation by monetary depreciation. 15 More important
are the clauses establishing sliding prices. 16
3· Legislation against Protective Clauses
(a) Gold clauses of all kinds are destined to be swept
away in one way or another in time of crisis. In the wake
of the First World War and of the depression, gold coin
clauses not frustrated by the disappearance of gold succumbed, like the pure gold value clauses, to emergency
legislation in all but a few countries. 17 The exceptions include England, where it has been held that gold value
clauses are not affected by public policy ;18 and no statute
has affected their force. It is known, however, that gold
clauses are uncommon in England and therefore offer no
threat to the currency. Other countries in which devaluation did not affect gold clauses are Czechoslovakia19 and
Switzer land. 20
(b) French doctrine. 21 From the 18th century, the
15 On these expedients in Germany in the 192o's, particularly the rye
mortgage bonds, see NussBAUM, Vertraglicher Schutz etc., supra n. 3, 75·
Promises of lessees to pay the rent in grains have been held valid in France,
even by CAPITANT, D. H. 1926, Chronique 33, who was a rigorous advocate of
the nullity of protective clauses, and by NoGARO, Revue Trim. D. Civ. 1925,
5 at 8.
1 6 See NUSSBAUM, Money 406; DAWSON and COULTRAP, "Contracting by
Reference to Price Indices," 33 Mich. L. Rev. ( 1935) 685. HuBERT, "Observations sur Ia nature et Ia validite de Ia clause d'echelle mobile," 45 Revue
Trim. D. Civ. (1947) I (inclining to invalidity) and ToULEMON, "L'indiceor," I Revue Trim. D. Com. (1948) 364 (for validity).
17 For the other countries, see NussBAUM, "Comparative and International
Aspects of American Gold Clause Abrogation," 44 Yale L. J. (1935) 53, 6o,
61; MANN, Money III n. 7·
18 Feist Case, supra n. 6; cf. MANN, Money 109.
19 S. Ct. (Dec. 10, 1936) 4 Z.osteurop.R. (1937) 54; (June II, 1937) Prager
Archiv 1937, 2088.
20 GUISAN, 56 z. Schweiz. R. (N. F.) ( 1937) z6oa, 276a, 295a; BG. (Feb. I,
1938) 64 BGE. II 88, IOI.
21 MESTRE et }AMES, La clause-or en droit franc;ais (1926); SCHKAFF, La
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French writers protected the monetary maneuvers of the
kings by a theory that all stipulations evading prescriptions
of legal tender are void. When a Law of August I 2, I 870,
invested the notes of the Banque de France with cours ligal
and freed the bank of its obligation to cash the notes ( cours
force), the Court of Cassation held previous stipulations
for payment in gold or silver coins to be void, because they
would impair the "liberating effect of the paper money"
and thus conflict with the compulsory legal tender of the
paper bills. 22 During the continuous downward trend suffered
by the French franc after the First World War, this practice was maintained and fortified. In the whole range of
domestic contracts, clauses protecting the creditor against
the depreciation of the French currency are regularly declared ineffective.
This doctrine, however, has not been extended to "international payments," to be discussed with the international
scope of gold clause restrictions.
The French theory that a compulsory legal tender is
necessarily opposed to protective clauses, is not shared anywhere else. Its effect distinguishes the French law in the
twofold respect that, in the domestic field, gold clauses are
retroactively invalid without express legislative provision,
while, in the international field, their validity is maintained
without restriction.
B. FOREIGN MONEY DEBTS

Rules concerning the payment of debts expressed in terms
of foreign currency are of two categories. English courts
have developed rules of procedure tending to exclude awards
of foreign money; in the United States these rules have
generated effects in the field of substantive private law.
depreciation monetaire {ed. 2, 1926); CAPITANT, D. H. 1926, Chronique 33.
1927, Chronique I; NussBAUM, Money 335·
22 Cass. civ. (Feb. n, 1873) D. I873·I.I77.
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Continental codes have determined the extent to which a
party may modify a contractual promise to pay in foreign
money, in rules of a purely substantive character.
No consideration will be given here to emergency laws
which go so far as to annul contracts for payment in foreign
money, as for instance, the French Law of April q, 1942,
prohibiting resident individuals and juristic persons established in France from signing insurance contracts in foreign
money.
I.

Right to Conversion

If foreign coins or notes are bought, either in specific
pieces or as unascertained goods, they are a commodity.
But when foreign money is the object of a debt, it is not a
commodity, as was sometimes believed by American courts. 23
The obligation is "a monetary obligation couched in terms
of a foreign currency" 24
The debtor, however, in an old commercial tradition, 25
enjoys the option (facultas alternativa) of paying the debt
in equivalent units of the local currency in force at the place
of payment. 26 This rule has been elaborated in the Geneva
uniform laws on bills of exchange and on checks. 27
This unilateral privilege of the debtor, however, may
be waived by agreement of the parties, ordinarily expressed
by the clause of "effective" payment. 28
23 See Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Henwood (C. C. A. 8th 1938) 98 F.
(2d) x6o, 166; NussBAUM, Money 412.
24 German C. C. § 244; 106 RGZ. 77·
25 ScACCIA, Tractatus de commerciis et cambio (ed. 1669) § 2 gl. 5 Nos.
185, 188; L. GoLDSCHMIDT, Handbuch des Handelsrechts (1868) I I 53 n. 35;
AscARELLI in Riv. Dir. Com. 1923 I 447, and in his book, La Moneta 24.
26 E.g., Allg. Wechselordnung (1848) art. 37; German BGB. § 244;
Swiss C. Obi. art. 84 par. 2; Scandinavian Law of Bills of Exchange, of x88o,
art. 35· See the list of laws in F. MEYER, Weltwechselrecht 290; VIVANTE, 4
Trattato Dir. Com. § 1566 n. 106.
27 Treaty on Bills of Exchange, art. 41; on Checks, art. 36.
28 E.g., art. 41 sub III, supra n. 27; BGB. § 244 par. I cit.; "lending" of
foreign money implies a sufficient agreement, 153 RGZ. 385.
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Business conceptions in the United States agree with these
rules. 29
A great controversy, however, has often arisen with
respect to the date determining the rate of conversion from
the foreign into the domestic currency. In theory and in
practice in civil law countries the just view prevails: conversion must be made with reference to the time of actual
payment, in order to give the creditor the exact value of
his claim, no more and no less. 30 Unfortunately, the language
of the Geneva Uniform Law on negotiable instruments
points to the date of maturity. 31 An older laborious attempt
by the International Law Association to unify the views
on this question failed. 32
2.

Judicial Conversion 33

In contrast to most civil law courts, English and American courts do not allow themselves to order payment of
29 See the proposal of 'commissioners on Uniform State Laws, National
Conference Handbook ( 1933) 160.
30 Argentina: App. Buenos Aires Comm. (Oct. 15, 1924) 10 Revue Dor 72.
Austria: OGH. (April 25, 1922) 5 Rspr. 110, 295; (Feb. 27, 1934) id. 1934,
64.
Belgium: App. Bruxelles (June 8, 1921) Pasicrisie 1921.2.111.
Egypt: Mixed App. Alexandria (Jan. 8, 1930) 23 Revue Dor 279·
France: Cass. req. (Nov. 8, 1923) Clunet 1923, 576; civ. (Dec. 5, 1927) id.
1928, 66o; req. (March 19, 1930) id. 1931, 1082; civ. (July 8, 1931) id.
1932, 721, but contra, for the date of maturity, Cass. req. (Feb. 13, 1937)
Clunet 1937, 766. The latter solution with the additional damages for default
is advocated by HAMEL, 2 Banques 470.
Germany: RG. (Feb. 20, 1920) 98 RGZ. 16o; Plenary Ct. (Jan. 24, 1921)
101 RGZ. 312.
Italy: Cass. (July 27, 1939) Taccone v. Uff. Bottonieri, Dir. Int. 1940, 267.
Switzerland: BG. (June 27, 1918) 44 BGE. II 213; (May 23, 1928) 54
BGE. II 257; (Feb. 11, 1931) 57 BGE. II 69. When speaking of the date of
maturity, the court has awarded damages for debtor's default between
maturity and payment, see NuSSBAUM, Money 425 n. 14.
31 See German RG. (July 1, 1924) 108 RGZ. 337; (March 17, 1925) 110
RGZ. 295, commenting on the identical German provision.
32
Vienna Rules 1926, Report of the 34th Conference (1927) 543 If., 718 If.;
STOURM, 14 Revue Dor (1926) 52; 15 id. 18.
3 3 See McCoRMICK, Damages 190 and cited literature; Note, 40 Harv. L.
Rev. (1927) 619; also 2 BEALE 1341 If.
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foreign money. The date for determining the rate of
conversion into the domestic currency raises difficult questions. It has been settled by the House of Lords that damages in tort should be converted as of the date of wrong, 35
and a similar rule prevails with regard to damages for
breach of contract. 36 The case of a liquidated debt was
doubtful, 37 but has been decided as of the date when the
debt matured. 38
The Supreme Court of the United States has developed
this theory into a rule of substantive law by which an obligation expressed in foreign currency is converted ipso jure,
at the rate in effect on the day of breach or default of the
debtor, so as to give the creditor an optional right to be
paid in dollars. 39 This automatic transformation by American law, however, depends on the fact that the obligation
is governed by American law and, in the case in which it
was proclaimed, seems to have been grounded in addition
34

34 England: Manners v. Pearson & Son [ 1898] 1 Ch. 581, 587; Graumann
v. Treitel [ 1940] 2 All E. R. 188.
United States: Statute of April 2, 1792, c. 16 § 20, 1 Stat. 250, 31 U.S. C. A.
§ 371: " . . . all proceedings in the courts shall be kept and had" (in dollars).
Canada: Rev. Stat. 1927, c. 40 s. 15 (1).
35 Celia, S. S. v. The Volturno, S. S. [ 1921] 2 A. C. 544, 563 f. per Lord
Wrenbury, as interpreted in several cases, last, Ottoman Bank v. Chakarian
[ 1930] A. C. 277-P. C.
36 Di Ferdinanda v. Simon, Smits & Co. [ 1920] 2 K. B. 704, aff'd [ 1920]
3 K. B. 409-C. A.; Barry v. Van den Hurk [1920] 2 K. B. 709; Lebeaupin
v. Crispin and Co. [1920] 2 K. B. 714-C. A.; Madeleine Vionnet et Cie. v.
Wills [ 1940] 1 K. B. 72-C. A.; Privy Council in Ottoman Bank v. Chakarian,
supra n. 35·
Australia: McDonald v. Wells (1931) 45 Commw. L. R. 506-High Court
of Australia.
37 See the discussion by MANN, Money 291-302.
S 8 Lloyd Royal Beige v. Louis Dreyfus & Co. (1927) 27 Ll. L. Rep. 288;
Graumann v. Treitel [ 1940] 2 All E. R. 188; cf. ibid. editorial note;
CHESHIRE (ed. 3) 858 n. 3· Also for promissory notes and bills of exchange,
Salim Nasrallah Khoury v. Khayat [1943] A. C. 507.
Scotland: Macfie's Judicial Factor v. Macfie (1932) Scot. L. T. 460.
Canada: Simms v. Cherrenkoff ( 1921) 62 D. L. R. 703.
Australia: In re Tillam Boehme and Tickle Pty., Ltd. [1932] Viet. L. R. 146.
39 Mr. Justice Holmes in Hicks v. Guinness (1925) 269 U. S. 71, even in a
case of an account stated.
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on the fact that the place of payment was in the country.
In another case, where just to the contrary German law
governed and the debt was payable in Germany, Mr. Justice
Holmes, speaking for the majority, subjected the obligation to conversion only "at the moment when suit was
brought," or as this should be understood, at the date of the
judgment. 40 The courts of New York have a different
theory, 41 that under ordinary circumstances the rate on the
date of breach would control the effect of the breach on
foreign debts, but they admit exceptions in favor of the rate
of exchange at the time of the judgment. 42
The mystic power of territorial law in the theory of
Mr. Justice Holmes, the doubts and, above all, the hardships caused by,, all these premature conversions have been
sufficiently criticized. 43 It follows that calculation according
to the rate at the time of judgment is the lesser evil, so
long as no satisfactory machinery is found for leaving the
conversion to the enforcement officer or a supervisory court.
C. INTERNATIONAL BOND ISSUES

Numerous American bonds, like the shares of certain
American corporations, circulate all over the world, but
their legal characteristics are untouched by any foreign law.
Indeed, neither the fact that they are bought in mass and
quoted on foreign stock exchanges, 44 nor still less that a
4 0 Deutsche Bank Filiale Nurnberg v. Humphrey (1926} 272 U. S. 517;
see FRAENKEL, "Foreign Moneys in Domestic Courts," 35 Col. L. Rev. (1935)
360, 385.
41 Hoppe v. Russo-Asiatic Bank (1923) 235 N.Y. 37, 79, 138 N. E. 497;
Comptoir Commercial d'Importation v. Zabriskie (1926) 127 Misc. 461, 216
N. Y. Supp. 473, aff'd, 222 App. Div. 736, 225 N. Y. Supp. 8o8; Sokoloff. v.
National City Bank (1928) 250 N. Y. 69, 164 N. E. 745·
4 2 See FRAENKEL, supra n. 40, at 389. But see Transamerica General Corp.
v. Zunino (1948) 82 N. Y. Supp. (2d} 595, 604.
48 NussBAUM, Money 431; MANN, Money 306; M. WOLFF, Priv. Int. Law
470 § 447·
"On the contrary tendency of certain courts, see infra ns. 49, 91.
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loan is floated in a country other than that of the debtor, 45
alter the purely domestic character of the bonds. The normal
distinctive characteristic of an issue relevant for international consideration is the alternative fixation of the money
amount in two or more currencies, by a "multiple currency"
clause, at the option of the bondholder. Such clauses, however, are of different classes. Their two main types, known
under their French names, may be termed here option of
currency and option of collection.
1. Option of Currency (Option de Change)
In the typical international loan which is to be offered to
the capital markets of several countries, the sum of interest
and principal is fixed from the start in the currencies of all
participating places and payable, at the option of the holder,
at any of these places. Thus, the bonds and coupons of a
loan of the municipality of Vienna in 1902 expressed the
principal sum as 100 kronen-85 marks-105 francs-4.3
pounds sterling-20 dollars of the United States, in gold
coin. 46 Here there are several obligations, each independent
of the others, as alternative obligations are. Devaluation of
one or more of the currencies does not affect the right of the
creditor to ask payment at the place where the money has
full value. Although this clause is intended to induce the
prospective investors of a certain place by offering payment
also at this place, no restriction to the original subscribers
of this place or their successors is attached, because the
bonds are also intended to be negotiated throughout the
world. This makes it possible for all holders to claim the
sum at the place of least devaluation.
45 In discussions of the International Law Association on suretyship for
international loans, the reporter, B. VAN NIEROP, contended that just this
was the criterion of an international loan, 40th Report (1938) 192, also
Nouv. Revue 1940, 368. This view may be exact from a purely financial
point of view, but is misleading in legal respects.
46 u6 RGZ. 196, 208.
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The loan, in fact, despite the currency option is "indivisible, " 41 granting every holder exactly the same rights.
Whether the Joint Resolution of the United States Congress, of June 5, 1933, affected multiple currency clauses,
is controversiaU8
2. Option of Collection (Option de Place)
The American loans of the 1920's to European corporations usually contained a clause that both principal and
interest of the bonds as well as any premium on the principal
shall, in addition to being payable in Manhattan, also be
collectible at the option of the holders, at the city office
of a New York bank in London, and at certain indicated
banks in Amsterdam, Zurich, Stockholm, etc., in each case at
the then current buying rate of the respective banks for sight
exchange on New York. This means that the amounts are
not only primarily expressed in, but based on, the American
currency, which is ,,therefore decisive in all future events.
The holder has the choice of several places for his convenience, to obtain substantially the same value at all times.
This situation has been universally recognized with respect
to many loan issues 49 despite numerous objections drawn
from forced interpretation of stipulations or code provisions, or from an ambiguous wording of certain contracts. 5°
47
United States: McAdoo v. Southern Pacific Co. (D. C. N. D. Cal. 1935)
10 F. Supp. 953·
Austria: OGH. (June 1, 1937) 37 Bull. Inst. Int. (1937) 245·
France: Cass. civ. (June 19, 1933) Clunet 1934, 939· To the same effect:
Germany: RG. (July r, 1926) JW. 1926, 2675; (Dec. 22, 1927) 27
Bankarchiv 162.
Switzerland: BG. (May 23, 1928) 54 BGE. II 257, Clunet 1929, 497·
48 See cases infra ns. 104-108.
49 Publications Permanent Court (1929) Series A, Nos. 20/21 at 35; App.
Haag (Jan. 14, 1935) N. J. 1935, II9.
Belgium: App. Bruxelles (Feb. 4, 1936) Pasicrisie 1936 II 52, 54·
France: Cass. (Feb. 24, 1938) Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (1938) 323.
Italy: App. Napoli (Feb. 21, 1936) Foro Ita!. 1936 I 498.
The Netherlands: H. R. (March 13, 1936) N. ]. and W. 1936, No. 280,
34 Bull. Inst. Int. ( 1936) 304 (Royal Dutch case).
50 The ambiguous formulations would fill a voluminous chapter. See
NussBAUM, Money 454, 455 ff.; MANN, Money 138, 140 ff.
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But a few courts have, indeed, incorrectly attempted to
help creditors evade the American Joint Resolution by contending that any place of issue suffices to subject the debt
to the locallaw. 51
The character of the option of collection, just explained,
is not only certain if the bonds are issued at one place, but
also in case the bonds are issued in several countries when
an identical external form of the bonds is employed. 52 Even
though several utranches" (divisions of the issue) may be
formed, the languages being different, the collection clause
exclusively decides the rate and therefore the content of the
obligation. Such view alone, "giving deciding weight to the
wording of the clause, conforms to the significance of bonds
as incorporating rights and to the needs of international
intercourse.' ' 58
II.

CoNFLICT OF LAws
A. LEX PECUNIAE

By indicating the currency of a state, the parties refer,
or the law refers, to the legal prescription defining certain
units of measurement. What a French franc is, is decided
at any time according to the French legal provisions then
in force, that is, under the principle of nominalism, those of
the numerous French currency laws which are in force at
the time of the payment or judgment respectively, including
the provisions determining legal tender. 54
51

Infra ns. 85, 90, 91.
This refutes the main defense argument based on the nationality of the
holder. See the convincing reasoning of the Plenary Opinion of the Austrian
Supreme Court (1935) 9 Z.ausi.PR. (1935) 899.
58
RG. (July x, 1926} JW. 1926, 2675; (Dec. 22, 1927) 27 Bankarchiv 162,
against former decisions; see RABEL, xo Z.ausi.PR. ( 1936} 505.
54 Great Britain: Ottoman Bank of Nicosia v. Chakarian [ 1938] A. C. 26o,
270, per Lord Wrlght-P. C.
Canada, Ontario: Derwa v. Rio de Janeiro Tramway, Light & Power Co.
[ 1928] 4 D. L. R. 542.
Czechoslovakia: S. Ct. (Jan. 19, 1934) (Dec. 12, 1934) xo Z.ausi.PR. (1936)
172.
52
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This reference, however, indicates the only importance
of the foreign currency laws as such. Even provisions on
legal tender do not affect the obligation except by the fact
that they are a part of the law governing the mode of
performance.
A contrary theory, establishing a veritable "law of
currency" ( W ahrungsstatut), i.e., a conflicts rule providing
that the fate of an obligation should be decided by the
changes of the monetary system referred to, has been suggested.55 The discussion of this problem took place with particular respect to revalorization (see infra B 3).
B. LEX CONTRACTUS

The copious discussion of the law governing money debts
and notably bonds, has developed a wholesome unifying
tendency, in ascribing to one law the great bulk of problems. What local connection serves to determine this law,
depends on the nature of the contract-which would seem
trite if it were not forgotten all too often. 56 As shown
before, in the case of bonds, this is the law of the country
of the financing institution and the principal market. We
are thereby enabled to deal shortly with a variety of subjects
to which the principle ought to extend.
1.

Content of Debt

Currency in which the debt is payable. 51 Whether a clause
is meant as option of place of payment or only as option of
collection, and what amount of money .is uin obligatione"
55 Theory

of NEUMEYER and NussBAUM, see infra n. 65.
Even a recent book by GUTZWILLER, Der Geltungsbereich der Wahrungsvorschriften (Freiburg 1940) 92 ff. looks for a law applicable to "obligations
expressed in a determinate currency" (p. 103) without distinguishing the
nature of the contracts. He believes that "currency debts" do not show a
lex causae in numerous cases (p. 107). This makes for more uncertainty
(pp. 107 ff.) than is conceded in the present book.
67 RG. (July 13, 1929) Leipz. Z. 1930, 306, cf. MELCHIOR 281, 284.
56

SPECIAL OBLIGATIONS

34

(money of account, monnaie de compte) depends on the
law of the contract. 58 What constitutes payment sufficient to
discharge the obligation is an almost identical question and
is certainly not to be decided under any other law. 59 English
cases, after hesitation, have taken the same view when after
accord and satisfaction, the question was whether an offer
for nonliquidated damages has a basis in a still-existing
obligation. 60 Also the faculty to deposit the sum due with
the court follows the governing law. 61
2.

Default

The qualification and effect of default is governed by
the same law. This extends to the question whether damages
on the ground of default are awarded in excess of interest;
whether damages are granted because of a loss through
devaluation of the currency in which the obligation is expressed j 62 how unliquidated damages are to be measured ;63
and whether rescission may be based on the diminution
of the purchasing power of the money equivalent.
3. Revalorization
Evidently, the law of the contract also governs the question whether a subsequent statute or judicial equity adjusts
depreciated money debts. 64 In a contrary isolated opinion,
MELCHIOR 277 ff.; MANN, Money 13 8; BATIFFOL, Traite 623 n. 3·
DICEY (ed. 5) 678; CHESHIRE 281, but incorrectly at 660 (lex fori), in
ed. 3, 353, 857.
60 Ralli v. Dennistoun (1851) 6 Exch. 483, 155 Eng. Rf. 633. Not contrary,
Lord Maugh in The Baarn [ 1934] P. 171, 185-C. A.; see MANN, Money 254.
61 United States: Zimmermann v. Sutherland (1927) 274 U. S. 253· Probably to the same effect, The Baarn [1933] P. 251-C. A.
6 2 United States: Transamerica General Corp. v. Zunino (1948) 82 N.Y.
Supp. (2d) 595, 604.
England: Scrutton, L. J., in Societe des Hotels Le Touquet Paris-PI age v.
Cummings [1922] 1 K. B. 451, 461.
Germany: RG. (Jan. 8, 1930) IPRspr. 1930 No. 48 and others.
63 MANN, Money 201, 215; contra: CHESHIRE 66o (lex fori), 857 in ed. 3·
64 Prevailing opinion adopted by the courts in:
England: Anderson v. Equitable Assurance Society of the United States
58

59
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the law of the currency rather than that of the obligation
applies. 65 Hence, French rules would decide against any
revaluation of a debt couched in French francs, although the
debt arises from a German contract and its amount under
the German rules is transformed into certain percentages
of the new currency. An English debt of German marks
would have to be revalorized in American courts. The currency, however, in which a debt is expressed, has nothing
to do with the equitable increase of the debt to a higher
content.
4· Gold Clause
The law applicable to the obligation in general naturally
determines the existence and construction of a gold clause ;66
its character as a gold coin or gold value clause ;67 and the
legislative measur~s upholding or impairing the clause. 68
(1926) 134 L. T. R. 557, 565, 566-C. A.; see also Re Schnapper [19361
All E. R. 322, cf. MANN, Money 205 ff.
Austria: OGH. (Sept. II, 1929) JW. 1929, 3519, Clunet 1930, 750; (March
12, 1930) JW. 1930, 2480, Clunet 1931, 196 (Austrian law on mark debts);
(April 24, 1927) JW. 1927, 1899 (German law on a German debt).
Czechoslovakia: S. Ct. (Nov. II, 1924) JW. 1925, 574; (Jan. 19 and Dec.
16, 1934) 10 Z.ausl.PR. (1936) 172.
Germany: II9 RGZ. 259, 264; 120 id. 70, 76; 121 id. 337; see MELCHIOR
294 and constant practice. The currency reform in the Western Zone of
Germany has raised new questions; on the municipal problems, see VON
CAEMMERER, 3 Siidd. }ur. Zeitg. (1948) 497·
The Netherlands: See 6 Z.ausl.PR. (1932) 856; H.R. (Jan. 2, 1931) W.
12259·
Sweden: S. Ct. (May 27, 1930) Nytt Jur. Ark. 1930, 507; (Oct. r6, 1930)
id. 513, as cited in MICHAEL! 321 f.
Switzerland: 51 BGE. II 303; 53 id. II 76; and constant practice.
65 RG. (March 5, 1928) 120 RGZ. 277, 279; (Feb. 9, 1931) JW. 1932, 583;
NEUMEYER, I Int. Verwaltungs R. III 368 ff.; NUSSBAUM, D. IPR. 254·
Contra: ScHLEGELBERGER, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (1929) 869 and the overwhelming
majority of German writers.
66 England: St. Pierre v. South American Stores ( Gath & Chaves) Ltd.
[19371 3 All E. R. 349, 352, 354-C. A.
67 Denmark: S. Ct. (Dec. 13, 1934) 9 Z.ausl.PR. (1935) 280.
Finland: Helsingfors (Dec. 23, 1937) 38 Bull. Inst. Int. (1938) 280.
68 England: International Trustee for the Protection of Bondholders A. G.
v. The King [19361 3 All E. R. 407; [19371 A. C. 505 (Lord Wright's judgment), reversed on other grounds, H. L. [19371 A. C. 500.
I
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The last-mentioned application gave an excellent method
for treating the very numerous intra-European transactions
in which gold dollars were promised merely for the reason
that the American currency appeared the most constant
measure of value, without any thought of submitting to
American law. In these cases, the American Joint Resolution was correctly discarded. 69 In other categories of cases,
however, the application of the general law of the contract
has encountered various obstacles, particularly in the extraordinarily wide repercussions of the Joint Resolution.
The international scope of the Joint Resolution. The
Congressional Act of June 5, 1933, was evidently intended
for the broadest conceivable application. According to its
text, it extends to all gold clauses attached to obligations
payable in money of the United States; no mention is made
of the law governing the debt, nor is a domestic place of
paymene 0 or a domestic domicil of the parties required.
This wide scope has been recognized by the courts. 71
Canada, Ontario: Derwa v. Rio de Janeiro Tramway, Light & Power Co.
[1928] 4 D. L. R. 542.
Austria: OGH. {Sept. II, 1929) Rspr. No. 332; {July 8, 1935) Rspr. No.
164; (Dec. 5, 1935) Clunet 1937, 127; {June x, 1937) 37 Bull. Inst. Int.
(1937) 245. Opinion (Nov. 26, 1935) Clunet 1936, 442, 717.
Denmark: See decisions supra Ch. 34 n. 49, and this Ch. n. 67.
Egypt: App. Mix. Alexandria (Feb. 18, 1936) D. 1936.2.78.
Germany: RG. {Oct. 6, 1933) JW. 1933, 2583.
Italy: Trib. Torino {July 7, 1934) Foro Ita!. I934.I.I351; App. Napoli
{Feb. 21, 1936) Foro Ita!. 1936.1.498.
Norway: S. Ct. (Dec. 8, 1937) 38 Bull. Inst. Int. (1938) 71, Revue de
sciences et de legislation financiere 1937, 646.
The Netherlands: H. R. (March 13, 1936) Case of Bataafsche Petroleum
Co., N. ]. 1936, 506.
Sweden: S. Ct. {Jan. 30, 1937) 36 Bull. Inst. Int. (1937) 327, II Z.ausl.PR.
( 1937) 286. ENGLISH in 3 Guldklausulmiilet {Stockholm 1937) 130.
69 Czechoslovakia: S. Ct. {Oct. 22, 1937) 4 Z.osteurop. R. (1938) 467: the
clause serving only to protect against a devaluation of the Czecho-crown
does not justify the payment of a reduced amount in Kc in case of a dollar
decline.
Germany: Cf. supra n. 9 on "goldmark" clauses.
10 But see the obiter dictum by Learned Hand, ]., in Anglo-Continentale
Treuhand, A. G. v. St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co. (C. C. A. zd 1936) 81 F. {zd} u.
71 Campania de Inversiones Internacionales v. Industrial Mortgage Bank
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Attempts repeatedly made in foreign courts to claim the
full gold value of a debt on the ground that the Joint Resolution was not meant to cover bonds issued or payable in
a foreign country, were futile. 72
It would seem that Congress, without considering the
problem closely, intended to give the Act the largest possible
territorial scope, without, however, wishing to transcend
the traditional limits of sovereignty. 73 In fact, no such transgression has been committed in judicial decisions. In the
outstanding New York case of a loan between foreign
parties, where the court declared the broad domain of the
Resolution, the loan had been floated and the bonds were
payable in New York; it was expressly stated that the law
of New York governed the obligation. 74
Another unfounded attempt has sometimes been made
to bar the Joint Resolution from the applicable American
law because the parties did not contemplate the possibility
that the apparently safest currency of the world would be
depreciated by such an extraordinary measure, and their
intention therefore was restricted to the American law
previous to the Resolution. But since the parties definitely
excluded the European laws as unreliable, they could not
limit the American law to certain cases and leave the others
without applicable law. 75
Exceptional statutes. In two countries, gold clauses have
been invalidated if the law of the currency so stated. 76 A
of Finland (1935) 269 N. Y. 22, 198 N. E. 617, cert. denied, 297 U. S. 705.
Notes, 45 Yale L. J. (1936) 723, 34 Mich. L. Rev. (1936) 726.
72 Such arguments have been rejected in Germany, OLG. Dusseldorf (Sept.
26, 1934) IPRspr. 1934 No. 93 (b); RG. (May 28, 1936) JW. 1936, 2058.
7 3 RABEL, 10 Z.ausl.PR. (1936) at 507.
74 Supra n. 71.
7 5 RABEL, 10 Z.ausl.PR. (1936) at 509; for English dicta, see MANN, Money
228. Cf. Vol. II p. 393·
76 Austria: Law of April 4, 1934, II Z.ausl.PR. (1937) 267, Clunet 1937,
643, cf. KOESSLER, id. 496.
Poland: Law of June 12, 1934, 1 Z.osteurop.R. (1935) 499; 2 id. 439·
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National Socialist German law even declared that all bonds
issued abroad for sums expressed in a foreign currency,
should be devaluated according to the devaluation of the
foreign currency, irrespective of a gold clause attached. 77
The German state thus undertook to invalidate a gold clause
valid under all foreign laws involved, merely because a
domestic court was seized of the matter. The law was a
countermove against a questionable judgment of the Reichsgericht excluding the application of the Joint Resolution to
American bonds circulating in Germany, on the ground of
alleged National Socialist principles, 78 but is itself guilty of
an outrage. It has rightly been refused recognition in
Switzerland. 79
French doctrine of international payment. Despite the
practice of considering gold clauses void as offending the
cours force of French bank notes, the French Supreme Court
in 1920 held the New York Life Insurance Company bound
to the contractual gold value promised in an insurance policy
to a Frenchman. The cours force based on French national
interest should not prevent the importation of gold from a
foreign debtor into France. 80 The courts subsequently have
elaborated a doctrine of "international payment," which is
two-sided so as to obligate also a French debtor to a foreign
creditor, at least in theory. An international payment has
been defined as a double transfer of funds between France
and a foreign country; the contract must "produce, as a
movement of flux and reflux across the frontiers, reciprocal
consequences in either country." 81 The Court of Cassation
77 Law on Foreign Currency Bonds, of June 26, 1936, RGBI. I 575 and
Decree of Dec. 5, 1936, RGBJ. I 1oxo; 10 Z.ausi.PR. (1936) 391, 666. This
law is also technically defective.
78 RG. (May 28, 1936) JW. 1936, 2058, see infra n. 89.
79 BG. (Feb. r, 1938) 64 BGE. II 88.
8 Cass. req. (June 7, 1920) D. 1920.1.237, S. 1920.1.193, Clunet 1920, 654,
Revue 1921, 452.
81 Att. Gen. Paul Matter, opinion in Cass. civ. (May 17, 1927) D. 1928.1.25,
S. 1927.1.289, Clunet 1931, 6, commonly quoted. Cf. MAITER in Etudes de
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considers "the nature and elements of an operation" rather
than the place of payment, or the domicil of the parties,
and inquires whether the scope of domestic economy is surpassed82 The currency laws have expressly recognized gold
and similar clauses in such cases. 83 The validity of the clauses
concerning the money of account, thus, does not depend on
the law governing the debt. 84
Law of place of payment. In many foreign courts, among
other attempts to bar the application of the Joint Resolution, creditors contended that the question belonged not to
the law governing the contract but to the law of the place
of payment as governing the mode of performance. In the
meaning of the Restatement it would even be categorized
as a problem of discharge of the obligation, and therefore
be subject to the lex loci solutionis ( § 35 8 d).
The courts, in general, have resisted this theory. Among
inconclusive except~ons, the English Court of Appeals has
enforced a Canadian mortgage bond, payable in London in
sterling gold coin of Great Britain, despite the abrogation
of gold clauses by the Canadian Gold Clauses Act, 1937. 85
Although the justices relied on the lex loci solutionis for
the "mode" of payment, their opinions were probably
more influenced by the text of the clause in the contract at
bar, which could be read as entitling the bearer to British,
in contrast to Canadian, money, if ever there should be a
difference. This would amount to a partial reference of the
parties to a special law, a construction occurring also elsewhere ;86 but it is a forced construction. The House of Lords
droit civil a Ia memoire de Henri Capitant (I939) I, 4 ff., also in Nouv.
Revue I943, 209.
82
Cass. civ. (Feb. I4, I934) D. I934·I.73·78, S. I934·I.297·
83
Stabilization Law of July 25, I928; Monetary Law of Oct. I, I936 and
Feb. I8, I937·
84 BATIFFOL, Traite 624.
85
British and French Trust Corp. v. New Brunswick Ry. Co. [I937] 4 All
E. R. 516, Note in I8 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (I937) 220.
86 Austria: See decisions in 9 Z.ausi.PR. ( I935) 89I, 897; IO id. 68o; II
id. 269.
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avoided the problem, but Lord Romer approved the wrong
theory. 87
The judgments of the Permanent Court of International
Justice in the cases of the Serbian and Brazilian loans 88
stressed somewhat the place of payment, but in reality
applied the law governing the loans which was identified
with that of the borrowing government. 89 This view follows
tradition but does not satisfy modern needs.
Public policy (situs of the bond). In the above-mentioned
lawsuit which attracted great attention in Germany, the
Reichsgericht decided that the American Joint Resolution
did not apply to such American-governed bonds as were in
German circulation at the time when the Act came into
force. 90 This decision, if it had remained in effect, would
have caused an impracticable discrimination and violated
the equality of the holders of bonds belonging to the same
issue. The German government's repudiation of the decision
was justified, although as noted above the repudiation decree
itself was highly objectionable.
Public policy (place of collection). The Dutch Supreme
Court, too, resorted to public policy when it denied effect
to the Joint Resolution with respect to bonds of the Royal
Dutch Company which showed a promise "to pay" in New
York and the promise of "collectibility" in Amsterdam at
the dollar rate of exchange, the suit seeking to recover
florins in Amsterdam. 91 The court maintained its view even
87

New Brunswick Ry. Co. v. British and French Trust Corp. [1939]
I, 43 f., criticized by CHESHIRE (ed. 3) 345·
8 8 Publications Permanent Court ( 1929) Series A, Nos. 20/21.
89 Correctly so, MANN, Money 224.
90 RG. (May 28, 1936) Kreissparkasse Aachen v. Deutscher Sparkassen &
Giroverband, ]W. 1936, 2058, Clunet 1936, 951; 10 Z.ausl.PR. (1936) 385
(suppressed in the official collection) overruling OLG. Dusseldorf (Sept. 26,
1934) IPRspr. 1934, 300, 302; OLG. Koln (Sept. 13, 1935) ]W. 1936, 203, 204.
An opinion by EDUARD WAHL which seems to have influenced the decision is
published in 9 Z.int.R. ( 1935) 779·
91 H. R. (March 13, 1936) N. ]. and W. 1936 No. 280, 34 Bull. Inst. Int.
(1936) 304.
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after the Netherlands had legislated against gold clauses. 92
The courts of other countries have rejected specious
arguments of such kind. 93 Neither the physical presence of
a bond instrument in a country nor the mere facility of
collection are sufficient contacts for the use of the public
policy doctrine, which, moreover, should be excluded when
the devaluation is due to a currency reform for assumedly
cogent reasons and carried out without discriminating
against foreign creditors. 94 It is inconsistent with the very
nature of international loans that any material differences
should be made between the holders of identically shaped
instruments. No sound public policy is served by disturbing
this necessary machinery.
C. SCOPE OF LEX LOCI SOLUTIONIS

On the strength of the settled special rule that the law
of the place of .performance governs the "mode" of performance, that law decides what money is legal tender. It
is also reasonable to include the question whether, in the
absence of a party agreement, the debtor of foreign money
may, at his option, pay in the currency of the place where
the obligation is to be discharged. This is a recognized rule
92
Cf. Dutch Law of June 24, 1938; H. R. (April 28, 1939) W. 1939, No.
895, French tr., 41 Bull. Inst. Int. (1939) 291 (Canadian law, but Canadian
Gold Clauses Act, 1937, criticized as too restricting); H. R. (May 26, 1939)
W. 1939 No. 896, German tr., 41 Bull. Inst. Int. (1939) 90 (Osram loan,
under German law; but gold clause prohibition, the law of 1936 on foreign
currency restriction, and the currency transfer r~strictions are against Dutch
public order).
93 Austria: OGH. {Nov. 26, 1935) 9 Z.ausl.PR. (1935) 891, 897; (July 10,
1936) Rspr. 1936, II4·
Belgium: App. Bruxelles {Feb. 4, 1936) S. 1937·4·1; aff'd, Cass. (Feb. 24,
1938) 64 Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (1938) 323.
Sweden: S. Ct. (Jan. go, 1937) 36 Bull. lnst. Int. (1937) 327,18 Brit. Year
Book Int. Law (1937) 215, 217; cf. the report by MICHAELI gos-gn.
Switzerland: BG. {Sept. 26, 1933) 59 BGE. II at 360; BG. (July 7, 1942)
68 BGE. II 203, also in 1 Schweiz. Jahrb. I. R. (1944) 168.
94 This is the prevailing opinion of German writers, cf. MANN, Money
232 ff., but see NussBAUM, Money 393, regarding the Royal Dutch case as
"not arbitrary."
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m Switzerland95 and, with certain doubts, m Germany. 96
It is included in the numerous, often too broad, French
references to "the mode of payment, particularly the
money." 91 It also seems to lie within the theory of the
English cases. 98 Finally, the Restatement with reason refers
the question of which of several debts payable in the same
state should be deemed discharged by a payment, to the
law of that state. 99
The same, however, cannot be said of the next question,
whether the parties may agree on effective payment in
foreign money, nor of all other questions determining the
quid rather than the quo modo of the obligation. The law
of the place of payment should only come in, if at all, on
the ground of public policy.
The adequate scope of lex loci solutionis has so far been
discussed critically by only a few writers. 100 A special point
has found more attention. During the long periods when
95 Switzerland: C. Obi. art. 84, speaking of money not being legal tender
at the place of payment.
96 Germany: BGB. § 244 par. 2, providing that the debtor can pay in
domestic currency if the place of payment is in Germany, contains a concealed conflicts rule, as the literature recognizes. For the literature, see
MELCHIOR 287 n. 1. This conflicts rule should be construed as characterizing
the question as one of the mode of payment. See NussBAUM, D. IPR. 259·
But the rule has been said to yield to any foreign law of the contract
(ENNECCERUS, Recht der Schuldverhaltnisse (ed. 1927) § 231 p. 21 n. 4) or
to the foreign law of the contract, if the place of payment is outside Germany
(M. WOLFF, IPR. 97) or, on the contrary, to belong to public policy
(MELCHIOR 285 § 190). The Reichsgericht, which seemed to adopt the normal
rule (Sept. 29, 1919) 96 RGZ. 270, 272, strangely deviated in the Plenary
Meeting of the Civil Chambers of Jan. 24, 1921, 101 RGZ. 312, 316, where
the place at which the payment is made rather than that in which the payment
is due is regarded as decisive, following the isolated view of NEUMEYER, 3
Int. Verwaltungs R. II 318.
97 WEISS, 4 Traite 397; RADOUANT in Planiol et Ripert, 7 Traite Pratique
526 § II93 and n. 2; 2 ARMIN JON § 132; BATIFFOL, Traite 623 n. I.
98 See infra n. wo.
99 Restatement § 368. This rule has been extended to the apportionment of
income as between successive life beneficiaries, in Safe Deposit and Trust Co.
of Baltimore v. Woodbridge (1945) 184 Md. 56o, 42 At!. (2d) 231, 159
A. L. R. 580, criticized by HENDERSON, J., ibid. dissenting.
lOO MELCHIOR 277 ff.; WEIGERT, supra ns. I, 2, 20; MANN, Money 169-179,
249-251.

SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF MONEY OBLIGATIONS 43
sterling currency indiscriminately obtained in the British
Commonwealth and the Latin Monetary Union dominated
many countries, contractual obligations of money were often
expressed simply in pounds or francs. How to construe
stipulations couched in pounds after these had been devaluated to different levels in the various territories, was
an issue in several decisions of the House of Lords and the
Privy Council. The decisions were of uncertain argument
and difficult to reconcile with each other. 101 They made it at
least certain, however, that on one hand the local money
at the place of payment was decisive, but on the other, that
this was a special function of the lex loci solutionis, the use
of which had to serve only a restricted purpose.
Where payment in "francs" and "dollars" becomes an
ambiguous indication, courts have often referred to the
currency of the place of payment. 102 But equitable considerations have also led to judgments awarding a creditor payment only in his own lower currency/ 03 or a specification was
inferred from premium payments in insurance contracts. 104
D. OPTION OF CURRENCY

An option de change granting the creditor choice of the
currency in which he may recover a sum fixed in the con101
Adelaide Electric Supply Co. v. Prudential Assurance Co. [1934] A. C.
IZZ, I5I-H. L. (the law of the place of performance should regulate the

discharge of the contract by performance) ; Auckland Corporation v. Alliance
Assurance Co. [1937] A. C. 587-P. C. (bonds made payable by option of
the holder in London, English pounds payable); Mount Albert Borough
Council v. Australasian Temperance & General Mutual Life Assurance Soc.,
Ltd. (I937) [I938] A. C. 224-P. C. (bonds considered as governed by New
Zealand law; the statute of Victoria reducing interests is inapplicable).
102 Canada, Saskatchewan: Simms v. Cherrenkoff ( 1921) 6z D. L. R. 703.
Quebec: La Corporation des Obligations Municipales Lim. v. La Ville de
Montreal Nord (Super. Ct. 1921) 59 Que. S. C. 550.
France: Cass. req. (Mar. I, I9Z6) Clunet 1926, 66I; (April IS, 1926) Clunet
1926, 970.
Switzerland: BG. (May 23, 1928) 54 BGE. II 257.
1 03 Canada, Alberta: Sheppard v. First International Bank of Sweet Grass
[1924] I D. L. R. 582.
104 See the list of cases, NussBAUM, Money 440 n. 10.
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tract, such as one pound sterling or five United States
dollars, constitutes a promise independent of the factual
relation of the currencies involved at the time of suit. Each
alternative right remains unaffected if all other currencies
are devaluated or the protective clauses with regard to them
are abrogated by the laws of the countries to which the
currencies belong. This view rests, of course, on the law
governing the contract inasmuch as it sanctions the intention of the parties. This, however, does not answer all
doubts.
In the United States, it has been held that on a bond
payable in dollars in New York or guilders in Amsterdam
a bondholder of any nationality, including that of the United
States, is entitled to sue for the full value of guilders payable in Amsterdam, irrespective of the existing prohibition
to sue for gold dollars payable at any place. 105 However,
subsequently another federal circuit court with reference to
the same loan decreed that dollars could not be demanded
for the value in guilders/ 06 Opinions were divided also on
the occasion of another loan. 107 The Supreme Court of the
United States took the more rigorous stand. 108 In its appraisal, promises in alternate currency were not separate
and independent contracts or obligations, but were parts of
1 05 Anglo-Continental Treuhand A. G. v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co.
(C. C. A. 2d 1936) 81 F. (zd) n, by Judge Learned Hand, cert. denied, 298
u.s. 655·
Analogous, for restrictive interpretation of the Belgian decree and law on
gold clauses as an exorbitant measure, Belgium: Trib. civ. Bruxelles (April
7, 1936) 35 Bull. Inst. Int. (1936) 130; Trib. com. Bruxelles (Dec. 17, 1936)
36 iJ. (I 937) 299·
106 Guaranty Trust Co. of N. Y. v. Henwood (C. C. A. 8th 1938) 98 F.
(2d) 160.
107 The judgment of Learned Hand, J., was followed in Zurich Gen. Ace. &
Liability Ins. Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co. (1939) 279 N.Y. 495, 18 N. E. (2d)
673; Anglo-Continentale Treuhand A. G. v. Bethlehem Steel Co. (1939)
279 N. Y. 790, 19 N. E. (2d) 89; contra: City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v.
Bethlehem Steel Co. ( 1935) 244 App.Div. 634, 280 N. Y. Supp. 494·
108 Guaranty Trust Co. v. Henwood ( 1939) 307 U. S. 247; Bethlehem Steel
Co. v. Zurich General Accident & Liability Ins. Co. and Anglo-Continentale
Treuhand A. G. (1939) 307 U. S. 265.
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one and the same monetary obligation of the debtor "which
was under American law and fell within the terms of the
Joint Resolution: 'obligations payable in money of the
United States.'" This decision may be regarded as an unwarranted extension of the Joint Resolution which does not
mention foreign currency debts. 109 In any case, the Court
ignored the faculty of the parties to stipulate in a contract
governed by American law obligations subject to a special
law.
In fact, foreign courts have taken a different view of such
clauses. The problem, of course, is directly concerned with
the amount of the debt. It would be a mistake to include
the right in question in the domain of modalities of payment belonging to the law of the place of performance.
Nevertheless, the f.ermer German Commercial Supreme
Court and the Reichsgericht have entertained a theory that
the contract with its alternative currency clause submits the
obligation conditionally to the law of the place the creditor
should select for presenting his bond for payment. 110 In the
case of the Viennese Investment Loan, the Reichsgericht
held Austrian law to govern the debt but Swiss law to govern
the payment in Swiss francs in Zurich so as to discard an
Austrian legislative act authorizing the city of Vienna to
pay exclusively in valueless Austrian crowns. 111 Similar constructions have been adopted in other countries. 112 Some
related arguments have also been used by the Permanent
supra n. I, at 33·
24 ROHGE. 388; RGZ.: I, 59. 61; 5. 254; IOO, 79; 126,196.
111 RG. (Nov. 14, 1929) 126 RGZ. 196; considered representing German
law in Pan-American Securities Corp. v. Fried. Krupp A. G. (1938) 6 N. Y.
Supp. (2d) 993·
112 Canada, Quebec: La Corporation des Obligations Municipales Limitee
v. La Ville de Montreal Nord (Super. Ct. 1921) 59 Que. S. C. 550.
Switzerland: BG. (May 23, I928) 54 BGE. II 257, Clunet 1929, 497·
In France, a similar decision was wrongly rendered in a case of option
of place, Trib. civ. Seine (Nov. 16, 1938) Mouren et Comite de Ia Bourse
d'Amsterdam v. Soc. des Services Contractuels des Messageries Maritimes,
Gaz. Pal 1938 II 728, 40 Bull. Inst. Int. (1939) 98.
109 WEIGERT,
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Court of International Justice and the English Court of
Appeals. 113
This reasoning has been acutely criticizedY 4 However,
all these cases point to the intention of the parties. The
problem may demonstrate the opportunity of recognizing
an appropriate sphere, not of the law of the place of performance, but of the choice of law by the parties. It seems
a sound case for conceding that the parties may agree on
the applicable law under condition subsequent. A multilateral currency clause constitutes the right to recover a
money value despite depreciation of the other currencies
and should not be frustrated by subsequent statutes of the
states controlling these currencies. Judge Learned Hand's
opinion mentioned above 115 is entirely agreeable to this
construction. We might submit, therefore, that a genuine
multiple currency clause includes an implied choice of law
under the condition of its exercise. This small corner of
refuge in the international field ought to be left to the
victims of the governmental money manipulators.
E. MORATORIUM AND EXCHANGE RESTRICTIONS

(a) M oratorium. 116 Moratorium is a temporary statutory postponement, for all debts, or those of a certain kind,
of the date when payment is due. Such exceptional deferment may be so short that its effect can be assimilated to
the "terms of grace" of the law merchant, traditionally
113 Publications Permanent Court (1929) Judgment No. 14, Series A, Nos.
zo/zr (see supra n. 5 at p. 44, cf. Judgment No. 15, id. p. 122); British and
French Trust Corp. v. New Brunswick Ry. Co. [1937] 4 All E. R. 516 (see
supra p. 39 n. 85.
114 NUSSBAUM, D. lPR. 261; NUSSBAUM, Money 383: "bad law," citing
decisions in his favor. Co11tra: WEIGERT, supra n. r, 37, basing the decision
on the "law of the currency," which is also questionable.
115 See supra n. 105.
116 GmRON, "Moratorie e regressi nel diritto internazionale privato," 9
Rivista (1915) rsz.
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subjected to the law of the place of payment or of the
forum. 111 Otherwise, the matter is controversial. 118
In England, it has been held that the law of the place
of payment as such is decisive, 119 because the matter relates
to the mode of performance. Beale120 advocates this view
despite a contrary decision of New York, 121 which applied
the law of the place of contracting. M. Wolff supports this
opinion by the equitable consideration that a debtor should
not be required to pay in a country where he cannot collect
his own claims. 122
In civil law countries, the French Law of I 870 granting
prorogations to the payment of bills of exchange and notes,
expressly claimed extraterritorial force. 123 This law once
gave rise to a widespread but unsuccessful debate and to
conflicting decisions in numerous countries. A frequent doctrine limited any statutory moratorium to the territory of
the state issuing l't, even though it was intended to be applied
to debts payable abroad. In a similar view, public policy is
always repugnant to the defense of a foreign moratorium. 124
But the French statute, in fact, merely prohibited the making of protests, an entirely special matter regarding enforcement of obligations flowing from negotiable instruments.125
Recent cases of moratoria, decreed in close connection
DEZAND, 10 Repert. 176 § 25.
Cour Paris (June 25, 1931) Clunet 1932) 993 declares inapplicable the
French moratorium to a bill of exchange accepted in Switzerland for a payment in Paris. The decision is approved by PRUDHOMME, ibid., but questioned
by BATIFFOL, Traite 622 n. I.
11 9 Rouquette v. Overman ( 1875) L. R. IO Q. B. 525, 535; In re Francke and
Rasch [I9I8] I Ch. 470, 482.
120 2 BEALE I270.
121 Taylor v. Kouchaki (1916) 56 N.Y. L. }. (I9I6) 8I3.
122 Priv. Int. Law 479 § 455·
123 GHIRON, supra n. 116, at I6I.
124 GHIRON I76 ff. j contra: 2 FRANKENSTEIN 242 n. 27.
125 2 MElLI 35I·
117
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with exchange restrictions, depend on the treatment of such
restrictions. We may say that the character and motivation
of the individual statutes relaxing the strict observation of
contracts have always influenced consideration of such
statutes in other countries.
(b) Exchange restrictions. 126 The main principle, again,
must be that the law of the contract decides the force of
any restriction. This includes two rules : (a) where the
governing law itself sets up an obstacle to the discharge of
money obligations, the parties are bound to it, irrespective
of where the payment is to be performed and where the
suit for payment is brought, and (b) restrictions by a state
whose law does not govern the contract are immaterial.
This natural principle seems to have become the accepted
basis of the international literature of the 193o's and 1940's.
The emphasis, however, has not been on the principle at all
but on the possible exceptions. These are varied and the
over-all picture is confused.
Procedural theory. One of the arguments supporting the
disregard of foreign restrictions has been their allegedly
territorial nature. Assets within the forum, it has been said,
cannot be exempted from enforcement by virtue of a foreign
prohibition. Sometimes it has been added that the German
restrictions especially, despite their immense scope and
ruthless elaboration, expressly refrained from affecting the
substance of the creditor's right, in that they limited themselves to the temporary prevention of payment, either voluntary or enforced. Thus, enforcement in England would only
be a procedural matter, dependent on English rules. 121 Ger126 FREUTEL, 56 Harv. L. Rev., supra n. r, 30 (informative on problems);
much material is collected by RASHBA, "Foreign Exchange Restrictions and
Public Policy in the Conflict of Laws," 41 Mich. L. Rev. (1943) 777, 1089.
Frankman v. Anglo-Prague Credit Bank [1948] z All E. R. rozs-C. A.
1 2 7 Thus, MANN, Money 266 ff. A new surprising position in recognizing
Czechoslovakian restrictions has been taken by the English Court of Appeal
in Kahler v. Midland Bank [1948] I All E. R. 8u. Comment is reserved for
Volume IV.
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man and other compulsory systems, however, if allegedly
not cancelling the obligation, in fact vitally impair its substance. On the other hand, it is of cardinal importance that
we should not extend jurisdiction, based merely on the
local situation of an asset, so as to impregnate a foreigngoverned obligation with local policy. 128
Public policy. Foreign legislation on currency exchange
has very often been discarded as "political," as confiscatory,
or as penal-a rather vague approach. 129 Moral indignation
repudiating the foreign restrictions has been embarrassing
when statutes of the forum resorted to similar methods.
The best support of a reaction against such foreign measures is afforded by the argument that they pursue in a
unilateral manner economic purposes of a state to the detriment of foreign interests. On this ground, rather than on
all others alleged, German, Austrian, and Swiss courts
have correctly rejected debtors' excuses based on Hungarian, Yugoslavian,. and German currency restrictions,
respectively .130
This view, advocated in the United States, 131 is better
suited than a rigid condemnation of all extraordinary
foreign measures for the safeguard of national economy.
128 An unwarranted objection to this proviso has been raised by RASHBA,
supra n. 126, who warns against exaggeration of the principle that substantial
contact with the forum is indispensable for the application of the local law
considered as public policy.
129 See for details, RASHBA, 41 Mich. L. Rev., supra n. 126, at 1089 ff.
130 Germany: KG. (Oct. 27, 1932) JW. 1932, 3773, IPRspr. 1932 No. 9i LG.
Berlin I (Feb. 19, 1932) JW. 1932, 2306, IPRspr. 1932 No. 10.
Austria: OGH. (Dec. 10, 1935) 10 Z.ausi.PR. (i936) 398, Clunet 1937,
333; cf. WAHLE, 9 Z.ausi.PR. (1935) 779·
Switzerland: 6o BGE. II 294, 310; 62 id. 242, 246; 62 id. II 108. The rejection extends to the case where the debt is governed by German law, see BG.
(March 2, 1937) 63 BGE. II 42. In its decision of July 7, 1942, 68 BGE. II
203, supra n. 93, the court agreed with an American judgment because of
analogous policy.
In the Swedish case, S. Ct. (June 10, 1942) Nytt Jur. Ark. 1942, 389, 394,
as cited in MICHAEL! 311 f., Bagge applied the same approach, whereas the
majority resorted to Swedish law as the law of the contract.
181 FREUTEL, 56 Harv. L. Rev., supra n. 1, at 58. Cf. DoMKE, The Control
of Alien Property ( 1947) 206, 313.
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It is also superior by far to a third view which holds the
debtor responsible for not being able to pay, since his own
state has caused his inability; he should bear the risk of
damage occasioned by such legislation while he enjoys the
benefits procured by the national economy of which he is
a part. 132
Is the law of the place of payment influential? This question carries us back to the pretended importance of illegality
under the law of a foreign place of performance. By abandoning this dogma, a court may easily defy a foreign currency restriction imposed in an incompetent state.
On the other hand, no one can reasonably be expected to
pay English pounds in Chile while this is prohibited there. 133
In the two Baarn cases, the court did not resort to the
Chilean law of obligations and had no need to do so for
the purpose of excusing the debtor. 134 The law governing
the contract, whatever it is, will provide for the effect of
nonpayment as well as for the question whether payment
in local money is to be accounted for at the exchange rate.
132
133
134

Repeated from "Situs Problems," II Law and Cont. Probl. (1945) at 123.
This against MANN, Money 255-258.
The Baarn (No. 1) [1933] P. 251; (No. 2) [1934] P. 171.
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Sales of Movables
I.
1.

1

LAws AND DRAFTS

Inadequate Proposals

(a) Application of general conflicts rules. Codes, restatements, and most court decisions as well as the great majority
of writers have treated sale of goods as the main example
for what they conceive to be the conflicts rule for all, or at
least for bilateral, contracts. 2 Indeed, not one of the numerous decisions in the United States, dealing with the law
applicable to sales of goods, expresses any doubt on this
point. In appearance, the court always chooses the law of
1 Special treatment has been given to this contract in the following treatises:
8 LAURENT I92-229 §§ 126-I58; DIENA, 2 Dir. Com. Int. I ff.; 2 FRANKENSTEIN 295; NUSSBAUM, D. IPR. 269-27I; BATIFFOL I6I ff.; 2 SCHNITZER 550 ff.;
2 RESTREPO HERNANDEz" 69-76.
In addition, see BAGGE, "Les conflits de lois en matiere de contrats de vente
de biens meubles corporels," Recueil I928 V I27; BoERLIN, "Die ortliche
Rechtsanwendung bei Kaufvertriigen nach der Rachtprechung des Bundesgerichts," 33 Z.Schweiz.R. (N. F.) ( 19I4) I99; HERZFELD, "Kauf und Darlehen im internationalen Privatrecht," 4 Basler Studien zur Rechtswissenschaft
(I933)·
Abbreviations in citing international drafts: Vienna Draft I926-International Law Association, Draft of an International Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Conflict of Laws. Contracts of Sale,
Contracts for Work, and Contracts for Services. 34th Report (I 927) 509 ff.
Hague Committee Drafts I928-Three drafts on the conflict of laws concerning sales; see Actes de Ia sixieme conference pp. 310 ff., 344 ff., 375, 395 If.
(discussion), 376 ff. (texts).
Hague Draft 193I-Draft of Convention on the Conflict of Laws in the
Matter of Sales of Corporeal Movables, prepared by a Special Committee
appointed by the Sixth Hague Conference, in their meeting of May 28 to
June 2, I93I, 7 Z.ausi.PR. (I933) 957-9.
A 32-page report on the meeting by }ULLIOT DE LA MoRANDIERE has been
printed confidentially without indication of year and place. This excellent
piece of work should be published.
2 For the United States, this has been stated by STUMBERG 370.
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the place of contracting, 3 or that of the place of performance,4 following some fixed or casual axiom. The truth,
however, is that often the real reasons behind the choice
of law, notably as they appear in the more recent cases, are
much superior to the pretended schematic rule.
In countries of the Latin group, the law of the nationality
common to the parties 5 or the law of the place of contracting, have been applied mechanically as a matter of course.
Innumerable German 6 and a few old Swiss decisions 7 have
indulged in their weird theory, splitting the problems according to whose obligations should be fulfilled at what place. 8
The law of the place of performance is automatically applied
under the Treaty of Montevideo and the codes agreeing
with this Treaty. 9
All these overgeneralized rules do not serve the purpose
of locating the great bulk of international and interstate
sales of goods with adequate assurance.
(b) Cases without a problem. The American cases, in
which conclusion and "performance" are centered in the
same state/ 0 according to the usual standards, offer no
3 Carver-Beaver Yarn Co. v. Wolfson ( 1924) 249 Mass. 257, 143 N. E.
919; Montreal Cotton v. Fidelity Co. ( 1927) 261 Mass. 385, 158 N. E. 795;
Youssoupoff v. Widener (1927) 246 N. Y. 174, 158 N. E. 64; Willson v.
Vlahos (1929) 266 Mass. 370, 165 N. E. 408; Hollidge v. Gussow, Kahn and
Co. (C. C. A. 1st 1933) 67 F. (2d) 459; Northwood Lumber Corp. v.
McKean, et al. (C. C. A. 3d 1946) 153 F. (2d) 753· See lists by 2 BEALE 1215;
BATIFFOL 171 n. I, 172 ns. 1-3.
4 BATIFFOL 174 § 193.
5 France: Trib. Dreux (July 22, 1925) Clunet 1926, 643; French law would
have been better justified by the seller's French domicil than by the London
buyer's French nationality.
Italy: App. Torino (Jan. 11, 1937) 36 Revue Dor 335, 4 Riv. Dir. Mar.
( 193 8) II 89, 100 (a contract c. i. f.).
The Netherlands: Hof Noordholland (Oct. 12, 1848) W. 1019.
6 See the surveys by LEWALD 249 ff. and by STAUB-KOENIGE in 3 Staub 765,
Anhang zu § 372, Anmerkung 9·
1 Notably, BG. (Nov. 7, 1890) 16 BGE. 790.
8 See Vol. II p. 466 ff.
9 See Vol. II p. 463.
10 Northrup v. Foot (N. Y. 1835) 14 Wend. 248; McKee v. Jones (1890)
67 Miss. 405, 7 So. 348; Texarkana Pipe Works v. Caddo Oil and Refining

SALES OF MOVABLES

53

conflicts question. This observation may stand as a starting
point, although there arise doubts when the various duties
of the parties have to be complied with at different places.
What we doubtless may recognize as a settled principle
is that the local law governs all sales executed and fulfilled
at once in one place by both parties, such as in shops and
open markets. This also accounts for the usual invocation
of the lex loci contractus for market bargains in recent
formulations. 11 The analogous rule for transactions in fairs 12
has been criticized and was eliminated from the last international draft/ 3 because in modern industrial fairs delivery
or payment is as often postponed as in other business.
However, it should be likewise regarded as well settled
that when both parties, seller and buyer, are domiciled in
the same state, where they undoubtedly make the contract,
no foreign law is called for, unless stipulated for in their
agreement. 14

Illustration. Two Swiss firms made a sales contract in
Switzerland for delivery f. o. b. Porto or Lisbon and payment by letter of credit on banks in Lisbon. Although the
goods were to be imported into Switzerland, the Swiss
Federal Tribunal, balancing the "criteria" of the presumable intention of the parties, 'pronounced that Portuguese
law should prevail. Neither the parties nor the lower court
Co. (1921) 228 S. W. 586; Hooker v. McRae (1923) 131 Miss. 809, 95 So.
744; Bird & Son v. Guarantee Const. Co. (C. C. A. 1st 1924) 295 Fed. 451;
Midland Linseed Products Co. v. Warren Brothers Co. (C. C. A. 6th 1925)
46 F. (2d) 87o; Montreal Cotton etc. Co. v. Fidelity Co. (1927) 261 Mass.
385, 158 N. E. 795; Hollidge v. Gussow, Kahn & Co., Inc. (C. C. A. 1st 1933)
67 F. (2d) 459·
11 Polish Int. Priv. Law, art. 8, I; Vienna Draft 1926, Int. Law Ass'n, 34th
Report (1927) 510; Hague Draft I931, 7 Z.ausi.PR. (1933) 957·
12 Vienna Draft 1926, supra n. I, art. I, B (c) I.
13 See 2 FRANKENSTEIN 318; OsER-SCHOENENBERGER, Allgemeine Einleitung
p. lxxviii No. 105; Hague Draft 193I, art. 4, see 7 Z.ausi.PR. (1933) at
958.
14 See, for instance, the sales contract in H andelsg. Zurich (Sept. 3, 1943)
2 Schweiz. Jahrb. I. R. (1945) 161, made in Switzerland by two Swiss firms,
dealing with goods stored in Cadiz, Spain, and to be delivered there. That
the price was payable in Switzerland was mentionable under the theory of
presumable intention.
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had thought for a moment of such a possibility, and the
federal court itself ended up without reversing the decision
because the lower court would nevertheless apply Swiss law
as the "presumable Portuguese law." 15
This conception is consistent with the idea slowly emerging from the international drafts 16 that in doubtful cases the
choice of law is restricted to the two domicils of the parties
to the sale. Nationality, of course, has no claim in this
matter.
The main problem, hence, is presented by executory sales
contracts, where the domicils of the parties are situated in
different countries, especially when other local connections
are established by the acts necessary for the fulfillment of
the contract.
(c) Special considerations. Certain American cases,
applying the lex loci contractus, are dominated by the particular lines of thought to be found in the treatment of the
statute of frauds, 17 liquor prohibitions, 18 Sunday contracts, 19
and other exceptional subject matters.
2.

The Important Contacts

In view of the nature of ordinary sales contracts, three
local connections have been advanced: the seller's domicil,
the buyer's domicil, and the place of the most significant
performance. The place of contracting has lost favor.
(a) The law of the seller. The most recent and best
15 BG. (June 22, I944) 2 Schweiz. Jahrb. I. R. (I945) I63; GUTZWILLER,
ibid., notes his doubt on the right "balance."
16 See n. I supra.
11 DaCosta and Davis v. Davis and Hatch ( I854) 24 N. J. Law 319;
Perry v. Mount Hope Iron Co. (I 886) I 5 R. I. 380, 5 At!. 632; D. Canale &
Co. v. Pauly and Pauly Cheese Co. ( I9I4) I 55 Wis. 54 I, 145 N. W. 372.
Cf. Vol. II p. 500 n. 65.
18 Smith v. Godfrey ( I854) 28 N. H. 379, 61 Am. Dec. 6I7; Bliss v.
Brainard (I86o) 4I N. H. 256; Keiwert v. Meyer (I878} 62 Ind. 587, 30
Am. Rep. 206; Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass'n v. Bond (C. C. A. 8th I 89 5)
66 Fed. 653.
19 See Vol. II p. 564.
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prepared proposals, although not yet many enacted laws,
subsidiarity subject obligatory sales contracts concerned with
goods to the law of the seller's domicil. 20 In the last international draft prepared by a special committee which was
appointed by the Sixth Hague Conference and which met
in 1931, article 3 (1) reads:
In the absence of a law declared applicable by the
parties . . . , the contract is governed by the internal law
of the country where the 'seller has his ordinary residence
at the moment when he receives the order. If the order is
received at an establishment of the seller, the sale is governed by the law of the country where this establishment
is situated. 21
In a considered argument, the Swiss Federal Tribunal, too,
has found the seller's law to be suitable to the entire sales
contract, neither the place of paymene 2 nor that of destination and receipt of the goods being regarded as having any
substantial importance. 23 This view finds its main justification in the dominant nature of the seller's promise to provide the buyer with the specific goods needed, while the
buyer's obligation to pay the price, has nothing distinctive
among all the manifold money obligations.
Less impressive is the argument that the seller is in a con2 0 Polish Int. Priv. Law, art. 9 No. 3: contracts concluded in retail business
are subject to the law of the place where the seller is established.
Czechoslovakia: Int. Priv. Law, § 46 No. I: sales in carrying on trade or
manufacture . . . are subject to the law of the place where the seller's trade
or manufacture is established.
Treaty of Montevideo on Int. Civ. Law (x889) art. 34, (1940) art. 38:
domicil of the promisor of unascertained or fungible goods,
Institute of Int. Law, 22 Annuaire (1908) 290 art. 2 (d); Draft Nolde,
B (f), 33 Annuaire ( 1927) III 198; Vienna Draft 1926, Int. Law Ass'n, 34th
Report (1927) 509 B (a); Hague Drafts at the Sixth Conference, Actes
p. 376.
21 Hague Draft 1931, see 7 Z,ausi.PR. (1933) 957·
22 Swiss BG. (Dec. 13, 1932) 58 BGE. II 433, 435, cf. NIEDERER, 6o
Z,Schweiz,R. (N. F.) 257a.
23 Swiss BGE,, 32 II 297. 39 II I67; cf. ROMBERGER, Obi. Vertriige so;
OsER-SCHOENENBERGER, Allgemeine Einleitung lxxvii No. 104.
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siderably more insecure legal and factual situation than
the buyer, since he bears the risk inherent in the supply and
storage of the goods and in the capital investment involved
and he carries extensive legal responsibilities, among other
things for unknown defects of title and quality. Common
law goes even further in extending his liability for damages.
The laws cumulate an amplitude of remedies and options for
the buyer. However, they do so because the economic power
and organization of the seller make him prevailingly the
stronger party. Moreover, the present laws do not help buyers to escape stipulations that nullify their legal advantages.
Hence, the conclusion that the seller should at least be sure
of the applicable law and not find himself open to some
surprising foreign severity, 24 is unconvincing. Besides, such
argument is open to the general objection that a party is
not necessarily better off with his domiciliary law and should
not enjoy domestic privileges in international deals.
Emphasis on the seller's establishment is sufficiently justified by his complicated and characteristic duties in the normal development of interstate or international business.
It is at the same time consistent with the need of any firm
exporting goods to various countries, to be able to fix sales
conditions on the basis of one central law. Where sellers
deal in mass sales, as mail-order houses, automobile manufacturers, fruit growers, textile dealers, and many others,
the central law cannot conveniently be other than that of
the domicil.
(b) The law of the buyer. Suggestions that the domicil
of the buyer should be taken as the decisive contact, are
infrequent. Certain of these proposals were manifestly· unfounded. 25 But a new effort in this direction has been made
HERZFELD, Kauf und Darlehen 85-96.
The most surprising contention was expressed by CLAUGHTON ScoTT,
British delegate at the Sixth Hague Conference, who asserted that the
British government would preferably agree to the application of the buyer's
24
25
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for a particular purpose. The international committees
working on conflicts rules for sales made several successive
attempts to complement the primary rule calling for the
seller's law by elaborate exceptions for the benefit of the
buyer. In the last two drafts of the International Law Association and of the Hague Conference, the law of the buyer
has been declared applicab_le to the entire contract under
certain circumstances :
Vienna Draft, 1926, B (b) :
The law of the buyer . . . shall, however, apply in the
following cases:
1. Where the seller or his agent or representative concludes the contract during a visit in the country of the buyer.
2. \Vhere the agent or representative of the seller has
his office, whether principal or branch, which concludes the
contract, in the country of the buyer and the agent or representative concludes the contract in his own name.
3· Where the agent or representative of the seller has
his office, whether principal or branch, which concludes the
contract, in the country of the buyer, and the movables at
the date when the contract is concluded are situate in the
country of the buyer.

This drafting is superlatively careless. 26 If an agent sells
in his own name, there is no sales ~on tract other than his;
if the contract of a casual visiting agent is subject to the
local law, it is incomprehensible that contracting by a perlaw if to rigid rules at all. He was moved mainly, however, by the idea that
the bank of the buyer must examine the documents sent by the seller and
should be able to do it according to the buyer's law. Due objections were
made to this muddled argument by ALTEN, }ULLIOT DE LA MoRANDIERE and
UssrNG. But the argument is wrong in the first place because the legal points
to be examined by any bank are regulated by general conditions and customs
rather than national laws. See moreover infra Ch. 37 p. 96.
Another advocate of the buyer's law, KRONSTEIN, 2 Bl. IPR. ( 1927) 126,
133, argues that the seller has sufficient opportunity to ask the buyer to submit
himself to the seller's law, and if he does not use it, he should be judged
according to the law of the other party!
26 See the criticism in Int. Law Ass'n, 34th Report (1927) 498 (ERNST
WoLFF, MrTTELSTEIN, BARRATT).
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manently established representative should not have the
same effect; the mere presence of a supply for the seller
has no relevant influence on the treatment of a sale of unascertained goods, at least not if delivery is to be made in
another country, et cetera.
The eminent lawyers working at The Hague finally
reached the following formulation:
Draft of June 2, 1931, art. 3 (2):
The sale is governed by the internal law of the ·country
where the buyer has his ordinary residence or where he
has the place of business which issued the order, if in this
country the order has been received either by the seller or
by his representative, agent or travelling salesman.
What idea inspired the formulation of this exception?
During the Conference some delegates found the ground
in a recourse to the lex loci contractus as identified with the
lex domicilii of the buyer. 27 Others rejected the lex loci contractus on principle, but explained that the exceptional rule
was due to the situation of small buyers contracting with
travelling agents and unable to ascertain the foreign seller's
law. 28 It was generally emphasized that the result should
not depend on the extent of an agent's authority to sell,
but a practical test should be preferred: when the seller or
his agent of any kind, including one who may only solicit
orders or merely accept an order as a messenger, is present
at a place in the country of the buyer and the latter addresses his order to him, the domestic law governs.
The resulting requirements combine the buyer's domicil
with one condition of the conclusion of the contract, viz.,
the arrival of the buyer's contractual declaration at an
address in the same country. This is a rather strange rule.
1f the place where the contract is made is immaterial for
27
28

BASDEVANT, Actes 315, followed by a Belgian and a Polish orator.
BAGGE and ALTI!N, id. 291 ff., 312, 317 n. 2, 318.

SALES OF MOVABLES

59

the choice of law, as has been rightly assumed, why should
a fragment of the making suffice to localize the contract?
How can we hold that a contract be subject to the law of
one party, although the contract is made and entirely to be
performed in another country? However, if it is only intended by this simple de_vice to avoid the difficulties of
searching for the legendary place of contracting, the most
essential objection to the lex loci contractus remains; the
external circumstances of concluding the contract have no
necessary relation to the character of the contract.
Again, why should the mere presence of a selling agent
in the country of the buyer influence the choice of law, if
the order itself, for instance, specifies that the goods are
deliverable at the principal's factory or at a vessel in a
distant port? The problem of agency is not so simple. As
explained in another chapter, we must distinguish (I) the
authorization of the agent-the extent of which is, in fact,
governed by the law of the place where he acts on the
authority; ( 2) the contract between the principal and the
agent, which follows its independent conflicts rule; and ( 3)
the contract of the agent with the third party, in our case
the sales contract. We cannot always subject this sales contract to the local law of the place where the agent happens
to act. Much less is the same tenden~y justified when a mere
messenger intervenes or an agent simply receives an order.
(c) The law of the shipping place. The experts at the
Sixth Hague Conference took no account of the well-known
fundamentals of international trade. Very probably, this
happened intentionally. 29 But in contrast it should be noted
that English and American courts have given consideration
to mercantile habits, and, as a matter of course, have
applied the law of the place at which the seller is bound to
make shipment of the goods. 30
29 See infra n. 48.
so Shohfi v. Rice (1922) 241 Mass. 2II, 135 N. E. 141. More cases to the
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F. o. b. contract. Thus, it is the practice of English 31
and American courts to apply the law of the seller's state
to the entirety of rights and duties flowing from the contract, whenever the seller, under the contract, has to deliver f. o. b. at his factory, 32 or to a carrier, 33 cars, 34 railway
express, 35 or at a shipping point. 36 Correspondingly, the law
of the buyer's place applies when delivery is due at the
buyer's place. 37
A perfectly justified exception is made when, contrary to
the prevailing usage, in an inexact, though not rare, language,
the clause f. o. b. is meant only to fix the price. When, for
instance, two lumber dealers in Pittsburgh contracted for
a car of lumber "f. o. b. Montreal," but the seller fulfilled
his obligation by shipping the goods in Ohio, the court
correctly applied not Quebec but Ohio law. 38
A recent decision of the highest Swiss court applies the
law of the place of f. o. b. delivery as a matter of course. 39
same effect will be cited in the following notes and on various occa.sions in
Ch. 37·
Likewise, e.g., Switzerland: Trib. Geneve (March 4, 1932) Sem. Jud. 1932,
523 (place of loading and furnishing of a letter of credit).
31 Benaim & Co. v. Debono [1924] A. C. 514.
32 Kansas City Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Weber Packing Corp. (1937) 93
Utah 414, 73 Pac. (2d) 1272; In re Pittsburgh Industrial Iron Works
(D. C. W. D. Pa. 1910) 179 Fed. 151.
83 Johnson County Savings Bank v. Walker (1908) So Conn. 509, 69 At!.
15; Denio Milling Co. v. Malin (1917) 25 Wyo. 143, 165 Pac. 1II3.
34 Northwestern Terra Cotta Co. v. Caldwell (C. C. A. 8th 1916) 234 Fed.
491; State of Delaware, for Use of General Crushed Stone Co. v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. (D. C. Del. 1943) 49 F. Supp. 467: moratory
interests on the price are due according to Pennsylvania law, not because the
"entire contract" was to be performed in Pennsylvania as headnote 13 asserts,
but because seller has "accepted" the contract in his place in Pennsylvania
and his responsibility ceased with delivery f. o. b. Harrington, Pa.
35 Willson v. Vlahos (1929) 266 Mass. 370, 165 N. E. 408.
36 Griffin v. Metal Product Co. (1919) 264 Pa. 254, 107 Atl. 713.
87 Price v. Burns (1902) 101 III. App. 418; York Metal & Alloys Co. v.
Cyclops Steel Co. (1924) 280 Pa. 585, 124 At!. 752.
ss Ward Lumber Co. v. American L. & M. Co. (1915) 247 Pa. 267, 93
At!. 470. The contract was made in Ohio, cf. infra Ch. 37 p. 81 n. 17.
39 BG. (Dec. 3, 1946) 72 BGE. II 405, 4II: sale "wagon Tanger"; in this
case, it is true, the goods were also to be examined and accepted in Tangier,
but the court treats this acceptance as merely provisional.
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In Germany, this question has been neglected, although
there is a distinguishable controversy regarding jurisdiction. In commercial forms and regulations, the f. o. b. place
has frequently been indicated to be the "place of performance," and this has sometimes been understood to include
a stipulation for submission to the jurisdiction of the cqurts
of this place. 40 According to a contrary view, such clauses
are merely concerned with the passing of the risk of loss. 41
C. i. f. contract. As the clause of "cost, insurance, freight"
is essentially a modified f. o. b. clause, we may consider the
importance of the shipping places in both instances to be
analogous. The tendency of business is equally strong to
regard the place of shipping, at the f. o. b. place or to the
c. i. f. place, as the "place of performance." The courts
have known this for a long time. It is true that former
Illinois decisions declared that in a sale c. i. f. Antwerp
with shipment in New York, the seller's damages for nonperformance were to be measured according to Belgian law
as that of the place of "delivery." 42 But these decisions were
"in violent contrast with the general rule in other jurisdictions. " 43 A much-noted English decision concluded from
this phenomenon that English jurisdiction over a contract,
based under Order XI r. 1 (e) on. the place of performance,
was to be denied where goods were shipped from Hamburg
c. i. f. Tyne on the Thames. 44 German trade forms and
40 See HEUER, "Von der Fob-Kiausel," Leipz. Z. 1925, 26; DuRINGERHACHENBURG (ed. 2) Anhang ZU §§ 355 1 358.
41 GROSSMANN-DOERTH, tJberseekauf 181-190.
42 Staackman, Horschitz & Co. v. Cary ( 1916) 197 Ill. App. 601.
43 L. 0. VAN DoREN, The Law of Shipment ( 1932) 498, citing Seaver v.
Lindsay Light Co. (1922) 233 N. Y. 273, 135 N. E. 329, disapproving the
Staackman case.
44 Crozier, Stephens & Co. v. Auerbach (1908) 2 K. B. 161-C. A., correctly criticizing Barrow v. Myers and Co. (1888) 4 T. L. R. 441.
Another, definitely wrong, view was again taken in an obiter dictum by
Lord Phillimore, inN. V. Kwik Hoo Tong Handel Maatschappij v. Finlay &
Co. [1927] A. C. 604, 609-H. L., where the goods had to be shipped from
Java to Bombay c. i. f. and the learned Judge asserted that normally lex lod
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general conditions of mercantile organizations have widely
identified the shipping place in c. i. f. contracts with the
"place of performance." 45 Again, this usually implies that
risk of loss passes to the buyer when the goods are shipped
at the port of dispatch. But it means also, in my opinion,
that where the shipping place is in the seller's country, the
parties intend that the courts of his country should have
jurisdiction. 46

II.
I.

THE SIGNIFICANCE oF SHIPMENT AND ANALOGous AcTs

The Concept of Delivery to the Carrier

In the most usual types of international commerce, shipment is included among the obligations of the seller, although he is not obligated to bear the risk of loss during
the travel of the merchandise. The English and Uniform
Sales Acts have accepted this old and universal conception,
stating that where, in pursuance of a contract, the seller
delivers the goods to a carrier for the purpose of transmission to the buyer, property and risks presumably pass to
the buyer. 47 In traditional and widespread commercial thinking, much emphasis is laid on this act of the seller, because
it forms the pointed end to all the multiple activities of the
seller and indicates the time and place at which the goods,
although not yet in the physical power of the buyer and
solutionis would dictate the application of the law of the place of delivery,
i.e., of Bombay.
45 GROSSMANN-DOERTH, Uberseekauf 245: "outright official formula" (in
business).
46 As to risk, see GROSSMANN-DOERTH, id. 247, 361 ff. As to jurisdiction, the
same author, id. 245 ff., 362-364 construes the German clauses determining
the "place of performance" to the effect that a seller in Ham burg stipulating
for "f. o. b. Amsterdam" does not want to submit himself to the Dutch
courts, and therefore any clauses fixing "the place of performance" should
not be referred to jurisdiction, unless they say so, or the case is exceptional.
Similarly BRANDLE II9. But the conclusion is wrong in the case where the
shipping place is in Germany.
47 Sale of Goods Act, s. 18 rule 5 (z); Uniform Sales Act, sec. 19 rule
4 (z).
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very often not yet in his ownership, leave the custody and
risk of the seller.
The types of commercial sale contracts are very diverse,
however. They differ according to the peculiarities of various kinds of goods and according to the habits of the various
trading centers and c;:ommodity exchanges. It has often been
contended that the variety is too great to allow legal rules,
or even uniform proposals for drafting individual sales
conditions, to comprehend commercial sales in general.
This objection, despite its annoying repetition by some
lawyers, has not prevented the Scandinavian Sales of Goods
Act of 1906, the Warsaw-Oxford C. I. F. Rules (1932)
and the Draft of an International Sales Act ( 1939) from
establishing comprehensive regulations for sales in general,
as a basis which may be modified for the various types of
contracts. These generalizations, however, were only possible on the ground that the entire distribution of rights
and duties in sales contracts rests on the determination of
the place where the goods are expected to arrive at a certain
time and to leave the seller's orbit. Manufacturers most
often sell their products, within the country and in export
trade, to be taken at the factory yard or at the station of
the factory. The many cases, in themselves somewhat different, where the seller's obligation of active dealing with the
goods extends to the dispatching of the goods from a seaport, as in most overseas transactions, form a group together with the others where the seller has to bring the
thing sold to a river port, to barges, or to cars at a point
on the way. On the other hand, the contract may promise
to have the goods at the disposition of the buyer at his own
place or station. The act of providing the goods at the
seller's place of shipment, at an intermediate place, or of
rendering them at the buyer's place or at any other place,
has been technically termed delivery in the draft of an inter-
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national sales act. But since the recent American drafts of
a Revised Sales Act do not accept this technical meaning
of delivery, we have to speak of shipment and tender of
delivery. A possible name would be ((surrender'' of the
goods by the seller.
Delivery or surrender in this sense is doubtless the center
of the relationship created by sale between parties of different countries. In a c. i. f. contract, for example, the seller
procures the contracts of freight and insurance up to the
port of destination, but he bears responsibility and risk of
loss only until shipment. This means that, if he sends goods
conforming to the contract from his place to the port of
shipment and the goods perish or deteriorate on the way
with or without his fault, he has to substitute other goods in
time or be in default. So soon, however, as he delivers the
goods to the carrier and they are loaded or possibly when
they merely reach the custody of the carrier, events beyond
the control of the parties are at the risk of the buyer. According to the American draft of a sales law, such delivery
would include transfer of title, which, in the prevailing opinion, rather, occurs when the documents, such as the invoice,
bill of lading, bill of exchange, and insurance policy, are received by the buyer or his bank. But delivery includes the
extremely important act of specification (identification,
specialization) by which specified goods take the place of
the unascertained goods described in the contract. In the
correct solution, warranty of quality is directly dependent
on the conditions existing at the time of surrender.
This concept of surrender has a variable element, since
according to the different basic types used in commerce,
the seller may tender the goods in any one of the places
to be touched by the goods. In every case, it indicates the
salient point in the course of any individual transfer. The
activities of concluding the contract and preparing delivery,
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as well as the subsequent happenings when the goods travel,
are unloaded, tendered, examined, accepted or refused, and
stored, and when the documents are sent and received, are
none of these so significant and distinctive of the contract in
the estimate of average parties, as delivery to the carrier.
2.

Shipment and Conflicts Law

Curiously enough, very rarely has the possibility been
envisaged of connecting sales contracts with the law of the
place of delivery to the carrier, except under the heading
of lex loci solutionis, which, however, could refer to any
act and in particular the physical reception of the goods.
Even the writers especially devoted to the study of the
commercial facts have neglected, if not definitely argued
against, employment of this contact.
In the first place, it has been emphasized that the parties
select the f. o. b. point within the travel of the goods according to such facts as the tariffs of carriers, timetable of
vessels, suitability of ports to the kind of merchandise sold,
rates of transshipment, and business connections with transportation and insurance personnel. 48 However true this may
be, when the parties agree on such point, they do connect
the contract with this place more than with any other. That
the intention of the parties is not really directed toward any
determined law, is no valid objection, so long as they have
not specifically agreed on a different law.
Furthermore, it has been stressed that separate important
local connections exist at the places where the documents
are endorsed, or dispatched, or received. 49 But if any rule of
conflicts is needed to take care of these accompanying relations, it must be a special rule. 5°
4 8 BRANDLE 120.
49 nRXNDLB 11 9 .
50

See infra Ch. 38 pp. 96-98.
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Shipment in a third country. Much more weight is attributable to the obvious consideration that the shipping point
may be situated elsewhere than in countries of the parties.
Neither the hypothetical intention of the parties, nor an
objective evaluation of such cases can refer the determination of the applicable law merely to the place of shipment.
We have seen how instinctively the American courts have
applied the law of the seller or of the buyer according to
the situation of the f. o. b. point in the state of either. Again,
there are American cases concerning an f. o. b. point in a
third jurisdiction, that may help to find our way, although
these decisions are objectionable on other grounds.
In a recent case, a firm in New York, dealing in malt and
hops, through its commission broker in New Jersey, re-·
ceived an order of a New Jersey company for Polish hops,
to be imported f. o. b. Philadelphia docks. The New Jersey
court ascertained the acceptance of the order in New York
and for this customary flimsy reason applied the law of
New York as the lex loci contractus. 51 Despite the formalistic approach, it was correct to disregard the f. o. b. place
in another state, which resulted incidentally from the importation.
Where a conditional sale was made in Massachusetts, the
domicil of the buyer, and the seller was a Pennsylvania
corporation, the shovel sold was to be delivered "f. o. b.
Manchester, New Hampshire." The decision of the Massachusetts court has often been criticized because of its failure
to satisfy the law of the situs, New Hampshire, with regard
to the retaking of possession. 52 The court, however, was
right in holding the delivery in New Hampshire immaterial
51 Manhattan Overseas Co. v. Camden County Beverage Co. (1940) 125
N. ]. Law 239, 15 Atl. (2d) 217, aff'd (1941) 126 N. J. Law 421, 19 At!.
(2d) 828.
52 Thomas G. Jewett v. Keystone Driller Co. (1933) 282 Mass. 469, 185
N. E. 369, 87 A. L. R. 1298. See Ch. 38 p. 83 n. 25.
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for determining the law of the obligatory contract, even if
no doubt had existed about the length of time during which
the shovel should stay there. That the law of the forum was
chosen could be justified by the domicil of the buyer in
addition to the circumstance that delivery f. o. b. Manches-·
ter was stipulated at the buyer's request and for his convenience. He wanted the shovel there and used it there,
though not for long.
The English courts, too, are correct in applying English
law to a contract made between English firms for delivery
c. i. f. London, although the goods are to be shipped from
New Y ork. 53 The real justification is that the shipping point
in a foreign country appears immaterial for the legal relationship between the parties. Lex loci contractus, resulting
in the application of English law, was incidentally harmless
in one case, 54 where hops were to be sent from the Pacific
Coast to England, since the selling corporation was established in London as well as in San Francisco and the buyer
in Sunderland, England. Had the seller been domiciled only
in San Francisco, the courts would have inconveniently subjected him to English law, as also the Hague Draft of I 93 I
does, merely because the order was given in England.
On the other hand, where a machine is to be installed at
the place of the buyer, it follows that the buyer's place is
the only decisive connection. 55
III.

CoNCLUSION

The international drafts have achieved a great progress
in supplanting the lex loci contractus and the lex loci solu53

Manbre Saccharine Co., Ltd. v. Corn Products Co., Ltd. [1919] 1 K. B.

198.
54 Bid dell Bros. v. E. Clemens Horst Co. [1911] 1 K. B. 214; [1911] 1 K. B.
934-A. C.; reversed [1912] A. C. 18-H. L.
55 Canada, Ontario: Linderme Machine Works Co. v. Kuntz Brewery, Ltd.
(1921) 21 0. W. N. 51 (right to reject).
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tionis, the two mechanical and ill-fitted rules, by the law of
the seller's domicil. Most decisions are really sustained by
actual circumstances including this fact of domicil. But it is
erroneous to formulate exceptions for the law of the buyer
either on the basis, again, of the lex loci contractus or of a
fragment of the process of contracting. International sales
in which the goods move from one country into another,
gravitate toward the side of the buyer only if "delivery" is
due at a place in his orbit.
There can be no doubt of this when delivery, always in
the meaning explained before, has to be effected at the
buyer's residence, factory, station, or pier. A buyer expecting
the goods to be brought and offered to him in his own
country quite as if they came from a domestic seller, can
reasonably expect to have his domestic law applied. Nor
would any other solution suit the situation of the seller.
He may have his own storehouse in the country from which
he intends to take the merchandise, or his agent may win
him customers by promising local delivery. He also may
send his wares to his correspondent on a bill of lading to
his own order, retaining full title until subsequent delivery
by the agent against cash. These are cases clearly requiring
the application of the local law. To implement the vague
ideas of the parties or the general conditions annexed to a
sale, as respects primary obligations, default, excesses, substitute goods, and warranty, the law at the place of delivery
has real advantages that have been too generally attributed
to the law of the place of performance.
Between the extreme cases where delivery is to be made
either at the seller's or the buyer's place, the intermediate
points usually emphasized in trade can most often be counted
within the sphere of one or the other. When an American
or Canadian merchant ships goods on a through bill of
lading by rail with subsequent transshipment to an ocean
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vessel, the transfer to the initial carrier, of course, points
to his state's law even though the first stage of the carriage
may end beyond the state line. It should not make any
difference that in other countries no such genuine through
bills are in use. Generally, whether the goods are shipped
at a point in the seller's state or, in an overseas transaction,
in a foreign state on his side of the ocean-as a Canadian
seller f. o. b. New York, or a Swiss exporter c. i. f. New
York with shipment in Amsterdam-the contract is still
centered nearer to the seller. Nor is there a valid reason
to abandon the seller's law if the Rotterdam agent of an
Argentine exporter in the latter's name sells grains c. i. f.
Rotterdam, shipment Buenos Aires, to a Swiss importer.
Such persons domiciled and contracting in Europe know
that the most important part of the transaction must occur
overseas.

Illustration. In a case decided by the Swiss Federal Tribunal (July 20, 1920) 46 BGE. 260, a London firm through
a Swiss agent sold to a Swiss firm in Switzerland Orange
Pekoe tea from Ceylon c. i. f. Marseille. Swiss law was
applied because both parties invoked it. That the foreign
firm "had to expect that the acts of its representative would
be determined under Swiss law," should have bearing only
on his authority. If the court had not been bound by stipulations of the parties on the applicable law, English rather
than Swiss law ought to have determined the issue.
On the other hand, the situation is substantially different
when the goods travel overseas at the risk of the seller and
must be presented to the buyer at some place on the continent where the buyer's domicil is located. Where a Japanese
trader sells silk to a manufacturer in Lyons according to the
standard conditions of Lyons, in which the chapter on "shipwreck and other risks of transportation" annuls the contract
in case of loss-one of the "avoidance" clauses usual in sales
for arrival-the parties concentrate the effect of the con-
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tract in the port of arrival in Europe. As the natural contact
therefore is not at the seller's place, it is at the buyer's place.
It deserves consideration whether the division of the
countries into legal systems does not offer an analogous
contrast. Suppose a United States seller ships goods from
New York to Panama for a Colombian buyer, with the clause
"to arrive" in Panama, would the buyer not expect to have
his law applied rather than that of the United States? Without a profound difference in legal systems, where, for instance, goods are to be sent from a seller in Michigan f. o. b.
Duluth, Minnesota, to a buyer in Chicago, no such importance can be attributed to the f. o. b. clause.
Apart from these uncertain enlargements, we may summarize as follows. The seller's law should be resorted to in
all doubtful cases, with the exception that the internal law
of the buyer governs the contract where the goods are to
be surrendered at a place situated within the buyer's country.
In other words, we may say that the law of the buyer's
place should govern only if the parties have agreed on it,
or if the contract is for surrender in the country of the
buyer or at a place fixed at his request outside the seller's
orbit.
What is a party's place. The Vienna Draft defined "the
law of the seller" by the following provision: "If the sale is
effected by an individual in the course of commerce carried
on by him, or by a firm, association, or corporation, the law
of the seller shall be the territorial law of the country
where, at the date when the contract is concluded, the office,
whether principal or branch, which concludes the contract,
is situate." 56
56
lnt. Law Ass'n, Report 34th Conference (1927) 509, B (a) (r). Cf.
Poland, Int. Priv. Law, art. 9 No. 4: domicil of a merchant with respect to
the course of his business is the seat of his enterprise; if he has several
enterprises, the seat of that enterprise with which the transaction has been
concluded, is decisive.
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As already pointed out, the Hague Draft of 1931 declares applicable "the law of the country where the seller
has his ordinary residence at the time when he received the
order. If the order is received by an establishment of the
seller, the sale is governed by the law of the country in
which this establishment is situated." 57
The latter test intends to eliminate the vexatious question
where the contract is made. The word "establishment" is
meant to include headquarters and branches of corporations
but not other places of business which are not a "seat." It
would be much better and clearer language to speak of
ordinary residence (of individuals) and places of business
(of individuals and organizations) and to make decisive
the place where the seller performs the act by which he
consents to the contract.
IV. SPECIAL KINDS
I.

oF

MovABLES

Sales on Exchange

Sales of commodities in the course of transactions in an
authorized exchange, like sales on a stock exchange, 58 are
subject to the usages of the institution. They are, moreover, subject to many administrative provisions and are
executed in forms not used in ordinary business. From all
these reasons, it has been concluded that such contracts are
tacitly submitted by the parties to the local law, 59 or objectively expressed, that this is the only adequate law. 60
57

7 Z.ausi.PR. (I933) 957·
BATIFFOL I82 § I99·
59 See Vol. II p. 385.
so Czechoslovakia: Int. Priv. Law, § 45·
Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. 8 No. I.
Vienna Draft I926, art. I, B (c) (I); Hague Draft I93I, art. 4, 7 Z.ausi.PR.
957; BRANDL, Int. Biirsenprivatrecht 59; NIBOYET in Recueil I927 I IOI ff.,
33 Annuaire ( I927) III 2I3.
58
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Other Sales under Administrative Control

For similar reasons, sales are considered localized when
they are made "by auction, by judicial process, by order of
the court, or under an execution. " 61
Registered chattels-ships. In view of the significance
of registration, in a widespread opinion, the sale of registered vessels is governed by the law of the place of registration or of the flag. Thus, the Vienna Draft states:
As regards contracts of sale of ships, vessels and aircraft which are registered, the law applicable shall be the
territorial law of the country where the ship, vessel, or
aircraft is registered. 62
This rule has been likewise suggested by Judge Hough
in a dissenting opinion of 1921, where the court followed
the lex loci contractus, on the ground that registration only
gives advantages to the purchaser and is not essential for
the passing of the title between the parties. 63 The register
publicizes the legal situation of the vessel for the information of presumptive buyers, whose rights relating to third
persons are more or less strongly influenced by the entry
in the register. 64
In many countries, this situation is complicated by prohibiting sales of registered vessels to aliens 65 and prescribing
that sales be concluded before their consuls for the purpose
6 1 Text of Vienna Draft, art. I, B (c) (x), following an American proposal,
Int. Law Ass'n, 34th Report (1927) 506.
62 Art. I, B (c) (2): a simplification of a proposal of the Int. Chamber of
Commerce (34th Report 1927, p. 506). Similarly most writers, see NIBOYET,
Recueil 1927 I 102; NIBOYET, 4 Traite 496 § 1228.
63 Gaston, Williams & Wigmore of Canada, Ltd. v. Warner (C. C. A. 2d
1921) 272 Fed. 56, 66.
In the old case, Lynch v. Postlethwaite (1819) 7 Mart. (La.) 69, 12 Am.
Dec. 495, the lex loci contractus (Mississippi) was applied, to satisfy La.
C. C. art. 10.
64 This is admitted by BATIFFOL 173 § 192 who nevertheless insists on
lex loci solutionis.
ScERNI, 77, cf. 195 recognizes the ordinary test of lex loci contractus.
ss E.g., England: Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, s. I.
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66

of registration. The parties, of course, may disregard a
registration existing at the time of sale, if the buyer is not
interested in maintaining the previous nationality of the
vessel. 67 They can agree on any other law of the contract.
But the seller would be responsible to his home authorities,
and possibly the contract would be considered invalid in
other countries as well.
3· Patent Rights 68
The relation of a patent right to the territory of the
country where it has been created, and the registration required for transfer of such rights, have also sometimes been
taken as suggesting a choice of law for sales promising such
transfer. 69 But as very often inventors acquire patents in
fifty states and may dispose of many of them in one contract,
this would imply the application of dozens of private laws.
Little authority is to be found on the sale of patent rights,
and this only if we include contracts for the granting of
licenses. But there is no obstacle to extending the conflicts
rules whatever 'they may be, to such contracts, whether
they are construed as sales or otherwise. The few cases in
point apply the common tests rather than localizing the
sale at the patent roll.
Illustrations: ( i) In an English case, a German firm,
evidently under German law, granted a license under an
English patent to another German firm, but subsequently
66 E.g., Peru: C. Com. art. 591; certain privileged debts must be paid
before the sale, id. art. 863.
Cuba: C. Com. art. 578.
67 This suffices to render justice to BATIFFOL's desire, 174 n. 1, to recognize
the sale of a Norwegian vessel in Japan to be brought into Japanese
ownership.
6 8 It may be remembered that the assignment of a patent right is coordinated to a sales contract quite as a transfer of title to a sale of a tangible
thing. Exclusive licenses are also bought, although agreements on nonexclusive
licenses may be better compared with leases.
69 Thus recently, BAT!FFOL 183 § zoo.
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infringed this agreement by giving another license to a
third person in an English contract. The court recognized
the application of German law to the obligations of the
grantor of the license. 70 The case, of course, did not lend
itself to a different choice of law.
(ii) Where two patented machines were sold in St. Louis
with the option to purchase the patent rights for several
countries and the right to have the machines patented in
any European country, in an action for breach of contract
the court considered the statute of frauds of the place of
contracting and of the forum, but did not even mention _the
states in which the objects had been or might be patented/ 1
The German practice, a little richer, 72 brings out the same
point somewhat more clearly. In addition to various cases
where two domestic parties contracted with respect to
foreign patents/ 3 the Reichsgericht also applied German
law to the assignment of the exclusive exploitation of an
Austrian patent, by a German chemist to a Viennese firm. 74
The German seller of an invention to be patented by him in
Italy is, of course, obligated under German law to take all
the steps prescribed by Italian patent law. 75
4· Copyright
The modern right of authors to their literary or artistic
products is not fixed in the territory for which protection
is granted. It is distinguishable from the physical thingmanuscript, painting, blueprint, film, etc. But it is not a
mere part of the right of personality as one influential
70 Actien Gesellschaft fiir Cartonnagen Ind. v. Temler and Seeman (1900)
18 R. P. c. 6.
71 Obear-Nester Glass Co. v. Lax and Shaw, Ltd. (C. C. A. 8th 1926) II F.
(zd) 240.
7 2 See NussBAUM, D. IPR. 338 n. 2.
78
E.g., RG. (Oct. n, 191I) II Markenschutz und Wettbewerb 254; (July 1,
1931) 31 Markenschutz und Wettbewerb 534, IPRspr. 1931, 197.
74 RG. (June 10, 1933) Leipz. Z. 1933, 1325, IPRspr. 1933, 44- It was

also stressed that the price was fixed in marks and the parties invoked German
law.
7 5 RG. (July s, 19n) II Markenschutz und Wettbewerb 142.
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theory construed it. It is a privilege accorded by law as an
absolute right to the ideal content embodied in the work.
Hence, when transfer of a copyright is promised, there is
no fixed local connection necessitating conflicts rules different
from those referring to tangible objects. The agreement
for transfer can be distinguished from the transfer itself
quite as well as in the case of chattels. In fact, there are
many formalities prescribed for the assignment of an
author's right, 77 but they do not, as a rule, affect promises
to assign it.
In this light, the German Supreme Court analyzed a contract of publication concluded between Viennese authors of
an operetta with a publisher of Stuttgart, Germany, according to the presumaole intention of the parties, as in any
other contract for work. The interpretation in favor of the
place of the publisher, however, is doubtfuP 8 My own suggestion, in the absence of agreement by the parties on the
applicable law, is that the ordinary rules advocated above
for chattels should apply.
Indeed, when a writer or artist himself promises to transfer-totally or partially-his right in the work to the extent
that he has the power to do so/ 9 his own domicil is a fair
point of connection. And where licenses are issued in mass,
as to movie theatres, the place of the vendor again is an
appropriate contact.
76

Theory of Orro GIERKE, abandoned by most writers.
See P. 0LAGNIER, z Le droit d'auteur (1934) Z9Z.
RG. (Oct. Z9, 19Z7) II8 RGZ. z8z, see Vol. II pp. 434, 435 n. 13.
79 Cf. RABEL, Z7 N. F. Griinhut's Zschr. (1899); MICHAELIDES-NOUAROS,
Le droit moral de !'auteur (Lyon 1935); ·Inter-American Convention on the
Rights of the Author in Literary, Scientific, and Artistic Works, of July zz,
1946, art. XI.
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Sales of Goods: Scope of Rule
I.
I.

CoNTRACT AND PROPERTY

Translative Effect of Contract

C

LEAPAGE of municipal systems. 1 As is well known,
in the group of laws following the Roman model the
sales contract creates obligations only. Title is transferred by a distinguishable act of conveyance, which, in its
more refined form, is also considered a "contract," but one
restricted to the declarations of giving and accepting ownership. If the Roman pattern is strictly observed, such transfer needs, in addition to this specific consent, the surrender
and acquisition of physical possession (traditio), or at least
a substitute therefor, such as brevi manu traditio (the buyer,
tenant of possession for the seller, becomes possessor),
constitutum possessorium (the seller makes himself the
buyer's tenant of possession), cessio vindicationis (the seller
assigns his claim to possession). When a chattel is bought
in a shop and taken home, the two contracts, obligatory
and translatory, are simultaneous.
The last-mentioned type of transaction is called "sale"
in the still-maintained terminology of the common law,
recalling ancient germanic law ( sala). In the Anglo-American sales acts as well as in many codes of the Latin group,
this appears as the basic kind of sales contract. The sales
acts and many civil codes even continue to make it appear
as though in principle any sales contract concerning a movable, would transfer ownership to the buyer. Within this
1

See RABEL, Recht des Warenkaufs 28 ff.
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group of conservative formulas, there is, however, a certain
division. The American Uniform Sales Act, section I9,
rule I, presumes that the parties intend the property to pass
to the buyer when the contract is made. The CodeN apole6n,
article I IJ8, makes the buyer of the chattel the owner "at
the moment when it ought to have been delivered," which
was commonly, against occasional protest, construed as
meaning only the time of contracting; the text has been taken
more seriously in recent comment. Yet, en fait de meubles,
la possession vaut titre, Civil Code, article 2279; the prevailing doctrine, therefore, restricts the translative effect of
a sale without transfer of possession so as to give the buyer
title only as between the parties. Some modern French
scholars seem inclined to recognize that such property, not
effective against third parties, is no property at all. 2
In daily application to modern life, all these contrasts
are not nearly so acute as they seem in theory. There is no
difficulty in dividing, whether in common law 3 or FrenchItalian law,~ an executed sale into an executory contract
and its performance by transfer of money and property.
Even the cash-and-carry transactions, with which the overaged concept of "sale" continues to agree and which are of
course still frequent in daily retail commerce, can thus be
analyzed as double acts. In all important commercial dealings, the dualistic approach is indispensable. In fact, it has
been followed in this country with slowly increasing aware2 This was the view of HENRI CAPITANT, as orally told to the writer. He
preferred the Roman system. The interpretation of C. C. arts. II38 and 1583
with respect to the transfer of property will be discussed in more detail in
Vol. IV, Ch. 54·
3 Cf., for instance, BENJAMIN, On Sale 315.
4 See GoRLA, La Compravendita 5-10. A practical argument sometimes used
in civil law for distinguishing the sale of movables from an executory contract is that the buyer having paid cash in a shop should not be forced to
prove his payment. But why should there not be a presumption of payment
where contract and delivery are proved to have occurred in the shop and
the buyer has no charge account?
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ness through the Uniform Sales Act to the most recent
American drafts of a Revised Uniform Sales Act. The
French doctrine has cumulated exceptions to article 1138,
until the principle that the sales contract passes title has
been hollowed out. And for the great majority of commercial sales, business practice has largely overcome the
differences in the legal systems.
Classification. Therefore the municipal divergencies mentioned above really cause only limited conflicts. N evertheless, the question remains what law should determine
whether the contract transfers title. Some answers suffer
from the traditional undue influence of the municipal systems themselves. Under the one-sided impulse of the French
and Italian codes, the law governing the contract, which is
by another mistake usually identified with the law of the
place of contracting, decides also whether title passes by
contracting. 5 Others have restricted the application of the
law of the contract to the so-called passing of title between
the parties; effects in relation to third persons would depend
on the law governing title. 6 Fortunately, on the Continent
a third view has come into ascendance, namely, that obligation and title are to be thoroughly segregated with the
understanding that the law of the situs also covers the relationship of the parties with each other respecting the title. 7
The same view prevails in England. 8 The lex situs remains
predominant whether the transfer of property is to be
accomplished by contract or ((traditio." This proposition
5 VELLA, Obbligazioni 1095, cited by FBDOZZI-CERETI 741 n. I.
6 7 LAURENT §§ 222 ff., 283, 8 id. § 130 j RoLIN, Z Principes §§ 912 ff., 3 id.
§§ u67 ff. j DESPAGNET II36 § 395· Contra: DESBOIS, CJunet 1931, 281, Z90j
BATIFFOL 395 § 475 and cit.j FEDOZZI-CERETI 740 ff. j DIENA, Z Dir. Com. Int.

36 § ro6.
1 For instance, VALERY § 395; RAAPE, D. IPR. 335; 2 ARMIN JON 63 § 28;
NIBOYET 633 § 506.
s FALCONBRIDGE, Conflict of Laws 385, who should be consulted against the
recent theories of SCHMITTHOFF 1901 and CHESHIRE (ed. 3) 576.
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has been confirmed by the Institute of International Law. 9
In the same vein, the Hague Draft of I 93 I on conflicts
rules concerning sales of goods, article 6, number 3, refrains
from determining how ownership passes to the buyer because
this question is separate and not easily solved.
In the United States, the bewildering confusion of contract and title doctrines in the sales acts for a long time obscured the problem, and still seems to create great uncertainty. Prevailingly, courts have erred in the direction
of extending the law of the place of contracting to the
transfer of title. 10 Minor even approved the theory that a
conveyance, assignment, or sale, if valid where made, should
be upheld in every jurisdiction as between the parties. 11
Beale disputed this approach. He explained the fact that
most cases apply the law of the place of contracting to the
title question, by the coincidence that in the particular cases
the movables were situated in the state of contracting and in
this state "the transfer of the title depended on the validity
of the contract." 12 To the same effect, Goodrich describes as
typical a case where "the court stressed the law of the place
of contract, quoted approvingly a statement that the domiciliary law governed, and rendered a decision which applied
in fact the law of the situs of the property." 13 At present,
the Restatement has made it clear, and the point seems
undisputed that in sales no less than in other contracts, the
validity of the transfer of title and the nature of the interests created by the "contract" are ~xclusively governed by
the law of the place where the chattel is at the time of contracting. (§§ 257, 258)
Consequences. This universally and rightly accepted
9 Art. 2 par. 3 of the decisions of Madrid, 24 Annuaire ( 1911) 368, 394, cf.
the article by the reporter, DIENA, in Revue 1911, 561-586, at 564.
10 See PARMELE in I Whart<Jn 681 § 311 a j STUMBERG 367, cf. infra n. 22.
11 MINOR 293 § 128 and n. I.
12 2 BEALE 978 § 255.1.
1 3 GooDRICH 408 § 150 n. 84.
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opinion needs comment where the obligatory contract is
governed by a law other than that of the situs. Attention
is drawn in this respect to a paragraph in Beale's treatise:
"The question whether a sale can be avoided because
of the insolvency of the buyer depends on the law of the
state of situs at the time of sale, though the goods have
been taken into another state. By that law must be determined the validity of the consideration, whether a parol
sale passes title, and whether a sale is voidable for fraud." 14
Since § 257 of the Restatement, on which this paragraph
is based, exclusively deals with the validity of conveyances,
including legality of the transfer and transfer in fraud of
third persons, a reader might think that rescission on the
ground of insolvency of the buyer, invalidity of consideration and voidability for fraud are always considered incidents of the conveyance rather than of the contract. However, this cannot be the meaning, since it would not be borne
out by the cases alleged in support. Apart from some decisions cited but which are not in point/ 5 the cases concern
the rescission of the sales contract on the ground of initial
insolvency of the buyer/ 6 and are prompted by the particular statute of Pennsylvania allowing rescission by seller
only when a trick, artifice, or deception has been practiced
by the buyer, whereas other laws are more favorable to the
seller. The decisions are clearly based on the ordinary con14 2 BEALE 982 § 257.1.
In Continental law, the complications in case of insolvency and bankruptcy
were discussed as early as 1913 by DE BoEcK, Revue 1913, 289 ff., 793 ff.
15 Bulkley v. Honold ( 1856) 19 How. 390, deals with breach of warranty
in the sale of a vessel the situation of which is only one of several elements,
see infra Ch. 37 p. 92 n. 68. Arnold v. Shade ( 1858) 3 Phil a. 82, applies the
law indicated by contracting, performance, and seller's domicil to the transfer
of title to an insolvent buyer. Madry v. Young ( 1831) 3 La. 160, applies Mississippi law as lex situs to the title in a slave, but the same law to the
contract, because not only were the slaves there but also the contract was
made there.
16 This is also true of the case cited by BEALE, supra n. 14, for validity of
consideration.
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tractual tests and not on the situs of the chattel. 17 The
courts, thus, do not disregard the contractual element but,
on the contrary, neglect the possible significance of property
law.
The difference in the systems was sensed in the Mixed
Arbitral Tribunals when they had to decide which party
was affected by the seizure or loss of goods that had been
sold before World War I and were in transportation between countries having different rules for the transfer of
title. Thus, goods sold by a German to a Belgian buyer and
requisitioned by the German government while still on
German soil, were in the seller's ownership, according to
the principle of traditio ( BGB. § 929) ; therefore, it was
not the Belgian buyer who was expropriated by the war
measure. 18 In other instances, these tribunals shared in the
confusion so frequent in English and Latin doctrines, by
applying to the transfer of ownership the law intended by
the parties, as though title questions were included in party
autonomy. 19 Section 18 of the English Sales Act and sec17 In the order of BEALE's citation: Parker v. Byrnes (D. C. Mass. I87I)
I8 Fed. Cas. No. 10,728 (I Lowell 539): lex contractus, based on place of
contracting, seller's domicil and delivery, all in Boston. Mann v. Salsberg
(190I) 17 Pa. Super. Ct. 28o: lex loci solutionis, as the contract (before the
Uniform Sales Act was adopted in Pennsylvania in I9I5) is presumed to be
a contract for arrival (in Pennsylvania). Perlman v. Sartorius ( I894) I62
Pa. 320, 29 At!. 852: the Pennsylvania court applies Maryland law to which
locus contractus, locus solutionis, and seller's domicil point. Lowrey & Co. v.
Ulmer (1896) I Pa. Super. Ct. 425: the Pennsylvania court applies the law
of New York where the goods were shipped f. o. b. Whiting Mfg. Co. v.
Bank (I9oo) I5 Pa. Super. Ct. 4I9: exactly like the Perlman case. W. G.
Ward Lumber Co. v. American Lumber & Mfg. Co. (I9I5) 247 Pa. 267, 93
At!. 470: the Pennsylvania court applies the law of Ohio, because the contract
was made and, by delivery to carrier, was performed there. Kline v. Baker
(I868) 99 Mass. 253: applies Pennsylvania law indicated by the places of
contracting and performance (through delivery to the carrier) and domicil
of the seller.
18 Germano-Belgian Mixed Arb. Trib. (April 30, I923) 3 Recueil trib. arb.
mixtes 274· The Anglo-German Mixed Arb. Trib. (June u, I926) Charles
Semon & Co. v. German Government, 6 Recueil trib. arb. mixtes 75, Clunet
1926, I033, may also have applied the English Sales Act, s. I7, as lex situs
in shipping the goods to the claimants' agents in Germany.
19 Germano-Rumanian Mixed Arb. Trib. (June I6, I925) 5 Recueil trib.
arb. mixtes 200, Revue I927 1 97; contra: NIBOYET, ibid. at I08.
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tion 19 of the Uniform Sales Act allow the intention of the
parties to determine at what time the title shall pass, but
this is only a municipal law governing goods in its own territory. The parties have no power to choose this law of situs,
although they may choose the law for the obligatory contract. In case of goods sold and sent from Germany to
England and which arrived in English territory, the Tribunal correctly stated that property had not passed in Germany under the German law of property, but held that the
goods although in England were not transferred because
a German seller accustomed to his own law was not supposed to have intended to transfer until the buyer acquired
possession. 20 This fiction amounted to an extension of the
German property law to England; it was also out of place
because the question of risk was in issue and should have
been solved irrespective of all these problems.
2.

"Conditional Sales" (Sales with Transfer of Title on
Condition of Payment)

The difficulty of distinguishing transfer of title and
promise of transfer again has been felt in common law and
Latin countries in sales retaining full title in the seller until
payment. In Germany, under romanistic legislation, the
statement is obvious that in a sale with reservation of title
the contract is absolute, and merely the title is conditionaP1
In conflicts cases, American courts, treating conditional
sales as a unit, have applied the lex loci contractus to the
questions affecting the title (at least as between the parties) 22
20
Anglo-German Mixed Arb. Trib. (April 7, 1927) 7 Recueil trib. arb.
mixtes 345, criticized by RABEL and RAISER, 3 Z.ausi.PR. (1929) 62, 67.
21
BGB. § 455, and commentaries, for instance, RGR. Kom. (ed. 8) § 455
II I.
22
STUMBERG 367; 2 BEALE 1001 § 272.3; LEE, "Conflict of Laws Relating to
Installment Sales," 41 Mich. L. Rev. ( 1943) 445; Restatement §§ 273, 277,
and WILLISTON, 2 Sales § 339 only refer to "transfer of title."
In Louisiana, where the seller's privilege takes the place of conditional
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or, sometimes, the lex situs to certain obligations, instead
of separating obligation from the domain of lex situs. The
result, however, has been harmless to the extent that in
many cases where the lex loci contractus was applied, the
chattel was in the state of contracting, and that the lex loci
solutionis was resorted to when the seller promised to deliver the chattel in a certain state. In both cases, the law
applied was identical with the law of the situs, either at the
time of the contract, or at the critical time of delivery into
the power of the buyer. 23
More recently, a vivid discussion has been devoted to the
treatment of the seller's right to repossess and the buyer's
right of redemption. Again, the courts have qualified these
rights either as contractual or as interests subject to the
law of the situs. 24 In the Massachusetts case arousing most
of the debate/ 5 the question whether the buyer had a right
of redemption when the seller failed to give him notice of
foreclosure, was regarded by the majority of the court as
an incident of the contract and subjected to the law of the
place of contracting (Massachusetts). The dissenting vote,
on the contrary, emphasized the buyer's interest in the
chattel, created at the situs and governed by the lex situs
(New Hampshire). The latter view has been widely indorsed26 and adopted in the Restatement, § 28 r. It needs a
sounder motivating force. Although the right to retake and
sale, lex loci contractus is applied to foreign-concluded conditional sales, excepting evasion. Overland Texarkana Co. v. Bickley (1922) 152 La. 622, 94
So. 138.
23 25 A. L. R. at u62; WHARTON § 416 f.; 87 A. L. R. 1309 at I3I4i
LoRENZEN, 31 Yale L. ]. (1921) 6o-62; 2 BEALE 1002 § 272.4; WILLISTON,
2 Sales § 339 n. II.
24 See Note, "Determination of Law Governing Power of Redemption in
Conditional Sales of Chattels," 43 Yale L. ]. ( 1934) 323.
25Thomas G. Jewett v. Keystone Driller Co. {1933) 282 Mass. 469, 185
N. E. 369; critical Notes, 47 Harv. L. Rev. (1934) 128; 33 Col. L. Rev.
(1933) 1061; I I N.Y. U. L. Q. Rev. (1934) 281; 18 Minn. L. Rev. (1934)
431, 474; 43 Yale L. J. (1934) 323.
26 Thus in all Notes cited supra n. 25; LORENZEN, Cases 643; 2 BEALE IOOI
n, 6 j GOODRICH 418 § 153 and n. 120.
5
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the right to redeem are fair matters of property, there are
corresponding rights and duties within the "contract." Yet,
since it would be unsound to recognize two laws for the two
sides of the same matter, the lex situs must be established as a special subsidiary law to cover the problems of
repossession. 27
This suggestion extends to a series of problems not included in the current American discussion. For instance,
the municipal laws vary with respect to the relation of
repossession by the vendor to rescission. In the United
States, despite some peculiar doctrines, 28 the tendency is to
allow the conditional seller in case of nonpayment to retake
possession in order either to collect the price from the proceeds or to rescind the contract; apart from statute and
agreement, reclaiming the goods is deemed to be an election
to rescind the contract, which frees the buyer. 29 German
prevailing opinion assumes that retaking without attaching
the chattel does not necessarily mean rescission, although
it may, and some writers have stressed the unfairness of
repossession without cancelling the contract. 30 The Austrian
Supreme Court, in fact, has rejected this right. 31 The Swiss
Code eliminates both remedies involved in conditional sales,
if not stipulated. 32 It would be entirely impractical to decide
this question under any other law than that of the situs,
which determines the right of retaking.
I understand GooDRICH ibid. to the same effect.
The Supreme Court of Michigan, in a series of cases, has assumed
that it is "inconsistent" for a seller to stipulate in the agreement reservation
of title and recovery of the price; he may base his claim of price only on an
absolute sale with reservation of a mere security interest which amounts to
a mortgage or a lien. See Atkinson v. Japink (1915) 186 Mich. 335, 152
N. W. 1079; Peter Schuttler Co. v. Gunther (1923) 222 Mich. 430,· 192
N. W. 661. For a more exact expression, see GEORGE BoGERT, 2A U. L. A. 8
§ 8, 169 § 124, 172 § 126.
29 Uniform Conditional Sales Act, §§ 21, 23; WILLISTON, 3 Sales § 579b.
30 See GuNTER STULZ, Der Eig;entumsvorbehalt im in- und ausliindischen
Recht (ed. 3), and Law on Installment Contracts, of May 16, 1894, § 5·
31 Austria: OGH., GIU. N. F. Nos. 2656, 2801 (installment payments).
32 C. Obi. arts. 226, 227 par. 2, cf. 214 par. 3·
27
28
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Therefore, although the questions concerning rescission
and the effect of conditions upon the existence of the contract are legal incidents of the contract, those obligatory
problems closely connected with the property in the chattel,
in the absence of a party agreement, are decidedly influenced
by this connection, and thus indirectly governed by the law
of the particular situs. In the prevailing view, this law is
that of the state in which the property was delivered rather
than that in which the vendor retakes the chattel or which
regulates procedure and subsequent events. 33 It seems confusing that many conditional sales contracts include the
vague clause that "the terms shall be in conformity with the
laws of any state wherein it may be sought to be enforced." 34
3· Unpaid Seller's Privilege
The existence and extent of a lien or security title for
the vendor's claims as regards price and damages are determined in the Restatement by the law of the place "where the
chattel is at the time when the pledge or lien is created." 35
Since, however, the nature of a lien as a pure right in rem
is not settled in all instances, the law of the contract has not
been generally excluded. 36
In particular, does the French privilege du vendeur really
depend only on the lex situs? Beale seems inclined to favor
this view. 37 In a comparable gesture, the authors of the
Hague Draft of I 93 I, article 6, excluded from its scope not
only rights in rem and creditor actions for fraudulent alienation but also the seller's privilege. The nature of this legal
prerogative accompanying the sales contract is very con33

See particularly, GooDRICH 418 § 153 n. 119.
See, for instance, Stevenson v. Lima Locomotive Works (1943) 180
Tenn. 137, 172 S. W. (2d) 812, 148 A. L. R. 370, 375·
35 Restatement § 279.
36 FALCONBRIDGE, Conflict of Laws 401 and n. (i) citing Note, 64 L. R. A.
( 1904) 831 f.
37
2 BEALE 1008 § 279·3; definitely so, NIBOYET, 4 Traite 463.
34
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troversial in France, and the problems have been inherited
by Louisiana. 38 Rights of third persons protected by the law
of the place where the goods are at a given time, of course
restrict the effect of the privilege, if this law so decides. 39
But which law creates the privilege?
The Supreme Court of Louisiana has developed a doctrine in which it restricts the privilege granted in the Civil
Code to sales contracts executed in the state. 40 But some
local "completion" of a foreign-negotiated contract has
been held a sufficient basis for applying the domestic law
including the privilege. 41 The gist of the doctrine 42 seems to
be that the privilege attaches to contracts governed by
Louisiana law, the test being fixed by the lex loci contractus.
"A common law contract cannot claim the vendor's privilege
given by the Civil Code of Louisiana." 43 The drawbacks
of this theory are climaxed by the curious application of
Louisiana law even though the goods may be in a foreign
state at the time of contracting. A Dutch court has recognized the unlimited application of the law of the contract
so as to recognize the Belgian court's refusal of priority for
the seller's claim in Dutch bankruptcy proceedings. 44
However, neither the lex situs alone nor the law of the
contract alone can be decisive. The correct view was laid
down by the Institute of International Law in 1910: the
lex situs has the power "to limit or exclude . . . the effects
of privileges established by the law governing the legal
relationship to which the privilege is attached." 45
38 Louisiana C. C. ( 1870) art. 3227 par. I; B. MARGOLIN, "Vendor's Privilege," 4 Tul. L. Rev. (1930) 239· In Quebec the institution has been refused
adoption, C. C. art. 1012.
39 7 LAURENT 267 § 212; RoLIN, 3 Principes 477 § 1446, 490 § 1457.
40 H. B. Claflin & Co. v. D. A. Mayer ( 1889) 41 La. Ann. 1048, 7 So. 139·
4 1 Mcilvaine and Speigel v. Legare (1884) 36 La. Ann. 359·
42
See the cases cited by 2 BEALE 1008 § 279·3·
43 G. A. Gray Co. v. Taylor Bros. Iron-Works Co., Ltd. (C. C. A. 5th
1894) 66 Fed. 686, 689.
44 App. Hertogenbusch (June 22, 1909) Heijmans v. Bolsius, Clunet 1912,
6o1.
45 Madrid 1910, 24 Annuaire (1911) 394 art. 3·
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There is a third law to be considered in an analogous
manner: the law governing bankruptcy proceedings involving assets of the buyer. It is neither to be ignored nor exclusively to be observed. Conflicts have been caused in the
three neighboring states, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, through different rules on the treatment of the prerogative in bankruptcy. 46 Public policy has been unnecessarily invoked, 47 and the Dutch Supreme Court has rendered
a most erroneous decision by resorting to the exclusive use
of the lex fori. 48 The court went so far as to grant the vendor a preference under Dutch law which he would not have
enjoyed under the Belgian laws of the contract.
The effect of rescission on third persons and their status
in bankruptcy proceedings are questions which require
reference to very different connections. 49
4· Risk of Loss
The buyer bears the "risk of loss," when he has to pay
the price despite destruction, seizure, theft, or deterioration
of the goods occurring without the fault of either party.
In the old doctrine, which still appears in the English and
American sales acts as a principle, though susceptible of
exceptions, risk of loss passes with the title. Many writers
46 Effect in bankruptcy is denied in France, C. Com. art. 550 par. 6, allowed in the case of certain machines in Belgium, C. Com. art. 546 and
Law of Dec. 16, 1857, art. 20, and generally granted in the Netherlands, BW.
arts. u8o, n85(3), II90.
47 In a case of a bankrupt buyer where the apparatus sold was in Belgium,
Trib. com. Seine (Sept. 6, 1906) Clunet 1907, 366, Revue 1909, 582 applied
French law as that of the place of contracting and at the same time as
prescribed by public order. The Belgian Trib. civ. Liege (Nov. 14, 1907)
Revue 1909, 961 denied exequatur to this French judgment on the theory of
lex situs and on the ground of Belgian public order. Cf. Note, LACHAU, Revue
1909, 588; 2 FRANKENSTEIN 91 n. 187; 8 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT § 1287.
48 Rb. Amsterdam (Oct. 29, 1915) W. 9935 applied the Belgian law of
the contract but was reversed, Hof Amsterdam (Nov. 3, 1916) W. 10069,
and H. R. (June 15, 1917) W. 10139, 1 VAN HASSELT 137. See the criticism by
TRAVERS, 7 Droit Com. Int. I 423 § 11432.
49
See for such a discussion, TRAVERS, id. §§ 11435, 11438 ff.
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still naively repeat the slogan of the doctrine of liability
for tort, casum sentit dominus, as if it indicated the doctrine of risk.
Based on this tradition, reputed French writers have
thought that since in French municipal law risk is bound
together with property, its transfer must be governed in
French courts by the statute real, whereas German courts,
according to their different characterization, would have to
apply the law governing the contract. 50 Such characterization, in this case, would not be determined by the law of the
forum but by the law governing the contract. 51 However,
the premise is wrong in all respects. Neither in France nor
anywhere else, despite traditional pronouncements, is it
true that risk passes necessarily with the title. In the case
where the seller has to ship the goods and his obligation
ends with the shipment (sale for shipment), which is the
great rule of all sales not confined to one town, risk passes
with the shipment in all laws and systems. In overseas commerce, the risk is regularly shifted to the buyer through
delivery to the vessel, although ownership is, with the exception of the United States, ordinarily transferred through
the arrival of the documents of title. The distribution of
risk of loss is felt to be an essential part of the contract;
it is the most conspicuous item in commercial offers and
forms. Property, on the other hand, is a legal matter, practically always left by the parties to subsequent consideration
by the lawyers in cases of divergence.
There was unanimity in the Committee on the International Sales Act that risk and title can and must be separated; the same view was held by all but three governments
answering the Dutch questionnaire for the Sixth Hague
50 DESBOIS 1 CJunet
EsMEIN in Planiol et
51 DESBOIS1

id.

296

1931, 281, 295 approved by BATIFFOL 399 § 479;
Ripert, 6 Traite Pratique §§ 412 ff.
n. 17 par. 2.

cf.
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Conference52 and by the Committee of I 93 I which established the last draft on the conflicts rules for sales. Scarcely
worth mentioning are other suggestions of special laws for
the problem of risk. 63
If we neatly isolate the question of who bears the risk of
casual events after the seller surrenders the goods, or what
casual events burden the buyer, we have no doubt that the
question belongs to the law governing the contract. 54 This
solution has been expressly adopted by the Hague Draft
of I 93 I , 55 and appears indispensable, because the passage
of risk, the duties of delivery, the duty of taking delivery,
and certain collateral duties 56 are essentially interwoven.
The unhappy German method of attributing the duties
of either party to the law of his domicil requires determination of the question whose obligation is concerned in the
passing of the risk. One decision declared it an obligation
of an English merchant who had sold f. o. b. Hamburg to
bear the risk so long as it did not pass to the buyer under
his own, viz. English, law. 57 But other cases have shifted
the emphasis to the question whether the buyer owes the
price, so as to call for the buyer's law. 58 The first argument
is evidently wrong, although the result is desirable. The
second produces strange results, when the law of the buyer's
52 Only Hungary, Japan, and Spain wanted to have risk of loss excluded
from the convention because of its connection with property. Inclusion was
approved by Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Rumania, Sweden, and Switzerland.
Cf. }uLLIOT DE LA MoRANDIIlRE, supra Ch. 36 n. I.
63 For the application of the law of the defendant party, 2 BAR 16, 107;
ALMEN, I Skandinav. Kaufrecht 55· Contra: DrENA, 2 Dir. Com. Int. 42
§ 107. Another strange proposal by 2 FRANKENSTEIN 299 has had no appeal.
54 To the same effect, e.g., BAGGE, Recueil I928 V 201; FEDOZZI-CERETI 741.
55 7 Z.ausi.PR. (1933) 958 art. 6 (3): The present Convention is not applicable . . . to the transfe:P of title, but with the understanding that the
question of risk is subject to the law determined by this Convention.
56 Infra II, 2, p. 96.
5 7 OLG. Hamburg (Oct. 24, I907) 2I Z.int.R. 68, Clunet 1909, 217.
68 OLG. Kiel (July 2, 1918) Schleswig-Holsteinische Anzeigen 1919, 27,
cited by LEWALD, IO Repert 81 No. 47·
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domicil has more exigent conditions for the passage of risk
than the law of the seller. 59 If, for instance, a Frenchman
by correspondence sells a specific lot of silk to a German
who is to take delivery in Lyons, risk passes in France at the
time of contracting, whereas under German law it would
not yet pass. If the silk is burned in the meantime by accidental fire, should the buyer be liberated from his debt,
although French law entitles the seller to the price? This
is a queer solution in view of the fact that German law is
not considered to govern the entire contract. 60 Only one law
can conveniently govern both parties.
Again, the variety of substantive rules concerning the
transfer of risk is by far less conspicuous in international
trade than in the civil codes. There is an impressive bulk
of uniform usages and rules beyond any national law. In
addition, modern insurance largely diminishes the burden
of risk. Yet some differences remain. An example is presented by the English principle that, if goods, shipped in
the time prescribed by the contract, perish on the voyage
overseas, the seller may nevertheless tender the bill of lading to the buyer with full effect. 61 The seller may do this
even knowing that the goods are lost. 62 French courts do
not allow such tender except when the seller is "in good
faith. " 63 German courts require transmission of the documents or notice of shipment of the goods appropriated to
the contract, before risk can pass, thus excluding retroactive
59 Such a case was construed as between Germany and England, RABELRAISER, 3 Z.ausi.PR. ( 1929) 77, 78; I should consider it, however, certain that
present English courts ought to recognize the passing of the risk by shipping
(as suggested at p. 8o n. r ibid.) irrespective of reception or proof of arrival
of the goods.
so See RABEL-RAISER, id. 8o; approved by RAAPE, D. IPR. 293 against
HAUDEK 84. Cf. NEUNER, 2 Z.ausi.P.R. ( 1928) 123 ff.
61 Atkin, }., in C. Groom, Ltd. v. Barber [r9I5] I K. B. 316, 324.
6 2 Manbre Saccharine Co. v. Corn Products Co., Ltd. [I9I9] I K. B. I98:
S. S. Algonquin, carrying starch and syrup c. i. f. London, was sunk by submarine or mine. Cf. KENNEDY, C. I. F. Contracts 119. WILLISTON, 2 Sales

106 n. 13.
63

See Note, AUBRUN, to App. Paris (Jan. 2I, I920) D. I92I. 2.IOI.
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effect of the tender of documents upon the risk. 64 It would
seem self-evident that the choice of law among these solutions can only be made for any individual type of contract,
irrespective of the passing of the title which depends on
valid tender and acceptance of the documents or is accomplished by shipment, according to the theory adopted.
II.
I.

VARIOUS INCIDENTS

Warranty of Quality

(a) American decisions. Stumberg65 has reviewed the
cases which for the most part antedate the time when the
Uniform Sales Act unified the law of warranty. He finds
that the courts applied the law of the state where the contract was made, or made and performed. But he wisely
warns against such "metaphysical arguments" and recommends referring all questions concerning the undertaking
of the vendor to the state into which the goods are sent.
The real impulses behind the decisions collected by Stumberg, however, seem exactly to follow the recognition of
the place of "delivery" usual in commerce and emphasized
here. Thus, the standard of quality was determined for
branded potatoes, delivered by the seller who was in Maryland to the carrier f. o. b. M~ryland, according to the
standard of that state. 66 The trade terms and usages of
South Carolina were held to control a shipment of sheep
manure from Chicago to South Carolina, because delivery
had to be made at arrival against payment of the draft
accompanying the bill of lading. 67 The option between
rescission and price reduction, adopted in Louisiana from
the civil law model, was accorded to a buyer of New Or88 RGZ. 389; 92 id. u8; 93 id. r66.
372-375.
ss Miles v. Vermont Fruit Co. (1924) 98 Vt. r, 124 Atl. 559·
67 Markey v. Brunson (C. C. A. 4th 1923) 286 Fed. 893.
64

65 STUMBERG
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leans when a New York vendor sold a ship, then in port
at New Orleans, and delivered it there to a buyer there
residing. 68 Merchantable quality of two pianos was required
under the law of Pennsylvania where the selling manufacturer resided and where he delivered the objects, as
Stumberg adds, apparently to a carrier. 69 Finally, in the
case of strawberries shipped from Arkansas to Massachusetts, Arkansas law was applied to the effect that acceptance of the goods by the buyer was not a bar to an action
for breach of an express warranty/ 0 which was correct if
the sale was for shipment in the ordinary manner.
However, these decisions, applying the law of the contract and determining correctly this law, all deal with problems certainly belonging to its general scope. No special
conflicts rule, hence, is noticeable. But some rule of such
kind may be suggested by the European discussion to which
we now turn.
(b) Civil law doctrines. Agreement has been reached
that the law of the contract determines, on one hand, the
extent of the buyer's examination of the goods as to
quantity, weight, and quality, and on the other hand, the
remedies for breach of warranty of quality, such as rescission, recoupment, damages, and substitute delivery. Considerable doubts, however, have been caused by certain particulars of the law of warranty. What law should decide
on the activity necessary for the buyer to avail himself of
the remedies for breach of warranty? This concerns in the
first place the form and time of an examination of the goods,
the duty of giving notice of defects, and the period in which
action must be brought. In the second place, the discussion
involves the effects of omissions in these regards as well as
the duty of the buyer to take care of goods rejected by him.
68

Bulkley v. Honold (1856) 19 How. 390.
Snow v. The Shomacker Mfg. Co. (1881) 69 Ala. III, 44 Am. Rep. 509.
70 Willson v. Vlahos (1929) z66 Mass. 370, 165 N. E. 408.
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The buyer has no duty of examining the goods, but only
a "burden": his failure of examination leaves him ignorant
of defects discoverable and therefore subject to notice. For
this activity the agreement of the parties or the usages
look to a certain place according to the circumstances, such
as consignment to the buyer, to his agent or subpurchaser,
or to the buyer for immediate transhipment to a purchaser
without inspection, et cetera.
The important proposal of the Hague Draft of 1931,
article 5, answers the question in the most satisfactory manner as follows :
In the absence of an express clause to the contrary, the
internal law of the country where according to the contract
the goods delivered ought to be inspected, shall apply with
respect to the formalities and the time within which the
examination and notifications must take place as well as the
measures to be taken in case of rejection of the goods. 71
(c) Duty of giving notice. The imposition on the buyer
placed by § 49 of the Uniform Sales Act that he should give
notice of a breach of promise or warranty within a reasonable time after the buyer's knowledge of breach has unified
the once greatly varying state laws. Correspondingly, no
cases affecting the problem seem to exist.
The situation abroad is very different. 72 In most countries
having separate codes for civil and commercial laws, nonmercantile buyers have generally been under no duty of
giving notice but must only observe the period of limitation of actions for breach of warranty, commonly six months
after delivery. 73 In the United States, a somewhat related
discrimination against merchant buyers has recently been
suggested. 74
7 Z.ausi.PR. ( I933) 958.
The assertion by HERZFELD, Kauf und Darlehen 98 that this duty is
known in all countries in the same manner, is very wrong.
73 See, e.g., German BGB. §§ 459 ff. in contrast to HGB. § 377·
14Revised Uniform Sales Act, Proposed Final Draft No. I (I944) §§ 92 (I),
95 (b).
71

72
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Three opinions have been advanced, suggesting (I) the
law of the contract ;75 ( 2) the law of the place where the
buyer has to perform his duty of taking delivery against
payment ;76 and ( 3) the law of the place where he has to
provide for examination of the goods. 77 The second test was
adopted by the German Supreme Court in abandoning
former attempts to enforce its theory of splitting the contract.78 The court felt that a unified and special approach
was needed. 79 But its stand is too much influenced by the
doctrine of locus solutionis. The place where the goods are
tendered to the buyer is not necessarily the place where he
is supposed to inspect them. Therefore, the third opinion,
which has been literally accepted by the Hague Draft of
I 93 I, quoted above, is preferable.
Fairness, in fact, seems to demand that a buyer should
not be compelled to study the rules of a distant country for
his own proceeding, provided that the contract does not
explicitly prescribe the conditions of his claim, which it does
very frequently.
(d) Method of examination. If goods are to be examined in France, obviously the judicial expertise prescribed
there must be carried out. In Eastern Asia, where certain
practices of "survey" are usual for certain kinds of goods,
75 Former German decisions cited by LEWALD 254, also HERZFELD, Kauf
und Darlehen 98 ff.; the German government wanted this rule, contrary to
the views of all other Notes of governments at the Sixth Hague Conference.
Switzerland: BG. (Mar. 5, 1923) 49 BGE. II 70 (buyer's domicil as locus
solutionis); BG. (Dec. 3, 1946) 72 BGE. II 405, 411 (lex loci solutionis for
delivery, examination, and acceptance).
16 Germany: 46 RGZ. 193; 73 id. 379 (rescission); 81 id. 273 (damages);
see also LEWALD 254, 255 (aa) and (bb).
Switzerland: BG. (Dec. 3, 1946) 72 BGE. 405, 413 (form and time for
examination and notice of defects; place where the goods are at the time of
examination).
11 BAGGE, Recuei] 1928 V at 167; FEDOZZI-CERET! 741 n. 3; ALTEN in Sixth
Hague Conference, Actes 327.
Switzerland: BG. (Jan. 16, 1930) 56 BGE. II 38, Clunet 1930, 1168.
78 RG. (Feb. 4, 1913) 81 RGZ. 273; dictum (April 21, 1925) 17 Warn.
Rspr. (1925) 240; HEINICHEN in 3 Staub (ed. 14) 551, Anhang zu § 372 n. 9·
79 See LEWALD 254 f.
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expert merchants or a consulate officer intervening, these
forms are contemplated by the parties, or by the usages
binding them, even though they are in Europe. Generally,
it is considered that if different formalities are prescribed
at the various places, the law of the place where the goods
are to be inspected is preferable to the law of the contract;
this is recommended in the interest of the buyer, but sometimes also that of the seller, for instance, where he turns
to a lawyer of the place prescribed for examination, who
knows only the local law. It is, hence, a settled rule that the
methods and proceedings of the place in which the examination is to occur must be observed. This might be expected
to be recognized under any law, but the above proposal of
the Hague Draft, which assures the same result through
a special conflicts rule, may be advisable.
(e) Time for notice of defects. An attempt to have the
law of the forum determine the time in which the seller must
be notified of a defect in quality or quantity, 80 has been
commonly rejected. Another controversy concerns the question whether such provisions pertain to the form or the
substance of the matter. But whatever the answer, provisions regarding notice are so closely connected with those
requiring examination that it has been declared impracticable
to choose them from different laws. 81 This seems justified,
if we have in mind an agent of the buyer at a remote place
(but, of course, a place within the contemplation of the
parties). The law of this place should determine for all
practical purposes the diligence that the buyer owes to the
seller.
(f) Custody of rejected goods. To the described scope of
the local law the Hague Draft in its final stage has added
only the buyer's duty to preserve goods that he has rejected. 82
80

App. Amiens (Feb. n, 1905) Revue 1907, 216, approved by VALERY 991

§ 68].
81
82

RoLIN, 3 Principes 200 § 1186, referring to numerous Belgian decisions.
Report of ]ULLIOT de Ia MoRANDIIlRE, suPra Ch. 36 n. r, 27 par. 4·
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The Draft has not extended the local law to the legal
consequences of the buyer's failure to give notice, not even
insofar as such omission is deemed to deprive the buyer of
certain or all remedies, by presumed waiver or by force of
law. The silence of the draft is too prudent; it is intended
to empower a judge to resort to the local law, should he
find a necessary tie between the legal effects of omitting the
notice and the prescribed time of notice. An express conflicts rule would be preferable.
2.

Collateral Duties

Although most collateral duties are, as a matter of course,
controlled by the law of the contract, 83 doubt may arise
about the classification of the seller's obligation to tender
the documents and of the buyer's obligation to furnish a
letter of credit.
(a) Tender of documents. The vendor's liability with
respect to the dispatch and arrival of the bill of lading,
invoice, insurance policy, and other documents required by
custom or the terms of the contract has been neglected. Of
course, what documents are required, is in the last resort
answered under the law of the contract.
Is the same true, for instance, with respect to the question mentioned before, 84 whether the seller may tender the
documents after destruction of the goods, or even when he
knows of their loss, and yet fulfill thereby his obligation,
so as to transfer the risk retroactively? And if the documents are regularly dispatched, may they reach the buyer
after the arrival of the vessel in the port of destination and
after unloading is commenced, as agreed in common law, 85
or not, as in France ?86 An English writer has presumed that
83

Swiss BG. (March 8, 1913) 39 BGE. II 161, 166.
See supra p. 90.
85 Brett, M. R., in Sanders Brothers v. Maclean ( 1883) II Q. B. D. 327,
337-C. A.; BENJAMIN, On Sale 776 If.
8 6 France: GEORGES SCHWOB, Les contrats de Ia London Corn Trade
Association ( 1928) 251.
84
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the documents ought to be tendered at the buyer's place of
business or residence. 87 Another English lawyer has, indeed,
postulated that the law of the buyer's domicil should apply
to the entire sales contract because of the duty of getting
the documents to the buyer. 88
It does not appear in the English cases applying English
law as a matter of course, that the buyer must presumably
receive the documents at his domicil; still less is that a
universal rule. At any rate, the choice of law is better
directed toward the law of the contract, which is usually
the seller's law and which must consider the usage at the
port of arrival.
(b) Furnishing letter of credit. The problem is illustrated by a case decided by a court in Geneva. The contract
was made in Calcutta where the seller was domiciled, and
where the bags of jute sold were to be delivered c. i. f.
Piraeus, Greece. The buyer, seemingly in Athens, had to
furnish a letter of credit, and offered a credit letter issued
by a London city bank. The court held in effect that the
seller could expect exchange of the documents against payment in Calcutta without the delay required by transmitting
the documents to London, and that by application of Indian
law, as law of conclusion and performance, the buyer was
in default. 89 The holding is right but the argument is wrong.
In this case, Calcutta, in addition to being the place for the
buyer's performance, was the place of the seller's domicil
and of shipment. Hence, the contract was fully centered
there. On the other hand, if the contract had been satisfied
87 KENNEDY, C. I. F. Contracts uo, against the authoritative doubt of
Atkin,]., in Stein, Forbes & Co. v. County Tailoring Co. (1916) II5 L. T. R.
215.
The Warsaw-Oxford Rules, Rule 16, in an otherwise complete statement,
fails to indicate the place at which the documents should be "presented"
(presentes) to the buyer. Int. Law Ass'n, 37th Report (1933) 429.
88 CLAUGHTON ScOTT in Sixth Hague Conference, Actes 288. See supra
Ch. 36 p. 56 n. 25.
89 App. Geneve (March 4, 1932) Sem. Jud. 1932, 523, 527. An arbitration
clause for the Bengal Chamber of Commerce was found ineffective.
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with a credit by the London bank not made payable at
a bank in Calcutta, there would nevertheless be no reason
why English law should enter into the picture.
The lex contractus suffices in all these cases.
3· Measure of Damages
Excluding the law of the forum, the law of the contract
governs damages. This is the present view of the American
courts, 90 and the Restatement confirms it, although it identifies this law with the law of the place of performance. 91
The same is true with respect to the right and duty of a
party to ascertain the measure of general damages through
resale or repurchase, and with respect to analogous transactions for the purpose of minimizing the damage. Only
the forms of procedure and the intervention of officials in
such cases depend on the law of the place where the transactions occur. 92
4· Specific Performance
In an old decision the German Supreme Court argued
that the disability of a seller of goods at common law and
under the English Sale of Goods Act to sue the buyer for
90 Vol. II p. 542. See recently, State of Delaware, for Use of General
Crushed Stone Co. v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. {D. C. Del. 1943)
49 F. Supp. 467 {interest) ; Pennsylvania law was correctly applied not
because the entire contract was performed in that state, as the headline {13)
falsely asserts, but because the responsibility of the selling company ceased
with the delivery of stone to the carrier in Pennsylvania.
91 Restatement § 413, adopted by a few decisions and WILLISTON, 3 Sales
275 § 589d.
92
Italy: Cass. civ. (June 20, 1938) Foro Ita!. Rep. 1938, 2080 No. 457,
Giur Ita!. Rep. 1938, 789 No. 130: as it seems, the Italian buyer bought goods
in Germany, then sued in Italy for rescission and damages for breach, which
were allowed in principle. In a separate suit he demanded the balance after
resale by him of the defective goods, in accordance with German law. Held
that Italian law applied for competence and forms of the resale.
Switzerland: BG. {March 8, 1913) 39 BGE. II 161, 167: Cologne was the
place of performance for delivery and payment, expressly stipulated. Hence,
German law governed the resale made in Cologne.
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payment of the price before the passage of the title was a
part of English procedural law and therefore not applicable
in a German court. 93
This result may be questioned, insofar as English law,
if applicable to a sales contract, in principle should be
applied as a whole, including the so-called "remedies." But
since judicial discretion under the equitable jurisdiction of
specific performance, not to mention the sanction of imprisonment for contempt, can scarcely be reproduced in a
civil law court, the procedural part of the English institution may be considered important by a foreign court. This
is the more acceptable, because in the inverse case an
English or American court can not help but resort to its
customary practice, although it may be inclined to favor
specific performance when an applicable foreign law grants
an action for satisfaction in kind. 94
5. Special Kinds of Sales

A painting was sold in England and delivered there.
Therefore English law applied to the contract. As the
seller reserved his right to repurchase under certain circumstances and the painting was brought to Pennsylvania, he
would have had to pay the repurchase price in that state.
The New York Court of Appeals, however, declared that
the law governing the main contract also applied to the
repurchase agreement. 95 This decision is obviously correct
and a memento against the splitting of contract stipulations.
The same may be said, for instance, of a sale on approval
and of a sale with a condition for return or approval, distinguished in civil law as sales under suspensive condition
of approval and under resolutive condition of disapproval.
93 RG. (April 28, 1900) 46 RGZ. 193, 199; cf. OLG. Hamburg (Oct. 31,
1924) 34 Z.int.R. (1925) at 450 f.
94 M. WoLFF, Priv. Int. Law 240 and n. 4·
95 Youssoupoff v. Widener (1927) 246 N.Y. 174, 158 N. E. 64.
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There is no reason why the ordinary tests should not extend
to the accessory agreement. 96
III.

PARTY AuTONOMY AND PuBLIC PoLICY

In the discussions of the international committees working on the conflicts rules concerning sales of goods, the problem of public policy has had a very big place. Finally, the
many objections raised against party agreements on the
applicable law, violating the various "imperative" rules,
were overcome with the result that clauses designating the
applicable law, either express or undoubtedly implied, are
valid, and this law includes the conditions of the consent
of the parties. 97 It is, then, left to each participant state
to deny "for reason of public order" application of the law
determined by the draft (Convention), that is, either that
agreed upon or in the absence of agreement, that directly
prescribed by the Convention. 98
If the courts would accept these simple rules and restrict
the public policy of the forum to the limits earlier advocated, 99 all desires would be fulfilled.
An illustration of fundamental conceptions of the forum
justifiably intervening is afforded by a German case of a
conditional sale on the installment plan, supposedly governed by Dutch law. A stipulation for the forfeiture of the
paid installments in case of default, allegedly valid under
Dutch law, was refused enforcement as offending the purpose of a German provision prohibiting such clauses. 100
96 Otherwise, HERZFELD, Kauf und Darlehen 99 and n. u8 who stresses
the precarious situation of the seller.
97
7 Z.ausl.PR. ( 193 3) 957 art. 2. The text requires an "express" clause,
but this term is awkwardly chosen.
98
7 id. art. 7·
99
Vol. II Ch. 33 p. 581.
100
RG. (March 28, 1931) 85 Scuff. Arch. 2oo, Clunet 1933, 162. Cf. German
Law of May 16, 1894, §§ 1, 6, concerning sales on installment payments.
This decision has been approved in Italy by FEDOZZI-CERETI 740 n. r and in
Brazil by EsPINOLA, 8 Tratado 613.
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Sale of Immovables
I.

WHAT LAw GovERNS THE CoNTRACT

ONCERNING the characterization as immovable,
the old traditional rule that lex situs determines
what rights are immovable, continues universally
despite the doctrinal objections of a few followers of the
"qualification according to lex fori." 1 This auxiliary conflicts rule on characterization promotes uniformity in the
domain of property as well as in that of contract.
In other respects, the picture is not so bright, and especially not in the United States. Here, the inconsistency
apparent in choice of law for contracts in general, repeats
itself in the special field of contractual promises to transfer
land or an interest in land. After many vain efforts to
extract a coherent law from the decisions, 2 the best way is
to recommend the rule approved by the majority of modern
legislation and literature.

C

I.

Lex Situs Compulsory

In the old doctrine, the law of the place where the land
is located, extended to all parts of the transaction by which
1Restatement § 208; Montevideo Treaty on Int. Civ. Law (1889) art. 26,
(1940) art. 32 (verbis "as to their quality"); C6digo Bustamante, art. 112.
See OSER-SCHOENENBERGER lxxvi No. 102; NEUNER, Der Sinn 130. For the
adversaries, see Vol. I p. 52 n. 30 and Vol. IV Ch. 54·
2 "When we look behind the decisions in relation to specific questions for
the formulation of a general and comprehensive criterion which will satisfactorily and consistently account for the results actually reached . . . disappointment generally ensues," Note, "Governing Law of Real Property Contracts," L. R. A. 1916A, IOII at 1015. "There is confusion in the authorities
upon the subject," GooDRICH, "Two States and Real Estate," 89 U. of Pa.
L. Rev. (1941) 417 at 420 n. 15.
101
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two parties sold and purchased any interest in land. Story
shared in this tradition3 and his close follower, Foelix,
wrote that the lex rei sitae governs "the obligations flowing
from the sale of an immovable, the causes operating its
nullity and its cancellation or rescission." 4
This clearly was the starting point of English and American conflicts law. Although its influence in the individual
cases is difficult to evaluate, the principle is certainly applied
when a court construes the contract, termed with characteristic vagueness "relating to land," as a single undivided
entity, subject to the lex situs. The Iowa court followed
this view in a decision discussed in the second volume, 5 as
it applied the statute of frauds of the situs without further
investigation.
In this country, however, the simplicity of the old doctrine
was efficiently shaken by the famous judgment of Holmes,
then a Massachusetts judge, in Polson v. Stewart. 6 The
court recognized as valid a contract made by a married
woman in North Carolina, although she promised to convey land in Massachusetts where she lacked capacity. In
other words, the state of the situs recognized the obligatory
contract of North Carolina as it stood. Theoretically at
least, it would seem that at present the ancient doctrine has
been abandoned in the United States, 7 as well as in most
countries. The Restatement fully recognizes the distinction
between conveyance or transfer of land and contract to
transfer or to convey land, and submits the validity of the
latter promises to the law of the place of contracting. 8
3

STORY §§ 372 ff.
FoEL!X (ed. 3) 110 § 6o. Similarly, FlORE §§ 215, 224, often criticized in
the literature, see as to Italy, FEoozzr 251.
5 Meylink v. Rhea (1904) 123 Iowa 310, 98 N. W. 779, discussed as to
formality Vol. II p. 489. For other cases, see L. R. A. 1916A, 1022 n. 36.
6 (1897) 167 Mass. 211, 45 N. E. 737, 36 L. R. A. 771; LoRENZEN, Cases 593·
7 See, for instance, II Am. Jur. (1937) 335 § 38 n. 2j 2 Beale§§ 340.1, 346.6,
s Restatement § 340 and comment.
4
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Remainders exist in Spain° and some other jurisdictions10
to the extent that the domestic law is prescribed with
respect to domestic immovables, in a one-sided public
policy.
Again, the Treaty of Montevideo reaches the same
result as the old doctrine under the theory of lex loci solutionis, forcibly applied to all contracts promising interests
in any property. 11
2.

Lex Loci Contractus

Beale and the Restatement postulate the law of the place
of contracting with respect to the validity of the contract,
whereas the lex situs operates in matters of performance. 12
Others have undertaken to harmonize the cases to the same
effect by the distinction that "executory contracts" to transfer real property are under the lex loci contractus, while
executed contracts follow the lex loci solutionis. 13
Misled by the theory of the last act in completing a
contract, a few decisions have applied the law of the place
9 See the Note of the Spanish Government to the Sixth Hague Conference,
Document I43; cf. also ECHAVARRI, 3 Cod. Com. 465.
to Brazil: (Requiring writing and registration, App. Alagoas (March 3,
I944) 27 Direito 404.) Former lntrod. C. C. art. I3 § un. III, cf. 2 PoNTES de
MIRANDA 243 1 criticized by ESPINOLA, 8 Trata'do 547 § I57 citing BEVILAQUA,
I C. C. Com. (ed. 6, I940) I36. The new art. 9 § I, however, seems to refer
only to formalities, cf. ESPINOLA, 8-C Tratado I8I3 § I56.
Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. 6 No. 3·
Switzerland: OsER-ScHOENENBERGER, Allgemeine Einleitung n. 48 and cited
authors; 2 ScHNITZER 556; Swiss law is the presumable law of contract, but
if another law applies to the contract, Swiss public policy governs the
obligatory promise to convey Swiss immovables.
Uruguay: C. C. art. 6; GUILLOT, I C. C. I23·
In Italy, some authors believed that a "vendita immobiliare" as a whole
had to be solemn. See Vol. II p. 490 n. I9, and for an application to the sale
of aircraft, LOMONACO 86 § I4. The contrary and correct view has been confirmed by the wording of C. C. (I942) art. I350, corresponding with old art.
I3I4 (I865).
11 Montevideo Treaty on Int. Civ. Law (I889) art. 34 par. un., (I940) art.
38 par. I (note the words "En consecuencia").
12 Restatement § 340; 2 BEALE II90 IZI6.
1
13 MINOR 3I § II; L. R. A. I9I6A, I027; this formulation seems to stem
from the wording of STORY § 363, first sent.

SPECIAL OBLIGATIONS

where the deed of conveyance was delivered, determining
thereby such problems as the measure of damages for breach
of contract. 14 This seems to mean that the entire obligatory
portion of the contract is under this law. It is uncertain
whether the same scope was intended in a decision determining the measure of damages for nondelivery of a deed. 15
The land was in South Dakota but the deed was promised
and to be delivered in Iowa. The court applied Iowa law.
This could mean a special conflicts rule for the isolated
duty of delivering the instrument, but probably does not
mean it. According to the Restatement, § 341 ( 1), the law
of the place where a deed of conveyance of an interest in
land is delivered determines "the contractual duties of the
grantor," which proposition seems to clash with every other
rule respecting contracts recognized in the Restatement.
Delivery of the deed is a condition of conveyance. That
the place where it is actually made, or for that matter,
where it is to occur, should determine the legal effects of
a conveyance, partly dislodging the significance of the situs
of the land, is a possible idea. But that the place of that
delivery should also localize the duty of the seller, to make
good a defective title to the land, cannot be ·reasonably
explained. This is a mere product of an obsolete concept of
breach of warranty.
These theories share in general the defects of emphasizing accidental localities, and some of them add the disadvantage of splitting title and obligation where no separation is required by the nature of the transaction.
3· Subsidiary Rule of Lex Situs
In the opinion prevailing in the world, obligations to
transfer land or interests in land are governed by lex situs,
14

15

Atwood v. Walker ( 1901) 179 Mass. 514, 61 N. E. 58.
Clark v. Belt (C. C. A. 8th 1915) 223 Fed. 573·
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where no other connection appears definitely required. This
law is regarded as presumably intended by the parties or
as the law most naturally competent. This is the undoubted
English doctrine ;16 it is taught in France, 11 Italy/ 8 and most
countries/ 9 shared in Germany in consequence of the predominance of the lex loci solutionis/0 and has been adopted
by international proposals. 21 There is also American authority for complying with the intention of the parties, for
which the location of the land may be important, 22 but
classification of the individual cases is difficult. 23
Exceptions to the subsidiary rule of the situs have been
16 England: Lloyd v. Guibert {1865) L. R. 1 Q. B. u5, ~~~;Rex. v. International Trustee [1937] A. c. soo, 529; WESTLAKE 269 § 216; DICEY s88,
953 If.; CHESHIRE (ed. 3) 712 If.; FALCONBRIDGE, Conflict of Laws 532; M.
WoLFF, Priv. Int. Law 441, 533·
1 7 France: NIBOYET in 2 Repert. 251 § 63; LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE, D.
1931.2.33; BATIFFOL 108 §§ 122 If., 393 §§ 471 ff. Contra: BARTIN, ~ Principes
65 n. 5 without argument.
18 FEDOZZI-CERETI 741.
1 9 The Netherlands: KosTERS 756; MuLDER 170.
Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. 8 No. 2.
Switzerland: OsER-SCHOENENBERG No. 102; BECKER in 6 Gmur Vorbemerkungen zu, arts. 184-186 No. 27.
Contra: RoLIN, Revue Dr. Int. {Bruxelles) {1908) 6o~ {in contrast to
leases of immovables).
20 RG. {Oct. 14, 1897) JW. 1897, 581; {Dec. 7, 1920) tot RGZ. 64; NussBAUM, D. IPR. 232.
2 1 lost. of Int. Law (Florence), 22 Annuaire (1908) 290 art. 2 {b); Int.
Law Ass'n, Vienna Draft 1926, art. r, A, in 34th Report {1927) 509.
22 STORY § 363; GooDRICH 394 § 145; II Am. Jur. 335 § 38.
2 3 See, to the same effect, Note, L. R. A. 1916A at 1021 ff. The decisions
referred to by 2 BEALE II90 § 340, I at n. 4 'for the lex situs mostly concern
capacity, although Hamilton v. Glassell (C. C. A. 5th 1932) 57 F. {2d) 1032,
1033 is based on presumed party intention. LoRENZEN, 6 Repert. 307 Nos. 129,
130 does not regard lex situs as governing all phases of the contract, as
BATIFFOL IIO § 123 has understood; LORENZEN discusses the problem on
p. 324 No. 206.
The often cited decision in the New York case, Hotel Woodward Co. v.
Ford Motor Co. {C. C. A. 2d 1919) 258 Fed. 322 belongs to the several
cases where lex fori coincides with lex loci solutionis; in addition both
parties were domiciled in New York. The judge would personally have preferred the law of Georgia where the deed was executed.
The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Selover etc. v.
Walsh (1912) 226 U.S. II2 only confirms the constitutional power of a state
to apply the law of the place of contracting without deciding whether it
should do so under a sound conflicts rule.

I06

SPECIAL OBLIGATIONS

claimed, apart from a contrary agreement of the parties, 24
for land situated on a border, 25 and land that is only a small
part of an estate. 26 Certainly an exception must also be
admitted when both parties are domiciled in the same
country and there contract with respect to foreign land.

Illustrations. (i) An English decision applied English
law to the purchase of a share in a decedent's estate, including real and personal property in Chile, where the
parties were three brothers, all of them domiciled in
England, and the purchaser residing in Chile. 27 Presuming
that the court correctly found Chilean law unsuitable to
the contract, the lex loci contractus had so many relations
to the case including the domicil and residence of the vendors, that its application was justified.
( ii) When a contract on the installment plan for the
purchase of Colorado land was made in Minnesota and the
Minnesota court applied its domestic statute prescribing
a certain notice to be given before forfeiture of the paid
installment sums, the court invoked the principle that the
lex loci contractus applies when the price is to be paid in
the state. 28 But not only was the seller a corporation chartered and domiciled in Minnesota but the buyer was a citizen
of that state. For this reason it was a domestic contract.
(iii) Other cases are more doubtfuP 9 Where a contract
was made in California for the purchase of mining property
in Mexico with the price secured by notes and mortgages in
California, 30 the court failed to state that the California
connections were strong enough to sustain a tacit agreement
for California law. It should, then, not have applied this
law to the question of rescission.
24

England: British Controlled Oilfields v. Stagg (I92I) 127 L. T. R. 209.
British South Africa Co. v. De Beers Consol. Mines [I9IO] I Ch. 354;
z Ch. soz, C. A.; [I9I2] A. C. 52.
26 M. WoLFF, Priv. Int. Law 44I § 4I5.
27
Cood v. Cood ( I863) 33 L. J. Ch. (N. S.) 273, 278, criticized by M.
WoLFF, ibid.
28
Finnes v. Selover (I907) IOZ Minn. 334, II3 N. W. 883.
29
See BATIFFOL I I I ff. on American cases; NUSSBAUM, D. IPR. 232 on
certain decisions of lower German courts.
30
Loaiza v. Superior Ct. ( 1890) 8 5 Cal. 11, 24 Pac. 707, 9 L. R. A. 376.
The parties were English and Mexican nonresidents.
25
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Such subsidiary localization of the contract at the situs
is preferable to the artificial method of identifying the place
of contracting with the situs. An offer for the purchase of
land in Maryland was mailed from England and the acceptance mailed back; the deed should have been delivered in
England, but was not. The Maryland court invoked the
settled method of applying its own law qua lex situs, but
conceived this as an extension of the real property rule and
thought it should corroborate the result by an auxiliary
construction in the course of which the place of delivery
of the deed was discarded because no English town had
been named. 31 Neither approach was correct; the law of
the forum could simply be assumed to be the most closely
connected law.
In this prevailing view, obligatory and real property
transactions are distinguished, not only when they appear in
separate agreements or instruments as happens in many
countries, but also when they are closely knit together in a
deed of conveyance. The obligatory part of the entire transaction depends on the real property law of the situs only
insofar as no effect on the title or interests is possible without the consent of the state of situs. The situs prescribes the
kind and conditions of the transferable interest, the formalities of the transfer and capacity to alienate and acquire
such interest.
Equitable remedies. On the other hand, the subject has
become slightly complicated in common law because of the
intervention of equity jurisdiction. 32 The Court of Chancery,
by assuming a constructive trust and in other ways, undertook to right wrongs done by an English defendant with
3LLatrobe v. Winans {1899) 89 Md. 636, 43 Atl. 8z9.
32 BEALE, "Equitable Interests in Foreign Property," zo Harv. L. Rev.
(1907) 382; 2 BEALE 953 ff.; GooDRICH, supra n. 2, 425 ff.; GOODRICH 398
§ 147·

I08

SPECIAL OBLIGATIONS

regard to foreign land. In particular, the practice has been
settled that on a contract for selling or charging land, where
the land is outside the jurisdiction of English courts, an
action in personam is allowed to enforce the execution of a
correct sales instrument sufficient under the lex situs. 33 The
lex situs is thereby respected to the extent that no interest
in the land is deemed to be validly promised that does not
conform to the law of the situs. The promise to convey a
recognized interest, however, is effective irrespective of the
validity of the contract under the law of the situs. No AngloAmerican peculiarity of international bearing is noticeable
in this practice, as confined to the problems of taking jurisdiction and of administering the local equity procedure.
Only when the domestic law is applied despite the closer
connection of the contract with the situs, as has occurred
in some cases just for the purpose of taking jurisdiction
otherwise not obtainable, do these courts deviate from
normal jurisprudence.
II.

FORM AND CAPACITY

Form

I.

Whether a contract prom1smg to transfer an interest
in land must be written, authenticated, registered, or in
the form of a deed, is usually determined under the general
conflicts rules concerning formality. 34 In the doctrine prevailing throughout the world, this means that the contract
may comply either with the law of the place of contracting
or with the law governing the substance. 35 In this special
33

Lord Cottenham in Ex parte Pollard (I84o) Mont. & Ch. 239·
France: Lex loci contractus is emphasized by Cour Paris (June 6, I889)
Clunet I889, 826; NIBOYET 634 § 507, 2, but this can scarcely be meant as a
compulsory rule.
Germany: EG. BGB. art. u; cf. WALKER 332 n. 12; see Vol. II p. 490.
The Netherlands: OFFERHAus, 30 Yale L. ]. (I92I) II7.
Rumania: PLASTARA, 7 Repert. 77 No. 253·
I BAR 620; GIERKE, I D. Privatrecht 23I n. 6I; 2 MElLI 67.
35 Vol. II p. 487.
34
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application, this optional variant of locus regit actum is also
recognized in England, if not clearly by judicial authority,
at least by the writers. 36 The American approach, uncertain
between lex loci contractus and lex situs, would seem to
suggest a correction toward the same view. 37 The Treaty
of Montevideo, however, applies the lex situs under the
guise of lex loci solutionis. 38
In some countries, the lex situs is applied, either openly
or as a matter of public policy, to formalities when domestic
immovables are involved. 39
It will be discussed separately whether these rules extend
to the manifold provisions prescribing formalities for
authorizing agents to make a contract for the transfer of
land. 40
2.

Capacity

Although capacity to transfer an immovable, of course,
depends on the conflicts law of the country where it is situated, capacity to promise such transfer is distinguishable.
It was a question of the capacity of a married woman on
which Mr. Justice Holmes formulated the contrast between
personal covenants and the incidents of the lex situs .41
In conformity with their general attitude, common law
courts will prefer the law governing the contract, 42 whereas
36 CHESHIRE {ed. 3) 727, referring to In re Smith, Lawrence v. Kitson
[1916] 2 Ch. 206; M. WOLFF, Priv. Int. Law 533· DICEY 588, 957 favored the

proper law in certain cases.
37 GoODRICH 272 § 106 i BATIFFOL I II § 125.
38 Supra n. II.
39 Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. 6 ( 3) ; and others, supra n. 10.
40 Infra Ch. 40 p. 159.
41 Polson v. Stewart ( 1897) 167 Mass. 2II, 45 N. E. 737; see Vol. II p. 490
n. 17.
42 England: Bank of Africa, Ltd. v. Cohen [ 1909] 2 Ch. 129 (lex situs) ;
CHESHIRE ( ed. 3) 727; W. WoLFF, Priv. Int. Law 533 § 499·
United States: 2 BEALE II77; GooDRICH 383 § 145.
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at civil law the personal law governs. 43 The latter 1s also
sporadically applied in the United States. 44
If the promise is valid under the law of the contract,
but the promisor is unable to fulfill it because of incapacity
under the law of the situs, he at least owes damages for
not conveying the interest, 45 except in the state where the
land lies and in other states where he is regarded as incompetent.
III.

CovEN ANTS FOR TITLE

At common law, agreements in deeds of conveyance are
distinguished as those "running with the land" and those
not running. The former category includes promises creating
under certain conditions a benefit for, or a burden on, the
successors of the purchaser without, however, establishing
encumbrances that would benefit or burden any owner of
the land in the manner of a jus in re. (It is misleading,
therefore, to call these agreements "real covenants.")
Also the grantee may promise, for instance, restrictions on
building binding his successors in title.
Interstate conflicts exist mainly with respect to covenants
deemed to be implied in some states but not in others. For
instance, some states, by statutory or judicial construction,
interpret the words "grant and bargain" used by the grantor
as implying promises of good title, quiet enjoyment, and
freedom of encumbrances, in favor of the purchaser and all
persons acquiring from him through similar conveyances.
In the traditional view, covenants running with the land
43 Germany: EG. BGB. art. 7· For the authority of guardians, see OLG.
Miinchen (Sept. 8, 1938) H. R. R. 1939, No. 8r.
The exceptions for transactions by foreigners who would have capacity
under the domestic law, are applicable, whereas they do not apply usually
to capacity for disposing of foreign real property by act within the forum.
See Vol. I p. 187; German EG. BGB. art. 7 par. 3; Ita!. C. C. Disp. Pre!.
( 1942) art. 17 par. 2, etc.
44
Vol. I pp. 103 n. 7, 183 n. 19.
45 CHESHIRE ( ed. 3) 727.

SALE OF IMMOVABLES

I I I

are governed by the lex situs. 46 Consequently, it is assumed
in the Restatement that this law decides whether and under
what conditions a covenant runs with the land.
For the agreements not running with the land, opinions
are divided. In one view, the lex situs again applies. 47 In
another, followed in a series of cases, these agreements
being "merely contractual" and without connection with
the land, are declared to be governed by the law of the
contract, that is, commonly the lex loci contractus. 48 The
Restatement places them under the law of the place where
the deed of conveyance is delivered. 49 There is considerable
opposition to this treatment, though termed logical, on the
ground that the distinction is questionable or difficult, or too
technical for the purpose of conflicts law. In this view,
covenants should fall under one law, the lex situs, avoiding
the confusion caused by the distinction of groups and division
of opinions. 50
There is much force in this proposition but more precision is needed as to the ground and scope of the lex situs.
Legal history may help. The cases extending lex situs to all
covenants evidently have been influenced by the old broad
scope of that law which comprehended the entire contract
by force of sovereignty. If the choice of law resorts to le.t
46 Restatement§ 341 (2) and comment; Platner v. Vincent (1921) 187 Cal.
443, 202 Pac. 6 55; LORENZEN, Cases 587; for other cases, see GooDRICH § 146
ns. 28, 29, 30; MINOR 457 § 185; LEFLAR, Arkansas Conflict of Laws 245 n. 38;
17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1094; L. R. A. 19r6A, 1027 n. 49, and for the municipal
doctrine in question, WM. RAWLE, Covenants for Title (ed. 5, r887) 301 § 205.
47 Lyndon Lumber Co. v. Sawyer (r9o8) 135 Wis. 525, rr6 N. W. 255;
Alcorn v. Epler (1917) 206 Ill. App. 140.
48 Bethell v. Bethell (r876) 54 Ind. 428, LORENZEN, Cases 585; other Indiana cases, see GooDRICH § 146 n. 33; other cases, Note, L. R. A. 1916A,
1027 n. 48; WHARTON§ 276 (d).
49 Restatement § 341 ( r).
5 0 Note, 9 Cal. L. Rev. (1921) at 35; 10 id. (1922) 174; LoRENZEN, 20
Yale L. J. (1911) 427, and in 6 Repert. 308, 131; HEILMAN, "Conflict of Laws
Treatment of Interpretation and Construction of Deeds in Reference to
Covenants," 29 Mich. L. Rev. ( 1931) 277; GooDRICH 397·
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situs only for convenience, it has to consider any contrary
agreement of the parties as well as the special situations
in which the contract is centered elsewhere. Do these considerations not apply to covenants running with the land?
On the other hand, what is the relationship in nature between covenants for title and veritable iura in re, the proper
field of lex situs?
That so much is unstable and controversial in the matter
of covenants for title in common law, in contrast with the
romanistic systems which sharply distinguish obligation
from right in a thing, must be a residue of legal history.
Traditionally, in England, as almost everywhere except in
classical Rome and derivative systems, real rights were
rights to possession and consisted in the better claim between two persons. The abstract and absolute character
inherent in the developed Roman dominium and jus in re
aliena was absent or less marked. Moreover, until the nineteenth century, formal certainty, as assured by public land
registers in Central Europe, did not exist, and surrogates
were needed, quite as in ancient times. Covenants and title
records are derived in the last instance from the universal
custom of instrumenta antiqua-so termed by the Roman
jurists contemplating the Eastern usages, and by the Italian
lawyers in considering the Lombard practice,-a chain of
conveyances transmitted from each vendor to his purchaser,
together with the deed embodying the actual sale. Each
document contained a comprehensive stipulation of warranty against the vendor, his family, and successors infringing the alienation, and promising protection or penalties
in case of attacks by strangers.
The usage in England was almost exactly the same,
although with great legal elaboration. The extended conveyance clauses beginning to appear in the thirteenth century
regularly expressed the promise of warranty to the feoffee,
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his heirs and "assigns," which granted a remote successor
direct claim against the original feoffor. 51 These warranties
of title formed the transition from a merely relative concept
of a claim to possession to the absolute right in real property. Where a legal system is ready to accord the buyer
independent possession and full ownership by derivation
from the former owner, there is no necessity for promises
of the vendor that he himself or persons on his behalf shall
not disturb the buyer's right, although the French Civil Code
(article I 628) still contains the doctrine of fait du vendeur,
and a certain usefulness may be found in it. 52 Clauses covering eviction by third parties on the ground of the vendor's
defective title lose importance with the introduction of
means providing public knowledge of the true legal situation
of the land.
In the light of these short observations, it is instructive
to comment on two outstanding judicial statements.
Geiszler v. De Graaf. 53 This New York decision describes the nineteenth century distinction between two types
of covenants for title. Covenants in which the grantor of
land promises quiet enjoyment to the purchaser or declares
warranty of title, were distinguished from those in which
he declares that he has lawful seisin or the right to convey
or that the land is free of encumbrances.
In the former type of covenant, the breach was construed
to occur only on eviction, actual or constructive. 54 The
benefit of this covenant runs with the land and any subse51 See the excellent article by S. J. BAILEY, "Warranties of Land in the
Thirteenth Century," 8 Cambr. L. J. ( 1944) 274; 9 id. 82.
52 The present writer has repeatedly dealt with the subject and refers in
particular to his book, I Haftung des Verkiiufers wegen Mangels im Recht
(1902) 33 If. (Roman Law and papyri), 169 If. (Germanic laws); and
various articles, esp. KATAGRAPHE, 54 Zeitschrift der Savigny Stiftung,
Roman. Abt. ( 1934) 189, 198; "Le fait du vendeur et du debiteur," 2
Rheinische Z. f. Zivil- und Prozessrecht.
sa Dictum by Brien, J., (1901) 166 N.Y. 339, 59 N. E. 993·
54 WM. RAWLE, Covenants for Title (ed. 5, 1887) § 202.
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quent purchaser in an uninterrupted chain of conveyances
containing such a covenant ("privity of estate") may sue
any predecessor for the breach of warranty. A breach of
the latter type of covenant occurred, if at all, upon delivery
of the deed and therefore the right of the grantee became a
chose in action which did not run with the land. This rule,
probably based on the ancient impossibility of assigning
chases in action was abandoned by the New Y ark court.
With respect to the first group it seems never to have
been doubted, either in New Y ark or elsewhere in America,
that the traditional stipulations of warranty were within
the scope of the lex situs, although in Europe this has only
been assumed by Foelix and one other writer. 55 But this
treatment is only convenient, not necessary. Of course, the
contractual bond between the parties to each of the successive contracts is insufficient to justify the "running";
there must be an agreement "touching and concerning the
land" and "privity of estate." 56 Nevertheless, the warranty
of good title or the promise to indemnify the purchaser and
his successors, creates a contractual obligation, necessary
and significant for the situation. The unconscious reason
why this institution is attributed to the law of the situation
is the same which once suggested the so-called "jumping
recourse." 57 The succession of auctores of old and the series
of written documents since the Middle Ages form the mechanism to secure the legal position of the possessor; they
furnish the only practical evidence of title, until prescription is realized. Since conflicts law has only to ponder the
social importance of local connections, it may reasonably
connect the complex of such warranty relations with the
05 I FOELIX ( ed. 3) 110 § 6o; MASSE, I Droit Comm. ( ed. 2) 546 § 637, as
cited by 8 LAURENT 222. Contra: the editor of FoELIX (ed. Demangeat) loc.
cit.; LAURENT /oc. cit.
56 CLARK, Covenants I 50.
57 Haftung des Verkliufers, supra n. 52, 244-249.
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situs of the land, which is where the records of title are
held and the only fixed contact of the entire chain.
As to covenants of lawful seisin, or right to convey the
land, and against encumbrances, since they were said to be
broken upon delivery of the deed, they were subjected to
the law of the place of this delivery. The modern construction, followed in an English statute of I 8 8 I, 58 is now shared
by most American courts. In the absence of contrary agreement, the grantor is presumed to give his promise to every
successor in the chain so that the right is assigned with the
land to the subsequent purchaser. This assignment is independent of any "nominal" breach said to be committed by
delivery of the deed with the false statement. Hence, all
the mentioned types of covenants run with the land. Presumably they are under the lex situs.
We may, then, finally appreciate the desirability of treating all covenants under the same law, and therefore of
determining the nature and effects of the promises by the
law of the state where the land is.
But there can be a difference in conflicts law between
covenants for title and veritable encumbrances. In the field
of obligation, and only in it, the parties enjoy autonomy in
the true sense, so that they may at their pleasure vary the
qualification of the rights created by their stipulations.
They must as well be able to choose the applicable law.
Likewise, in a case such as Good v. Cood/ 9 where the contract relating to foreign land is made at the common domicil of the parties, the contract is centered there and covers
all obligations of warranty.
Smith v. Ingram. Another point is illustrated by the
doctrine neatly presented in Smith v. Ingram and often
repeated since. 60 Two effects of covenants of warranty were
58

44 & 45 Viet., c. 41, s. 7·
Supra n. 27.
60
( 1903) 132 N. C. 959, 44 S. E. 643, 61 L. R. A. 878;

59

6
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distinguished. One is that the vendor is estopped from
claiming the land against any purchaser in the proper chain
of transfers. This effect, subject to the law of the situs,
was denied in the instant case under the law of North Carolina where the land was, the seller being a married woman,
whose contract was valid under the law of her domicil in
South Carolina. The other effect is that an action on the
covenant arises for breach of warranty, as a purely personal contact, sounding in damages only, and this would be
determined by whatever law governs the obligatory contract.
To a comparatist this reasoning appears very attractive.
A parallel may support it and suggest its adoption in civil
law courts. In fact, the doctrine of estoppel has produced
a perfect analogy to the Roman exceptio rei venditae et
traditae-not noted thus far by historians, as it seems. 61
In the just-mentioned ancient stipulations, and in later
periods by the legal force of sales contracts, the vendor
promised that both he and his successors should not disturb
the purchaser and the successors of the latter. Under
Roman law, however, where the vendor sold and delivered
land (or a slave) to the buyer but either failed to proceed to
the formal act ( mancipatio) required for transferring the
ownership at law ( dominum ex jure Quiritium) or had only
subsequently acquired the title, the seller was entitled at
law to enforce his "Quiritarian" ownership by vindicatio.
But because he was obligated to transfer title to the buyer,
he encountered the praetorian defense that he had sold and
delivered. This exception was a part of the mechanism by
which the praetor recognized an interest of the buyer, which
under the name of "in bonis habere" closely approached
n. 15 § 276 (d); 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1094. The decision in the particular case
of Smith v. Ingram had an odious result, pointed out in the dissenting vote
by Walker, J., but this phase was due to the old doctrine concerning the
capacity of married women.
61 I do not mean to say that the Romans knew covenants running with the
land; see BUCKLAND and McNAIR, Roman Law and Common Law (1936) 91.
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ownership and by the Greek interpreters was called bonitarian ownership. Thus, the purchaser and his successors
in title were protected against the owner or one from whom
he derived title, on the ground of an obligatory right transformed into a kind of property. This defense against the
nominal owner pertains to the law of the situation.
Apart from estoppel, the law of the contract, generally
but not necessarily the law of the situs, covers the creation
and effect of all covenants. 62 This result is simple and
satisfactory.
Our discussion has no bearing on such agreements as a
promise to convey, 63 or a promise by the vendor of a manufacturing plant not to enter into competition with the
purchaser. 64
IV.

LAEsw ENoRMis

(INADEQUACY oF CoNSIDERATION)

In conformity with French law, 65 the Civil Code of Louisiana66 allows a vendor of an immovable estate sold for less
than half the value, to demand rescission, unless the purchaser chooses to make up the just price and keep the
thing sold. This remedy, abolished in Quebec, 67 and most
other countries, developed out of an institution going back
62 Just for the historical interest connected with warranty for title, we may
note the controversy in the old French doctrine 'regarding the law determining
the vendor's duty to furnish security against possible eviction. Certain postglossators, reading GAlUS' Lex si fundus, Dig. 2I, 2, 6, interpreted the consuetudo eius regionis in qua negotium gestum est, as the law of the vendor's
domicil rather than the lex situs, and BouLLENOIS, 2 Traite de Ia personnalite
et de Ia realite des loix (I766) 46I explained the former as presumably
intended by the parties. In the nineteenth century, this warranty was not
distinguished from the other incidents of a sale of immovables, see 8
LAURENT 223 § IS3·
63 MrNoR +ss § ISs.
64
Robinson v. Suburban Brick Co. (C. C. A. 4th I904) I27 Fed. 804,
65
France: C. C. arts. I674-I68s, "of rescission of the sale on the ground of
lesion."
Austria: Allg. BGB. § 934 has preserved the general remedy of lesion.
66
Louisiana: C. C. (I82S) arts. 2s67-2s78; (I87o) arts. 2s89-26oo.
67
Quebec: C. C. arts. 6 so, IOI2. But it still exists in Italy: C. C. (I 86 s)
arts. I S29-I S37; ( I942) art. I448. On South Africa, see infra ns. 78, 79·
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to the legislation of the early Byzantine Empire. 68 In common law, a shocking insufficiency of valuable consideration
in a bilateral agreement is likely to be treated as a presumptive fraud 69 and as such has been paralleled with the
laesio enormis of civil law.
In conflicts law, the subject has been interestingly discussed, notably by French writers. A number of authors
have construed, from a purely French point of view, every
lision as a defect of consent and therefore subject to the
national law of the damaged party. 70 In another theory, the
lex situs applies directly or as intended by the parties. 71 But
the lex situs has also been supported on another ground.
Maury, 72 after an elaborate historical study, states separate
legislative motives for the six different cases of genuine
lesion at present founding rescission in French law. With
respect to the vendor's lesion, he discards the idea of deficient assent or moral coercion and he doubts whether the
purpose of protecting vendors or owners has been decisive.
68 Cod. Just. 4, 44, 2, proved to be interpolated by GRADENWITZ, 2 Bulletino
dell 'istituto di diritto romano (1889) I4; see JoLOWICZ, "L'origine de Ia
laesio enormis," in I Introduction a !'etude du droit compare (Etudes Lambert
I938) I85. For the connections between Justinian's compilation and the
modern doctrines, see DAWSON, "Economic Duress etc.", II Tul. L. Rev. (I937)
345. 364 ff.
69 Coles v. Perry ( I851) 7 Tex. I09, I34·
70 8 LAURENT 2I2-2I6; BARTIN, 2 Principes 66 § 243; AUDINET in S.
I931.2.145; LAPRADELLE in Revue I932, 295·
For the law of the vendor as the party possibly obligated, 2 BAR 43; 2
FRANKENSTEIN 302.
The personal law of the vendor in combination with other laws has been
advocated by RoLIN, 3 Principes 210.
71 Cour Paris (Feb. 9, I93I) D. I931.2.33, S. I93I.2.I45, Clunet I932, I09,
Revue I93I, 348 (lex rei sitae for lesion of a contract in Paris for sale of a
German immovable, notwithstanding lex loci contractus applied to the contract in general); Cass. req. (June 29, I93I) S. I932.I.289, Revue I932, 295
(on the ground of a Morocco law); see attempts to harmonize at least the
second decision with the theory of lex loci solutionis by BATIFFOL 343 n. 5,
35I n. I. C6digo Bustamente, art. I82: "territorial law" for rescission in
general also seems to mean the lex situs. 2 BRacHER § I85; CHAMPCOMMUNAL,
Revue I932, 508.
72 MAURY, "La lesion dans les contrats," Revue Crit. I936, 344, 352 ff.,
and in 3 Travaux du comite fran~ais de droit int. prive (I936) 70-I04.
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Finally, accepting the latter idea, he restricts the French
provision to French immovables. This places the problem
under the lex situs. BatiffoP 3 objects that the true thought
of the French legislator is not so much to care for an American owner of a villa in Cannes on the Riviera, but to favor
a French family owning immovables wheresoever. His conclusion is to apply the law of the contract. But Capitant has
authoritatively stated that it is impossible to say which
among the mingled ideas from the Byzantines to the present
can be termed the true foundation of this institution. When
Maury replied that "Certainly it is very difficult to choose,
but since we place ourselves in the point of view of private
international law, we are forced to do it," Capitant
answered: "But this is arbitrary." 74
It is not exact that conflicts law should depend on a
doubtful intention in the legislative background of the
domestic and still less of a foreign legislation. Nor are
Maury's results good enough. He himself notes a "crying
injustice" in deducing that when a sale is made under French
law with respect to German immovables, French law would
not be applicable because it refers to French immovables
only, whereas the general remedy of German law against
usury, the nullity of a contract violating good morals (BGB.
§ I 3 8), would not apply because it refers only to contracts
governed by German law. 75 Why should a remedy be severed
from the contract? The problem is not one of real property
although it has been claimed as such most recently by
Niboyet. 76 On the other hand, the lex loci contractus as
such 77 has no More justification than usual. The law of the
73

BATIFFOL, Revue 1934, 630 and BATIFFOL 351 § 405 n. 4·
74 3 Travaux du comite fran~ais, supra n. 72, 100, 102.
75
MAURY, Revue Crit. 1936 at 382.
76 NIBOYET, 4 Traite 243 § 1158.
17 FEDOZZI-CERETI 732 j 2 RESTREPO HERNANDEZ 72 § II 12.
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contract must govern, and this is ordinarily, but not always,
the law of the place where the land is. 78
Illustration. A contract was entered into in the Transvaal
Republic for the sale of land situated in the Cape Province.
Lesion was a valid defense under Transvaallaw/ 9 although
such defense has been repealed by the law in the Cape
Province. 80 The court applied the law of the place of contracting, which was also the law of the forum, on the argument that lesion like fraud must be judged in considering
the place where the vendor committed it. 81 In our view the
situs of the immovable is not "an immaterial incident," as
the court assumed, but (in the absence of closer connections
in particular cases) it is the center of the entire transaction,
as it also furnishes the data for appraising the "just price."
LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE, Note, D. 1931.2.33; BATIFFOL 350 § 404.
Transvaal: SeeR. W. LEE, An Introduction to Roman-Dutch Law (ed.
4, 1946) 234 n. 3·
80 Cape of Good Hope Prov.: Act No. 8 of 1879, § 8.
81 De Wet v. Browning [1930] S. A. L. R. Transvaal Prov. Div. 409.
78

79
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Representation
I.
1.

DEPENDENCE ON MuNICIPAL DocTRINEs

Three Main Doctrines

N SURVEYING the present laws of representation in
the world it is unfortunately still necessary to insert a
few historical notes. The stages of evolution have left
too many marks on this doctrine in numerous countries.
Originally, nowhere was it imagined that one person
(Agent, A), by making a contract with a third party
(Tertius, T), could create obligatory rights and duties between the third party and a principal ( P). The official law
of the Roman Empire, the classical Greek law, the Germanic laws, and the English law during the whole Middle
Ages, were no exceptions. Needs of daily life, of course,
required makeshift arrangements to approach the purposes
of representation, surrogates sometimes coming very near
to the legally barred result. In the seventeenth century,
representation was finally recognized. Yet, as late as the
nineteenth century some notable writers asserted that representation in creating obligations was logically impossible. 1
To make the strange phenomenon conceivable to the reluctant mind of the lawyers, various awkward attempts were
made of which some shadows may be detected in the doctrines of conflicts law. Only at the cost of much pain was
the simple truth learned that conclusion of a contract
through an agent produces a threefold relationship, corresponding with the three persons involved. What happened

I

1

THiiL,

I

Handelsrecht ( ed. 6, 1879) 234·
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to conflicts law when uncouth doctrines insisted on seemg
the three-dimensional phenomenon in two dimensions, may
be seen in the two theories dominating French and American laws, respectively, which are briefly described as follows.
(a) Doctrine of mandate. An old doctrine, widely maintained in Latin countries, is that of the two-sided "mandate."
On one hand, article 1984 of the French Code states that:
"Le mandat ou procuration est un acte par lequel une
personne donne a une autre le pouvoir de faire quelque chose
pour le mandant et en son nom." 2
On the other hand, "mandate" is at the same time characterized as a contract (art. 1984 par. 2) creating obligations
between principal and agent (arts. 1991, 1998). Broadly
speaking, this is the same method of dealing with the problems of representation as that originally used in common
law; the contract of "agency" between principal and agent
at the same time includes the grant of powers to represent
the principal. Speaking only of the case where the agent is
to perform a legal transaction, "mandate" or "agency"
and "representation" are conceived as one sole legal institution producing two relationships: one internal between
the principal and the agent, the other external between the
principal and the third party. The internal relationship
extends to the conditions under which A, by contracting with
T, causes legal effects for and against P. Consequently, these
conditions are included in the law governing the contract
of "mandate," which again is most frequently identified
with the law of the place where the contract of "mandate"
is completed.
(b) Incident of main contract. In an American decision
2 In Louisiana, the Supreme Court, in one of its most drastic moves, has
declared the words "in his name" of the analogous art. 2985 C. C. "not
essential," so as to abandon the civil law definition and to adopt the common Ia w concept of power of attorney. See Sentell v. Richardson {1947)
211 La. 288, 29 So. {2d) 852; JoNES, Note, 7 L<•. L. Rev. (1948) 409.
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of I 841, in order to find what law governs the effect of an authority, an elaborate attempt was made to answer the question, "what law determines whether the act (of the agent)
constitutes a contract, with whom and to what effect." 3 In
other words, there is but one external relationship in which
the power of the agent to affect the principal's legal situation is a mere incident. As the contract with the third party
is governed according to the orthodox doctrine, by the law
of the place where it is made, this also covers the agent's
authority.
It has never been stated, but it appears almost certain
to the present writer that the continuous American practice
ultimately laid down in the Restatement comes from that
decision. While in the first mentioned theory the lex loci
contractus of the agency contract applies, in this view the
lex loci contractus of the third party contract governs the
extent of the agent's authority.
(c) Modern theory. The German, and to a certain
degree the English, courts have recognized that the power
of an agent to affect the rights and duties of the principal
constitutes an independent institution and ought to have
its own proper law, not necessarily coincident with those
governing either of the two other relationships.
Notwithstanding other propositions advanced in this
field, these three conflicts doctrines demonstrate their intimate connection with the development of representation
in the municipal systems, or more exactly, in the general
science of private law.
2.

Agency (Mandate) and Authorization

The Roman ius civile did not progress to a true concept
of representation in obligatory contracts, although business
3 Carnegie v. Morrison (1841) 43 Mass. 381, 397 (issuance of a letter of
credit by the agent of London bankers in Boston.)
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life, protected by the praetors, furnished an increasing number of auxiliary institutions and Justinian's compilation presented a treasury of scattered remedies. 4 The Continental
commentators, sometimes unable to continue adequately the
ancient development, clung to the contract of mandatum,
which was recognized in classical and Byzantine times as
one of the four orthodox contracts concluded by consent and
enforced by corresponding civil actions. Discarding all the
more helpful possibilities that the Corpus Juris richly offered
from oriental and occidental practice, the doctrine preferred
the pattern of the classical mandatum. In Rome mandate
was a contract between principal ( mandans) and agent (is
cui mandatur, later mandatarius) imposing on the agent
an obligation, originally gratuitous, to perform a factual
work or to conclude a legal transaction in the interest of
the mandator or of a third person. The agent, in making a
contract with another party in performance of his obligation
to the principal, necessarily entered alone into the contract
with the third party. The effects of this contract had to be
transferred within the internal relationship from the mandatarius to the mandans. On this ancient foundation, the
main line of doctrinal tradition took its orientation toward
the agency contract rather than toward an institution of
representation. When, finally, on the Continent, during the
seventeenth century, as a result of various previous impulses,
representation by free persons was formally recognized in
law, the old formulations were nevertheless retained, and
the legal doctrine mirrored life in a curiously distorted
picture. Thus Puchta taught:
The effect of the mandate is partly the constitution of
representation with its effects, in this respect the mandate
is called authority, partly an obligation between the man4 RABEL, Grundziige des Ri:imischen Privatrechts (1915) 507-512, and in
subsequent articles, mostly followed in the literature.
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dant and the mandatary from which the former acquires
the actio mandati directa, the latter the contraria. 5
This doctrine was in force as late as
Laband, described it as follows:

I

87 I, when its critic,

Wherever someone acts instead of another upon his
authority, a mandate is assumed to exist; the principal is
called mandant and the agent mandatarius; agency, mandate, contract of authorization are words used synonymously by the lawyers. Those distinguishing more exactly,
refer the term agency to the relationship between mandant
and mandatarius, authority to the relationship between the
mandant and the third party; agency indicates the internal,
authority the external side of the relationship. 6
Conflicts law has experienced many strong influences
of this conception. The writers, viewing representation from
the angle of "mandate," without thinking assumed that the
law governing this contract also determines whether and to
what extent a transaction made by the agent in any country
constitutes rights and duties for the principal. Hence, provided that the main contract is effective in all other respects,
it binds the principal if the law governing the contract of
agency (mandate) so determines.
The law thus specified was, moreover, schematically
identified with the lex loci contractus of the mandate. Again,
to ascertain the place of contracting of the mandate, the
traditional opinion held the mandate to be completed at
the place where the agent "accepts the charge," 7 that is,
in general, where the agent lives. But counterpropositions
preferred the place where the mandant "receives the accep5

PUCHTA, Pandekten § 323·
LABAND, IO Z. Handelsr. I83, 203 with respect to the German part of the
literature.
7
CASAREGIS, Discursus de commercio, disc. 179, §§ I, 2 n. I91 followed by
HERT!US, I Opuscula de Collis. Leg. 147; BURGE, 3 Commentaries, pt. 2 ch. 20
p. 753; STORY § 285; FIORE ( ed. 2) §§ 129 ff.; DESPAGNET 894 § 300 (reserving
contrary intention); ROLIN, 3 Principes § 1390; WAHL in Baudry-Lacantinerie
et Saignat 266 n. I § soo.
6
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tance" from the agent,S or where the mandant is established,9 which both come down to localizing it at the domicil
of the principal.
This awkward theory has still some followers/ 0 especially
in Italy 11 and in Latin America. 12
Not until Laband's famous article from which I have just
quoted, was it clearly understood that a sharp distinction
is needed. ( I) Principal and agent are connected by a relationship producing a right or a duty, or both, of the agent
to act on account of the principal. This relationship may
be based on a contract without consideration, as the Roman
mandatum was a gratuitous promise. But in modern times
it flows normally from such contracts as agency or partnership, or from an appointment of an administrator or guardian by a court, or directly from law. ( 2) Authority is the
power of the agent to conclude a contract with a third
party.
Employment, partnership, and the like may exist without
authorization, and the latter may be conferred without
imposing any contractual duty. Authority may exist contrary
to internal directions by the principal to the agent; formalities may be prescribed only for the underlying contract or
only for the authorization; death or revocation may terminate the former only, et cetera.
The distinction was fully carried out in the German
doctrine and elaborated in the German Civil Code of I 896 13
8

7 LAURENT 541 §§ 452 f.
AssER-RIVIER, Elements § 97·
1o Probably for the same reason, the Draft submitted by BARON NOLDE to
the Institute for International Law, 33 Annuaire ( 1927) III 219, speaks
merely of mandate as governed by the domiciliary law of the principal, and
ignores the problem of authority.
11 FEDOZZI-CERETI 740 ff., with the only concession to the local law that it
ought to safeguard its own imperative provisions.
12 E.g., Argentina: ALCORTA, 3 Der. Int. Priv. 109 ff.
Brazil: ESPINOLA, 2 Lei Introd. 572 § 242; SERPA LoPES, 2 Lei Introd. 360.
13 BGB. §§ 164 ff. on "representation" and "authority" are included in the
general part, separated from the sources of obligations.
9
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and the subsequent literature. At present, it prevails in the
modern currents everywhere in civil law countries, including
the views of the leading French writers of private law14
and, although not too apparent, in most Latin-American
legal literature. Numerous recent codes, 15 among them the
Italian Civil Code of 1942/6 have changed the former system and separated the doctrines of representation and
agency.
This dualism so slowly perceived in the Continental doctrine was equally obscured in the late and difficult beginning
of true representation in England. The doctrine of Principal
and Agent started from that of Master and Servant and
never could be entirely separated from it. Command and
ratification were the first grounds for making the master
liable for the contract or tort of the servant. 17 Authority
remained until recently such a ground, a condition of vicarious liability, and hence a part of the doctrine of agency
rather than a clearly autonomous subject. In our times, however, despite some antiquated arrangements of encyclopedias and inappropriate definitions, 18 English and American writers have been fully aware of the significance of
14 France: I COLIN et CAPITA NT 88, cf. 2 id. 704, 706; DEMOGUE, I Obligations §§ 89-155; EsMEIN in Planiol et Ripert, 6 Traite Pratique 72 § 55·
15 The Swiss C. Obi. {1881) arts. 394-406 on mandate followed the French
model, C. C. arts. 1984-2010. The Rev. C. Obi. adqpts the division in representation and authority, arts. 32-40, and the sources of obligations, especially
mandate, arts. 394 ff.
Poland: C. Obi. arts. 93 ff. on representation, arts. 498 ff. on mandate.
The same distinction is made in the Scandinavian countries.
16 The Italian C. C. {1865) arts. 1737-1763 is similarly replaced by C. C.
( 1942) arts. 1387-1400 on representation and authority, arts. 1703 ff. on
mandate and related contracts.
17 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, 2 History of English Law (1911) 530; HOLDSWORTH, 8 History of English Law (1922) 222, 227 f., 252 f. See also HOLMES,
Agency, in Collected Legal Papers (1920) at 96.
18 In such a modern English book as CHESHIRE and FIFOOT, The Law of
Contracts ( 1945) 294, agency and authority are still not called by their
names but described as "the two aspects of the contract of agency." What we
call authority is circuitously defined "as leading to privity between principal
and third party."
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authority. They even share in two theoretical developments
of the German doctrine that bring the conceptual distinction
to a climax.
The German Civil Code frankly admits that the principal may declare his grant of authority directly to the third
party ( § I 70), or by public notification ( § I 7 I), and treats
him in the same manner, if he embodies his authorization
in a written instrument and the agent shows it to the third
party ( § I 72). These cases are plainly recognized in the
American Restatement of Agency as "apparent authority"
(§§8,9).
Another characteristic feature of the modern system is
that authorization is conceived as a unilateral act of the
principal, 19 in full contrast to the contract of agency. This
construction, formulated in the German Civil Code, § I67,
is likewise laid down in the Restatement of Agency. 20 It has
also not been considered too subtle by the English courts
in which the point has been recently reaffirmed in a case of
conflict between English and German law. 21
There is, of course, a fundamental difference between
the two great systems. In civil law, representation requires
that the agent should be authorized to act, and in fact
should openly act, in the name of or at least on behalf of
the principal, so as to make him from the beginning the
exclusive party to the contract.
At common law, when an agent acts in his own name and
19 It is another question whether this act is "abstract," that is, may operate
irrespective of the validity of the agency contract. National Socialist writers,
in denying this effect, which is debatable, attacked the entire doctrine; for
example, HERBERT MEYER, 2 Z. Ak. deutsches R. (1935) 53· But here Swiss
law recognizes one of the rare cases of abstract acts; see OSER-SCHOENENBERGER art. 32 n. 27.
20 Restatement of Agency §§ 15, 16, 26 comment a. The separation is felt
but not quite correctly expressed as late as in TIFFANY, Agency 9·
21 Lewis, J., in Sinfra AG. v. Sinfra, Ltd. [ 1939] 2 All E. R. 675, 682: "A
power of attorney is not a contract. It is a onesided instrument." Lindley, L. J.,
in Chatenay v. The Brazilian Submarine Telegraph Co., Ltd. [1891] 1 Q. B.
79 at 85.
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the other party does not know him to be an agent, the agent
becomes the party to the contract, but the "undisclosed"
principal may be sued by the third party, or may sue the
latter under certain conditions. 22 Accordingly, the concept
of authorization must be defined broadly enough to cover
the manifestations by which the person in whose interest,
though not name, the act is to be done makes himself the
principal. It is essential for our purposes that authorization
be therefore understood in a double sense: the one for civil
law consisting in the agent's power to act in the name of
the person represented; and the other for common law consisting in the agent's permission to act either in the principal's name or as an undisclosed agent, or both. This conception is no more difficult than the common law doctrine
itself, but precise terminology is not available to cover this
large ground.
Terminology. The Restatement of Agency chooses to
speak vaguely of the power "to affect the legal relations
of the principal" ( § 7). If authorization be defined as assent
of the principal that the agent should contract in his name
"or on his behalf," 23 this identification would go counter to
the common significance of "on behalf" as indicating disclosed principals, named and unnamed, or only the latter. 24
Nor is "on account" a distinctive term, although it would
admirably designate the representation of interests, since
the word seems to be employed in the Agency Restatement
sometimes also as a synonym of the term, "for a disclosed
principal. " 25
22 See GooDHART and HAMSON, "Undisclosed Principals in Contract," 4
Cambr. L. J. (1932) 320, conclusion at 356.
23
Thus BRESLAUER, 50 Jurid. Rev. (1938) at 308 n. 7·
24 See, e.g., BoWSTEAD, Agency art. 27, "in whose name or on whose behalf,"
with respect to ratification which is not permitted to an undisclosed principal.
25 See, e.g., §§ 7 comment d, 85 (r) and illustration 1; cf. § 4· In § 199,
however, "on his account" and "on account of the principal" expressly mean
an undisclosed principal.
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For international purposes, we had better revert to an
old terminology as follows :
Acting in the interest of another person ("on account"
of a principal in a proper sense) may be either:
(I) direct (open) representation, i.e., acting "on behalf"
of a principal (disclosed agency), namely, either (a) in the
name of another person, or (b) on behalf of whom it may
concern (unnamed agency; Restatement: partially disclosed
principal) ; or:
( 2) indirect representation (representation of interest
but not of right), i.e., acting in the agent's own name for an
undisclosed principal.
In order to embrace all these institutions, authority
broadly defined may be termed as a power to act "on account" of the principal, which seems identical with the
power "to affect his legal situation." 26
Conflicts law must adopt the distinction between agency
and authorization. Authority originates or survives if its
law so disposes, irrespective of an accompanying agency
contract following its own law. An American food concern
may send an employee to Guatemala to buy bananas, and his
power to bind the firm may be construed under the law of
that state. This, however, is no reason why his salary and
the right of the firm to dismiss him should not be subject
to American law.
Conflicts rules, on the other hand, may readily combine
direct and indirect representation referring both to a
national law which may or may not recognize the common
law doctrine.
26 Agency Restatement § 7: "Authority is the power of the agent to affect
the legal relations of the principal . . ."; Conflicts Restatement § 345 "on
account."
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3· Fiction of Identity
Other sources of theoretical mistakes arose with the
various primitive attempts to lay down the principle of open
(disclosed) representation. The slogan, qui facit per alium,
est perinde ac si faciet per se ipsum, much used in the medieval development of the English master and servant doctrine,27 came to embody the idea that the represented and
the representing persons are deemed to be one, in a merger
of personalities. That this fiction dominated the history of
agency in England, is not an exact proposition according
to prevailing opinion. 28 But a distinct tradition of writers
on conflicts law on the Continent took inspiration from some
remarks of Casaregis. This jurist, who died in 1728, explained the transfer of property in goods sent from a seller
to the buyer through delivery to a carrier, by the following
construction (for which there were ancient analogies) : The
seller, a "correspondent" of the buyer, is his commissioner.
In complying with the buyer's order, he assumes a double
personality, since in consigning the goods he conveys the
property from himself as vendor to himself as the buyer's
agent. 29 This dictum was read together with the same
author's doctrine-which Story qualified as "so reasonable
in itself, "-that the principal's order for purchase plus the
ultimate consent by the agent form the contract in loco in
quo et ipse ( mandatarius) · et venditor existunt. 30
27 See for the early occurrences, SAYRE, "Criminal Responsibility for the
Act of Another," 43 Harv. L. Rev. (1930) 689, 690 n. 9·
28 The sources collected by HoLMES, History of Agency, in 3 Select Essays
in Anglo-American Legal History ( 1909) 368, In the prevailing opinion do
not support Holmes' hypothesis that modern agency doctrine in general, and
the rules concerning the undisclosed principal in particular, originated
from the fiction of identity. See PoLLOCK and MAITLAND, 2 History of English
Law (1911) 532 n. 1; YouNG B. SMITH, "Frolic and Detour," 23 Col. L. Rev.
( 1923) 444, at 452 and cited authors; WiiRDINGER, Geschichte der Stellvertretung (agency) in England (1933) 241.
2 9 CASAREGIS, Discursus de commercio, disc. 38 § 51 (ed. 1737) p. 126.
30 Disc. 179 § 10 ( ed. 1737) p. 192; STORY § 285.
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In a long chain of subsequent writings these figures of
speech led to the conception that the principal, represented
by half of the agent's double personality, appears himself
in the conclusion of the main contract. Among the various
consequences derived therefrom in municipal law, it was
contended by some outstanding Romanists that the contract
with the third party is exclusively and immediately concluded by the principaP 1 In this radical view, all requisites
of consent to the main contract, such as sanity of mind,
serious intention, freedom from coercion, fraud, and misrepresentation, the significance of knowledge in such matters
as warranty of title and quality, were exclusively referred
to the principaP 2 However, in other versions, less emphasis
was laid on the principal's part, and in some the fiction had
even a reversed effect of making the principal disappear
behind his representative.
In 1828, the English chancellor, Lord Lyndhurst, adopted
the obvious application of the fiction to conflicts law, by
stating that:

"If I, residing in England, send down my agent to Scotland, and he makes contracts for me there, it is the same as
if I myself went there and made them." 33
Story found the same view accepted in two Louisiana decisions.34 It has been approved in the case of Milliken v.
Pratt 35 and often since. The French and Italian literature
followed largely the same trend. 36 The person of the principal merges, se confond, with that of the agent,-this
31 DERNBURG, I Heidelberger Kritische Zeitschrift I8 as cited by LABAND,
infra n. 32; UNGER, 2 System des osterreichischen allegemeinen Privatrechts
(ed. 3, r868) I36.
32 Contra: LABAND, IO Z. Handelsr. 225 f.; THoL, I Handelsrecht ( ed. 6,
I879) 236 § 70.
33 Pattison v. Mills ( 1828) r Dow & Cl. 342, 363.
34 Mr. Justice Mathews in Whiston v. Stodder (r8zo) 8 Mart. (La.) 95,
134; Malpica v. McKown (r83o) r La. 248, 254; STORY§ 285.
35 (r878) 125 Mass. 374·
36 See 3 FIORE § II 50.
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dogma appears as late as in the work of Andre Weiss. 37
In his words, a French principal acting through an agent in
Belgium, is considered "to be on the Belgian soil. " 38
These fictions are, like so many others, artificial and
fallacious. As Bar pointed out, 39 how can the contract be
regarded as made by the principal at the place of the agent,
if the agent nevertheless decides whether and on what terms
the contract should be made? And moreover, with the logic
employed in this traditional approach, why should we not
reach the opposite conclusion, viz., that the contract is
deemed made at the principal's real domicil?
As to legislative policy, of course, the overemphasis
laid on the external side of agency is certainly preferable
to the overstressing of the internal side of which the mandate theory is guilty. But in many respects it is important
not to forget that both principal and agent contribute to
the effect of representation. Although they do so by no
means on the same plane in concurrent acts of consent to
the main contract, as was sometimes contended, 40 they cooperate, the one by conferring authority and the other by
making the contract.
The merger theory was rather detrimental to the early
formation of the American conflicts rules. As an illustration,
we may remember the Louisiana case of I 830, in which a
shipmaster entered into a contract in Mexico and the Mexican law affirmed his implie.d authority and made the shipowner personally liable, contrary to the law of Louisiana
where the owner was domiciled. The court applied the MexiWEiss, 4 Traite 373·
Exactly to the same effect, VALERY§ 658: by charging his employee to
go to France to represent him, the master transports himself in some manner
to that country under guise of this representative; hence the contract is
formed as though the master were present.
39 2 BAR § 268. Among recent Latin-American writers, 2 RESTREPO
HERNANDEZ §§ 1294-6 has warned against the fiction.
40 See HuPKA, Vollmacht 36 against MriTEIS, Die Lehre von der Stellve rtretung 109, 182.
37
38

I3+
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can law as the law of the place where the contract with the
third party was made, simply because if the owner had been
personally present and had concluded that contract, the
measure of his liability would be determined under Mexican
law. 41 That the principal was not present and did not make
the contract, was forgotten under the spell of the fiction. 42
In Milliken v. Pratt/ 3 a case considered as leading in conflict of laws concerning both the place of contracting and
agency, the fiction was extended in a particularly offensive
way. A married woman who could not bind herself under
her domiciliary law of Massachusetts, delivered a note to
her husband, guaranteeing the debt. The husband sent it by
mail to his creditor in Maine. The Massachusetts court,
eliminating its own law, held her liable under the law of
Maine, because "if the contract is completed in another
state, it makes no difference in principle whether the citizen
of this state goes in person or sends an agent, or writes a
letter across the boundary line between the two states."
This makes the place of the recipient of a letter a place of
acting by agent, treating the mail as agent although it is
only a messenger. And in all the innumerable situations
covered by this broad definition, the party giving a declaration is considered as quasi-present at a place where either
the recipient is present or the contract is deemed to be made.
The real question had nothing to do with agency44 and leads
to the debatable question of the place at which a declaration by letter is localized, in order to satisfy the devious
test of the place of contracting. The true issue involved the
41

Arayo v. Currell (1830) I La. 528, 20 Am. Dec. 286, 289.
See the pointed refutation by Story in Pope v. Nickerson (1844) 3
Story, U. S. Circ. Ct. Reports 465, 480.
43
( 1878) 125 Mass. 374·
44
Bell v. Packard (1879) 69 Me. 105, 31 Am. Rep. 251 presents a skillful
argument and leaves the mail out of it. The contrary decision in Hauck
Clothing Co. v. Sophia Sharpe (1900) 83 Mo. App. 385 is equally tendentious.
42
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territorial scope of the laws restricting or freeing the
capacity of married women. 45
4· The Developed Systems
In many older and some quite recent treatises of conflicts law, all there is of agency is the eternal question where
a contract through an agent is made. The question is idle,
since the agent alone concludes the contract.
The true problems of voluntary representation arise
from its tripartite structure. In sum, we have to distinguish
the contract (if any) creating obligatory rights and duties
between principal and agent; the unilateral authorization by
the principal empowering the agent to make a contract (or
other transaction) with a third person; and this contract
itself.
It may also be recalled that civil law only considers acting
on behalf of a principal as representation, and accordingly
requires the principal's authorization to act on his behalf.
In the best elaborated doctrine, the agent must make it
clear to the third person that he acts not only in the principal's interest but to make him immediately the exclusive
party. 46 Where the agency is undisclosed, the contract exclusively regards the agent personally, and only the actions
arising between agent and principal provide the means of
transferring the effects of the external transaction to the
principal. There are, however, important exceptions. Particularly in the case of a commission agent, claims acquired
by the agent in his own name are deemed to belong to the
principal as between these two persons or their creditors.
The cautious provision of the German Commercial Code
( § 392 paragraph 2) to this effect has been hesitatingly
extended by judicial practice to other cases. Scandinavian
45
46

See Ch. 40 ns. 46 f. and ns. 97 f.; cf. 46 Mich. L. Rev. ( 1948) at 634.
German BGB. § 164 par. 2.
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law has definitely gone (to some extent) beyond the German pattern. 47 These modifications of the logical antithesis
between representation in law and representation in interest
have given rise to a suggestive comparison with the common
law doctrine which confers rights and duties on an undisclosed principal. The two systems starting from opposed
principles admit exceptions that diminish the contrast. They
retain, however, their basically different outlooks and both
leave notable gaps. 48 Thus, they lend importance to the
question what law governs.
In the international field, the opposition of the systems
was once incisively diminished by the common law rules
presuming that the agent of a foreign, nonresident, or
absent principal is not authorized to act on behalf of the
principal, and that he is exclusively personally bound when
acting in his own name. The usages of trade on which these
distinctions were based, have disappeared.
A remarkable divergence exists also in the types of intermediaries developed in commercial life and then constituted
special legal institutions. In common law, the terms, agent,
factor, broker, and commission agent have retained much
of their original colloquial meaning with overlapping connotations. They are not identical with any nomenclature of
a civil law country, in most of which the language equally
fluctuates between commercial routine and legal exactitude.
In Germany, such expressions as Prokurist, H andlungsbevollmachtigter, Kommissionar, A gent, and Filialleiter, are
most rigidly legal. The language of conflicts law ought to
47 Scandinavian law as adopted in Sweden, Agency Law of April 18, 1914,
§§ 57, 58, see CAPELLE, Das Aussenverhiiltnis bei der Vertretung fremder
Interessen nach Skandinavischem Recht, in Festschrift fiir Leo Raape ( 1948)
325. 330.
48 See in the first place SCHMIDT-R!MPLER, Das Kommissionsgeschiift, in
Ehrenberg's Handb. V, r, 479, 6ro; HANS R. HARTMANN, Das Ausfiihrungsgeschiift im deutschen und englischen Kommissionsrecht (Rostock 1935) reviewed by ScHMIDT-RIMPLER, I I Z.aus!.PR. (1937) 744-753.
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be broad enough to embrace all such categories m a few
rules.
II. ANGLo-AMERICAN FoRMULATIONS oF THE CoNFLicTs RuLES
1.

Dicey

The two rules of Dicey have been so often cited in the
English courts that they must be mentioned, though with
utmost disapproval. Rule I 79 predicates under the headline
of "Contract of Agency" that:
"An agent's authority, as between himself and his principal, is governed by the law with reference to which the
agency is constituted, which is in general the law of the
country where the relation of principal and agent is created."
Does this section deal with authority or the contract
of agency? With respect to the latter, the application of
the general subsidiary criterion of lex loci contractus would
be entirely wrong. However, the notes refer to the American cases dealing with the powers of a shipmaster and
a partner.
On the other hand, Rule I So (c) says that:
"When a principal in one country contracts in another
country through an agent, the rights and liabilities of the
principal as regards third parties are, in general, governed by the law of such other country, i.e., where the contract is made (lex loci contractus)."

If this rule, as it seems on its face, refers to the law governing the main contract, it may again be criticized insofar
as it calls for the lex loci contractus. But in the notes and
comment, Dicey evidently includes authority, and he presumes an intention of the parties that the agent should have
authority in each country in accordance with the laws thereof. Thus, authority, totally missing in the text of the rules,
is obscurely interpolated in both comments. Moreover, the

SPECIAL OBLIGATIONS
attempt to proclaim the lex loci contractus for these matters
is not supported by the English cases. 49
2.

Restatement

The Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws, under
the topic of "creation of a contract" establishes one rule
( § 342) concerning the obligations of a principal and his
agent as between themselves, 50 unfortunately calling for
"the law of the place where the agreement was made."
Authority is separated and treated in three bewildering
rules, which can only be approximately understood in connection with the Restatement of Agency. The latter Restatement, in an original attempt to break down the powers
of agents into categories, distinguishes four classes:
(I) "authority," short-named, created by manifestation
of the principal to the agent ;51
( 2) "apparent authority," created by manifestation of
the principal to the third party ;52
(3) estoppel, which on condition that the third party
"changes his position," produces an action for him against
the principal ;53 and
( 4) unnamed "powers" arising in various situations, 5 4
which, for instance, include the acts incidental to, or usual,
or necessary for conducting authorized transactions. 55
While these classes, despite certain doubts, may be helpful for analytical purposes in municipal law, it is astonishing
49 On this point of the criticism, see BRESLAUER, so Jurid. Rev., supra n. 23,
at 303. See now the thorough criticism by the editors of DICEY ( ed. 6, 1949),
with criticisms partially similar to mine.
50 At the same time, the sections in question deal with partnership. It has
been submitted before (Vol. II, Ch. 21) that this treatment is wrong insofar
as the personal law of partnerships is ignored. Of course, partnership is
also one of many sources of representation.
51§§ 7. 26.
52§§ 8, 12 comment a, 27.
53 §§ 31 ( 1) comment a, 159 comment e.
54 § 12 comment b refers in particular to §§ r61-176, 194-202.
• 5 §§ 161, 194.
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that the Conflicts Restatement should undertake to lay
down three different rules for the three groups ( 1 ) , ( 2),
and ( 4) , omitting ( 3) . We shall look into the confusing
results of this effort. 5 6 But we may take encouragement from
the neat separation of authority from agency.
3· Encyclopedias
The various comments on the conflicts rules in practitioners' works, are unenlightening and full of contradictions.
They ought to be radically reformed.
III. THE THREE SuBJECT MATTERs oF CoNFLICTs LAw

The right categories of operating facts to be subjected
to conflicts rules are easily found. The three distinguishable
relationships among the three persons involved in agency
require three independent conflicts rules, although, of
course, they by no means necessarily have to refer to different laws.
I.

Authority

The law or laws governing the power of an agent to act
on behalf, or on account, respectively, of the principal have
to comprehend creation, extent, modification, and termination of the power. Authorization by ratification must also
be included, and all shades of manifestations to the third
party or the public through which authority is either really
constituted or only apparently but reliably asserted. 57 There
Infra Ch. 40 p. 159.
The subject of what in common law was shortly called implied authority,
has been much discussed in the German doctrine. A full and critical report
on the not too happy formulations of the German Civil Code and the literature is to be found in THEMISTOCLES D. MACRIS, of Athens, Greece, Die
Stillschweigende Vollmachtserteilung (Mar burg 1941).
On the French doctrine, see the informative article by LE:Auri:, "Le mandat
apparent dans ses rapports avec Ia theorie generale de l'apparence," 45 Revue
Trim. D. Civ. ( 1947) 288.
56
57

q.o
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is no sense in differentiating in conflicts law powers conferred by the principal on the agent directly, or by declaration or conduct on which the third party relies. For, in any
case where any relations between the principal and third
parties should arise, the third party may only rely on some
manifestation, i.e., declaration, act, real or apparent acqUIescence, not of the agent but of the principal.
2.

Underlying Relationship 58

The internal situation between principal and agent,
whether based on a contract or not, extends to all their
obligations toward each other, including the duty of the
agent to follow the instructions of the principal and to
notify all third persons concerned of modifications or termination of his authority. It would seem that also the fiduciary
position of agents and the control by the principal to which
they are subjected in American law, general as they appear, 5 9
are incidents of the underlying relationships, such as employment and partnership, rather than of the authority.
3· External Relationship
Where an agent concludes a contract with a third party,
or makes or receives a unilateral legal statement, in the
principal's name, such transaction is the basis for all relationships imaginable betvxeen the principal or the agent
on the one hand, and the third party on the other.
Due to the extraordinary confusion in this field, the
assertion has sometimes been ventured in the United States
that a contract made by an authorized agent is governed
by the law of the agent's domicil or of the place where the
58 Following the common law terminology but distinguishing as we do,
FALCONBRIDGE, Conflict of Laws 368, speaks of "authority," in opposition to
"power"; this corresponds in the case of disclosed agency with what we
call the internal instructions given within the underlying relationship.
59 See Restatement of Agency §§ 13, 14.
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agent exercises his authority. 60 This is true of authorization
but not of the third party contract. Nor is this contract
subject to the lex loci contractus,S 1 any more than other
agreements. The governing law is simply determined according to the type or individual character of the contract
itself, sale, bailment, loan, et cetera.
The law governing the "main" or "third party" contract
(or other transaction), whatever law it may be, decides
whether a party to it can be represented by another person
at all, or under what circumstances; whether, for instance,
authorization must be given by a special act or in a written
document 62 and whether the agent must make known his
authority to the third party. 6 ~ The particular common law
doctrine regarding the rights to sue and be sued when the
principal is not disclosed in the contract, also belongs to the
effects of the main contract, which has not always been
understood. 64
The same is also true, however, with regard to the effects
of the contract, if the agent's authority is missing or insufficient.6" In this respect again confusion is frequent. 66
The American courts are not in similar danger because they
6o I5 C. }. S. 886, Conflict of Laws § 11 n. 28.
61 2 C. J. S. I038, Agency § 8 n. 83.
62 With regard to the formal requirements, this is a delicate question; see
infra Ch. 40, III, I, pp. I69-I70.
sa 9 Repert. 2I No. 6.
64 In Mas pons v. Mildred, Goyeneche & Co. ( I882) 9 Q. B. D. 530, 539 the
Appeal Court correctly declared that the nature and extent of the authority
given by a domiciled Spaniard to another in Havana, Cuba, was to be ascertained under the Spanish law there in force but, when this was ascertained,
the law governing the third party contract determined "the persons who can
sue and can be sued on that contract." Wrongly, BRESLAUER, 50 Jurid. Rev.
( I938) 30I, 309, 3IO f. assumes that the latter question is the very question
of authority, that therefore the decision is inconsistent and that it proclaims
the law of the place of the main contract for authority. Also DICEY 725 is not
quite clear on the classification.
65See RABEL, 3 Z.ausi.PR. (I929) 824 (against 2 ZITELMANN 211, I
FRANKENSTEIN 59I) followed by RAAPE, D.IPR. 275, II. See also FEDOZZICERETI 751.
66 Thus, RG., 76 Seuff. Arch. 2 is confused. See RABEL, supra n. 65, at 823.
The tortuous ways of the doctrine since Casaregis are still reported by such
authors as ALCORTA, 3 Der. Int. Priv. 113.
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apply the law of the main contract to every problem of
authority. Correct classification is assured, if we remember
that in the best opinion liability of an unauthorized agent
to the other party is based on his fraudulent or innocent
misrepresentation of authority. 67 Common law has led the
way in this construction, which is expressly formulated in
the provisions of the Restatement of Agency on implied
warranty of authoritt 8 and has been consistently recognized by the English courts. 69
We shall deal next with authority (Chapter 40) and
subsequently with the most typical contracts between principals and agents. The transaction with a third party with all
its just-mentioned incidents, is determined by its own nature.
6 7 HUPKA, Die Haftung des Vertreters ohne Vertretungsmacht ( 1903) on
the basis of comparative research. With meticulous consequence KosTERS 771
advocates with the Dutch H. R. (April 4, 1913) W. 9494 the law of the
place where the agent warrants authority, to govern the liability of the
agent to the third party.
·
68 § 329·
6 9 See Brit. Russian Gazette and Trade Outlook, Ltd. v. Ass. Newspaper,
Ltd. etc. [1933] 2 K. B. 616-C. A.
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Authority
}\S EXPLAINED before, the present chapter is exelusively intended to report on the conflicts concerning the authority of agents, that is, their powers to
enter into transactions with third persons on behalf or on
account of a principal. For the sake of simplicity, we shall
suppose that the transaction with a third person is a contract in the technical sense which we have called the main
contract or the third party contract. The local connections
between which the choice of law for the existence and the
scope of authority must be determined are not numerous.
The selection ought to be confined, roughly speaking, to two
contacts, namely, the places where the principal is deemed
to be situated and where the agent is deemed to act. We
may call them the law of the principal and the local law.

..t1.

I.

THE CoNFLICTS RuLES

r. Policies of Conflicts Rules
The influential theories of Story 1 and Bar 2 had a common
merit. They emphasized the policy problem inherent in the
choice of law governing the validity and effect of an agent's
authority. Both eminent writers were in agreement that the
protection of the principal's interest was of prevailing significance. Although they realized the difficulty for a third
party to obtain full knowledge of the existence and extent
of the powers of a person acting on behalf of a foreign prin1
STORY§ 286 (b), and in Pope v. Nickerson (1844) 3 Story, U.S. Circ. Ct.
Reports 465.
2

2 BAR 69.
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cipal, they argued nevertheless that the latter could only
be made liable under the law of his domicil. In this view, the
third party must inform himself concerning the facts of
the agency on which he relies, or else be satisfied with what
liability an unauthorized agent may incur. It was thought
intolerable that one should, without having conferred the
requisite power under his own law, incur liability by reason
of another person's transactions. This might subject him to
any law in the world!
The Restatement, in its first section on the subject, § 343,
approaches this appreciation of the problem by prescribing
the law of the place where the agreement constituting
authority is made.
An opposite view, however, has doubtless acquired superior strength. Arguments and formulations vary, but
the emphasis in all variants has shifted from the principal's
place to that of the agent's activity. Lord Phillimore, in
a much noticed brief remark, pointed to "the duty as well
as expediency of upholding bona fide transactions with the
subjects of foreign states," which he called the first principle of private internationallaw. 3 His many followers have
concluded that security of commerce requires protection of
the third party in assuming that the agent has the powers
that he would have under the local law. In the case of
"apparent authority," though for unknown reasons only in
this case, the Restatement likewise refers to the law of the
state where "reliance is placed" on the authorization
( § 344) . According to another analysis, the state in which
the transaction takes place is entitled to preference over
the foreign law to which the principal may be subject. 4 It
is often argued that the creation of an authority is of less
importance than its practical exercise by the agent in enter3 4 PHILLIMORE
4

§ 705; 2 MElLI 39; RoLIN, 3 Principes 420 ff.
THOL, 1 Handelsrecht (ed. 6, 1879) § 67 n. 3·
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ing into a transaction with a third party. Accordingly,
§ 345 of the Restatement proclaims the law of the place
where the agent is to "act for the principal or other partners," and the German courts stress the law of the place
where the authority "develops its effect." 5
Both basic theories have been recently attacked for considering the protection of interests instead of being content
with a simple application of the law of the place of performance.6 This idea, however, rests on the old, inadequate
theory of mandate as containing a duty which is to be
"performed.''
The debate has indeed suffered from a congenital defect,
namely, an unwarranted generalization of reasoning. As
will appear immediately below, Story and Bar dealt with
special cases in which the powers of the agent were from the
beginning limited by a law deserving universal effect. In
pursuance of their arguments, we may contend that the law
of the principal governs the powers of a shipmaster and
those conferred on certain representatives directly by law
or by public appointment. On the other hand, where a
principal constitutes authorization by an ordinary, private,
voluntary act, intending its use in a foreign state, the law
of this state is justifiedly considered competent to construe
the validity and effects of the authorization. In the former
cases the protection of the principal, in the latter cases the
protection of the third parties, obtain preference.
The two theories, thus, can be reconciled. Neither does
Story's opinion mirror the present American law, 7 nor is it
completely obsolete, 8 nor wrong because of unilateral consideration of the risk of the principal. 9 But it is no more
5

See infra n. 74·

6 BATIFFOL 282 § 315.
7 KUHN, Comp. Com. 277, cf. Recueil 1928
8 BRESLAUER, 50 }urid. Rev. (1938) 307.
9 2 BEALE I

196.

I 258.

q.6
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correct to harmonize, as does Wharton, 10 the theory of the
principal's law in Pope v. Nickerson and the proper law
doctrine adopted in the Chatenay Case by the supposition
that the intentions of the parties were different.
We shall first discuss the special situations of authorizations recognized everywhere as constituted under the law
with which the principal is connected. The rest of this
chapter will be devoted to the domain, commonly the only
one envisaged, of the powers of privately constituted agents.
2.

Authorizations Internationally Determined by Their
Source

(a) Shipmaster's powers. Story, in his treatise/ 1 discussed the common law rule that the master of a ship has
a limited authority to borrow money in a foreign port and
give a bottomry bond only in cases of necessary repairs and
other pressing emergencies, while in some maritime countries
the master has a broader authority, or at least a broader
liability may attach to the vessel and the owner. Story
approved the English practice restricting the master of an
English ship according to the law of the domicil of the
owner.
Later, in the Massachusetts federal circuit court, Story
applied this view in the case of Pope v. Nickerson 12 in which
a Massachusetts vessel, owned by a resident of that state,
on a voyage from Malaga to Philadelphia, put in to Bermuda under stress of weather and was sold by the master
with the whole cargo. The liability of the owners for the
acts of the master was limited by the laws of Spain and
Massachusetts to the value of the vessel and her freight,
but was unlimited in Pennsylvania.
WHARTON 875 § 408a.
STORY § 286 (b).
Pope v. Nickerson ( 1844) 3 Story, U. S. Circ. Ct. Reports 465, 474, 19
Fed. Cas. 1022 No. I I 1274·
lO

11
12
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Story held13 that "if the ship is owned and navigated
under the flag of a foreign country, the authority of the
master to contract for and to bind the owners, must be
measured by the laws of that country, unless he is held out
to persons in other countries, as possessing a more enlarged
authority. . . . If any person chooses to trust him under
any circumstances, or beyond this-it is a matter of blind
credulity, and at his own peril. . . . If we were to resort
to a different rule-to the laws of the different countries
which the ship might visit, for the interpretation of his
powers, while he was in the ports of that country-we
should have the most extraordinary and conflicting obligations arising. . . ."
To be sure, Story, while arguing about the force of the
law of the flag, exclaimed that "No one ever imagined that
in any other case of agency to be transacted in a foreign
country, the principal was bound beyond the instructions
or authority given to his agent . . . . The authority confided (to him) by the principal is measured by the interpretation and extent of that authority, by or according to the
law of the place where it is given, by the lex loci and not
by the laws of a foreign country. . . . " However, this is
an entirely mistaken obiter dictum, whereas his decision in
the instant case was perfectly correct.
That a shipmaster's authority is to be measured once
and for all according to the law of the flag, may indeed be
called a universally settled rule. It has been adopted in
England, clearly in Lloyd v. Guibert14 and probably in constant practice. 15 It appears in the resolutions of international congresses16 and in the C6digo Bustamente. 11 It preJd. at 475 ff.
(I86S) L. R. I Q. B. us; CHESHIRE (ed. 3) 3ZZ f.
15 M. WOLFF, Priv. Int. Law 450 § 4z4; infra p. Z6I.
16 Congresses of Antwerp and Brussels, see I Revue Int. Dr. Marit. 4Z6.
17 Art. Z79·
13

14
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vails commonly.18 In this respect, it can be said therefore
that legitimate reliance of the public may be based not on
local laws but only on the law of the state to which the
vessel belongs.
Story and other common law jurists have spoken of the
master's authority as interpreted under the law of the flag.
On the Continent, it is often directly construed as a legal
power. There is no substantial difference of meaning. The
decisive consideration is the international preference enjoyed by the law of the state where the vessel is registered.
(b) Legal authority. To refute the application of lex
loci contractus of the main contract, Bar contended that
security of commerce, instead of requiring this application,
on the contrary demanded the application of the law under
which the authority was given. 19 For illustrations, he referred to the directors of a corporation, the powers held
in civil law on the ground of family relations, and those
of a shipmaster. "What would be the use, for instance, for
a stock corporation to limit the powers of a director by
requiring assent of the board or of the assembly of stockholders, if he were not so bound in contracting abroad?"
These are forceful arguments. But they support the lex
domicilii merely in application to what are called in civil
law countries legal representatives. Such include the father,
mother, guardian, or curator of an individual, inasmuch as
they are granted by law supervision over person or property
and conclude legal transactions in the name of the child
or dependent person, or assist in his transactions; the organs
of legal persons; receivers in bankruptcy, administrators of
decedents' estates and all other agents acting with legally
defined powers for estates, without being the titular owner
as common law trustees are.
1 8 With the ill-reputed exception of the German Reichsgericht, see infra
Ch. 43· See for France, citations in 3 Repert. 30 No. 45·
19 2 BAR 69.
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The principle extends to formally fixed powers which
cannot be restricted with effect against third parties. Such
powers are vested in many countries in the boards of corporations,20 in commercial managers such as procura institoria under Italian, 21 or procura under German law, 22 in
guardians, 23 and others. The investigation of such powers
is reduced to a minimum of inquiry.
This doctrine seems to be settled at present, clearly in
Germany, 24 and also in other civil law jurisdictions. 25 It
is the only view consistent with the principle of personal law.
This law determines in what respect and by whom an individual or association is represented by operation of law. 26
At common law, the situation is different. The category
of "authority by law" is not unknown, but consists of few
and doubted cases. 27 Powers based on family relations are
scarce. The personal law thus largely disappears behind
the law of the place of contracting, or that governing the
contract.
However, in the broad domain of the law of corporations
and other associations, we have found it highly advisable to
recognize that the law governing the life of the organization should extend to the powers of the principal officers
or managing partners. 28 This postulate, it is true, is often
neglected.
20 See Vol. II pp. 169 f.
21 C. C. (I 942) arts. 2203 ff.
22 BGB. §§ 49, so; see for other

commercial dependent agents, § 54·
French C. C. art. 450; German BGB. § 1793.
24 When I suggested this approach in 3 Z.ausi.PR. (1929) 809 ff., the
doctrine seemed insecure, but it has been commonly confirmed since.
25 E.g., Hungary: Curia (Oct. 27, 1937) 5 Z.osteurop.R. (1938) 396; the
manager of an Amsterdam shipping enterprise, a registered merchant in
Vienna, had unlimited authority under Austrian law to hire there a
Hungarian worker.
2 6 Vol. I pp. 318, 6o2; Vol. II pp. 167 ff.
27 MECHEM, Agency 9· 2 WHARTON 868 spoke of taking charge of the
affairs of another "either by the voluntary act of such latter person desiring
to be relieved of care, or by act of the law, as in the case of guardianships
and commissions of lunacy."
2s Vol. II, pp. 168-172.
28
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Illustration: An Ohio corporation owning land in West
Virginia conferred on Porter, a real-estate broker ( apparently in Ohio), by formal action of its board of directors a
power of attorney "to sell the property." In a subsequent
lawsuit, the issue depended on the authority of a subagent
in West Virginia appointed by Porter. The West Virginia
court applied its domestic law, laid down in two preceding
decisions of the court, in order to state that the board of
directors-in Ohio !-had failed to comply with the formality prescribed in West Virginia that the signature and
the corporate seal be affixed. 29 Although the law of the
forum for several reasons was applicable to determine the
subagent's powers, it should not have been extended to the
original authorization except upon its questionable force
as lex situs, which is not even mentioned in the report.
Finally, the powers of all persons appointed by a court
or an administrative agency, whether connected with a trust
relation or not, are as a rule legally defined and therefore
must be expected to be subject to the law of their creation.
In all these cases, neglected in the treatises, the law
under which a power is deemed to be constituted has a
natural and overwhelming claim. Exceptions for protecting
innocent third parties will not be justified except in rare
cases. Persons dealing with the alleged principal officers of
an association or court appointees, indeed, should be charged
with the knowledge of the existence and extent of their
powers. On the other hand, they may rely on the source of
these powers.
3· Authorization Determined by Local Law
(a) Former views: Law of the principal. It is only in
the field of authorization by private legal act that the law
of the principal has been pushed into the background. For
29 Gallagher v. Washington County Savings, Loan and Building Co.
(1943) 25 S. E. (zd) 914, 918. The court invoked§ 345 of the Restatement.
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a time it was favored on the Continent. 30 Some followers of
the mandate theory supported it as the law of the place
where the mandator receives acceptance. 31 More writers
have maintained the same device as a subsidiary test, as in
the case of an agent sent to several countries. 32
(b) Local law. On the other hand, the fiction of identity
was a strong factor in promoting the law of the place where
the agent represents the principal. As late as I 917, the
Appeal Court at the Hague applied Italian law to the
authority of a Genoese broker with the justification that the
Dutch principal was deemed to have traveled to Genoa. 33
The real grounds, of course, for preferring the law under
which the agent "exercises his power"-or however else
the courts express the local law-lie in the idea that third
persons should be able easily to ascertain the powers of
the agent. Most frequently, this consideration has been
aided by presumptions concerning the intentions of the
parties. For, so far as the principal manifests his will
unequivocally and brings it to the knowledge of the third
party, no problem arises. But when he is silent or negligent
or relies on internal instructions or legal restrictions relating
to the power conferred by him, which are unknown or
unusual in the foreign country, construction of his conduct
in the light of the local law is regarded as justified. Similar
problems arise with respect to the validity and termination
of authority.
80 Belgium: 7 LAURENT 539 § 450 (place of the principal as the party
making the offer of mandate).
Germany: 8 ROHGE. 150.
Italy: FEDOZZI-CERETI 751 and n. 3, reserving the law of the forum protecting bona fide parties.
The Netherlands: Rb. Amsterdam (Dec. 14, 1876) W. 4132.
81 Supra p. 125 n. 7·
82 Thus, e.g., 2 WHARTON 869 § 406 (who confuses the case with that of a
soliciting agent); DIENA, 2 Dir. Com. Int. 283; VALERY § 658; 2 ScHNITZER
541. And see infra at n. 59·
88 App. s'Gravenhage (June 8, 1917) W. 10208, applying Ital. C. C. (1865)
art. 376.
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Other rationalizations are questionable. That modern
writers should think (in Savigny's manner) of the principal
as "submitting" himself to the foreign law only because he
sends his agent there, 34 resurrects an antiquated emphasis
on the volition of a party. It is also objectionable that Beale
terms the question one of jurisdiction.35 Ultimately, Beale
ascribes the principal's subjection to the foreign law to the
fact that he causes the use of the authority in the foreign
state. 36 Not even this justification is accurate.
Beale's main example is Milliken v. Pratt which we have
not found to be a suitable part of agency law. 37 Accepting
its bizarre construction of the mail service as a regular
agency, Beale concluded that Massachusetts law was applicable because the woman caused the postal delivery in
that state. 38 This amounts to saying that a person under a
disability at his domicil, can render himself competent by
directing his note to another state through the mail. Commonly, the same weird result has been reached under the
law of the place where the contract is "completed."
In another case 39 adduced by Beale, a married woman
signed an accommodation note in favor of her husband's
firm in Alabama, supposing that it would be discounted in
Alabama. The note was, however, taken to Illinois. The
New York court declared that she was not liable because
of incapacity under her own law. But did she not "cause"
the discount in Illinois, in the sense of a conditio sine qua
non? She did, although it may be contended that she did not
authorize such discount. Causation is the wrong word also
84 2 BEALE u98; similarly e.g., RG. (Dec. 5, 1896) 38 RGZ. 194, whereas
recent decisions stress the needs of commerce.
35 2 BEALE II98 § 345.2.
36 Restatement § 345 and comment c.
37 Supra Ch. 39 n. 43·
38 2 BEALE II97 § 345.2.
39 Union National Bank of Chicago v. Chapman (1902) 169 N. Y. 538,
62 N. E. 672.
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for the reason that it raises the idea of some compulsion on
the agent whereas authorization confers merely a power,
and a duty of employing it flows only from an accompanying contract.
The true reason for the application of the local law is
simply objective expediency, provided that the principal
has contemplated acting in the foreign country.
England. Among the approaches taken by the courts in
various countries, the most impressive is illustrated by the
English case, Chatenay v. Brazilian Submarine Telegraph
Co. 40 While numerous other English decisions are elusive
or confusing, this Court of Appeal decision is outstanding.
A Brazilian executed in Brazil in the Portuguese language
a power of attorney authorizing a broker in London to buy
and sell shares of stock. The court had to decide under what
law the extent of the authority was to be determined. Although starting from the usual references to lex loci contractus and lex loci solutionis, the Court of Appeal passed
to the twofold consideration that ( r) the true meaning of
the authority was to be ascertained on the ground of all
circumstances of the execution of the instrument including
the Brazilian law, and ( 2) if the meaning was that shares
were to be bought and sold in England, "the extent of the
authority in any country in which the authority is to be acted
upon is to be taken to be according to the law of the particular country where it is acted upon." The court, thus,
emphasized two distinguishable requisites of representation, one to be determined with a certain regard to Brazilian law, and the other with an exclusive view to English
law.
Recent decisions follow the same line. 41
40 [1891] I Q. B. 79, 83 f.; CHESHIRE (ed. 3) 319 seems to interpret the
case quite differently.
41 Sinfra Aktiengesellschaft v. Sinfra, Ltd. [ 1939] 2 All E. R. 675; Apt v.
Apt [1947] P. 127, aff'd, C. A. [1947] 2 All E. R. 677 at 68o: analogy for
authorization of a proxy marriage.
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It has been said 42 that a contrary opinion was expressed
in 1933. 43 An English insurance company, employed by
a New Y ark insurance broker through an English broker,
insured a Canadian corporation residing in New York. The
American broker cancelled the policy, and the question was
whether he had authority and ground to do so. The court
affirmed this question, applying New York law to determine
the extent of the broker's authority. This decision was
amply justified, since the power was considered conferred
by the brokerage contract and therefore effective as against
the insured. Lord Scrutton, it is true, invoked Dicey's Rule
No. I 79 and applied the law of New York as the place
where the brokerage contract was made. But the learned
judge would scarcely have followed this theory if the brokerage contract had been concluded somewhere else. This
Appeal Court decision, scantily equipped, should not be
regarded as overruling former considerations.
Germany. Exactly the same approach as that manifested
in the Chatenay Case was developed by the German courts
in an elaborate system presently to be discussed. 44
France. The majority of French authors are led by the
theory of identity of principal and agent to the application
of the law of the place where the agent contracts with the
third person. 45
United States. Likewise, despite Story, the American
courts do not apply the law of the principal to an agent's
authority. Nor is it true that they determine the validity
and scope of an authority under the law of the place where
42 Note, 5 Cambr. L. J. ( 1934) 251; FALCON BRIDGE, Conflict of Laws 373; .
see SCHOCH, 4 Giur. Comp. DIP. 290.
43 Ruby Steamship Corp. v. Commercial Union Ass. Co. (1933) 46 LI. L.
Rep. 265, 39 Com. Cas. 48, 4 Giur. Comp. DIP. No. 161.
44 Infra pp. 156 ff. On the Swedish views, see MicHAEL! 301 f.
45 LAURENT 544; WEISS and VALERY, see supra Ch. 38 ns. 37, 38. Directly
to the same practical effect, BATIFFOL, Traite 609 § 609 and Cass. civ. (July
2, 1946) Gaz. Pal. {Nov. 30, 1946) cited by him.
Contra: ARMINJON, Droit Int. Pr. Com. 412.
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the authority is constituted as has been asserted on the basis
of one sole case, 46 that of Freeman's Appeal. 41 There, the
Connecticut court was interested in applying the law of the
forum to deny capacity to a married woman domiciled in
the state, in opposition to the leading case of Milliken v.
Pratt and all other cases in point. 48 The woman, in her own
state of Connecticut, had signed a note of guarantee for
her husband and handed it to him, and he mailed it to
Illinois. The decision was based on her incapacity to authorize him as her agent in Connecticut. What such an argument is worth, is shown by the previous decision of the same
court validating a married woman's blank endorsement
of an insurance policy, delivered to her husband in Connecticut, on the ground that the husband filled it out in
New J ersey. 49
The usual approach of the American courts is different.
They determine the powers of an agent according to the
law of the place "where the agent exercises his authority,"
identifying this place with the place where the contract
between the agent and the third party is made. 50 It is not
certain under what theory this law, the lex loci contractus
of the main contract, is applied. The decisions often refer
to the alleged general rule of Scudder v. Union National
BanP 1 that the validity of a contract is governed by the
law of the place of contracting. But in almost every single
case some additional connection has pointed to the same
law, apart from the fact that most decisions are concerned
46 Thus 2 C. ]. S. 1038, Agency § 8 and n. 82; Restatement § 343· However,
a recent case may be added with respect to formality. See infra n. 89.
47
( 1897) 68 Conn. 533, 37 Ad. 420.
48
Supra Ch. 39 n. 43·
49 Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Westervelt (x884) 52 Conn. 592.
2 BEALE II96 n. 3 places the case on a more convincing ground: the assignment of the policy to the beneficiary was the act authorized by the woman.
60 2 BEALE II95; 15 C. J. S. 886 n. 28 and Supp. 1948. This includes recent
cases such as Moore v. Burdine (La. 1937) 174 So. 279; Paxson v. Commissioner of Int. Revenue (C. C. A. 3d 1944) 144 F. (zd) 772.
51
(x87s) 91 u. s. 406.
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with insurance contracts made by a local agent. If as suggested before, 52 the rule goes back to a case of I 84I, its
significance is that the existence and extent of authority is a
mere incident of the contract with a third party, quite as
form and capacity have been so often treated in this country.
What exact localization this theory furnishes if we
abandon the tenet of lex loci contractus, will be discussed
later. 53
Latin America. Despite the continued influence of the old
mandate theory, Latin-American writers also seem to veer
towards the law of the place where the agent "carries out
his mandate." 54 The hope is justified that authority may
be given its own place in the conflicts law.
(c) Limitations on the local law: Types of agents. The
German doctrine applying the law of the place where the
agent exercises his power, was first established in the case
of an agent having a permanent and fixed place of business.
Bar, the advocate of the law of the principal, conceded an
exception for foreign domiciled representatives. 55 The German courts, in fact, for a long time emphasized the agent's
domicil only under a threefold limitation: namely, (I) the
agent should be an individual or organization, established
at a fixed place of business in a country other than that of
the principal; ( 2) he should have concluded contracts in
that country only; moreover, (3) the suit should arise from
52 Carnegie v. Morrison (I84I) 2 Metcalf (43 Mass.) 38I, supra Ch. 39
n. 3· We exclude entirely the liability of stockholders for acts of directors
in a state other than that of incorporation, often categorized under the
subject of agency, as by Thomas v. Matthiessen (I9I4) 232 U. S. 22I and in
England by BRESLAUER, so Jurid. Rev. (I938) at 3I4. On the subject itself,
see Vol. II pp. 8I ff.
53 /nfra II, I (a), pp. I63, I65.
54 E.g., Brazil: EsPINOLA, 2 Lei Introd. 372 § 242; SERPA LoPES, 2 Lei Introd.
360 § 26I.
55 BAR, in I Ehrenberg's Handb. 345 and n. 5; followed by HUPKA, Vollmacht 2 52; similarly, 2 WHARTON 867 § 405.
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different interpretations of the scope of authority m the
countries of principal and agent. 56
The typical case, thus defined, presents the core of the
matter and seems to be treated practically everywhere to
the same effect. In the words of the Swiss Federal Tribunal,
"the manifestation of the agent goes out from the territory
of his law and is directed from there to the third person." 57
The latter, as the Reichsgericht constantly states, has to
rely on this law.
This unanimity may partly be explained by the fact that
in outstanding cases the solution is obtainable from both
ends of the controversial line of thought. The courts often
stress the necessity for the third party to depend on the
local law. But where the agent is a branch or agency in the
exclusive service of the principal firm, his place of business
may be regarded as a special domicil of the principal himself. Such reasoning has inevitably prevailed when a foreign
corporation carries on business in a state. Whether or not
that state prescribes that an agent with full powers must be
appointed and registered, the powers of any permanent
representative of the foreign corporation are conveniently
measured by the local standard.
The same solution is to be found where the agent is a
domiciled independent contractor. When a Dutch firm
through its branch in Cardiff, England, employed an Italian
brokerage firm domiciled in Genoa, Italy, to sell coal, the
Dutch court did not hesitate to apply the Italian Code of
Commerce in construing its authority. 58
56 Germany: RG. (Dec. 5, r896) 38 RGZ. 194; (Jan. 14, I9ro) 66 Seuff.
Arch. No. 73; (Dec. 5, 19n) 78 RGZ. 55·
5 7 Switzerland: Inspired by 2 MEILI 39, BG. (Dec. 22, 1916) 42 BGE. II
648, 650 (validity of "procura" of a foreign branch); accord: (Dec. 14,
1920) 46 BGE. II 490, 493 (branch manager); (March 5, 1923) 49 BGE.
II 70, 74 (although concerned with agency in contracting, seems also conclusive for authority).
58
The Netherlands: App. Haag (June 8, 1917) W. 10208, with the argument that because authorization was given to a brokerage firm carrying on its
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But, while modern followers of the law of the principal
are forced to acknowledge concessions in the cases mentioned, some have insisted on their rule in the case of a
traveling salesman having no fixed domicil. 59 Nevertheless,
the German courts which once proclaimed such a distinction,60 have enlarged their formulation of the rule in such
generally expressed dicta that it is prevailingly understood
to include the powers of any agent. 61 In the United States,
it has not been doubted that when a traveling salesman
goes from state to state selling goods, "the situs of the
contracts he makes is where he exercises his authority." 62
The recent English decision in the Sinfra Case has recognized
that where a power of attorney is issued for use in several
countries, the scope of a copy for use in England is determined by English law ;63 the English presumption is that
any authority given for several countries entitles the agent
to act in each country in accordance with the laws thereof. 64
Kinds of problems. Since the differences of municipal
rules concerning the extent of authority, and particularly of
implied authority, are outstanding in judicial discussions
everywhere, they appear also in the foreground of the
business in Genoa, Italy, the contract constituting the authority was made in
Italy. The court distinguishes sharply the contract made through the agent
with the third party. Cf. e.g., Swiss BG. (July 20, I92o) 46 BGE. II 26o, 263:
the plaintiff, having a special agent in Switzerland, had to take into consideration that the acts of its representative are determined under Swiss law.
59 Supra n. 32.
60 RG. (June 15, I92o) 76 Seuff. Arch. 2, still followed by NussBAUM,
D. IPR. 263, and LAUTERBACH in Palandt, Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch (1944)
I9I2, 5 (a). But the decision was confused and has no authority; see for
criticism, RABEL, 3 Z.ausi.PR. (I929) 822.
61 See the authors cited in 3 Z. ausl. PR. (I929) 815 n. I; and adde LG.
Berlin I (Oct. 5, I932) IPRspr. I932 No. 63 with comment by RABEL, 7
Z.ausi.PR. (I933) 802.
62 Succession of Welsh (I904) III La. 8oi, 35 So. 9I3 (for the purpose of
applying the Louisiana law of seller's privilege); Kamper v. Hunter Land
Co. (I92o) I46 Minn. 337, 34I, I78 N. W. 747·
63 Sinfra Aktiengesellschaft v. Sinfra, Ltd. [I939] 2 All E. R. 675.
64 Esher, M. R., in the Chatenay Case at 83, cited by DICEY 725 Rule I8o
(c), comment and note (e).
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literature from Story to the present time. But the rule that
the law of the agent's act governs, naturally enlarges its
own domain. Problems such as the effect of ratification and
termination of authority cannot conveniently be solved in
a different manner. The scope of the local law expands, and
it becomes the general law governing voluntary authority.
The American practice has never made a distinction among
the problems.
(d) The Restatement. In § 343, whether an agreement
constitutes "authorization" is said to be determined by the
law of the place where it is made, the lex loci actus. However, § 344 subjects "apparent" authority to the law of the
state "where reliance is placed upon such apparent authorization." Finally, § 34 5, under the condition that there is
authority or apparent authority for acting in a state, leaves
it to this state to decide "whether an act done (there by
the agent) on account of the principal imposes a contractual
duty upon the principal."
We know that Beale 65 intended to consider the risks and
rights not only of the principal, as Story did, but also of
the third party, which he found protected in the cases. But
we are faced once more with patently contradictory rules,
since here less than anywhere else can creation and effects
of the legal relationship be submitted to different laws.
If § 343, for instance, says that the state where an agreement is made determines whether it constitutes an authorization, does this not include the requirement of personal
capacity to appoint an agent? Yet, illustration 2 to § 345
states that a married woman's promissory note signed and
handed to her husband in X is valid if the wife is responsible
under the law of Y where it was to be, and was, discounted.
Certainly this is the solution prevailing in the courts. But
this practice clashes with the broad language of § 343· To
65 2 BEALE

II96 § 345.1.
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read Beale's own comment to § 34 5, 66 it seems that he endorsed the cases in many other respects. Is, then, § 343 in
reality restricted to the question whether P in X sends the
agent to state Y to act on his behalf ( cf. § 34 5 comment c) ?
This would make sense, but does not exhaust the meaning
of the section.
For comment a to § 345 of the Restatement assigns to
§ 343, viz., the lex loci actus, the "extent" of authority.
However, illustration 3 to § 345 calls for the law of the
place of acting to determine, according to § 345, implied
authority.
The place of reliance ( § 344) must be something different
from the place where the agent "acts" ( § 34 5), and the
difference might reflect a diversity of opinion about the
selection of convenient contacts. But what this place of
reliance exactly is, why the rule is changed from § 344 to
§ 345, and what is meant by the agent's "act," is nowhere
explained. The suspicion seems justified that the reliance
rule for apparent authority intends to satisfy some scholastic
need for a symmetrical contraposition of the manifestations
to the third party in contrast to manifestations to the agent.
The confusion is due in the first place to the stereotyped
use of lex loci contractus and, in the second place, to the
erroneous belief that the distinctions proposed in the Agency
Restatement could support differentiated rules of conflict.
Leaving these obscure riddles unsolved, we may remark
with satisfaction not only, as noted before, 67 that agency and
authority are neatly distinguished but also that the local
law receives a significant role with the express purpose of
protecting the expectation of third parties.
66 22 BEALE II9S·
67 Ch. 39 p. I39·
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4· Consideration of the Principal's Law
In applying the local law of the place where the agent
"exercises" his authority, the English and German courts
expressly presuppose that the principal has agreed that the
agent should act for him in the specific country. With a
similar intention, though less correctly, the Restatement,
§ 34 5, requires "causation" by the principal for the agent's
acts in the foreign country (supra pp. 152 and 159). The
American courts require "some conduct of the principal
. . . warranting a legal presumption of agency." 68
Does all this mean a preliminary conflicts rule referring
to the law of the principal's domicil or of the place where
he constitutes the authority? In my own former proposal
I suggested that the law of the principal's domicil ought to
determine "whether the principal has declared his assent
that the agent should act for him in the specific foreign
country." 69 The Restatement takes a similar position, as
§ 343 subjects the question whether an authorization to
act in the foreign country exists, to the law of the place
where the agreement is made. This is usually the domicil
of the principal.
However, this reservation has been criticized as too
subtle, 70 and it would be consistent with the point of view
as KUHN, Comp. Com. 277, cf. Hauck Clothing Co. v. Sophia Sharpe ( 1900)
83 Mo. App. 385. The mother in Missouri sent her note to the son in Indiana
"without legal restriction and with legal authority to sell it, where and to
whom he wanted," at 392.
69 RABEL, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (1929) 835, cf. 7 id. (1933) 8o6.
Cf. the English Sinfra Case, supra n. 63; the judge contrasts extent and
revocability with "formation," and leaves a question open as to formality
and capacity.
Germany: OLG. Hamburg (March 18, 1895) 16 Hans. GZ. (1895) HBI.
139: the law of the flag decides whether the shipowner could be bound "at
all" by the signing of the bill of lading, whereas the law of the port of
destination under German practice governs the rest of the problems. OLG.
Hamburg (March 3, 1914) 35 Hans. GZ. ( 1914) HBI. 131: the Italian agent
was not at all authorized to contract for the Hamburg firm, hence no
question of the extent of authority arose.
70 BATIFFOL 282 n. 5; BRESLAUER, supra p. 145 n. 8, at 312.
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preferred in discussing consent by silence and analogous
questions/ 1 here also to abandon insistence that the above
formulated question should be determined by any special
law. In the Chatenay Case, the court required the ascertainment that the Brazilian principal by his power of attorney
under the circumstances prevailing in Brazil intended to
authorize selling and purchasing in England. But this question was not expressly assigned to Brazilian law; the judgment may be read as applying English law in prescribing
an investigation of the Portuguese language, the Brazilian
usages, and the legal knowledge of the principal in order to
construe his intention. This is probably how the English
commentators understand the case. 72
An express intention of the principal to submit his authorization to the law of a certain country is extremely rare.
But a tacit selection of the applicable law has sometimes
been correctly assumed when the powers were given for
the purpose of proceeding in the courts or government
offices of a foreign country. 13 By the same reasoning, the
English rules providing for strict interpretation of powers
of attorney, 74 apply where a sealed deed of authorization
is conferred in England.
II.
1.

THE DEFINITION oF LocAL LAw

Various Views

Although the distinct trend of the courts in the United
States, England, Germany, the Netherlands, and probably
most other countries has veered toward the local law, no
agreement has resulted in the exact definition of this law.
See Vol. II p. 522.
See CHESHIRE 264.
To a similar effect, probably RAAPE, D. IPR. 275 speaking of simultaneous
application of the law of the principal.
73LG. Berlin I {Oct. 5, 1932) IPRspr. 1932, No. 63 at I35·
74 See BowsTEAD, Agency 49 art. 36.
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Usually there is no reason for doubt, because a permanently
established agent of a foreign principal concludes a contract with a third party in the country of his domicil. Thus,
the extent of the general authority of a London ship broker
to make a charter party for a foreign shipowner or charterer
certainly is subject to English law. 75 But which of the three
involved connecting factors, viz., the conclusion of the
contract, the domicil, or the agent's part in the conclusion,
prevails if these factors do not coincide?
(a) Lex loci contractus of the main contract. 76 The
French authors and the American cases are probably to be
interpreted to the effect that authority is governed entirely
by the law of the place where the main contract is made.
If we do not believe in the force of the lex loci contractus,
this rule may be transformed into either of two possible
variants. It might be concluded that authority should be
determined by whatever law governs the main contract.
This agrees with an approach sometimes suggested in
Europe. 77
Or the place where the agent does the act embodying his
consent to the main contract might be emphasized. This
would bring the American tradition into a near relation to
the following attempts at localization.
(b) Law of the agent's domicil. Whenever the local law
has been applied in view of a permanent domicil of an
agent, his place has been contemplated as that where he
exercised his powers or acted in the interest of the principal;
the law of this place governed his transactions. In particular, the German and Swiss highest courts have constantly had such a situation in mind. 78
75 E.g., the Netherlands: Rb. Rotterdam (Oct. 29, 1930) W. 12345, N. J.
1934. 631.
7 6 KosTERS 769 advocates this law when it is more favorable to the third
party than the law of the principal's domicil.
77 BRESLAUER, so Jurid. Rev. ( 1938} at 308 optimistically contends that
this is the true doctrine to be drawn from the English cases.
7 8 All the cases supra ns. 56, 61, and n. 57 are conclusive on this point.
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(c) Law of the place of operation. A few American
decisions mention, among coincidental facts, the place where
a power of attorney was to be exercised. Thus, a power of
attorney to lease Mexican land was subjected to Mexican
law because, among other contacts, it was "to be exercised
in Mexico." 79 The termination by death of an authority to
sell Texas land was declared to be governed by Texas law
with the justification that attempts had been made to carry
out the power in the state. 8° Commonly, it is true, such
language seems to mean nothing else than the place where
the main contract is made. 81
The German courts have constantly used the same language in the formula that the power conferred by authorization is governed by the law of the place where that power
is to take effect or "deploys its force, " 82 for instance, the
place where the agent and the third party meet. 83 It is
identical with the place of "reliance" according to § 344 of
the Restatement and its illustration, in the case of an agent's
showing his written power of attorney to the third party.
The contract may be concluded subsequently at any place.
If A sends T an offer with notice that he is authorized by
P to transact with him, he may be considered as using the
authority at his own place, while the contract may be considered completed by the mailing of T's acceptance. It may
also be said in such a case that the agent "acts" at his own
place (Restatement § 34 5), although T places his "reliance" on the letter when he receives it. Or vice versa, the
agent may visit the other party and show his authority
79 Merinos Viesca y Campania v. Pan American P. & T. Co. (D. C. E. D.
N.Y. 1931) 49 F. (2d) 352; cf. 2 C.]. S. 1038 at n. 83.
so Gilmer v. Veatch (Tex. Civ. App. 1909) I2I S. W. 545·
81 This is the impression given by 12 C. J. 451; 5 R. C. L. 934; II Am.
Jur. 395 § II2 n. II; Succession of Welsh (1904) III La. Sox, 35 So. 913;
Kamper v. Hunter Land Co. (1920) 146 Minn. 337, 340, 178 N. W. 747·
82 See in particular RG. (Dec. 5, I9II) 78 RGZ. 55; (June 14, 1923) Recht
1923, No. 1222; KG. (Dec. 14, 1933) IPRspr. 1933, No. 9·
sa RG. (March 23, 1929) Leipz. Z. 1929, 1268 No. 3·
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while he subsequently writes the decisive letter from his
own domicil. It is true that the other party is supposed to
rely on the authority at the very moment of contracting,
whether he sees a written authority at this moment or not
at all; but the formulation here in question stresses the act
of the agent in which he leans on the authorization.
Also an English judge has stated that the place where
an authority is "operated," determines the law. 84
2.

Rationale

Ad (a) The proposition of applying the law governing
the main contract is manifestly wrong, despite its adoption in the courts of this country. If A in London, agent of
a Bombay firm P, sells to T in New York roo bags of jute,
deliverable f. o. b. Bombay, the sale is governed by the
Anglo-Indian Sale of Goods Act. To determine for this
reason the power of the London agent under the same law,
would defy the very idea from which the argument starts.
The applicable law would be that of the principal instead
of that on which T may rely.
On the other hand, in Mas pons v. Mildred,S 5 the English
Court of Appeal held that the extent of an authority given
and accepted in Havana, Cuba, between firms there domiciled was governed by Spanish law, then in force in Cuba.
Nevertheless the main contract concluded with the third
party, a firm in England, by correspondence, was declared to
be under English law, probably according to the party's intentions. It would have been grotesque to determine the
extent of the agent's power by English law.
Again, suppose that A, the local agent of a foreign finance
84 Sinfra Aktiengesellschaft v. Sinfra, Ltd., supra n. 63, at 682; in Apt v.
Apt [1947] 2 All E. R. 677-C. A. at 679, Cohen, L. J., refers to the law of
the intended place of performance, which was a sufficient formula in the
instant case.
85 Supra Cb. 39 p. 141 n. 64.
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corporation P, makes a loan to T and the printed loan form
includes a stipulation for the law of P's home state. Does
this clause extend to the question whether the agent was
entitled to waive some forfeiture clause of the printed
form? The courts are unanimous in subjecting this question
to the local law.
Ad (b) In the narrower, but by far most important, case
of a permanently established agent, the law of his place
offers a sound compromise. The business place of a branch
manager or a servant of the foreign principal, amounts to
a secondary seat of the latter. If the contract is made in
the jurisdiction where the agent resides, which is the regular
case, no practical doubt disturbs the courts. It would be
pedantic to search for another place of reliance. Indeed,
the locality in which the agent shows the written power of
attorney to the third party, or where the principal orally
tells him that he authorizes A, is immaterial in such a
situation.

Illustration. P of New York at a convention in Chicago
tells T of Arizona that he has a new district manager A for
several states with headquarters in Denver, Colorado, and
hopes that Twill patronize him. According to § 344 of the
Restatement, this "apparent authorization" would be determined by the law of Illinois. If subsequently, A makes an
offer by letter to T in Arizona and T accepts by letter,
according to § 345 of the Restatement, the "effect" of the
authorization would be determined by the Arizona law
which conflicts with § 343 and § 344, but in this case agrees
with the decisions. Under the German rule for agents with
fixed domicil, the Colorado law governs the acts that the
agent is entitled to make. It is submitted that this agrees
with the presumable intentions of all three parties.
Ad (c) The place where the agent "acts" (Restatement
§ 345) may be any place in the course of his activity from
his assertion that he is authorized to the completion of the
third party contract.
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In American decisions, it is true, this exact point has
never been raised. In one case, 86 the district manager of the
Firestone Corporation in Oklahoma went to Texas for the
purpose of concluding a contract and at the same time made
an oral promise to a third beneficiary. But since the federal
court in Texas stated that "the foreign corporation sent
its district manager to this state," the possibility was not
considered that his implied authority might have been governed by the law of Oklahoma; under the circumstances,
the agent was not functioning as district manager but as
a special envoy.
Conclusion. The law of the principal has lost its claim to
govern generally the conditions and effects of authority.
A logical solution would always point to the place where
the agent warrants his authority expressly or impliedly. But
it might in some cases be doubted where this place is. Moreover, if he or the principal manifests the authorization during the negotiations, the ultimate consent by the agent to the
contract is the more important event.
While such doubts challenge a single rule, judicial experience has furnished, instead of one, two rules.
If an agent, acting for a foreign principal, carries on
his function from a fixed place of business, the law of this
place governs.
In all other cases, the law of that place should govern,
in which the agent manifests (declares or dispatches) his
consent to the main transaction.
The law of the principal's domicil is not even applied
when it is more favorable to the third party than that just
mentioned. When a Danish city,. having contracted with
a domiciled agent of a German firm for the purchase of
certain goods, resorted to a provision of the German Com86 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Fisk Tire Co. (C. C. A. Texas 1935)
87 S. W. (zd) 794·
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mercial Code, § 86, paragraph 2, authorizing third persons
to address notice of defects and rejection of goods to the
agent, the Reichsgericht refused the plea. Because security
of commerce requires that persons dealing with the agent
should be able easily to examine and ascertain the scope of
his authority, for this purpose, they must rely on the law
at the place of the agent. A larger extent of powers under
the law of the principal is not necessarily more favorable
to the third party. "It may be disadvantageous to him, for
instance, where it is in question whether his declaration
to the agent binds or obligates him. In no case should the
application of any law depend on its being or not being
favorable to him." 87 This, in my opinion, is convincing.
III.
1.

ScoPE OF THE LocAL LAw

Validity of Authority

(a) Form. Although the majority of American cases
apply the lex loci contractus of the main contract, 88 there
is no firm rule. When a power of attorney was signed in
Italy before a vice-consul of the United States without a
seal being affixed, the act was recognized as formally valid
in accordance with Italian law, and hence declared sufficient
to support the execution by the agent of a sealed instrument
in the United States. 89 This agrees with the first Restatement rule rather than with the traditional rule, although
it is not clear why an American consul should be supposed
to act under Italian rules of formalities.
Municipal laws include many formal requirements for
authorizations. The rule of the common law just alluded
to requires that an authority to execute a deed must also
87 RG. (Jan. 14, 1910) 66 Seuff. Arch. No. 73· All these propositions made
in 3 Z.ausi.PR. (1929) 835 seem to me still the best.
88 2 BEALE §§ 332.4, 342.1.
89 /n re Everett Estate (1941) 112 Vt. 252, 23 Atl. (2d) 202.
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be under seal. 90 In many states of the United States authority
for an agent to contract for the sale of land91 requires an
instrument satisfying the statute of frauds, like the sale
itself. 92 In a widespread doctrine, authority is generally subjected to the same formalities as the authorized contract. 93
The German law has taken the contrary viewpoint; although a contract to transfer title to land requires solemnization by court or notary, 94 authorization to conclude such
contract is formless ;95 however, increasing exceptions have
been stated. 96
The conflicts question has scarcely been treated with
special reference to authority. The repeatedly mentioned
German conflicts rule, in its latest broad formulation, seems
to extend to formalities the law of the place where the
agent exercises his authority; this place is identical with
the situs when the agent sells an immovable at the place of
its location. 97
The American practice, on the other hand, ought to be
crystallized to the effect that the law governing the third
90 BowsTEAD, Agency 31 art. 24; Restatement of Agency § 28. But this Restatement § 29 notes that if an oral authorization is insufficient to make a deed
of conveyance effective, it suffices to maintain the deed regarded as a
memorandum of a contract to convey.
9l Authority to transfer land or rights in immovables is another thing and
always is governed by lex situs.
92 MECHEM, Agency 96, 257. For a recent example of a contrary West
Virginia statute under which oral authorization to contract for real estate
is permitted, see Gallagher v. Washington County Savings Loan and Building
Co. (1943) 25 S. E. (2d} 914.
93 Restatement of Agency § 27.
Georgia: C. C. ( 1910) § 3574; a "broad and sweeping rule," Byrd v. Piha
(1927) 165 Ga. 397, 141 S. E. 48; Oellrich v. Georgia R. R. (1884) 73 Ga.
389.
Italy: C. C. (1942) art. 1392.
94 BGB. § 313.
95 103 RGZ. 295, 3oo-3o2, and many other decisions.
96 See comments to § 313 of the BGB.
97 See the dicta in LG. Berlin (Dec. 5, 1932) IPRspr. 1932, 133 No. 63;
cf. KG. (Dec. 14, 1933) IPRspr. 1933 No. 9· To the same effect, the Preliminary Draft of a Uniform Law on Representation in Private Law Contracts (October 1946) requires the formality prescribed by the law of the
country where the act is to be accomplished.
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party contract should determine the form in which the
power must be conferred upon the agent. This result logically and conveniently includes the closely connected problem whether the agent needs a special authorization for
the intended transaction, this being under all circumstances
an incident of the main contract. 98
On the optional theory of locus regit actum, finally, an
authorization would also be sufficient if its form complies
with the law of the place where the principal constitutes it.
How far this theory may be carried, seems to deserve
future investigation.
(b) Capacity. In the United States, this problem has
been lost in the game of searching for the place where a
married woman makes a contract when she sends a note
through correspondence, agents, or messengers. 99
In civil law, the personal capacity of a principal to
authorize an agent is in practice governed by the law of
the former's domicil rather than his nationality. 100
If we eliminate lex loci contractus and avoid confusion
with the main contract, the problem reverts to the question
of policy, whether a principal, incompetent by his domiciliary law, should be deemed capable if the law of the place
where his authorization is used so provides. According to
the conclusions reached in Volume One, capacity to establish
obligations should be determined under their proper law,
if not accorded by the personal law. The law governing
authority to create obligations, therefore, should be able
to grant capacity.
(c) Intrinsic requirements. American as well as German
98
99

Supra Ch. 39 p. 141.
Supra pp. 134, 155.

100 On the ground of the older theory (STORY and BAR, supra ns. r, 2)
the domicil of the principal determines all of the authority. Consistently,
only domicil, not nationality, remains a possible test for determining the
capacity of authorizing, which I adopted in 7 Z.ausl.PR. ( 1933) 8o6. But in
the following text I give up even this restricted role of the personal law.
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courts do not hesitate to determine such questions as nullity
and revocability101 of a power of attorney according to the
local law.
2.

Implied Authority

Modern laws abound in usages, customary constructions,
legal presumptions, and legal rules, defining the acts which
agents of certain classes or under c~rtain circumstances are
authorized or not authorized to do on account of the principal. Some codes, particularly the German Commercial
and Civil Codes, have elaborated various categories of
such commonly called "implied" authority, and the Restatement of Agency also distinguishes "authority," "apparent authority," estoppel, and unnamed other "powers."
The Conflicts Restatement, § 344, it is true, singles out
"apparent" authority for applying the law of the place
where the third party places "reliance" upon such authority.
To the contrary, it has become evident in considering the
case law of German courts that there can be no distinction
on the international plane among constructions, presumptions, and rules, or among court interpretation, legal rules
of construction, and subsidiary legal rules, as well as between
statements or conduct of the principal toward the agent and
toward the third party, or between directly obligating
declarations and estoppeU02 They are not neatly separable
even in the most elaborate municipal laws, and in fact not
distinguished in many jurisdictions. They must be of equivalent significance in the conflict of laws. Neither English nor
American courts, to my knowledge, have shown any inclination to classify in heterogeneous compartments what is
distinguished as express and apparent authority, and in the
Infra sub ( 3) and (4).
I refer for details to my repeatedly cited article, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (1929)
at 825 f.
1o1
102
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latter category, as authority to do what is usual in a particular trade or what agrees to local usage, authority extended by statute, etc. The idea of estoppel in its broadest
meaning appears to Continental observers of the English
theory as present more or less in all parts of the doctrine
of implied authority. 103
Illustrations. (i) P in state X hands to A his written
authorization to purchase goods on P's account in state Y.
A shows this statement toT in Y. Pis bound toT according
to the law of Y without respect to internally declared restrictions. The Restatement, § 344, illustration, expressly
decides this case under the law of Y, because the authority
is apparent and T relies on it in state Y. The substantive
rule, however, is exactly the same in the German Civil Code
( § 4 72) which expressly says that where the principal has
handed the agent a written authorization and the agent
shows it to the third person, the agent is authorized in
relation to this person. Although thereby a true authorization is recognized, the German conflicts rule simply applies
the law of Y as that of the place where the agent acts
upon his authority. The right conflicts rule naturally covers
this case.
( ii) Whether a traveling salesman is enti tied to sell
for cash and to grant deferment of payment, is a question
of the extent of his power, regulated in Germany by a legal
rule and in France by an implied agreement ( mandat tacite).
In the case of a French salesman traveling in Germany,
the German Reichsoberhandelsgericht once decided the question under the French law of the principal,104 whereas it
would be determined at present according to the German
Commercial Code ( § 55, paragraph 2). Even the authority
of a commercial agent under the German Commercial Code
( § 8 6, paragraph 2) to accept certain statements of third
persons, although considered a "legal authority," has been
refused to the Danish agent of a German firm acting in
103

Cf. MACRIS, supra p. 139 n. 57, at 278 ff., 293·
(Dec. 4, 1872) 8 ROHGE. 150, Clunet 1874, 81.

104 ROHG.
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Denmark. 105 English and American courts decide to the
same effect.
(iii) An agricultural producer in Silesia sent eggs for
sale through an agent on the market of Berlin. The sender
was to be deemed to have "submitted" to the usages of
the Berlin market. As Willes, J., said in Lloyd v. Guibert,
"whoso goes to Rome, must do as those at Rome do." 106
The Reichsgericht, criticized for having ignored this rule/ 07
amended its practice immediately.108
This resort to the local laws is also supported by the
differences in the usual national types of agents. An English
factor, operating in England, cannot be conveniently treated
like a Brazilian commercial agent in Brazil. The legal presumptions and usual constructions defining what the authorized broker or clerk or traveling salesman may and may
not do on the account of the principal, are commonly
intended merely for agents carrying on business within the
state and for all such agents.
The American decisions show similar tendencies. Most
of those in point, 109 it must be noted, do not deal with our
general problem but concern insurance agents, a very special
matter, the local sphere of the state where the insured lives
being much emphasized in constitutional and conflicts practice of the courts. With this reservation, the cases may be
cited regarding the authority of local insurance agents to
issue a policy, 110 to waive conditions, 111 or to give binding
1os RG. (Jan. I4, I9IO) 66 Seuff. Arch. No. 73·
(I 86 5) 6 Best & Sm. 100, I 3I Eng. Rep. II34·

106

107 RG. (June 26, I928) JW. I928, 3I09; IPRspr. I928 No. 39, criticized
by DoVE, JW. ibid.
1os RG. (Oct. I3, I928) IPRspr. I928 No. 40.
109 Perry v. Pye (I9I3) 215 Mass. 403, I02 N. E. 653 (cf. 2 BEALE II95
n. 6) does not offer any problem.
110 Gallagher v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co. (Tex. I9I8) 206
S. W. 2I2; Grant v. North American Benefit Corp. of IIJinois ( I928) 223 Mo.
App. Io4, 8 S. W. (2d) I043·
111 Cohen v. Home Ins. Co. (I9I6) 6 Boyce 207, 97 Atl. IOI4; American
Fire Ins. Co. v. King Lumber & Mfg. Co. (I9I7) 74 Fla. I30, 77 So. I68;
Keesler v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. of New York (I9I9) I77 N. C. 394,
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information. 112 The law of the insured person's residence
has been applied under the theory that the contract was
made, or in the case of insurance of immovables, the object
was situated 118 in that state.
No separate rule is apparent with respect to general
agents. 114 General powers are the main subject of the customary and legal definitions of implied authority. Whether,
of course, the particular main contract can be made by a
general agent, or whether special powers are needed for
such purposes as contracts relating to land, lawsuits, compromises on litigious matters, or gifts, is a problem of the
main transaction itself.
3· Ratification
The old conflicts literature was affected by the theoretical
mistakes of doctrines which involved "ratification" and
"confirmation" of contracts made by an unauthorized agent
and unnecessarily bothered about distinctions between lack
of and transgression of authority. 115 The modern view is
very simple; it accepts the Roman idea of ratification.
Mandat et qui ratum habet means that ratification is an
authorization subsequent to the main contract. Its nature
is identical with a precedent authorization. This idea operated in indirect representation in the internal relationship
between principal and agent, 116 but its effect on the agent's
power is confined to disclosed agency, even in the common
law doctrine.
99 S. E. 97; Sovereign Camp W. 0. W. v. Newsom (I920) I42 Ark. I32,
2I9 S. W. 759 (including estoppel); Springfield Mtl. Ass. v. Atnip (I925)
I69 Ark. 968, 279 S. W. IS (false indication of age by the agent).
112 McMaster v. New York Life Ins. Co. (C. C. N.D. Ia. I897) 78 Fed. 33·
England: Pattison v. Mills (I8z8) I Dow and Cl. 342.
113

Cases of American Fire Ins. Co., Gallagher, Keesler, supra ns. uo, III.
Contrarily to NussBAUM, D. IPR. 264, see the decisions of LG. Berlin I
and KG., supra n. 97·
115 See, e.g., 7 LAURENT 546 § 457·
11 6 The latter is meant in CASAREGIS, Discursus I79 §§ 20, 64, 76, 89 and
his followers including 3 FIORE § nsi.
114
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Opinions are divided only with respect to the permissibility of such belated confirmation. Thus, in the United
States, three solutions depend upon whether ratification is
allowable at all, or after a reasonable time, or so long as
the other party does not cancel the contract. 117
From the nature of ratification as a true authorization,
it follows that its effect is retroactive, and this, too, is commonly settled. Hence, there is no reason why the law of the
place where the agent acts should not extend to this incident. No fiction of "submission" of the principal to the
foreign law118 is needed.
(a) Normal rule. The rule, therefore, is that the law of
the place where the agent acts as a representative governs
the validity and effect of a manifestation of the principal
allegedly consenting to the agent's transaction. 119 The Restatement, § 33 I (I), accedes to this rule saying, as is
habitual, that this place is "the place of contracting." 120
Since there is no material difference between acting without any authorization, and acting beyond authorization, 121
it does not matter, contrary to certain older doctrines,
whether principal and agent before the ratification were
bound by contract or whether the agent acted as a negotiorum gestor. This result was reached by Story, speaking
for the Supreme Court of the United States, in I832, al1 17 HUNTER, "What is the Effect of a Ratification of an Agent's Unauthorized Contract?" 5 La. L. Rev. (1944) 308.
11s BEALE, "The Jurisdiction of a Sovereign State," 36 Harv. L. Rev.
(1923) 241, 258; assumption of a renvoi is tentatively construed by GRisWOLD, "Renvoi Revisited," 51 Harv. L. Rev. (1938) 1165, 1200.
119 United States: Dord v. Bonnaffee (1851) 6 La. Ann. 563; Golson v.
Ebert (1873) 52 Mo. z6o; Pugh v. Cameron (1877) 11 W.Va. 523; Hill v.
Chase (1886) 143 Mass. 129, 9 N. E. 30; WILLISTON, 1 Contracts § 278;
2 BEALE 1076.
Canada: Quebec: Trudel v. Assad ( 1912) 14 Que. Pr. zoz.
12o Is the objection to this rule by STUMBERG 205 not influenced by the
theory of the last act of completing a contract, of which he himself is rather
critical?
121 Restatement § 33 I says: "beyond or contrary to his instructions," which
confuses the relationships.
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though he operated with an imaginary lex loci solutionis. 122
(b) Soliciting agent. It is well settled that when an
agent, sent out to solicit orders, transmits an order to his
principal and the latter declares his consent to the customer,
the contract is made by the principal himself. 123 The reason,
however, is not as is sometimes confusedly assumed, that
the agent has no authority to contract. Whether he has or
not, the material point is that he does not purport to conclude the contract. The place of the agent is immaterial
in this case, as also his powers are. The result, that the
principal makes the contract, is recognized by the American
courts also for the purpose of ascertaining in what state a
corporation does business by such a contract ;124 whether
Louisiana's privilege of the vendor applies ;125 and under
what law title is reserved, incidentally to the contract. 126
But the main contract, in reality, has its own law, according to its nature and this law governs offer and acceptance.
(c) Abnormal solution. Suppose that in the case of a
liquor sale a soliciting agent in Iowa (where the sale would
have been invalid) went beyond his authority and made a
sale as if he were empowered to conclude the contract
without reserving the approval of his principal in Illinois
(where the sale would have been valid). But he sent the
order to the principal who confirmed it to the buyer. Accord122 Boyle v. Zacharie ( 1832) 6 Pet. S. C. 635, 8 L. Ed. 527. The consignee
of a cargo in New Orleans furnished suretyship and paid when the ship
was attached there. The shipowner recognized the intervention, and Story
localized his duty in Louisiana, because if he had contracted with the defendant (Story says: "authorized" him) to advance money there on his account, this contract would have been performable there and the lex loci
solutionis would be applicable.
128 GooDRICH 264 n. 24; 7 LAURENT § 456 in fine; I FIORE § 133;
2 RESTREPO HERNANDEZ § 1297·
124 Aultman, Miller & Co. v. Holder (C. C. E. D. Mich. 1895) 68 Fed. 467;
State Mutual etc. Ins. Co. v. Brinkley (1895) 6x Ark. x, 35 S. W. 157. See
also State v. Colby (1894) 92 Iowa 463, 6x N. W. 187; Kling v. Fries (1876)
33 Mich. 275.
125 Claflin v. Mayer (1889) 41 La. Ann. 1048, 7 So. 139.
126 Barrett v. Kelley (1894) 66 Vt. 515, 29 Atl. 809.
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ing to the normal rule, since the agent sold the liquor in
Iowa, the contract, as governed by the law of Iowa, would
be invalid and not subject to approval by the principal,
although the latter, of course, might have made a new
offer. This self-evident result seems to agree with the two
decisions of the Iowa Supreme Coure 27 which have subsequently been invoked for a contrary view by a federal circuit
court. This court decided in Schuenfeldt v. Junkerman, an
Iowa case, that although the contract was concluded in
Iowa by an unauthorized agent, the confirmation by the
principal, the firm in Chicago, constituted an acceptance
of the order and completed the contract in Illinois, hence
validly. When the validity of the contract is in question,
as in liquor and Sunday contracts, the court considered "the
very time and place where and when the act was done that
gave life to the contract." 128 Incautious commentators have
tentatively extracted the recognition of a ratification having no retroactive effect. 129 The Restatement finally takes
from this isolated decision the impulse for an astonishing
general rule. 130 The individual decision in the Shuenfeldt
Case may be condoned as an instance of extraordinary favor
extended by the courts to interstate contracts affected by
the crude sanctions of Sunday and liquor laws. Moreover,
as usual, the belief in lex loci contractus promoted extrava127 In Tegler v. Shipman (1871) 33 Iowa 194, zoo, the court stated as the
general rule, that, "if the agent simply took an order from defendant upon
his principals in Rock Island, which they might fill or refuse at their option,
it was a Rock Island contract, and the plaintiff can recover unless it is
shown that they sold the liquors with intent to enable the defendant to violate
the provisions of the act. . . ." The decision in Taylor v. Pickett (I 879) 52
Iowa 467, 3 N. W. 514, concerning the territorial scope of a license to sell,
upheld instructions to the jury saying that "it would be a sale at the house,"
if the agent took orders subject to final acceptance by the principal, whereas
the sale would be illegal if orders were taken "not subject to approval."
12s Schuenfeldt v. Junkerman (C. C. N. D. Ia. 1884) 20 Fed. 357; HARPER
and TAINTOR, Cases 154.
129 I I Am. Jur. 394 § nz.
1so § 331 (2): "If by the law of the place where the agent acted, there is
no contract as a result of the ratification, the ratification is regarded in the
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gancies. But it is a grave mistake to disturb the international
function of the normal rules by such arbitrary exceptions.

Illustration. Suppose an ammunition manufacturer in
Illinois sends a soliciting agent to Bolivia, who, pretending
to be authorized to sell, accepts an order from an unlicensed
dealer for delivery in a Bolivian port. While the buyer,
violating Bolivian laws, must know that the contract is void,
American courts, according to the Restatement, should
argue that the manufacturer supplementing his authorization concludes the contract under American law and therefore makes a valid contract. Every part of this argumentation is wrong. A unilateral confirmation of a void agreement
is ineffectual. That the traditional theory of illegality at
the place of performance is defied, would not matter so
much as that the contract is really governed by Bolivian
law, because of all the circumstances.
The liquor cases could have been approached differently.
Shuenfield, by the order, had delivered the goods at a railway station in Chicago, his own city. The sale, for this
reason, and for this alone, could have been governed by
Illinois law. Equally, in the hypothetical case of an armaments sale in Bolivia, if the goods were to be delivered
f. o. b. New York, the buyer would be rightly supposed to
comply with the laws of the United States, when sued in
an American court; the decision would depend on the court's
conception of international policy.
4· Termination
Death of the principal and revocation of authorization
have been controversial matters in the municipal laws.
From the old point of view of a merely two-sided relationship, rights and obligations between master and servant,
mandator and mandatary, naturally ended with such events,
state where it is made as the acceptance of an offer made to the agent and
transmitted by him and if the acceptance completes a contract, the contract
is there made."
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and the powers of the agent, too, were automatically
ended. But the Roman praetor granted actions against a
master during a year after he withdrew the peculium from
a slave. 131 A shop manager had the powers of an institor
so long as his name was not canceled in the shop. 132 Modern
systems have prolonged either the underlying contract, or
at least the authority, beyond its original termination, in
the interest of third persons, or even of an innocent agent.
(a) Death of principal. A general power of attorney
conferred in California for sale of land in Texas was ended
under Texan law by the death of the issuer, although it
would have been valid until notice to the agent under California law. The court in Texas based this decision on the
attempt to carry out the powers in Texas. 133
This represents the universally prevailing and recommendable conflicts rule, 134 alone consistent with the application of the local law to apparent authority. That the continuation of the power should require the consent of two
laws, or even three/ 35 is strictly objectionable.
(b) Revocation. An irrevocable general power of attorney was signed by an American in New York for all
transaction on his behalf regarding his German assets. Under
the law of New York, this authorization, not coupled with
an interest of the agent, was revocable. German courts,
under a questionable rule, have treated irrevocable general
authorizations as void, at least for the purpose of transactions contemplating transfers of rights in immovables. This
German rule was applied to the case on the theory that
authority is subject to the law where it is exercised. 136 If,
Actio annalis de peculia, LENEL, Edictum Perpetuum 277, 282 ff.
ULPIAN, D. 14·3·II § 3·
138 Gilmer v. Veatch (Tex. Civ. App. 1909) 121 S. W. 545·
134 Thus, against STORY § 286 d: 4 PHILLIMORE 571 § 705; 3 FIORE § II 54;
ALCORTA, 3 Der. Int. Priv. rr6; cf. 2 WHARTON 871.
135 Thus, 2 RESTREPO HERNANDEZ § 1306.
136 LG. Berlin (Oct. s, 1932) IPRspr. 1932, No. 63, discussed as to the
131

132

8
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conversely, a German authorization were used in New York,
its revocability would doubtless have to be determined
under New York law.
The identical solution has been recently followed in an
English case, 137 and may also be advocated as a universal
rule.
questionable municipal rule and the pioneering conflicts rule in my article,
7 Z.ausi.PR. ( 1933) 797, evidently unknown to BATIFFOL 282 n. 6. To the same
effect, KG. (Dec. 14, 1933) IPRspr. 1933, No. 9·
187 Sinfra Aktiengesellschaft v. Sinfra, Ltd. [1939] 2 All E. R. 675, 682.
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Employment and Agency
I.

THE SUBJECT MATTER

W

HILE voluntary authorization operates in the relation between the agent or, in common law, the principal, and the third party, the internal relationship
between principal and agent rests upon a contract commonly
termed contract of agency, although this word is also used
differently. This includes, for instance, a contract of brokerage for buying securities, and excludes a sales contract made
by a buyer intending a resale, or any other party contracting on his own account. To embrace, however, the contracts
for a factual work, generally the word "employment" is
added which really has no recognized legal meaning and
overlaps the scope of agency; brokerage may also be called
an employment. 1 Although these two terms do not express
a neat contrast, there is a distinction, important at least
for conflicts law, between the two groups of contracts
involved.
Common law has an appropriate and significant terminology: "Master and servant" is a broad old doctrine within
the category of "principal and agent." Its criterion is the
superior choice, control, and direction, by the master, of the
servant's conduct and method in doing the work. 2 In Europe,
1

35 Am. Jur. 448 § 5; 144 A. L. R. 740; 151 id. 1331.
This distinction was first suggested by 2 MElLI So to the extent that he
advocated the law of the organization into which the employee integrates
himself by his contract. The same result was recently proposed by 2 FRANKENSTEIN 335 (inconsistent with 333 ff.); 2 SCHNITZER 571; BRESLAUER, 50 Jurid.
Rev. ( 1938) at 293 (despite the vacillating English cases). No distinction
has been made in the International Law Association, Vienna Draft 1926,
34th Report ( 1927) 509 ff.
2
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the same outstanding type of contract has emerged more
recently from ancient narrow and modern broad concepts.
In Romanistic tradition, locatio condu'ctio operarum
(louage de service, Dienstmiete), the hiring of services, was
comparatively the most adequate analogue; the Institute
of International Law spoke of conflicts rules for this type
as late as 1927. 3 But the full ground was covered only by
the addition of locatio conductio operis ( W erkvertrag),
the contract for performing work, and numerous special
kinds of contracts.
On the other hand, the modern term Arbeitsvertrag, confrat de travail, or contralto di lavoro, was sometimes extended to all types of contracts in which the obligation to
work is outstanding. At present, however, this name is reserved for the contract concluded with dependent employees,
industrial and agricultural as well as white collar workers,
including even high-placed employees. This contract of work
is to be defined as the private law contract whereby a person
obligates himself to work with a certain continuity in the
service and according to the directives of another person
for a salary. 4 It is unnecessary to restrict this concept to the
accomplishment of material acts as contrasted with the
conclusion of legal transactions. 5
The National-Socialist doctrine was eagerly at work to
eradicate the very idea of this individual private contract
of labor. But it has withstood totalitarian fanaticism. 6
Annuaire 1927 III 219.
Germany: I HUECK and NIPPERDEY 100.
France: RouAsT in Planiol et Ripert, II Traite Pratique 9 § 67; 2 CoLIN et
CAPITANT 587.
Italy: BALDONI, Rivista 1932, 348, and cit.; Notes in 37 Riv. Dir. Com.
(1939) II 387 to Cass. (Jan. 23, 1939) 40 id. (1942) I I77·
Switzerland: OsER-SCHOENENBERGER III8 No. 9·
Brazil: CESARINO }UNIOR, 2 Direito social brasileiro (ed. 2, 1943) 132 § 228.
5 Thus RouAsT et DuRAND, Precis de legislation industrielle (1943) 286
§ 256 and 291 § 262, excluding the contract of "mandat."
6 At least these writers (SIEBERT, MANSFELD, etc.) tried to degrade the labor
contract to an "auxiliary" position, see, e.g., RHODE, 3 Zeitschrift der
3
4
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The thus established distinction of types is indeed of
interest in conflicts law. In localizing the relations of an
employer, there is a difference between his subordinates,
bound to his business organization and instructions, and the
professional persons lending him their services. Local connections have an overwhelming influence on the activity
of independent contractors, while their importance in the
other case is conditional and limited, although by no means
insignificant. To anticipate the tendency of the most adequate decisions, we may observe that contracts of independent persons are governed by the law of their own domicil, and employment contracts with "servants" are governed
by the law of that place of the principal's business to which
the employee is attached. Usually, of course, servants live
in the state where they are working, so as to make the laws
of their domicil and of their working place identical. For
this reason, the groups are often confused without any harm
done. Moreover, the concept of servant in municipal law
is for certain purposes sometimes reasonably extended
beyond its usual scope. 7 But for analytical purposes and
for the practical needs of individual cases the distinction
is needed.
Under this approach it is of minor significance that, in
civil law, servants are supposed to make contracts as simple
agents in the name of their principal, as for instance commercial clerks (German H andlungsgehilfe), whereas members of professions either act in their own name, such as
the commercial "agents" (German H andlungsagent) or,
in appearing for their clients, exercise their own functions,
such as attorneys.
Our productive materials for the conflict of laws regarding the employment of servants are scarce and are further
Akademie fiir Deutsches Recht ( 1936) 371. A good survey on the discussion
is given by CESARINO, supra n. 4, 125 ff.
7 See infra n. 59·
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diminished by the prevalence of workmen's compensation
in the cases. This subject, for compelling reasons, requires
special discussion. Only insofar as the law governing the
employment contract is deemed to determine the question
of indemnization for accidents may contributions be extracted from these cases.
II.
1.

MASTER AND SERVANT 8

Lex Loci Contractus

The law of the place of contracting has also been applied
to employment contracts. 9 This has remained the declared
rule in Italy. 10 The same rule obtained in the earliest English case on the subject, 11 but other decisions reaching a
seemingly similar result may be explained by additional local
connections. The Dutch Supreme Court insisted on the rule
in 1926 whenever the agreement fails to modify it. 12 In
Austria the more recent practice applies foreign law where
the contract is made abroad with a foreigner. 13 Before 1917,
the Brazilian courts did the same where the principal was
a foreigner. 14
It is scarcely necessary to mention again how often a
s RoUAST, "Les conflits de lois relatifs au contrat de travail," I Melanges
Pillet I95; CALEB, "Contrat de travail," 5 Repert. 2IO ff.; GEMMA, Dir. Int.
del Lavoro.
9 FOELIX § I05; DESPAGNET § 300; 7 LAURENT § 454; WEISS, 4 Traite 374·
10 Italy: c. c. Disp. Pre!. (I 86 5) art. 9; c. Com. (I 882) art. 58; c. c. Disp.
Pre!. (1942) art. 25 par. I. GEMMA, Dir. Int. del Lavoro 159 ff.; however,
makes a meritorious attempt to apply the law of the place of performance on
the ground of implied party agreement.
11 Arnott v. Redfern ( 1825) 2 Car. & P. 88, per Best, C. J.
12 The Netherlands: H. R. (Dec. 2, I926) W. u6o6, N. J. 1927, 321. The
facts are left obscure in the reports, and the tendency to favor the lex fori
is all too transparent, though the Dutch branch manager seems to be
prejudiced thereby.
13 Austria: Allg. BGB. § 37; OGH. (Jan. 24, 1933) and (May 28, 1934)
discussed by WAHLE, IO Z.ausi.PR. ( I936) 788, overruling the former decisions cited by NUSSBAUM, D. IPR. 272 n. 2 and BATIFFOL 268 n. 5·
14 Brazil: Sup. Trib. Fed. (June 20, 1896) Agr. No. 140, Jur. Sup. Trib.
1896, 67, 0CTAVIO, Dicionario No. 266 against one dissident vote, which was
followed in the C. C.
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decision asserts adherence to the lex loci contractus, while
performance and all other fact elements point to the same
result. This is particularly frequent in the United States.15
More remarkable, however, are decisions contrasting the
law of the place of hiring with the law of domicil, as when
a minor Irishman comes to Scotland and is there regarded
as having capacity to be hired, because he is emancipated
through independent establishment, "forisfamiliated," although not domiciled in Scotland.16
Lex loci contractus is a convenient rule if both parties
are domiciled in the same state where they make the contract. There is no reason why an intended foreign place of
work should be material in such a case. When Italian parties
contracted in Italy for service in the German branch of the
firm, a German court correctly applied Italian law. 17 It is
farfetched to say that a French industrialist establishing
a new factory in Africa and hiring personnel in France to
take there, is contracting under an African law/ 8 or that a
couple of American missionaries hiring a maid in the United
States for their station in China, have Chinese law in mind.
By itself, lex loci contractus is an inept rule, despite
Dicey19 and Beale. 20
15 For this and other reasons, the long case lists in 2 BEALE 1196 are insignificant.
16 M'Feetridge v. Stewarts & Lloyds [1913] Sess. Cas. 773, per Lord
Salvesen, at 790.
17 Germany: OLG. Miinchen (April s, 1909) 23 ROLG. 245, 22 Z.int.R.
(1912) 175·
Sweden: S. Ct. (May 21, 1941) Nytt Jur. Ark. 1941, 350 No. So: contract
between Swedish domiciled parties signed in Sweden for service in Johannesburg, South Africa; stipulation for restraint of competition validated under
Swedish law; cf. SCHMIDT, Revue Crit. 1948, 430.
1 8 Thus, RoUAST in Melanges Pillet at 203.
19 DICEY 724; as to the inconsistency of his exposition, see BRESLAUER, so
Jurid. Rev. ( 1938) 282.
2 0 2 BEALE 1192 f.; Restatement § 342·
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Law of the Master's Domicil

Where a contract is made outside the principal's residence or place of business, considerable authority has nevertheless selected the latter place for choice of law. 21 This
approach is wrong when the law of the place of the headquarters is applied to workers in foreign branches of a firm.
But restricted to the cases where the servant is in fact
attached to the central business place of his firm, the rule is
excellent. It is corroborated in many instances by the comprehensive integration of modern employees into the particular business organization. Working conditions (whether
determined by collective agreement or unilateral regulation),
duties and benefits, discipline, hospitalization, and insurance,
are in force for all affiliated persons without reference to the
place where they sign the contract or where they live.
Where no other local attachment is manifest, the main office
of the firm is the natural center.
This localization of the employment relationship naturally
also extends to :
( i) Employees occasionally or temporarily sent out by
their employers to perform services in another country ;22
21 Institute of Int. Law, 22 Annuaire ( 1908) 29I, art. 2 (h).
England: WESTLAKE 310 § 218.
France: RoLIN, 3 Principes 418 § 1390.
Germany: OLG. Hamburg (Oct. 30, 1902) 6 ROLG. 5·
The Netherlands: KosTERS 756; MULDER 170.
22 United States: In the workmen's compensation cases, it has been often
assumed that temporary work incidental to employment in a foreign state is
no ground for the jurisdiction of the board. See Proper v. Polley ( 1932)
259 N. Y. 516, I82 N. E. 161; Darsch v. Thearle Duffield Fire Works Co.
(1922) 77 Ind. App. 357, 133 N. E. 525. For details, see infra Ch. 42 pp. 216 ff.
England: South African Breweries v. King [1899] 2 Ch. 173; [1900]
I Ch. 273-C. A.
France: RouAsT in Melanges Pillet at 206.
Germany: R. Arb. G. (April I, 1931) and (July x, 1931) IPRspr. 1931,
Nos. 53, 54 (dicta as to private law).
Italy: GEMMA, Dir. Int. del Lavoro 162 f.
Switzerland: Ob. Ger. Zurich (June 22, 1933) 9 Z.ausl.PR. (1935) 7Io:
activity in various countries with possible change of domicil according to the
orders of a Swedish principal governed by Swedish law, though uncodified
and not known to the German agents.
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(ii) Traveling salesmen who have no fixed place of business in the country or countries visited by them. 23
The combination of the master's domicil and the conclusion of the contract between present persons, e.g., when
the future employee was invited there to negotiate the contract, has prompted several English decisions to apply the
law of this place. 24 This also seems a sound solution. On the
other hand, the appointment of a soliciting sales agent for
Michigan by an Ohio corporation certainly should not be an
Ohio contract simply because the contract is consummated
there by approval of the corporation. 25
3· Law of the Servant's Working Place
Prevailing opinion may at present be stated to the effect
that where the servant is attached to a place of business
different from the main office, the local law is applicable.
Manifestly, this view complements rather than replaces
the theory that the law of the principal's place governs.
The working place to which the employee is attached depends on the employer's organization.
(a) Domestic working place. This approach has been
preferred by many courts in favor of their own law. Some23

England: Arnott v. Redfern, infra n. 24.
Germany: ROHG. (Dec. 4, I872) 8 ROHGE. ISO; cf. RG. (Dec. I, I9II)
22 Z.int.R. ( I9I2) 3I I (German law of a German firm employing an Italian
traveling salesman, as tacitly stipulated law).
24 Arnott v. Redfern (I825) 2 Car. & P. 88: "English contract" between a
London principal and a traveling Scotch sales agent on commission, made
while the Scotchman was in London. In re Anglo-Austrian Bank [I920]
I Ch. 69: P, German corporation, A, manager in England, contract made
and signed in Germany.
Oppenheimer v. Rosenthal [I937) I All E. R. 23: P, German corporation,
A, manager of associated business in England, contract made in Germany.
Younger, J., emphasized that the agent was directed and controlled by the
firm.
United States: Weiner v. Pictorial Paper Package Corp. (I939) 303 Mass.
123, 131, zo N. E. (zd) 458, 462.
25 This against Aultman, Miller & Co. v. Holder (C. C. E. D. Mich. 1895)
68 Fed. 467; actually the decision sought to avoid invalidity of the contract
because the corporation had no license for doing business in Michigan.
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times they construct a "submission" of the principal to this
law, sometimes it is claimed that private and public labor
laws are interrelated and must be given territorial force.
Such a rule, technically based either on lex loci solutionis or
on public policy, in deviation from the regular test of the
court, was applied in older Austrian decisions, 26 in Brazil
under the Introductory Law of I 917/ 7 often in Italy, 28 and
occasionally elsewhere.
(b) Domestic or foreign working place. We may, however, at present presume that in most countries the rule
is bilateral. Even when the place of work is not within the
country, the law of the employer's business place to which
an employee or worker is permanently assigned as a matter
of organization, governs his relations with his employer.
This is true for the foreign systems. 29 The same rule has
OGH. (June r, 1929) and others, see WAHLE, 10 Z.ausl.PR. (1936) 788.
Brazil, on the general rule of Introd. Law of 1916, art. 13 I, cf. OcTAVIO,
Dicionario No. 266 at the end.
2 8 E.g., App. Genova (April 18, 1904) Riv. Dir. Com. 1904 II 361: P,
Berlitz school in Milan, A, Swiss in Switzerland where contract was made
for teaching in Milan, Italian law applied restraining the teacher's activity
after termination; Cass. (July 28, 1934) Foro Ital. 1934 I 824, Rivista 1934,
557: Belgian company employs an Italian, contract made in Belgium, work
in Italy, Italian law prevails and invalidates the clause for Belgian arbitration. Against the latter conclusion, BALDONI, Rivista 1934, 566: at present the
place of business decides, not the place of contracting.
Hungary: Curia P II 4864 (1931): P, firm in Saloniki, A, Hungarian in
Greece, Greek law; Curia P II 2214 (1933): P, foreign firm, A, Hungarian
in Hungarian branch, Hungarian law. See SzA.szy, I I Z.ausi.PR. (1937)
175 Nos. 8, 9·
The Netherlands: Trib. Amsterdam (April 7, 1932) N. J. 1932, 1541, I I
Z.ausi.PR. ( 1937) 203 No. 31: P, stock company domiciled in Amsterdam and
carrying on a branch in Netherlands India, A, Dutchman to serve there,
Netherlands-Indian law; App. Amsterdam (May 16, 1935) N. J. 1935, 1335,
I I Z.ausl.PR. (1937) 229 No. 133: P, shipowner in Netherlands India, A, to
serve on ships based there, Netherlands-Indian law prohibiting attachment
of the wages (apparently the principle of the place of work rather than
that of the flag is invoked). MEIJERS, N.J. 1927, 323, Note: commonly the
place where the work is to be performed is assumed (to decide).
29 Canada: Wilson v. Metcalfe Construction Co. [1947] 3 D. L. R. 491,
aff'd [1947] 4 D. L. R. 472: American domiciled in Canada employed by an
American firm in the construction, in Alaska and Canada, of the Alaska
Highway, law of Alaska.
Belgium: App. Bruxelles (Nov. 26, 1938) Pasicrisie 1940 II 92: both parties
26

27
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been claimed with respect to the United States, 80 and is
supported, if not by an impressive array of decisions, at least
by a promising trend. 31
4· Special Rules
(a) Cases actually applying the national law common to
the parties are isolated. 32 Employment contracts have much
Belgian nationals, contract made in Belgium, but work abroad, hence foreign
law for form and notice; Trib. com. Bruxelles (Jan. 26, 1935) Jur. Com.
Brux. 361, 364: P, Swiss, A, English, contract made and entire performance
in Belgium, Belgian Jaw.
France: Theory advocated by RoUAST in Melanges Pillet at 205; CALEB,
5 Repert. 215 and BATIFFOL 270, who, however, states only two decisions not
concerning workmen's compensation; of these claims, Cour Paris (Jan. 12,
1900) Clunet 1900, 56o, favored "implicit" adoption of lex loci solutionis,
whereas Cour Pau (Feb. 28, 1922) Clunet 1922, 406 would not deal with a
true conflict of laws.
Germany: KG. (Nov. 23, 1910) 23 ROLG. 61, 22 Z.int.R. (1912) 168: P,
German firm, A, Warsaw employee, Warsaw-Polish law, hence no jurisdiction
of a German merchant tribunal. OLG. Hamburg (July 16, 1936) JW. 1936,
2939, 2940: provision of agent, who has to serve in Hamburg, is governed
by German law. R. Arb. G. (July 20, 1935) JW. 1935, 3665, 6 Giur. Comp.
DIP. 353 No. 269: an American corporation, through an agent, engaging an
actor for performances in the United States, American law to decide whether
the corporation can be sued on the agent's contract.
Switzerland: BG. (Oct. 21, 1941) 67 BGE. II 179 speaking of the activity
of the agent as primary whence it is concluded that the court generally
applies the law of the working place, see 2 SCHNITZER 573, cf. infra n. 63
on 6o BGE. II 322. BG. (Dec. 22, 1916) 42 BGE. II 650: branch manager.
so BATIFFOL 266, as law of the place of performance.
81 United States: Garnes v. Frazier & Foster (Ky. 1909) 118 S. W. 998
(statute of frauds); Denihan v. Finn-lffiand (1932) 143 Misc. 525, 256 N. Y.
Supp. 801 (damages for unjustified discharge; contract held to be concluded
in Pennsylvania, but subject to New York law as the place of performance);
Vandalia R. Co. v. Kelley (1918) 187 Ind. 323, 119 N. E. 257 ("Indiana contract," because the railroad employee is employed there); Roth v. Patino
( 1945) 185 Misc. 235, 56 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 853, 855 concerning workmen's
compensation. Under the contract theory of most states, as well as under the
quasi-contract theory of New York (infra Ch. 42), a workmen's compensation
statute is not applied where a worker is a foreign resident and performs his
work wholly outside the state. Thus, the claimants, in Cameron v. Ellis
Construction Co. (1930) 252 N. Y. 394, 169 N. E. 622, a Canadian sand pit
worker, and in Elkhart Sawmill v. Skinner (1942) 111 Ind. App. 695, 42 N. E.
(2d) 412, a Michigan timber cutter, were not regarded as having a New
York or an Indiana employment contract, respectively.
82 Germany: OLG. Hamburg (Oct. 30, 1902) 6 ROLG. 5; R. Arb. G.
(Aug. 27, 1930) JW. 1931, 159 and in other decisions; contra: NUSSBAUM
272 n. 3, BATIFFOL 268 n. 2.
Italy: App. Torino (April 6, 1934) Rivista 1935, 416.
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more important local connections which overshadow this
nationalistic criterion. 33
(b) Contracts of employment made by the state or other
public entities for public constructions have often been said
to depend on the law of the seat of the principaP 4 This rule
would better be reduced to the meaning of the general rule
stated above.
(c) Briefly it may be noted that the contracts by which
master and crew of a seagoing vessel are hired, as a rule,
are commonly governed by the law of the flag. 35

5. Public Law and Public Policy
(a) Public law. In cardinal points, legal protection for
workers has been beneficially unified under the conventions
promoted by the International Labor Office. For the remaining differences, agreement seems to exist that the state
policy over industrial, commercial, and agricultural labor
33 Against the special rule, Cour Paris (Jan. 12, 1900) Clunet 1900, 569:
two Americans in Paris, French law; German RG. (Mar. 16, 1895) 5
Z.int.R. (1895) 507; OLG. Dresden (Jan. 25, 1907) 14 ROLG. 345: only
certain German provisions are public policy; Greek Supreme Court ( 1932)
No. I31, 43 Themis 449·
34 Institute of Int. Law, 22 Annuaire (1908) 290 art. 2 (e); Poland, Int.
Priv. Law, art. 8 No. 4; Sz..\szv, Droit international prive compare (1940)
577·
as united States: The City of Norwich (C. C. A. 2d 1922) 279 Fed. 687;
56 C. J. 925, Seamen § 7 on 46 U. S. C. A. § 564 n. 13; American prohibitions
expressly made applicable to seamen on foreign vessels, see The Troop
(D. C. W. D. Wash. 1902) 117 Fed. 557, aff'd, Kenny v. Blake (C. C. A. 9th
I903) 125 Fed. 672.
England: Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, s. 265 (subsidiarily).
Belgium: Trib. com. Antwerp (Dec. I, I904) 20 Revue Int. Dr. Marit.
(I905) 934·
France: Code du Travail Maritime (Law of Dec. I3, 1926) art. 5, with
exceptions, see VERNEAux, 8 Repert. 529 ns. 22-25.
Germany: RG. (Oct. 30, 1926) 39 Z.int.R. (1929) 276; Seemannsordnung
§ I par. I.
Italy: Disp. Pre!. C. Navig. art. 9 (if the flag is not Italian, the law may
be chosen differently by the parties).
The Netherlands: Rb. Rotterdam (Feb. I, 1932) W. 12533, I VAN HASSELT
419 (preferring the English place of the principal to the Dutch place where
the seaman was enlisted in the ship's crew).
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as expressed in the compendious modern administrative law,
has territorial force, prevailing over private law and excluding private international law. 36 On the other hand, the
public law is territorially restricted. It extends to working
places within the jurisdiction and those occupations on
foreign soil which have been termed radiations from a
domestic center by the German Supreme Labor Court. Thus,
where an engineer is sent by his employer, a machine manufacturer, to install a machine sold to a foreign country, 37
or employees live in a neighboring town beyond the state
border, laws concerning unemployment or social insurance
may extend to them. But when groups of German enterprises were organized in order to carry on important works
in France, for reparations after the First World War, the
German laws on labor representation and the hiring of
disabled war veterans were held inapplicable, although the
employment contracts were presumably governed by German law. 38
It has been held, on the same theory, in Austria, that the
law regulating the legal situation of commercial servants
is inapplicable to the employees of foreign enterprises, 39
and in Greece that the right of a worker injured abroad to
compensation under the foreign law does not concern international public policy. 40
(b) Collective labor agreements. Labor contracts, negotiated in collective bargaining between employers and labor
unions, in the common opinion, are effective in the district
in which the employer's working establishment is physically
situated. The state in which this place is, determines all
aa See Vol. II Ch. 33sr Swiss BG. (March 4, 1892) r8 BGE. 354·
88 Supreme Labor Court (April r, 1931) and (July r, 1931) IPRspr. 1931
Nos. 53, 54·
8 9 OGH. (May 28, 1934) cited by WAHLE, ro Z.ausl.PR. (1936) 788.
40 Aeropag (1932) No. 131, 43 Themis 449·
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particulars. 41 But insofar as these contracts pertain to private law, it is recognized that they may be extended through
agreement of the parties to foreign-located branches. 42 And
the elements of private law contained in the standard agreements on working and wage rules incorporated into the
individual labor contracts,-which have been correctly described in this country as third party beneficiary agreements,
subject to the conventional law of contracts, 43-may be expected to be enforced in courts of other states.
(c) Public policy. Less well settled, however, is the
extent to which the private law of the forum should intrude
into a private employment contract governed by foreign
law. 44 The domestic private law in question includes the
termination of employment by dismissal and the compensation in case of unwarranted or premature dismissal, restraint
of trade on a former employee, duties of preserving the
health and morals of servants, and presumably laws prescribing place, time, and means of wage payments. The
territorial character of all provisions on such matters is
often in the mind of writers. 45 If the work is to be done in
the forum, the domestic law would thus necessarily be
applied.
In the most appropriate view, 46 however, provisions of
412 HUECK and NIPPERDEY 225; BALDONI, "II contratto di lavoro nel diritto
internazionale privato italiano," in 24 Rivista ( 1932) 346, 362.
42 2 HUECK and NIPPERDEY 225; cf. C. GREGORY, Labor and the Law ( 1946)
385.
43 MULROY, "The Taft Hartley Act in Action," 15 U. of Chi. L. Rev.
(1948) 595. 629·
44 Cf. Vol. II pp. 561, 578.
45 See for France, RouAST in Melanges Pillet at 211 ff. (with exceptions);
CALEB, 5 Repert. 210 ff. (characterizing some of these problems as tort) ; following this lead, App. Bruxelles (Nov. 26, 1938) Pasicrisie 1940 II 92, Journ.
des Trib. 1940, c. 87, even though the contract is made in Belgium between
Belgian nationals, prescribes territorial application of the law of the foreign
working place protecting the employees as to "paid furlough, form and
effects of notice and discharge." Distinctions have been made by GEMMA,
Dir. Int. del Lavoro 161 ff.
46 This view has been developed against many other theories by KASKEL,
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public labor law for the protection of employees are, of
course, compulsory for the working conditions within the
territory, but private interests safeguarded by protective
provisions of local private law do not include relations
governed by foreign law. The distinction is emphasized by
the fact that public interests merely create duties of the
employer towards the state, without giving the employee a
cause of action, whilst contractual rights are enforceable
against the other party.
It is true that modern consideration for the worker has
in part breached these confines. Private duties towards the
employee may duplicate the public duties towards the state;
public social protection may influence, directly or by construction, the contractual relationship. All this has been
observed in Europe, 47 and exactly the same development is
occurring at present in the United States.
Thus, the Fair Labor Standards Act expressly prescribes
an action for the employee against the employer. 48
The New York Labor Law only provides that the wages
to be paid upon public works "shall be not less than the prevailing rate of wages, 1149 and the Appellate Division, accepting the correct principle, specifically found that the Labor
Law gave an exclusive remedy to be exercised only by the
fiscal officer. 50 The Court of Appeals, however, held that a
laborer could enforce the provisions of the statute by common law action since they must be inserted in the contract. 51
se~ Kaskei-Dersch, Arbeitsrecht 258, and advocated by I HuECK and NIPPERDEY II7.
47 I HUECK and NIPPERDEY II7.
48 § r6 (b), 52 Stat. I069 (I938), 29 U. S. C. § 2I6 (b) (Supp.). Applied
to Bermuda Base in Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell (I948) 69 S. Ct. 140.
49 § 220 subd. 3, Cons. Laws, Book 30; cf. subd. 5 (c) and 7 on the enforcement by the fiscal officer.
~° Fata v. Healy Co. (I94I) 263 App. Div. 725, 726.
61 Fata v. Healy Co. (I943) 289 N.Y. 40I, 405, 46 N. E. (zd) 339: "It cannot be doubted that provisions requiring the contractor to pay such wages
are also inserted in the contract, whether voluntarily or under compulsion
of the public body which is a party to the contract." (Note that this does not
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III. INDEPENDENT AGENTS

r. Rule
More or less definitely, a part of the literature 52 and
the bulk of court decisions in many countries have decided
that contracts made with attorneys, solicitors, physicians,
or other persons exercising a public profession, as well as
commercial orders to commission agents, factors, brokers,
or any merchants acting in the interest of the principal,
are governed by the law of the state where these persons
have their permanent place of business. It has rightly been
argued that no one can expect such persons, sought out at
their domicil, to change their conditions according to the
nationality or domicil of the client or customer; they exercise functions within the social and cultural framework of
their state; they are under legal rules and professional
organizations governing a substantial part of their activity.
It should be regarded as immaterial in this connection
whether the acting person discloses his principal or not and
whether his order is given from case to case or is a standing
assignment.
In opposition to this view, lex loci contractus retains a
role in Italy and probably other Latin countries. Also Beale
and the Restatement have turned the meaning of the cases
to the stereotyped rule of the law of the place of contracting. 53 These are undesirable remainders.
mean public interest in every labor contract.) Cf. LENHOFF, "Optional Terms
(Jus Dispositivum) and Required Terms (Jus Cogens) in the Law of Contracts," 45 Mich. L. Rev. (1946) 39, 75·
52 RoLIN, 3 Principes 416; NEUMEYER, 2 Int. Verwaltungs R. 253, 262 ff.;
NUSSBAUM, D. IPR. 274; 2 SCHNITZER 571; ARMIN JON, Droit Int. Pr. Com.
409 and n. x.
53 Restatement § 342; 2 BEALE II92 § 342.1; Ital. Disp. Prel. C. C. (1942)
art. 25; 7 LAURENT§ 454; DESPAGNET 635.
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Public Professions 54

(a) Attorneys. The English Privy Council once decided
a case where the plaintiff, an attorney of Quebec, was
appointed to represent the British Government in an international commission between Canada and the United States
on the payment for fishing rights. The contract with the
attorney was perhaps made in Ottawa, Ontario, and the
meetings were held in Halifax, Nova Scotia. The Canadian
courts and the Privy Council, however, selected the law of
Quebec for determining the fees due to the plaintiff because
this was the state where he normally exercised his professional functions. 55 The same view is held in other countries, 56
and is probably in the mind of American courts. 57
(b) Physicians. Cases are scarce, 58 but no opinion opposing the above view is known.
3· Commercial Agents

(a)Permanent agents. This term may indicate independent merchants who place their activities at the serv1ce
5 4 Inst. of Int. Law, 22 Annuaire ( 1908) 291, art. 2 (g).
Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. 8 (6): notaries, attorneys, and other persons
exercising a public profession; WESTLAKE § 218: barristers.
55 Regina v. Doutre (x884) 51 L. T. R. 669, Clunet x886, u6-P. C.
56 Austria: OGH. (Jan. 17, 1928) JW. 1929, x6o.
Germany: RG. (Oct. 25, 1935) 149 RGZ. 121: German attorney, as executor
of will acting in the United States, fees according to the law of his legal
domicil; RG. (March 20, 1936) 151 RGZ. 193: Austrian attorney for German
party, "the law in force at the professional domicil governs the relations
between the attorney and his client," Austrian law.
Greece: 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 229 n. 7·
Switzerland: App. Bern (April 7, 1933) 8 Z.ausl.PR. (1934) 826 (Yugoslavian law).
57 Roe v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (C. C. A. 7th 1943) 132 F. (2d) 829 (limitation of action) is not strict evidence since everything happened in Illinois.
In Lust v. Atchinson etc. R. Co. (1932) 267 Ill. App. 6o it was held that the
law of the place (San Francisco) where the attorney entered into his contract
with his client determined whether the attorney has a lien for the costs of
the suit against the defeated adversary. But evidently this decision was
supported by the facts that the attorney was domiciled in San Francisco and
the judgment was rendered there.
58 Germany: OLG. Miinchen (June II, 1926) 75 Seuff. Arch. 313 No. 129.
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of a firm, either as exclusive distributors in an assigned
territory or to administer buildings, buy or sell in continuous
relationship, solicit orders, or cash money. The delimitation
of these types from the field of master and servant is sometimes difficult to state. Wise courts have extended by analogy
legal provisions literally restricted to commercial servants
so as to comprehend certain groups of merchants. 59 Therefore, conflicts rules should not necessarily require a radical
distinction of functions.
In the United States, the clear tendency to apply the
law of the agent's domicil has been concealed under the
cover of lex loci contractus.

Illustration. The Transit Bus Sales Company, a resident
of Wisconsin, obtained by written contract exclusive distribution of interurban busses manufactured by Kalamazoo
Coaches, Inc., in the territory of "a number of states," including Wisconsin and Upper Michigan. The court after
much argument about the doubtful "place of contracting"
construed it as being in Wisconsin. 60 The sales territory,
59 For example, in the United States where a truck driver uses his own
vehicle to transport goods of another, courts have allowed common law
action for injury or death, or applied statutes on workmen's compensation,
social security, and unemployment compensation. Cf. Note, 144 A. L. R. 735,
740, but see 151 A. L. R. 1331.
In Germany, the case of independent contractors employed similarly to
servants (Arbeitsnehmerahnliche Agenten) has been much discussed, see
HuECK in 39 Riv. Dir. Com. (1941) I 143 at 145.
A nice example, for our purposes, is furnished in a German case, RG.
(Jan. 8, 1929) JW. 1929, 1291. A German firm appointed a firm in New
York as exclusive general agent for distributing its goods in the United
States and Canada. The goods, however, were to be bought by the American
party as buyer and resold by it within its territory. In the words of the
annotator, TITZE, the New Yorker is not an "agent" (in the German sense)
since he sells in his own name; he is not a commercial employee, since he
sells in carrying on his own business; and he is not a commission agent since
he distributes on his own account." The court finds a relationship similar to
"agency" as justification for applying by analogy the limitations on dismissal by the principal, prescribed for agency in § 92 of the Commercial
Code. Of course, the court should not have applied German law at all, much
less without a word of justification, cf. IPRspr. 1929 No. 34·
60 Transit Bus Sales v. Kalamazoo Coaches, Inc. (C. C. A. 6th 1944) 145 F.
(2d) 8o4; Alexander v. Barker (1902) 64 Kan. 396, 401, 67 Pac. 829 directly
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of course, afforded no clue since the states of both parties
are included. The decision in favor of Wisconsin law could
have been very simple, on the ground of the place of business of the sales agent. 61
In another recent case of a contract, combining sales and
agency, exactly the same result has been based upon the law
of the place of performance. 62
In a long chain of decisions, German and Swiss courts
have developed the constant doctrine that the law of that
place governs where "the agent deploys his activity," meaning the fixed domicil where the agent is established and from
which he is active in the interest of the principal. 63
applied the law of Cherokee, the place of activity and performance, to the
validity of the contract of agency.
In Gaston, Williams & Wigmore of Canada, Ltd. v. Warner {C. C. A. 2d
1921) 272 Fed. 56, the broker employed for the sale of a ship was domiciled
in New York where the brokerage contract was made and the vessel was
to be delivered. It was held immaterial to the earning of the fee, on the
ground of the law of New York, that both parties to the sale were British
subjects and hence the sale, in wartime, was void.
61 This theory should have been followed in Smith v. Compania Litogr.
de Ia Habana ( 1926) 127 Misc. 508, 217 N. Y. Supp. 39· The plaintiff was
to represent the defendant company of Cuba in the United States and
Canada, and made the contract inter praesentes in Cuba. The court referred
to the law of Cuba as mere lex loci contractus, which is insufficient, and as
supplanting lex loci solutionis, because the agent had to work in several
countries (a known, inappropriate approach). Finally, the Cuban law not
being in evidence, the lex fori was applied. The agent probably had a domicil
in the United States from which he traveled; the decision does not state the
contrary. Even so, he lived and worked in North America. This fact surely
supports the application of some American law-though not the lex fori-in
preference to the labyrinthian solution of the court.
6 2 Cowley v. Anderson {C. C. A. roth 1947) 159 F. (2d) r.
63 Germany: RG. (Oct. n, 1893) JW. 1893, 549 (rights of agent after
notice); 38 RGZ. 194, 51 id. 149; JW. 1899, 146 No. 21; OLG. Kolmar
(March 27, 1896) 8 Z.int.R. (1898) 45, Clunet 1903, 886 (agent for buying
flour in Paris, French law); OLG. Hamburg (June 26, 1909) 21 ROLG. 385
(English agent for exclusive distribution for Great Britain and colonies,
English law of restraint of trade).
Otherwise, RG. {Oct. 28, 1932) 138 RGZ. 252 {on the ground of express
agreement for the German law of the principal). RG. {Jan. 8, 1929) JW.
1929, 1291 (without justification and much criticized).
Switzerland: BG. (Sept. 18, 1934) 6o BGE. II 322 {French general agent
for France and the French colonies, French law). BG. {Oct. 25, 1939) 65
BGE. II r68 (as a rule, law of the place where the exclusive representative
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(b) Brokers and occasional agents. We distinguish this
group for the one reason that certain doubts have arisen
with regard to stockbrokers. Apart from some old decisions
which do not even consider the conflict of laws, 64 there is
no controversy with respect to factors and to selling or
buying agents contracting in their own name on orders.
Certainly the domicil of the principal 65 and the place where
the order is given 66 are without importance, although both
have been favored by some theoreticians. 67 Thus, where a
grain broker in Chicago is ordered to buy or sell grain on
the Chicago Board of Trade Exchange or a stockbroker
in New York is ordered to transfer securities on the New
York Stock Exchange, the local law of the broker and the
exchange governs the entire contract, including validity,
performance, and effects of wrong performance by either
party. 68 However, complications do exist.
deploys his activity). For many other cases, see KNAPP, 6o Z. Schweiz. R.
(N. F.) (1941) 335 (a) No. 40.
Austria: OGH. (July 9, 1937) Zentralblatt 1937, 748 No. 433, where the
agent is a merchant registered and domiciled in Austria, Austrian law
applies.
Hungary: Curia P. VII 3813 (1931), SzA.szy, 11 Z.ausl.PR. (1937) 172
No. 1: a Hungarian firm granted an American firm exclusive distribution of
certain skins in the United States and Canada ; the agent gave notice and
demands damages because the principal made a direct offer to another
American firm. The court recognizes American law as governing, but under
a sort of natural law, it charges the American plaintiff with lack of good
faith because he failed to warn the defendant of the rigidity of American
law.
64 E.g., Cartwright v. Greene (x866) 47 Barb. 9 explains the effect of an
account of del credere under the New York law of the principal, whereas
the factors were in San Francisco.
The French Supreme Court, Cass. req. (July 9, 1928) S. 1930.1.17, examining the question whether a broker in Leigh, England, was entitled to insert
a clause of arbitration into the contract with the third party, thoughtlessly
applied French law; see Note, NIBOYET, ibid.
65 Thus, Adams v. Thayer (1931) 85 N.H. 177, 155 At!. 687, the principal
lived in New Hampshire, the contract was centered in Massachusetts.
66 Berry v. Chase (C. C. A. 6th 1906) 146 Fed. 625. French courts do not
reaily apply in this case the lex loci contractus, see BATIFFOL 287 n. 3·
67 The place where the order is given appears as late as in the proposals
of PILLET to the Institute of International Law, 23 Annuaire ( 1910) 283,
291, and in AMIEux's article, 2 Repert. 440 f. n. 17, although he concedes
that this place is difficult to determine.
6 8 France: Trib. com. Seine (July 4, 1894) Clunet 1894, 994 (London
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The American practice has become fairly firm in applying
this rule to the question whether the contract is invalid as
gambling or wager. 69 The contract is even enforced in the
states where it would be invalid under domestic law, 70 th~
few exceptions 71 probably being obsolete. However, this
concerns the relation of the states to federal institutions
for the common benefit. Would the rule be applied to
foreign exchanges as well? We have seen a more restrictive
practice in European courts. 72
A difficulty arises where the broker's place differs from
the location of the exchange. Of course, it is commonly
realized that the parties reasonably contemplate the rules
of the exchange at which the order is intended to be executed.73 American courts, furthermore, have conveniently
applied the rules of an exchange not determined by the
parties but at which the contract would be customarily
executed. 74 In connection with this view, the legality of the
broker) ; and many subsequent decisions, see BATIFFOL 287 n. 3; adde Paris
(March 7, 1938) Clunet 1938, 739·
Belgium: Cass. (June 4, 1940) 70 Pand. Belges 599, cited by BRANDL, Int.
Biirsenprivatrecht 85 n. 13.
Franco-German Mixed Arb. Trib. (July 25, 1925) Ruperts' Merck & Co. v.
Broca & Cie., 5 Recueil trib. arb. mixtes 795; (Feb. 22, 1926) Cohen v. Herz,
6 Recueil trib. arb. mixtes 228.
Germany: RG. (May ro, r884) 12 RGZ. 34, 36; (April r, 1896) 37 RGZ.
266 (although the instant contract was invalidated by public policy) ; RG.
(June r8, r887) 4 Bolze No. 26, according to NussBAUM, D. IPR. 276 n. 2
denies the right of the English broker to intervene as a party according to
English law.
Italy: Cass. Napoli (Sept. r8, 1914) Clunet 1915, 703, and many other
decisions, the "absolutely prevailing opinion" according to CAVAGLIERI, Dir.
Int. Com. 425 n. r.
69 Winslow v. Kaiser ( 1934) 313 Pa. 577, 170 Atl. 135·
70 Jacobs v. Hyman (C. C. A. 5th 1923) 286 Fed. 346; MEYER, The Law
of Stock Brokers and Stock Exchanges (1931) 678.
71 MEYER, id. 677 n. 4·
72 Vol. II pp. 568 If.
73
E.g., Winslow v. Kaiser (1934) 313 Pa. 577, 170 Atl. 135. The defendant
client "was visited with knowledge of the board's rules which allowed the
matching of orders to buy and orders to sell."
France: E.g., Trib. com. Dijon (July r, 1908) Clunet 1910,536 (selling out).
Germany: Infra n. 79·
Switzerland: See Vol. II Ch. 28.
74 Berry v. Chase (C. C. A. 6th 1906) 146 Fed. 625, 629.
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operation always depends on the law of the state of the
exchange and not of the place where the order was given
or received, thus excluding the law of the broker's domicil.T 3
Sometimes, a direct correspondence between the client and
the substitute of his local broker, at the seat of the exchange,
has facilitated the decision that the entire contract was
governed by the law of the exchange/ 6
Nevertheless, in numerous respects there remains room
for the broker's law. Some decisions have ignored the problem, and some have directly referred to the law of the
exchange, although the operation is made through a local
broker with the aid of a subagent. On the other hand, in
what appears to be the best considered decision, the Massachusetts court states that, as in the absence of specification
the order was executed in New York, it was only "in certain
respects subject to the rules and regulations of the New
York Stock Exchange," but not "to be governed by the
laws of that state relating to stock bought on margins." 77
75 Brooks v. People's Bank (1921) 233 N.Y. 87; 134 N. E. 846; In re
Clement D. Cates & Co. (D. C. S. D. Fla. 1922) 283 Fed. 541, 545; Hoyt v.
Wickham (C. C. A. 8th 1928) 25 F. (2d) 777, 779; Lyons Milling Co. v.
Golfe & Carkener (C. C. A. 10th 1931) 46 F. (2d) 241, 245; MEYER, The Law
of Stock Brokers 677 n. 4, Supp. ( 1936) 236 § 181.
Germany: To reach the same result, the Reichsgericht goes so far as to
apply the law of the exchange as the general law of the contract, see supra
n. 72 and BRANDL, Int. Biirsenprivatrecht 94·
France: The courts emphasizing generally the determination of legality by
the law of the exchange, e.g., Trib. sup. Colmar (Jan. 17, 1923) Clunet 1924,
1049 and Note, NAsT, might decide likewise where the broker is established
elsewhere. It is true that the frequent detour of decision through construing
the place where the commission agent receives the order as place of contracting might mislead in this case.
76 Hoyt v. Wickham, supra n. 75· In Mullinix v. Hubbard (C. C. A. 8th
1925) 6 F. (2d) 109, II4 the order was given in Memphis to a local branch
of the New York stockholders; hence no further question of localization
occurred.
France: A similar case, though with express submission to the rules of
the London stock exchange, in Trib. com. Seine (June 8, 1931) Clunet 1932,
629·
77
Papadopulos v. Bright (1928) 264 Mass. 42, 46, 161 N. E. 799 citing
Barrell v. Paine (1922) 242 Mass. 415, 425, 136 N. E. 414; Marshall v.
James (1925) 252 Mass. 306, 310, 147 N. E. 740.
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This question was determined under the law of Massachusetts, considered as the law of the place of contract; we
ought to add that payment and delivery were due there, and
more important yet, the broker was domiciled there.
As a Quebec decision justly asserts, advances made by
a broker in buying and selling at an exchange are to be
recovered under the law governing the contract with the
client, and not by the law of the place where the buying and
selling took place. 78
The German Reichsgericht, to the contrary, prefers the
law of the exchange as a whole 9 to that of the broker. But
this is just another consequence of overemphasizing the
lex loci solutionis. Prevailing German literature is in
opposition. 80
The law of the broker's place of business, hence, should
govern such problems as free consent and capacity of the
parties, time and place of payment and of delivery to the
customer, remedies for nonperformance by the broker, and
his duty to account. Where the broker under his own law,
e.g., German, is entitled to take up the ordered transaction in
lieu of a third party, he may do so despite the contrary law
of the state, e.g., England, where the exchange is situated
in which the order would otherwise be carried out. But of
course this question is decided under the usages of the
exchange in the case where the order is performed by a
subagent. On the other hand, if the customer fails to provide
Finlayson v. Kell (1921) 23 Que. Pr. 328.
RG. (Nov. 30, 1899) JW. 1900, 19 No. 32; (Nov. 21, 1910) JW. 1911,
148 (German broker ordered to sell securities in the United States, American
limitation of action; contra, LEHMANN in 5 Diiringer-Hachenburg II 676. RG.
(May 30, 1923) 107 RGZ. 36, see infra n. So.
France: Similarly, the editor of Clunet in Notes, e.g., Clunet 1938, 742, 745,
speaking of the law of the exchange as "professional law."
so This is the main point of controversy between German writers and the
Reichsgericht, 107 RGZ. 36 j cf. NUSSBAUM, D. IPR. 276 n. 2 j STAUB-KOENIGE
in 4 Staub 638 § 383 n. 37; BRANDL, Int. Borsenprivatrecht 91; LEHMANN in
5 Diiringer-Hachenburg 676 § 383 n. 25.
78

79
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cover according to the contract, the broker is entitled to
sell out by any method recognized at the exchange. 81
(c) Real-estate broker. When a real estate broker is
domiciled at the situs of the immovable, this fact determines the applicable law without regard to the place where
the brokerage agreement is made or a purchaser is found. 82
The Georgia court, so reasoning, decided to apply the lex
loci solutionis,S3 but this, too, is not the adequate rule. The
broker sues for his fees, which he earns when he presents a
buyer able and willing; this may occur at any place. If
the broker resides outside the state of situs, an Illinois decision has applied the Louisiana law of the situs on the
ground that the agreement was made there. 84 This, however, happened only by accident, as the activity of the broker
was centered in Illinois where he also found a purchaser.
Lex loci contractus in this case, as lex loci solutionis in the
first case, is beside the point. The lex situs has simply scored
another undeserved victory.
Even more questionable are other decisions invalidating
the brokerage and depriving the broker of his fees on the
ground of his lack of license. While understandably the law
of the situs upholds its public policy with respect to its
land, 85 an Illinois court decided against a broker, licensed
in Illinois, who found a purchaser for Illinois land in New
York, where he was not licensed, 86 and in New York a
81 Switzerland: BG. (Oct. 21, 1941) 67 BGE. II 179, 181 recognizes this
in principle, although by substituting Swiss law for the "unknown" Czechoslovakian procedure, the rights of the banker of Prague against the Swiss
customer were frustrated.
82 Pratt v. Sloan (1930) 41 Ga. App. 150, 152 S. E. 275; since the broker
was not licensed in Florida, the Georgia court dismissed his claim.
83 BATIFFOL 288 n. 3 claims this construction for his theory.
84 Benedict v. Dakin (1909) 243 Ill. 384, 90 N. E. 712: the fees are determined according to the standard of Louisiana which is half of that of
Illinois.
85 Moore v. Burdine (La. 1937) 174 So. 279·
86 Frankel v. Allied Mills, Inc. (1938) 369 Ill. 578, 17 N. E. (2d) 570.

EMPLOYMENT AND AGENCY

203

broker's suit was dismissed because he was not licensed to
deal in Pennsylvania land. 87
Consistently, the contract ought to be centered at the
domicil of the broker. The broker, then, should be required
to be licensed at his domicil, and the situs may void his
claim if he is not licensed there, although even this, once
more, unduly disturbs the private law in the interest of
administrative interstate diversity.
4· Public Policy
Under the French law, the promise of an exaggerated fee
to any agent, including solicitors, barristers, notaries, architects, and enforcement agencies, may be reduced by the
court. It has been correctly argued that the law of the contract rather than the French territorial law should apply. 88
Angell v. Van Schaick (1892) 132 N.Y. 187, 30 N. E. 395·
MAURY, Revue Crit. 1936, 371 ff., 382, commenting on a decision applying
the French provision for the honorarium of a foreign advocate on a contract
made in France.
87
88
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Workmen's Compensation
I.
I.

THE SuBSTANTIVE LAw

Municipal Systems1

T HAS always been recognized that liability of employers for injury to the health of employees could be
based on tort, which, however, required either proof,
or at least a prima facie showing, of fault. The German
Civil Code, § 618, added a contractual duty of employers to
protect the employee against dangers to life and health,
and this has been adopted in other codes. In the industrial
age, however, special institutions have increasingly been
found necessary to provide accident compensation not based
on tortious and contractual liability of the employer and
even despite excusable fault of the injured employee. In
the common law countries, an additional reform was needed

I

1 Strangely, despite an immense literature, no satisfactory modern comparative work exists.
United States: ScHNEIDER's Workmen's Compensation (ed. 3, 1941) Supp.
1947, Vol. I §§ 155-218, Extraterritorial Application of Acts and Conflict of
Laws. Valuable surveys on the statutes and decisions have been furnished by
YNTEMA, 2 Giur. Comp. DIP. (1932) 338, 340; STUMBERG 189; HANCOCK,
Torts 2n; DwAN, 20 Minn. L. Rev. (1935) 19; DuNLAP, 23 Cal. L. Rev.
(1935) 381; Notes, 35 Col. L. Rev. (1935) 751; and particularly informative,
Note, 57 Harv. L. Rev. ( 1943) 242-247 (on whose dates I am leaning).
On "Jurisdiction and Venue in Aviation Accident Cases Including Workmen's Compensation Claims," with interesting side lights, see GoLDBERG, 36
Cal. L. Rev. (1948) 41.
European countries: The most informative general survey is still afforded
by NEUMEYER, 2 Int. Verwaltungs R. (1922) 437 ff. § 69. The various publications of the International Labour Office contain numerous details. In
Italy the R. Deer. (Aug. 17, 1935) No. 1765 in SALEMI, Codice corporativo e
del lavoro ( 1942) § 206 seems to retain force.
On Latin America, a short report by TrxrER, "The Development of Social
Insurance in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay," 32 Int. Labour Rev.
( 1935) 610 is mainly concerned with the social and administrative features.
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to eliminate the defense of common employment. Progressive impulses were most felt in hazardous industries,
which still constitute a special class in New York, but the
area of "social protection" has constantly expanded, though
it varies in the world.
Finally, the legislative idea of the statutes has changed.
The great tendency, taken as a whole, has been from improvements on, or substitutes for, the ordinary tort remedies
to a theory of the employer's professional risk, and from
individual responsibility of the employer to common liability
of the employers of a district or industry, often with contributions by the employees and public subsidies.
Four groups of compensation organization are distinguishable:
(a) A group of mere substitutes for tort actions, such
as the British Employers' Liability Act, I88o, is represented in the United States by the Federal Employers' Liability Act, I908. The former Swiss Factory Liability Act,
I88I/I887, illustrated an analogous attempt to insert a
somewhat stricter liability in the employment contract.
(b) A superior type of individual liability has been
adopted in the workmen's compensation acts of most states
of the United States (since I 908), the United States Employees' Compensation Act ( I9I6), the Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (I927), and the
enactments of England ( I 9 2 5) and many other countries.
These statutes apply regardless of real or presumed fault
on the part of the employer, or the defense of common employment, and other features of the old master and servant
doctrine.
The American compensation acts are of two kinds.
"Elective" or "optional" acts operate merely if the parties,
or either party, declare for the act, or do not reject its
application. Statutes of the other kind apply irrespective
of any disposition by the parties.
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(c) To secure the employee's claim, some of the same
statutes in the United States and abroad favor, others require, that the employer take out insurance for the compensation risk. The insurer may be a private company,
or a public or semipublic institution, at the employer's
option.
By another method, the French Law of I 898 created a
trust fund to which all employers contribute, for guaranteeing the claim of the injured in case of insolvency of the
employer.
(d) The most effective protection of workers is provided by the system of automatic insurance against accident.
On the mere ground of occupation in work in a domestic
enterprise the worker enters into a corporative, "social"
relation with a public or semipublic insurance fund operating
as an administrative agency. Germany adopted this system
as early as I 8 8 5 under Bismarck and was followed by the
states of central and northern Europe, and later by others,
including certain jurisdictions on the American continent.
Great Britain has joined this system by its National Insurance Acts of 1946. 2
2 United States: See LENHOFF, "Insurance Features of Workmen's Compensation Laws," 29 Cornell L. Q. ( 1944) 176, 353·
Great Britain: National Insurance {Industrial Injuries) Act, 1946, and
National Insurance Act, 1946, 9, ro, u, Geo. VI., c. 62 and c. 67. The Employers' Liability Act, r88o, has been repealed by Law Reform {Personal
Injuries) Act, 1948, s. 1 (2).
Canada: "Beginning in Ontario in 1914, workmen's compensation laws are
now in force in every province except Prince Edward Island. . . . More
nearly uniform than any other class of Labour Legislation, the provincial
Workmen's Compensation Acts each provide for a system of State insurance
. . . the Ontario statute embodies principles adopted from the German system
of accident insurance and from a collective liability law enacted in 1911 by
the State of Washington." Labour Legislation in Canada. Legislation Branch,
Department of Labour of Canada, August 1945, p. 17.
Brazil: Decree No. 85, of March 14, 1935 and following acts, see CESARINO
JuNIOR, 2 Dir. Soc. Bras. 321 § 308.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
2.

207

International Treaties 3

International conventions of Geneva established a mtmmum of unified rules of compensation for the benefit of the
workers. 4 Of great influence is another Convention designed
to end the frequent discriminations against alien workers
in general, or nonresident workers, or nonresident alien
dependents of workers, by guaranteeing reciprocity of treatment. This Equality of Treatment (Accidents Compensation) Convention of 1925, was in force in forty-one states 5
on September 30, 1948.
II.

NATURE oF CoNFLicTs

The nature of conflicts between divergent laws on professional accidents varies according to the systems involved.
On the one hand, statutes represented by those imposing
employer's liability for presumed fault move in the sphere
of quasi-tortious liability. Their application remains tied
to the principle of the lex loci delicti.
On the other hand, obligatory social insurance of the
workers depends exclusively on territorial public law. The
requirements of participation in the scheme by business
establishments and insured workers are set out in detail
in the statutes, and bind the courts as well as all other
agencies. These statutes cannot be applied abroad.
a The International Labour Code, published by the International Labour
Office, Montreal 1941, 289-298.
4 Workmen's Compensation (Agriculture) Convention, 1921; Workmen's
Compensation (Accidents) Convention, 1925, Int. Labour Code, supra n. 3,
at 289-298. More ratifications have been coming forth recently, such as in
France by Decree No. 48-681 of April x6, 1948.
5 Belgium, Bulgaria, Burma, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece,
Hungary, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Mexico,
the Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Poland, Portugal, South Africa, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia. Int. Labour Code, 299 n. 1.
The new list omits Estonia and adds Bolivia, Egypt, Iraq, Pakistan, Peru,
and Venezuela. International Labour Conference, 32nd. Session, Reports on
the Application of Conventions (Geneva 1949) I 38.
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The situation created by most American and similar
statutes, despite their different theories, results in the same
rule of a purely territorial application of workmen's compensation acts. The American states, with few exceptions,
have established administrative boards which by their
organization and composition of personnel are intended to
administer exclusively the domestic workmen's compensation law. In this majority of states, the particular local
circumstances and policies so completely dominate the spirit
of the statutes, and a speedy and inexpensive regulation of
claims is so important, that application of another state's
compensation act is commonly thought to be entirely impracticable. 6
Five jurisdictions, however, expressly permit an employee
hired outside the state to enforce rights acquired under
the foreign law. 7
Continental countries, following the system of individual
employers' liability, have usually entrusted the administration of their industrial and agricultural accident statutes
to the labor courts or other segments of the regular judiciary
which are regarded as capable of deciding cases according
to foreign law. Nevertheless, the arguments and solutions
are fairly comparable to those advanced in the United States.
Generally, indeed, the normal conflict arising when a
worker employed in one state is injured in another, is a
conflict of jurisdictions rather than of substantive laws.
The intricacies and ramifications of this subject, however,
have given it a certain prominence in the treatment of conflicts law.
6 Mosely v. Empire Gas and Fuel Co. ( 1926) 313 Mo. 225, 245, 281 S. W.
762, quoted by HANCOCK, Torts 214; Goodrich 244 § 97; Note, 57 Harv. L.
Rev. ( 1943) at 246; DWAN, supra n. x, at 19.
1 Arizona, Idaho, Utah, Vermont, Hawaii, see Note, 57 Harv. L. Rev.
(1943) at 246; see also HANCOCK, Torts 215, 216.
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THE THEORIES

An able survey of the territorial delimitation of American workmen's compensation statutes, by their express provisions or court construction, has stated six types of solutions, one of which has five variants. 8 Arminjon enumerates
six different theories in France. 9 Resorting to historical and
comparative points of view, we may distinguish three main
theories. 10
I.

Tort Theory

In the United States, workmen's compensation was first
construed as substituting a statutory for a common law tort.
Consequently, an act was applied always and only when
the injury occurred in the state. 11 At present, however, only
very occasionally does a court retain the idea that the
domestic statute does not include injuries outside the state. 12
The Restatement ( § 398) forms a presumption to the
same effect, viz., that a workman may sue for bodily harm
arising out of and in the course of the employment, but
restricts this to contracts concluded in the state. Nevertheless, it presumes also ( § 399) the applicability of any
workmen's compensation act when the harm is sustained
in the state-a principle conforming to the tort theory and
not corresponding with the actual situation, which, however, may suggest a possible equitable supplement to the
main rule.
The English Court of Appeals interprets the Works Note, 57 Harv. L. Rev. (1943) 242.
9 2 ARMINJON {ed. 2) 344 § 121.
10 See Restatement, Introductory Note before § 398.
11 See the cases in 15 Am. Dig. 2d Dec. Ed. 86.
12 Oklahoma: Utley v. State Industrial Commission (1936) 176 Okla. 255,
55 Pac. {2d) 762. The famous previous decisions in Massachusetts and
Illinois were abrogated by statute, see STUMBERG 189 ns. 2-4. The conclusions regarding the American principle in NEUMEYER, 2 Int. Verwaltungs R.
493 are obsolete.
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men's Compensation Act, 1906, to the same effect as the
tort theory on the ground that acts of Parliament do not
extend beyond the territorial limits of the kingdom, unless
they so declare. 13 The Belgian Supreme Court follows
strictly the tort doctrine, 14 which is occasionally also found
elsewhere. 15
In France, the tort theory has been developed in a construction of the domestic compensation statutes as laws
of securite et police, involving all professional activity on
French soil. Some courts of appeal, taking this theory
seriously, have emphasized the fact that the law has not
considered where the contract is made or of what nationality
the parties are, but only whether the work is done in
France. 16 However, the administrative courts and, following them, the Court of Cassation, have adopted this theory
with a singular reservation. They use it to assume jurisdiction over all cases of injury occurring in France but, reversing the lower courts, have also assumed jurisdiction under
other theories in case of outside injuries. 17
13 Tomalin v. S. Pearson & Son, Ltd. (1909) 100 L. T. R. 685, Revue 1910,
480, per Cozens-Hardy, M. R.; Schwartz v. India Rubber, Gutta Perch a and
Telegraph Works Co., Ltd. [ 1912] 2 K. B. 299, Clunet 1913, 215. See also
dictum in Krzus v. Crow's Nest Pass Coal Co., Ltd. [ 1912] A. C. 590, 597P. C. This absolute doctrine was rejected by the High Court of the Irish
Free State, in Patrick Keegan v. Julia Dawson [1934] I. R. 232, without
indicating the minimum requisites for applying the Act.
Exceptions are made for seamen and persons employed on certain aircraft,
and in the case of reciprocal treaties, see 34 HALSBURY ( ed. 2, 1940) 8oo
§ II34•
14 Cass. Belg. {Feb. 21, 1907) and (Nov. 26, 1908) Revue 1909, 952, the
second also in Clunet 1909, 1178.
15 Italy: App. R"oma {Aug. 18, 1935) Foro !tal. 1936.I.159, Rivista 1936,
295, criticized by BALDONI, ibid. and BALLADORE PALLIERI, 3 Giur. Comp. DIP.
(1938) 86 No. 36. But the latter author, according to BALDONI, Rivista 1932,
440, also advocated the law of the place of the accident.
In France, 2 ARMINJON {ed. 2) 346 likewise simply concludes for the law
of the place of the accident.
16 See especially App. Amiens (Dec. 10, 1913) Antifoul v. Hersant freres,
Revue 1921, 501, later reversed, see infra n. 17.
17 Circular of the Garde de Sceaux, of April 22, 1901, see SUMIEN, I
Repert. 109 No. 19; Cass. civ. (May 8, 1907) Revue 1907, 539; also two
decisions in the case, Antifoul v. Hers ant freres: Cass. civ. (March 10, 1913)
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Contracts Theory

(a) Lex loci contractus. Undoubtedly, the statutes establishing employer's liability for accidents commonly presuppose a contract of employment. It has frequently been
concluded therefrom that the statute covers contracts governed by domestic law; and through the usual influence
of the lex loci actus principle, the thesis is reached that a
workmen's compensation act has for its domain accidents
occurring anywhere to workers hired by a contract within
the state. For practical purposes, fifteen jurisdictions of
the United States have adopted this proposition in its pure
form/ 8 Similarly, all contracts of employment made in
France are subject to the French statute in the theory of
the Court of Cassation, irrespective of alien nationality of
the parties, although at the same time accidents occurring
in France form another ground for application. 19
An influential Italian doctrine follows the legal prescription of lex loci contractus in the cases where the working place is outside the country, so that the Italian accident
statute is applicable, as well when the work is done in Italy
as when the contract is made in Italy. 20
It is noteworthy, however, that in this matter even the
Restatement has felt compelled to concede special treatment
to a worker hired through an employment agency in, e.g.,
S. 1913.1.307, Revue 1914, 425, and Cass. Chambres reunies (May 26, 1921)
Revue 1921, 501, reversing the Amiens decision, supra n. 16.
18 By statute in Alabama, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky,
Maine, Missouri, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont; by judicial practice without
statutory reference to the place of contracting, Connecticut, Massachusetts,
New Jersey; and against the statutes requiring the worker's residence,
California, Michigan. See 57 Harv. L. Rev. ( 1943) at 243 ns. 9, 10, 244 n.
13; Bauer's Case ( 1943) 314 Mass. 4, 49 N. E. (zd) u8; and for New
Jersey, Sweet v. Austin (1934) 12 N.J. Misc. 381, 171 Atl. 684; Franzen v.
E. I. Dupont De Nemours & Co. (1942) 128 N.J. Law 549, 27 Atl. (2d) 615.
19 Cass., decisions in the Antifoul Case, supra n. 17.
2 0 BALDONI, Rivista 1932, 442; Rivista 1936, 298; followed by ScERNI 128;
App. Milano (Dec. 12, 1930) Rivista 1932, 438 applied Italian law to a
contract made in Italy between Italian parties for working abroad, but in
this case both parties were Italian.
9
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Pennsylvania, where the worker is sent to enter his occupation in, e.g., California. In that case, it is agreed, the compensation act of the state where the workman reports for
duty governs compensation. 21 Why not recognize generally
that it is not the making of the contract but the starting of
the work that is essential?
(b) Proper law. In a few cases, American courts have preferred the law of the place of performance. 22 On the other
hand, the Indiana court, in an obviously just denial of
compensation to a worker hired in Michigan to cut timber
in Michigan, who was injured doing transitory work in
Indiana, believed that this case constituted an exception to
the rule of lex loci solutionis. 23
In particular, the argument "that the rights and duties
under the Workmen's Compensation Act are contractual
and the provisions of the Act binding only as part of the
employment contract," was invoked in a series of decisions
restricted to "optional" acts. That is, since the effect of
these acts depends upon election or a presumed agreement,
which may be excluded by voluntary act of one or both of
the parties, as the case may be, it has been thought that the
liability rests upon consent of the parties, whereas a compulsory act applies by operation of the law. 24
Thus, in Iowa quite recently the domestic act was applied
because it was elective and the contract made in the state,
though for work in Oklahoma. 25
§ 398 comment a; cf. GooDRICH 249·
Thus, Johns-Manville, Inc. v. Thrane ( 1923) 8o Ind. App. 432, 141
N. E. 229, the court applies its own act to an occupation considered not
temporary.
Similarly, Belgium: Trib. civ. Arion (July 13, 1904) Revue 1905, 539;
(July 20, 1904) id. 543·
23 Elkhart Sawmill Co. v. Skinner (1942) 111 Ind. App. 695, 42 N. E. (2d)
412.
24 Sheehan Pipe Line Const. Co. v. State Industrial Comm. (1931) 151
Okla. 272, 3 Pac. (zd) 199.
25 Haverly v. Union Construction Co. ( 1945) 236 Iowa 278, 18 N. W. (2d}
629; the criticism in 31 Ia. L. Rev. ( 1946) 472 is beside the point.
21
22
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The contracts theory has been pushed to the farthest
point by some French writers and decisions in France and
Louisiana (whose act is optional). They directly invoke
party autonomy to the effect that the law chosen or presumed to be chosen by the parties for governing the employment contract also includes the respective compensation statute. 26 It does not need much argumene 7 to refute
this transformation of a law applicable to a contract into a
law selected by the parties. Where an "optional" compensation act is not dependent on adoption by the parties but
only permits either party to exclude its application by
declaration in contracting, the choice has been said to be
usually merely on paper. 28 At any rate, the law does not
base its own force, in the absence of a declaration, on the
agreement of the parties. Even though both parties may
contribute to a fund covering the liability, the law governs
as it is at the time of the award, changes of the law not
being prevented by constitutional protection of contractual
obligations, and the parties are without power to modify
its effects.
(c) Contracting and residence required. Certain American statutes restrict the jurisdiction of their boards to the
case where, in addition to the making of the employment
26 PERROUD, Clunet I906, 633; I910, 668; I912, 389; RAYNAUD, Clunet I9I3,
63; SUMIEN, I Repert. uo; Cour Paris (March I6, I925) Revue I925, 348,
Clunet I926, 346; cf. J. DONNEDIEU DE VABRES 592; McKane v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co. (La. App. I940) I99 So. I75; Hunt v. Magnolia Petroleum
(La. App. I942) IO So. (2d} 109, reversed by the Supreme Court of the
United States on the grounds discussed below; cf. Note, 5 La. L. Rev. (I943)
at 3 57·
Particularly strange, Belgian Trib. civ. Mons (May 30, I925) Pasicrisie
I925-3-12I applying lex loci contractus in adding that even though lex loci
delicti (French law) were applied, a deviation in favor of the lex fori would
be assumed according to the presumable intentions of the parties.
27 See GOODRICH 240, 24I, and in France, NIBOYET, Recueil I927 I 2I, n. I.
However, a recent American decision has recognized without restriction
a party stipulation for the applicable law. Duskin v. Pennsylvania-Central
Airlines Corp. (C. C. A. 6th I948) I67 F. (2d) 727, 730; noted, r6 U. of
Chi. L. Rev. (I949) I57·
28 STUMBERG I93·
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contract, the residence of employer or employee 29 or both30
is in the state. A sound instinct has driven these legislators
away from purely contractual reasoning. But better formulations have been found in the third group.
3· Law of the Place of Employment
(a) In general. Some American compensation statutes
define their territorial sphere with reference to the place
where the worker is regularly employed. This is sometimes
the only test. 31 In other statutes it is an alternative to the
law of the place of contracting, 32 or the working place and
the employer's residence must both be in the state. 33
It may be recalled, moveover, that the employer's place
of business or residence is an additional requisite to the
domestic place of contracting in same states. 34 And more
important, when the place of the making of the contract is
emphasized, following the beaten path of the doctrine,
coincidence with the really important place of work is very
largely the rule. 35
This slow trend to a method away from the inadequate
terms of tort and contract, though not yet carried to a
settled conclusion, 36 is unmistakable and effective. The reFlorida, Georgia, see 57 Harv. L. Rev. (1943) at 244 n. 13 (d).
North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, id. n. 13 (c).
31 Oregon, West Virginia, id. 243 n. II.
32 Arizona, Colorado, id. n. 12.
33 Delaware, Pennsylvania, Maryland, id. 244 n. 13 (e).
34 Supra n. 29.
35 Cf. e.g., for Georgia, McDonald-Haynes v. Minyard (1943) 69 Ga.
App. 479, 26 S. E. (2d) 138.
In New York, in the case of nonhazardous employment it is usually said
that it suffices for application of the act (e.g., to traveling salesmen) that
"the employment contract" is made in the state. See Wagoner v. Brown
Mfg. Co. (1937) 274 N. Y. 593, 10 N. E. (2d) 567; Roth v. A. C. Horn Co.
(1941) 262 App. Div. 922, 28 N.Y. Supp. (2d) 8o8, aff'd (1941) 287 N.Y.
545; Lepow v. Lepow Knitting Mills ( 1942) 288 N. Y. 377, 43 N. E. (2d)
450; cf. CRONIN, Note, 28 Cornell L. Q. (1943) 206 n. 4, 209 n. 19.
36 GOODRICH, "Five Years of Conflict of Laws," 32 Va. L. Rev. (1946) 295,
319: "So there developed the description of the acts as a regulation of the
29

30
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suiting localization patently agrees with the European
theories converging from the doctrines in older and newer
types of liability to practically consonant delimitations. The
Canadian laws, 37 German 38 and Swiss 39 courts, the Italian
writers, 40 and probably many other national systems 41 refer
to the place where the work is regularly to be done within
the employer's business organization.
It is still impossible to extract a precise common idea from
these regulations. But two basic concepts have emerged;
whether applied alternatively or in combination these concepts at any rate mark the main tendency and may lead to
a final agreement. One idea is that the employer's business
to which the employee is attached must be in the state, the
other that the worker must do his regular work in the state.
(b) Place of employment. The localization rule of
Minnesota has acquired some repute, whereby the place of
the employer's business prevails rather than his main office
even though the worker may be hired at the latter place.
Where the work, as for instance the construction of an
airport, is carried on, there is the decisive location. 42 This,
in a frequent expression of New York constitutes a "status
of employment," more important than the fact of hiring
the worker at a particular place. 43 The localization of the
industry justifies application of the police power of the
state to regulate that industry; originally aimed at preventrelation of employer and employee. Enunciation of the theory, however, did
not settle all the questions."
3 7 E.g., Ontario: Rev. Stat. 1937, c. 204 s. 5·
3 8 Germany: Reichsversicherungsordnung §§ 153 ff.; NEUMEYER, 2 Int.
Verwaltungs R. 514 and cit.; Trib. Arb. Mixte Germano-Belge (April 25,
1924) 4 Recueil trib. arb. mixtes 319; (April 10, 1925) 5 id. 348.
39 Switzerland: BG. (March 4, 1892) 18 BGE. 354·
40 GEMMA, Dir. Int. del Lavoro 241 f.; BALDONI, SCERNI, cited supra n. 20.
4 1 In France, the statute of the normal place of working was advocated by
MAHAIM, cited by BALDONI, Rivista 1932, 441, n. 6 at 442.
42 De Rosier v. Craig (1944) 217 Minn. 296, 14 N. W. (2d) 286, Note, 28
Minn. L. Rev. (1944) 335·
43 Note, 10 N. Y. U. L. Q. ( 1933) 518, 522.
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mg accidents, it has been extended to provide accident
compensation. 44
Illustration. "Where air route between Minnesota and
Illinois was operated by a foreign corporation (a Delaware corporation) from Minnesota where all runs were
started, business offices maintained, mechanical work done,
payrolls distributed, and pilots and copilots lived and received all instructions, copilot injured in crash was subject
to Minnesota Workmen's Compensation Act so as to preclude a common-law negligence action, notwithstanding
crash occurred in Wisconsin and regardless of whether
contract of employment was made in Iowa, on theory employer's business was 'localized' in Minnesota." 45
Other statutes approach this conception. But it appears
useless to look for an absolutely unequivocal localization.
Provided that both the contract is made and the business
located in the state, the employment is sure to be considered
domestic.
(c)Regular work in the state. The bulk of discussion
in the American practice concerns the distinction between
the case where the employee works regularly and where he
does only transitory, "incidental," "occasional," or "temporary" work in a state.
There seems to exist agreement that a claim otherwise
founded is not prejudiced by the fact that the injury occurs
in transitory work outside the state. This maxim is often
applied, since usually the transitory nature of out-of-state
work is liberally affirmed.
44 Minnesota: Chambers v. District Court (1918) 139 Minn. 205, x66 N. W.
185; Ginsburg v. Byers ( 1927) 171 Minn. 366, 214 N. W. 55·
Nebraska: Watts v. Long (1928) n6 Neb. 656, 218 N. W. 410.
45 Severson v. Hanford Tri-State Airlines (C. C. A. 8th 1939) 105 F.
(2d) 622, headnote summary. See other airline cases, GoLDBERG, 36 Cal. L.
Rev., supra n. x, at 50 n. 33·
The 1948 Supplement to the Restatement § 400 recognizes that a state
may confer a right of action within the terms of its statute even though it is
not the place of injury or place of contracting. The interest of the state in
the employer-employee relationship is considered sufficient to justify such
an extraterritorial effect of the statute.
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The cases of multiple claims of employees are thereby
even more increased than in the other systems. It would
seem logical and equitable to accord optional compensation
also when an employee is hired by a firm for out-of-state
work but suffers an accident within the state while temporarily employed there. 46
Some statutes have, however, limited the time of outside employment to ninety days 47 or required that the
injury should not happen six months or more after leaving
the state 48 or set up additional requirements for awarding
compensation for outside injuries. 49
Similar provisions are to be found in the Treaty between
France and Great Britain, of July 3, 1909, 50 and many
subsequent treaties.
On the other hand, great variety or doubt exists as to
work regularly divided between two state territories and
work prevailingly done out of the state which, viewed from
the standpoint of the employer, is incidental to his business.
It has been maintained that the New York courts have
reached a system covering the entire ground, as summarized
in the footnote. 51
4 6 To this effect, evidently, GooDRICH, "Five Years of Conflict of Laws,"
32 Va. L. Rev. ( 1946) at 320, criticizing House v. State Industrial Accident
Commission (1941) 167 Ore. 257, 117 Pac. {2d) 611, noted, 5 U. of Detroit
L. J. ( I94I) 67.
4 7 Delaware, Pennsylvania: 57 Harv. L. Rev. (I943) 244 n. I5·
48 Ontario: Rev. Stat. I937, c. 204, s. 5 (I).
49 Note, 57 Harv. L. Rev. ( 1943) at 244·
50 See Int. Labour Code, 307 n. I, and Reports on the Application of Conventions {1949) supra n. 5, at 142 and 145, on recent treaties between France
and Great Britain, and of France with Belgium, Italy, and Poland.
51 Mr. WILLIAM SPRAGUE BARNES, in agreement with the Note, 28 Cornell
L. Q. ( 1943) 206, submits the following statement:
The New York statute contains no provision as to extraterritorial effect.
The courts have followed a consistent approach in recent cases. The nature
of the work in the course of which the employee was injured is the decisive
factor.
If the "employment" is of a fixed or permanent nature at a definite location outside the state, recovery under the New York Act is denied, regardless
of such New York contacts as the principal office of the employer, the residence of the employee, or the place of hiring; Copeland v. Foundation Co.
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(d) Self-sufficiency of the test. However the "place of
employment" may be understood, it can obviate additional
requirements. Considering the strong effort to extend workmen's compensation to employees in domestic business who
are not primarily employed outside the state, it is not
strange that § 400 of the Restatement, asserting that "No
recovery can be had under the Workmen's Compensation
Act of a state if neither the harm occurred nor the contract
of employment was made in the state," was amended (I 948)
by adding "unless the Act confers in specific words, or is
interpreted to confer, a right of action because of the extent
of the activities of the employer or employee within the
(1931) 256 N. Y. 568, 177 N. E. 143; Amaxis v. Vassilaros, Inc. (1932)
258 N. Y. 544, 18o N. E. 325; Zeltoski v. Osborne Drilling Corp. ( 1934)
264 N. Y. 496, 191 N. E. 532; or compensation insurance in New York,
Bagdalik v. Flexlume Corp. (1939) 281 N. Y. 858, 24 N. E. (2d) 499; all
these claims were dismissed, reversing the lower court on the ground of the
decision in Cameron v. Ellis Construction Co. (1930) 252 N.Y. 394, 169 N. E.
622.
The place of "employment" is located in New York as a matter of law,
if the injury-producing work is confined to a definite location in the state
regardless of foreign residence or hiring, Bauss v. Consolidated Chimney
Co. (1945) 270 App. Div. 70, 58 N.Y. Supp. (2d) 717, even though there is
no office in New York and no New York compensation insurance. Adams v.
Max Solomon Co. ( 1943) 265 App. Div. 427, 39 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 492;
Grasso v. Donaldson-Reynolds, Inc. (1938) 279 N.Y. 584, 17 N. E. (2d) 449·
If the work is not fixed at a definite location but is temporary, Berman
v. Hudson Amer. Corp. (1946) 271 App. Div. 847, 65 N. Y. Supp. (2d)
676, or transitory in nature, Alexander v. Movietonews, Inc. (1937) 273
N.Y. 511, 6 N. E. (2d) 604 (cameraman), a place of business in New York
to which employee is attached is sufficient to allow New York recovery even
though he is injured outside the state. White v. H. J. Heinz Co. (1936)
248 App. Div. 654, 287 N. Y. Supp. 951.
The courts will also allow claims under the New York law on the ground
that the work outside is: under the supervision of the New York headquarters, Farrigan v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. (1945) 269 App. Div. 872, 56
N. Y. Supp. (2d) 103; incidental to New York business, Rendt v. Gates
(1945) 269 App. Div. 1007, 58 N.Y. Supp. (2d) 438; based on New York
union wage scale, Carp v. Gladstone Raines, Inc. (1942) 264 App. Div. 962,
37 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 146.
If the employee of a foreign business is injured while working in the
state, claims under New York law are precluded where the New York
work is incidental to foreign "employment," Eurbin v. Prud. Ins. Co. of
Amer. (1937) 250 App. Div. 868, 295 N. Y. Supp. 247; or temporary, Proper
v. Polley (1932) 259 N. Y. 516, 182 N. E. 161; or transitory, Whitmire v.
Blaw-Knox Constr. Co. (1934) 263 N. Y. 675, 189 N. E. 753·
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state." We may take it, just to the contrary of the original
rule, that both tests included are undesirable for a main
rule and as such antiquated by the current development.
As the Wisconsin court said, "Where the employer under
the act engages a person to perform services in this state
under a contract of hire, express or implied, no matter
where or when such contract may have been engendered,
such employee is under our act and is entitled to its benefits,
and this is so even though he is injured while outside of the
state, rendering services incidental to his employment within
the state. Whether the employee be a resident of this state
is not material. The controlling and decisive factor is
whether he had a status as an employee within this state." 52
This is an unusually clear formulation of the modern
tendency. 53
4· Social Insurance System
The German pattern of insurance 54 under public law is
based on a network of regulations, including duties of the
employer to report on employments, to contribute premiums
on his own and the worker's account, and many other obligations facilitating administrative control. The natural
criterion determining the connection with the state in this
system is the situation of the employer's establishment involved, viz., the place where he carries on that independent
part of his undertaking to which the worker is attached
(Betriebsort). Nationality and domicil of the employer
and the employee are immaterial except in a few special
situations. The place of the undertaking, thus, is decisive
for enrollment of the parties to the insurance as well as
52
McKesson-Fuller-Morrisson Co. v. Industrial Commission of Wisconsin
(1933) 212 Wis. 507, 512, 250 N. W. 396.
53 See also HANCOCK, Torts 212.
54
For Germany, see NEUMEYER, 2 Int. Verwaltungs R. 514 ff.; STIERSOMLO, 2 Kommentar zur Reichsversicherungsordnung (1916) 31 ff., 988.
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for claims for benefits. Consequently, when workers are
sent to work in another country, it depends on the nature
of the foreign establishment, whether a new undertaking
is formed subject to the territorial statute or the occupation of the individual worker is only incidental, temporary,
or ac::essory, a so-called "radiation" of the domestic undertaking. Examples of the latter category have been the sending of employees to install machines, to construct a bridge,
to give theatrical performances, to load vehicles, and the
various activities of interstate transportation.
The Canadian pattern exemplified by the Ontario statute
includes temporary work outside Ontario for less than six
months where the residence and usual place of employment
of the workman are in Ontario; temporary work, if only
his residence is out of Ontario; and work for some casual or
incidental purpose outside the province, if the employer's
place of business or chief place of business is outside, but
the worker's place of employment is within Ontario. 55 The
text underlines the rule that no compensation shall be payable where the accident to the workman happens while he
is employed elsewhere than in Ontario.
The present Italian view is not known to me. But in 1939
it was agreed that application of the workmen's compensation statute, having territorial character, should be based
either on the place of the accident, or that of the enterprise, or that where the work is done, with the accent on
the last test. 56 It would seem that the German doctrine
eliminates this doubt.
55

Ontario: Rev. Stat. I937, c. 204 s. 5 (I) to (3); s. 5 (5).
See MARMO, Note to Cass. (Jan. I, I939) Foro !tal. Mass. I939, 67 in
8 Giur. Comp. DIP. (I942) I79 No. 99, summarizing a book by VENTURINI.
56
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5. International Treaties
Article 2 of the above-mentioned Equality of Treatment
(Accident Compensation) Convention, I 9 2 5, expressed the
following recommendation:
"Special agreements may be made between the members
concerned to provide that compensation for industrial accidents happening to workers whilst temporarily or intermittently employed in the territory of one Member on behalf of an undertaking situated in the territory of another
Member shall be governed by the laws and regulations of
the latter Member." 57
The influential Treaty between Germany and Austria,
of I926/I930 58 decided that the law of the state where the
head office of an employer is situated is applicable to a
temporary employment in the other state for a period of
one year. The provisions of the same law relating to other
claims on account of the same accident are also applied.
Another model Treaty, concluded between Denmark and
the Netherlands, of October 23, I926, 59 follows the general
rule that the insurance law of the country in which the work
is performed shall apply. But the legislation of the state
where the undertaking carries on its main operation extends
to work of short duration and performed in a subsidiary
manner in the other country by workers not permanently
domiciled there. It is likewise applicable when workers are
sent out to perform inspection or supervision or any other
special duties.
In the absence of such treaty agreements, the International Labour Office is of opinion that according to Article I
57

Int. Labour Code 305, art. 485.
League of Nations, Leg. Ser. 193o--Int. 10, reproduced Int. Labour Code
308, note, art. 2 (I) (a), ( 3).
59 League of Nations, Leg. Ser. 1926-Int. 6; Int. Labour Code ibid. notes
that it contains the fullest provisions of date subsequent to 1925 which are
not based on the Austro-German model.
58
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of the Convention, the laws and regulations of the country
in which the accident occurred should be applied. 60
IV.

CONCURRENCE OF CLAIMS

We shall first deal with the conflicts rules irrespective
of the United States Constitution.
1.

Compensation and Tort Actions

It seems settled in this country that if the state of injury
in its compensation act has barred alternative remedies
based on common law tort no other state will allow the
employee to avail himself of such remedies. 61 Since the
lex loci delicti refuses a tort action, there is none anywhere,
whether at the court of the place of contracting 62 or at the
court of the place of employment. 63 This thesis thus disregards the possibility that these latter courts interpret
their own compensation statutes as not exclusive. On the
other hand, it is regarded as settled that replacement of
common law suits by the statute of the state where suit is
brought, does not bar tort actions flowing from injuries
received in another jurisdiction. 64 The latter theory acknowledges that the substitution of statutory workmen's compensation for tort has exclusive effect only for the awards
made in the state, whereas extraterritorial effect is given
60 Answer to the Japanese Government (10th Session, Int. Labour Conference (1927) Report of the Directors, vol. 2, 99) Decennial Report (1937)
27.
6 1 Mr. Justice Brandeis in Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper (1932)
286 U. S. 145, 154 takes this for granted.
The 1948 Supplement to the Restatement § 401 confines this doctrine to
the place of injury recognizing that the place of contracting cannot deprive
a victim of his right of action if the place of injury finds such a provision
obnoxious to its public policy.
62 Pendar v. H. & B. American Mach. Co. ( 1913) 3 5 R. I. 321, 87 Atl. 1;
Wasilewski v. Warner Sugar Refining Co. (1914) 87 Misc. 156, 149 N. Y.
Supp. 1035; Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Turner ( 1933) 188 Ark. 177, 65
S. W. (zd) 1.
6 3 Restatement § 401 ; GooDRICH 244 and n. 90.
64 Reynolds v. Day ( 1914) 79 Wash. 499, 140 Pac. 681.
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to the similar foreign provision of another state. Apparent
logic has once more misled the lawyers. Both propositions
are mistaken. The reason why in many jurisdictions liability
without fault, though with a limited measure of damage,
exclusively replaces unlimited tort liability based on intentional, or at least unintentional fault, 65 is simply that a
broader scope of liability is balanced by a milder compensation standard. Additionally, the employer, in the thought
of some legislators, should not be sued twice. A state
reasoning thus within its own compensation system does
a strange thing in allowing suits for foreign tort beyond
its domestic awards of workmen's compensation, although
it has no interest in restricting cumulations of claims in the
case of foreign awards. The result, hence, should be just
opposite to that commonly accepted. Whether an award
of accident compensation without fault may be supplemented by other remedies, ought to be determined by the
legal system of which the workmen's compensation is a
part. Exactly to the analogous effect, the prementioned
Austro-German Treaty provides that the law of the state
whose insurance statute is applied, has to decide whether
additional rights arise out of the same accident. It is inconsistent with the policy of a workmen's compensation act,
barring common law suits, that a common law suit should
be brought under a foreign tort law in respect of the same
injury. Where, on the other hand, workmen's compensation
is granted pursuant to a statute combining statutory restricted liability without fault and full liability under common law for fault, there is no reason why the tort law of
the place of injury should not be applied, although it would
not be available to increase workmen's compensation of the
6 5 The German R. Versicherungs 0. § 898 leaves standing the ordinary
action in excess of the compensation award when the employer has caused
the accident intentionally, which fact normally must have been stated by
penal judgment.
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state of injury. Objections to these claims until they are
satisfied or waived, should only arise insofar as the employer is subrogated into the claim against the tortfeasor,
or his liability is reduced by the latter's payment. The North
Carolina court in a case involving injury in Tennessee, finding the common law action forbidden by the Tennessee
Workmen's Compensation Act, allowed recovery in tort
under the common law of North Carolina. 66 The court
should have applied the Tennessee tort law, abrogated in
workmen's compensation cases only for the use of Tennessee, not North Carolina courts.
Curiously, in a recent Ontario decision, the court found
it against public policy that the dependents of a Michigan
employee killed as a passenger in an airplane crash near
St. Thomas, Ontario, could have a remedy against the
wrongdoer in one state, and workmen's compensation against
his employer in another. 67
2.

Several Compensation Acts

Before the Supreme Court of the United States committed itself to a novel application of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause with regard to workmen's compensation, the
Constitution did not preclude a workman from obtaining
compensation in two states up to the higher amount granted
by either statute68 where the statutes made this possible.
The Restatement, § 403, maintains this proposition, which
has been adopted by the courts with very few exceptions,
66 Johnson v. C. C. & 0. R. Co. (1926) 191 N. C. 75, 131 S. E. 390; HANCOCK, Torts 218 n. 3 cites a similar decision of a Quebec court, Johansdotter
v. Canadian Pac. R. Co. ( 1914) 47 Que. S. C. 76.
67 Scott v. American Airlines Inc. (Ont. High Ct.) [1944] 3 D. L. R. 27.

The decision should have been based on the fact that all rights were terminated by release. Compare the recent decision in Texas Indemnity Ins. Co.
v. Henson (Tex. 1943) 172 S. W. (2d) II3, stating that the claim of an
injured person in one state and that of his dependents after his death in
another state are two separate actions. Cf. Note, 22 Tex. L. Rev. ( 1944) 246.
68 GooDRICH 243 n. 88; Restatement § 398, 399·
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although rarely confirmed by statutes. 69 The plaintiff may
choose freely which statute seems proper and according to
some of the authority, he may switch even after an award. 70
But apart from the constitutional issues, some courts denied
compensation proceedings when an award was given in
another state. 71
3· American Constitution
(a) Legislative power. The Supreme Court of the
United States, in a decision formulated by Mr. Justice
Brandeis, extended the Full Faith and Credit Clause of
the Constitution to legislative state acts, and applied this
thesis to workmen's compensation statutes. The decision is
generally understood as recognizing the power of only one
state to regulate compensation for accidents in the case of
a specific contract of employment. The contract was made
between residents in Vermont, which has an optional statute;
the employee was killed while working temporarily in New
Hampshire. On these facts it was held that the statute of
New Hampshire was excluded by the statute of Vermont. 72
Opinions may be divided on the problem whether for
humanitarian reasons an injured worker should have free
option among compensation statutes offering him redress, or
whether the parties should have foreknowledge of the
applicable statute, so as to be able to ascertain the risks to
be covered or the fund to which contributions should be
69 See Note, 57 Harv. L. Rev. (1943) 246.
Canada: The independence of the provincial statute is emphasized in
Desharnais v. C. P. R. [ 1942] 4 D. L. R. 6os.
The amendments in the 1948 Supplement to the Restatement except the
case where the act of the state of award precludes recovery under any other
act. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt ( 1943) 320 U. S. 430.
70 GooDRICH 238.
71 HANCOCK, Torts 228 n. 5·
72 Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper ( 1932) 286 U. S. 145. The
optional character of the Vermont Act emphasized by the defendant was
not urged.
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made. The above-mentioned decision, in its effect rather
than its reasoning, favors the latter view and joins the
modern efforts to give the main employment place preference over an accidental work assignment. Nevertheless, the
circumstances of employment and the policies of the different states are too heterogeneous for efficient regulation of
power from the standpoint of a superstate. Although a
federal compensation law, of course, would be feasible in
its sphere and with its own policy, it is inconvenient to weigh
critically the legitimacy of territorial connections which
state legislatures may find sufficient. In addition, Mr. Justice
Brandeis borrowed the test of legitimate power from the
mechanical conflicts rule of lex loci contractus instead of
emphasizing mainly the work in Vermont.
This decision was too radical to stand. The theory
of an exclusively controlling workmen's compensation
statute was soon "tactfully explained away," 73 and the
criterion was radically changed by Supreme Court decisions
influenced by Mr. Justice Stone. 74 The ancient conflicts rule
was replaced by an appraisal of the legitimate public interest which a state has in granting workmen's compensation. In a leading case, California was approved for having
applied its act, although the parties had stipulated for
Alaskan law and all facts except the place of hiring pointed
to Alaska. The main ground was equitable; it would have
been a great hardship for the worker to seek compensation
in the faraway territory, and he might have become a public
charge to California.
The California statute was again permitted to operate
in the inverse case where the injury happened in that state,
though the work was temporary and Massachusetts law
73 CHEATHAM, "Stone on Conflict of Laws," 46 Col. L. Rev. (1946) 719, 723
n. 16.
7 4 Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Commission (1935) 294 U. S 532.
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governed the employment. 75 Finally the legitimate interest
has been declared not to turn on the fortuitous circumstance
of the places of work or injury. 76 "Rather it depends upon
some substantial connection" between the jurisdiction and the
particular employment relationship.
Much effort has been spent in the American literature
to evolve fragments of a legal system out of these incoherent pieces. Perhaps it will be finally conceded that Stone's
idea is no more conclusive than that of Brandeis.
In no event, however, should we be influenced by the
numerous authors who seem to hope for better conflicts
rules to be gained from these decisions. From the point of
view of conflicts law, it is a plainly illusory proposition to
hold that the state where a worker is injured in temporary
business, as in the case of New Hampshire, has no "interest"
sufficient to apply its own law, while California has an
interest sufficient to exclude the Alaskan law. It is also immaterial that in the first case, New Hampshire seemed not
necessarily to refuse giving effect to the Vermont act under
conflicts principles, 77 and that in the other case, Massachusetts assumed exclusive applicability of its own law. 78
When two states make their administrative or judicial
machineries available to an injured workman, this may be
done for different reasons, but never really without some
reasonable consideration. Apart from the nature of a
federal state, there is neither occasion in such cases to
75 Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission
( 1939) 306 u. s. 493·
The 1948 Supplement amends § 401 of the Restatement by omitting the
power of the place of making the contract of employment to abolish tort
actions extraterritorially.
76 Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. (1947) 330 U. S. 469 at 476.
77 Mr. Justice Stone based his concurrent vote on this fact; see FREUND,
"Chief Justice Stone and the Conflict of Laws," 59 Harv. L. Rev. (1946)
1210, 1220.
7 8 This Mr. Justice Stone himself declines to consider for conflicts law, see
CHEATHAM, supra n. 73, 722, 723 n. 16.
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supervise their judgment in taking jurisdiction nor, much
less, to select a contact and impose it on all states.
Co-ordination and equitable treatment of the employer
must be secured through interstate, if not federal, arrangement. Models are contained in the numerous international
treaties. That an employer should have to pay the same
damages twice, as happened once in European practice, 79
is a rare occurrence also in this country. 80
(b) Force of awards. In the Magnolia decision, rendered
by a five to four majority, 81 it was held that a final award
of Texas, equivalent by statute to the judgment of a court
of competent jurisdiction, is under the protection of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause, irrespective of any "interest"
of other states. The state in which the contract was concluded was forced to give the award of the state of injury
exclusive force, and to reject the claim of the employee
for additional compensation. This theory treated workmen's compensation on the footing of a transitory tort
action, and failed to evaluate precisely the particulars of the
Texas procedure. 82 Although this decision has sometimes
been praised, the Supreme Court itself has recently reduced
its bearing to the least possible scope. It has been stated
recently that to be exclusive the award must be final and
conclusive, intended to preclude another judgment not only
in the state but also under the laws of other states; and
such an interpretation was held not readily to be reached. 83
79

See NEUMEYER, 2 Int. Verwaltungs R. 726.
so See ScHNEIDER's Workmen's Compensation, supra n. 1, 470.
81 Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt {1943) 320 U. S. 430.
82 CHEATHAM, "Res Judicata and the Full Faith and Credit Clause etc.,"
44 Col. L. Rev. ( 1944) 330; FREUND, supra n. 77, 1229.
83 Industrial Commission of Wisconsin v. McCartin (1947) 330 U. S. 622.
In this case, the first awards under the Illinois workmen's compensation
statute stipulated that "this settlement does not affect any rights that applicant may have [in] Wisconsin." But the majority of the Supreme Court
seems to have modified its general proposition, cf. DEAN, in 1947 Annual
Survey of American Law 61 f.
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CoNCLUSIONS

The development of conflicts law in workmen's compensation cases has amply demonstrated that the tests borrowed
from the general rules regarding tort and contracts are
equally impracticable. The choice of the applicable law lies
among the places with which the work rather than the conclusion of the contract or the accident is connected. Furthermore, European and international efforts suggest that decisive influence should be accorded the place of the employer's business supervising the employee's work. This
result entirely agrees with the most desirable principle governing labor contracts.
If the contract is made at the headquarters of the firm,
it has been claimed in the United States that with respect
to optional compensation statutes the parties are presumed
to agree on the law of that place. In Europe, a similar
preference for the law of the headquarters has been based
on the integration of the worker into the employer's organization. It would seem that the more closely the state takes
the indemnization of the workers in hand, especially by
making it a public or semipublic institution of social insurance, the more distinctly attention is turned to the mere
territorial connection of the business place to which the
workman is attached.
In the United States, this leading idea, more or less
consciously living, might well be generalized and achieve
uniformity. Even so, competition among the state laws
would remain unchecked in the various cases of temporary
employment in a state other than where the controlling
business place is situated. Whether a total elimination of
such an overlapping jurisdiction is desirable, except in the
interest of the employer, is uncertain. If complete unification
is wanted, the agreements made on the basis of the Geneva
Convention would be a natural model. So long, however,
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as no uniform statute or agreements among the states with
federal support are in existence, past experience eventually
ought to teach that judicial interference in order to define
the proper spheres of state legislation on this subject has
not proved helpful.

CHAPTER

43

Maritime Transportation of Goods
J.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Conflicts and Unification

U

NTIL the nineteenth century, the ancient modes of
carrying persons and goods on the seas and on the
highways did not cause many problems of conflict of
laws; carriage by sea because universal conceptions had
achieved a general maritime law, and carriage on land because territorial boundaries separated the laws. In modern
times, this situation has changed. The transformation of
marine commerce by powerful and costly vessels, by the
enormous increase of traffic, and the many modern innovations in communication, just when the policies of national
seclusion segregated the laws of the various countries, has
multiplied and aggravated the conflicts of law. 1 Equally
cumbersome were the legal complications arising from interstate and international operation of railways. Sensitivity to
these obstacles to commerce has been such that the unification of laws concerning carriage has been accomplished
more readily than in most other fields. Railroad transportation has been unified in the United States by federal statutes
and in almost all states of Europe by the Bern Convention
on international carriage of goods, which upon its revision
in I 924 was accompanied by a convention concerning carriage of persons and luggage. In the maritime and aeronautic fields, the technical rules of navigation have been in
1

See

BERLINGIERI,

Verso l'unificazione del diritto del mare, seconda serie

(1.933) 20.
23 I
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great degree unified; the almost universally enforced Convention of Brussels, that of Warsaw, and the Rome Convention (still in course of ratification) all mark a vigorous
impulse towards uniform private law. These and other
significant efforts await final success.
Conflicts law remains awkwardly married to a worn-out
scheme of lex loci contractus and lex loci solutionis, which,
at least apparently, does not differentiate between the manifold means of transportation, its objects, and the types of
related agreements. Similarly, the writers, as a rule, do
not attempt to consider such distinctions, despite their
indulgence in various opinions regarding the most appropriate single local connection for this whole congeries of
contracts. In fact, the most recent enactments have served
to destroy rather than to foster international uniformity.
Most discussion, judicial and literary, has been devoted
to carriage of goods in maritime cases. For this reason we
commence with this topic.
2.

Types of Contracts Involved

In the various systems of transportation, contracts are
classified differently, and even analogous types are often
given different names. If all such categories were decisive
for "characterization" m conflicts law, the rules would be
illusory.
Fortunately, there are favorable influences: traditions
inherited from a past more satisfactorily unified, similarity
of habits in the international trade, and the support afforded
by the prevalence of British shipping. Only recently have
the codes begun to recognize the main types of contracts
created by a long development. The following kinds of
contracts must be distinguished, in order to be adequately
classified in conflicts law.
(a) Lease of vessel. The Roman jurists distinguished
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the hiring of a ship, viz., of a thing, a locatio conductio rei,
from the contract of carriage, that is, for doing a job,
locatio conductio operis. 2 In the first case, there is no contract of transportation, and opinion is divided whether it
IS a maritime contract at all.
Demise. In the Anglo-American countries, the hiring of
a vessel, termed the demise charter, has been defined for
certain purposes, such as fixing the liability of the shipowner for the acts of the master and crew, or the statutory
limitation of liability. In a demise, the owner agrees to
transfer possession and control of the vessel to the charterer.3 The former remains only the "general owner" for
the period of the charter, during which the charterer, who
is to "man, victual and navigate" the vessel, is deemed to be
the owner pro hac vice. 4 This may be the case, even though
the general owner appoints and pays the wages of the
master and crew. This type of agreement is never presumed
to have been made; it is less frequent in peacetime, though
not extinct. 5 It would seem to transcend the ordinary scope
of the usual conflicts rules respecting "transportation" or
"carriage." The parties are not in the relation of carrier
and shipper.
Bareboat lease. The same is true of the transaction, well
2 In SCAEVOLA, Dig. 19,2,62 § II, when a vessel was hired for a voyage from
Cyrenaica to Aquileja and was retained after loading at the port of dispatch
for nine months, the rent for this time had to be paid by the lessee (conductor rei). In LABEO-ULPIAN, Dig. 19,2,13 § I, the skipper assumed transportation of a cargo by voyage charter (he is the conductor, i.e., operis). The
latter type included carriage of goods (eod. 13, § 2) and of persons (eod.
I

9> § 7) •

SCRUTTON, Charterparties 4; WILLISTON, 4 Contracts 3001, 3003 § 1074·
United States: Rev. Stat. § 4286, 46 U. S. C. § 186.
To the same effect, Canada: Shipping Act 1934, 24 & 25 Geo. V., c. 44,
p. 245, s. 653.
5 Banks v. Chas. Kurz Co. (D. C. E. D. Pa. 1946) 69 F. Supp. 61, 66 in
the case of the usual oral demise of lighters without motive power. It is
not at all so "very rare" as the often repeated words of Vaughan Williams,
L. J., in Herne Bay Steam Boat Co. v. Hutton [1903] 2 K. B. at 689 would
indicate. Cf. the Indices to American Maritime Cases.
3

4
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known in civil law, where a ship is leased so as to give the
lessee full nautical as well as commercial control. In the
simplest case, the vessel is not equipped for transportation
of goods, or it is delivered without master and crew, in
consideration of compensation for a term or a voyage. Such
bareboat charter, services to be furnished, is certainly a
contract alien to transportation. In the German doctrine,
it was formerly sometimes contended that all contracts
giving the charterer control of navigation should be excluded from the category of maritime contracts, 6 while most
French writers and their followers include them under
affreightment. 7
In any case, as between the two parties to a demise or
bareboat charter, the applicable law is more appropriately
determined by the conflicts rules concerning leases of movable chattels than by those concerning transportation. Of
course, if the law of the flag is invoked to cover all contracts
regarding the use of a vessel, as in recent Italian notions,
it operates also here. 8
(b) Charter party (affreightment by charter). Under
a traditional type of agreement, the shipowner furnishes the
ship as a whole, with master and crew. He agrees to deliver
the cargo in good condition, dangers of the sea excepted,
and assumes the marine risk as to the ship; the charterer
determines the ports for loading and discharging the cargo
to be delivered by him to the ship. The essentials of all
charter parties are full control of navigation by the owner
and directions for proceeding by the charterer. Although
6 German Schiffsmiete in contrast with Frachtvertrag, see PAPPENHEIM,
3 Seerecht 87; this view is abandoned in theory, see Wi.isTENOORFER, 13
Annuario Dir. Comp. (1938) I at u6.
7 DANJON, 2 Droit Marit. §§ 744 If.
LYON-CAEN et RENAULT 533 § 622 distinguished this affretement-louage
from affretement-transport, but in the treatment starting in § 627 the comprehensive concept of affreightment is underlying.
Belgium: I SMEESTERS and WINKELMOLEN § 272.
s C. N avig., Disp. Pre!. art. xo.
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oral contracts are not excluded by usage and the codes, there
is normally a written contract, originally a deed, a carta
partita (whence the name comes), at present one of the
printed standard forms of English · origin. Constructive
analysis of these forms has finally led to the assumption
that they combine elements of hiring of things and hiring
of services in a "mixed" contract. 9
The use of the ship and equipment may be granted for a
time (time charter) 10 or for a voyage. A promise of a proportional part or specific quarters in the vessel is sometimes
included in this category, where the other characteristics of
charter parties are present. It is so classified in the German
Commercial Code, § 55 7, because charter party documents
are usual in such cases. But these cases seem to have become
rare. In the United States, usually "charter" carriage is
distinguished from common carriage by the fact that the
charterer engages the whole of the ship's capacity.11
Charter parties are in wide use in many branches of
trade for reasons of organization and geographical considerations. Thus, for instance, American steel concerns
shipping ore from remote South-American ports commonly
enlarge their fleets by chartering "tramp" vessels. 12
(c) Carriage by general ship (Stiickgiiter-Frachtvertrag;
affreightment with bill of lading). Under the ordinary
contract of marine transportation, the shipmaster is under
the exclusive control of the carrier, whereas the shipper has
merely a right similar to that in rail transport of merchan9 For certain purposes of mercantile law, analysis is required for ascertaining which element prevails; see PAPPENHEIM, 3 Seerecht 87.
10 German: (Eigentlicher) Zeitfrachtvertrag, e.g., "Baltic Time Charter;"
similar names in Scandinavian and Dutch languages; French: alfretement
a temps; Italian: noleggio a tempo.
11 ROBINSON, Admiralty 593 § 83.
12 Other articles are sugar, wheat, rice, potash, bauxite, lumber, coal, oil
etc. See C. D. MACMURRAY and MALCOLM M. CREE, Charter Parties of the
World ( 1934) 4 ff.; JOHNSON-HUEBNER-WILSON, Principles of Transportation ( 1932) 467 ff., 560, 569 ff.
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dise. The contract may include conditions obligating the
carrier to load the goods in certain types of compartments,
but though stowage is not necessarily at the discretion of
the vessel, it is always under its responsibility.
The Netherlands Code, in treating this type of contract,
distinguishes tramp and line steamers/ 3 while the recent
Italian law, apart from charter parties, somewhat obscurely
differentiates transport of shipload or partial shipload from
that of identified objects. In the Russian Law of I 929 (art.
73) charter parties are contracts in which the whole vessel,
or a part of it, or identified spaces in it, are put at the disposal of the charterer, in contrast to contracts without such
conditions.
(d) Purpose of the distinction. Many further types can
be differentiated. 14 However, thus far except for time
charters, differentiation of all the variants included in
groups (b), charter party, and (c), bill of lading, has been
slow and somewhat difficult. 15 This fact may have caused
the remarkable phenomenon that in the common law and
in the Latin laws, charter parties and other forms of transportation have been prevailingly treated together under
the general term of affreightment or carriage of goods,
while German commercial law doctrine has consistently
distinguished the two above groups, the technical name of
S tuckgiitervertrag (contract relating to single packages p 6
being employed for group (c). The Brussels Convention
on bills of lading also distinguishes this latter contract
although it extends its effects to negotiated bills of lading
issued under a charter party. 17
13 C. Com. arts. 517e·517Y (special rules for carriage in line shipping) ;
52og-52ot (for carriage not by line boats).
14 This regards especially the peculiarities in the services of privately
operated or industrial carriers and the contracts, not of agency but of
transportation, made by the United States Shipping Board for governmentowned vessels.
1 5 PAPPENHEIM, 3 Seerecht 103.
16 Germany: HGB. § 556 No.2.
17 Art. I (b), see infra n. 27.
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In conflicts law, however, the two groups are quite commonly merged without any discrimination. This is true of
the United States 18 as well as of France 19 and Germany. 20
By way of exception, the Dutch Law of 1924, in the absence
of a contrary intention of the parties, applies to time charters the law of the flag, instead of the usual law of the place
of contracting. 21
Under these circumstances, it would not be suitable
further to divide the materials relating to carriage of goods
by sea. Ultimately, it will nevertheless be easy to see that
such failure to discriminate is improper. Not only must the
lease of vessels be excluded but neither time nor voyage
charters can be brought simply under the criteria appropriate to ordinary carriage by liners.
3· Carrier
"Carrier" includes the owner of the vessel and the
charterer who enters into a contract of carriage with the
shipper. 22
Private carrier. The important common law distinction
between common and private carriers has some bearing on
the application of the Harter Act and more recent federal
legislation in American courts. 23 But no consequence is
known to have been drawn in conflicts law from the distinction.
Forwarding agent (French ((commissionaire," German
uSpediteur"). The services of independent merchants operating as intermediaries in effectuating transportation, are
18

Cf. MINOR § 169; BEALE § 346.7; see also DICEY, Rule 165.
BATIFFOL 257 § 284 implies this.
2 0 2 FRANKENSTEIN 573; NUSSBAUM, D. JPR. 281.
21 The Netherlands: C. Com. art. 518g.
22 Convention of Brussels on bills of lading, art. 1 (a).
23 On this difficult subject, see as to the Harter Act, AuSTIN T. WRIGHT,
"Private Carriers and the Harter Act," 74 U. of Pa. L. Rev. (1926) 6o2;
and with respect to the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of 1936, RoBINSON,
Admiralty 506 f.; Note, 54 Harv. L. Rev. ( 1941) at 667 and n. 33; KNAUTH,
Ocean Bills of Lading 144·
19
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brought under very different categories in the various systems. Moreover, doubts exist almost everywhere concerning their treatment insofar as the rules of agency and the
rules on carriage conflict. It would be disastrous if the
conflicts rule should follow the variety of these domestic
characterizations.
A model of international characterization may be found
in the simple words of Scrutton, L. J., interpreting the concept of "carrier" for the specific narrow purpose of the
Convention as one which "might include a freight agent or
forwarding agent or carriage contractor in cases where by
issuing a bill of lading he enters into a contract of carriage
with the shipper." 24
Whenever, we might say, any person, not a servant of
either party, contracts with the shipper for carriage, whether
by his own or another's services, the conflicts rules involving
contracts of transportation ought to apply exclusive of
those regarding agency inasmuch as they lead to different
results.
4· Transportation Contract and Bill of Lading
It is elementary to distinguish between the contract of
affreightment and the obligations flowing from a bill of
lading. In theory, the relationships in the two sets of obligations are so differently shaped that two entirely different
conflicts rules seem to be required. In practice, however,
the picture appears modified. In the great majority of cases,
there is either a written contract or a bill of lading, but
not both. The former in almost every case involves a
charter party, while in the modern conveyance of goods
bills of lading are almost unfailingly used and usually incorporate the contract of carriage. 25 The Hague Rules
24

25

ScRUITON, Charterparties 481.
PAPPENHEIM, 3 Seerecht 221: failure to issue a bill of lading may

Cf.
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26

adopted in the Brussels Convention of 1924 illustrate the
situation. They envisage in the first place the rights based
on bills of lading issued in connection with ordinary carriage but also include, in the case of a charter party, bills
issued to a charterer and endorsed to a holder. They exclude
the relationship created by the charter party itself. 27
Although the systems vary in the details of the protection granted to an innocent holder, as for instance, whether
the bill of lading constitutes prima facie or conclusive evidence, the bill everywhere dominates the relation between
the carrier and a consignee who is a holder in due course.
It follows that the bill of lading must prevail also for the
purpose of conflicts law. Instinctively, the American and
many other courts, as we shall see, are anxious to subordinate the law of the affreightment contract to that of the
port where the bill of lading is issued. They endeavor also
to eliminate such conflicts as may arise.
Transfer of title in goods by transfer of the bill of lading
is not in question here. In regulating this function, the law
governing the creation and effect of bills of lading is subordinate to the law of the situs of the goods but never to
the law governing the contract.
II.
1.

MAIN SYSTEMS OF CoNFLICTS LAw

Choice of Law by the Parties

Remarkably, apart from restrictions on stipulations exonerating the carrier from liability/ 8 the usual attempts
occur when goods are shipped on the account of the shipowner, in case of
urgent dispatch and in coastwise shipping; 1 VAN HASSELT 363 f.
26 Hague Rules, art. I (b); in the United States, Carriage of Goods by
Sea Act, 1936, 46 U. S. C. A. § 1301 (b). The same exclusion of charter
parties in the relation between shipowner and charterer was assumed for
the Harter Act, see ROBINSON, Admiralty 506. This subject does not include
of course the common phenomenon that charterers issue bills of lading to
their customers.
27 On this situation, cf. the cases cited by PooR, Charter Parties § 25, and
in England, The Njegos [ 1936] P. 90, 155 L. T. R. 109.
2s Vol. II p. 421.

SPECIAL OBLIGATIONS
to restrict the efficacity of party autonomy in the determination of the general law of the contract, are all but absent.
Probably due to the age-old conceptions of maritime intercourse, an appropriate stipulation or, in the absence of
express agreement, the so-called presumable intention of
the parties, universally justifies application of foreign law. 29
Even the Soviet Maritime Law expressly states the right of
the parties to modify the normal conflicts solutions; although the imperative Soviet rules are excepted, this express permission is in full contrast to the general Soviet
legislation. 30
This result is exactly the opposite of what the adversaries
of party autonomy expect of a contract bound to such
stringent provisions as those contained in the Harter Act
and the Hague Rules.
United States

2.

Not the law of the flag. The vast majority of American
cases involving carriage are concerned with interstate transportation by rail or water. The simultaneous treatment of
land and maritime shipments, therefore, serves to explain
why the law of the flag has never been stressed. 31 The fact
29

See e.g.:
United States: The Ferncliff, infra n. 3 5; Roland M. Baker Co. v. Brown
(I9I3) 2I4 Mass. I96, IOO N. E. I025 (express clause, in contrast with the
law governing the endorsement).
Belgium: I SMEESTERS and WINKELMOLEN 39I § 277.
England: Lloyd v. Guibert (I865) L. R. I Q. B. II5, I3 L. T. R. 602.
Denmark: Trib. marit. Copenhague (May I7, I889) I6 Rev. Autran
( I900-0I) 249•
France: LYON-CAEN et RENAULT 785 § 844; RIPERT, 2 Droit Marit. 422.
Germany: 68 RGZ. 209; I22 RGZ. 3I6; ScHAPS 305.
Greece: 2 STREIT-V ALLINDAS 2 54 and n. 42.
Italy: C. N avig. Disp. Pre!. art. IO; C. C. ( I942) Disp. Pre!. art. 25; SCERNI
I93·
C6digo Bustamante, art. 185 cf. 285; cf. BusTAMANTE, Der. Int. Priv.
(ed. 3) 332 § I449·
30 Soviet Maritime Law of I929, art. 5; FREUND, Das Seeschiffahrtsrecht der
Sowjetunion (I93o) 39, 58.
On the restrictions by public policy, see infra p. 267.
31 The decision in The Titania (D. C. S. D. N. Y. I883) I9 Fed. IOI, I03,

MARITIME TRANSPORTATION OF GOODS

241

that American ports were prevailingly served by foreign
vessels may have contributed to this same result that in no
case has the law of the flag been decisive. The most influential decision of the Supreme Court investigated the law
of the flag in the light of a thorough review of the English
cases and flatly rejected it. 32
General maritime law? In two significant cases of old
standing, the federal courts resorted to the general maritime law as administered in the United States, in each case
on the ground of the presumed intention of the parties. In
the first case, the domicil of the shipowner in Baltimore was
expressly discarded; it was deemed of no importance since
local connections of the carriage were at a considerable
distance. 33 In the second case, the fact that the contract was
concluded in New Orleans was declared immaterial because the contract was between an American and an Englishman for an ocean voyage of an English ship (to Europe) .~
In other decisions extending to a recent date, "our general
maritime law" or "mercantile law" has been applied in lieu
of foreign law recognized as governing, but not proved in
the suit. 35 This is but another name for the lex fori. 36 No
other use seems to have been made of this device, although
4

is nominally based on the English law of the flag, but at the same time shipment in England is emphasized.
The ground on which British law would have been applied in Franklin
Fire Ins. Co. v. Royal Mail Steam Packet Co. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1931)
54 F. {2d) 807, if it had been proved, is unknown. The cases cited in
2 WHARTON 1067 n. 14 for occasional application of the law of the flag are
exclusively English.
32 Liverpool etc. Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co. {1889) 129 U. S. 397,
449-453. See also The Brantford City (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1886) 29 Fed. 373,
381, 384 {defending general maritime law against the law of the flag).
33 Naylor v. Baltzell {C. C. Md. 1841) 17 Fed. Cas. 1254 No. 10,061.
34 Watts v. Camors {1885) 115 U.S. 353·
35 The Ferncliff (D. C. Md. 1938) 22 F. Supp. 728, 1938 Am. Marit. Cas.
206; Blumenthal Import Corp. v. Brocklebank (C. C. A. 3d 1945) 148 F.
(2d) 727, 1945 Am. Marit. Cas. 635; The President Monroe (1935) 156
Misc. 432, 286 N. Y. Supp. 990.
36The President Monroe (1935) 286 N.Y. Supp. 990·
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admiralty jurisdiction covers a very large field 37 and commonly is said to imply federallaw. 38
Evidently, the above-mentioned old decisions are no
longer authoritative. As the editor of Wharton has noted,
whereas once the courts resorted to general maritime law
in order to eliminate foreign law, it is now possible for the
law of the place of contracting (or what they so term)
to govern, since all matters of public policy are being taken
care of by the growing body of Congressional statutes on
maritime law. 39
Lex loci contractus. Although the Harter Act and the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act ( 1936) apply to inward as
well as outward maritime carriage, this extension of scope
does not affect the problem of what law governs a contract
of transportation in general. Characteristically, the Pomerene Act of 19 r6 has never been applied to bills of lading
issued abroad for transportation to the United States. In
fact, apart from the questions of liability imperatively
regulated by the Acts of 1893 and 1936, it is commonly
recognized that the law of the place of contracting has
fundamental force in all contracts of transportation according to the great majority of American decisions. However,
more accurate inquiry is necessary. Just how strong is the
rule? And if the ancient approach through a general contracts rule is no longer attractive, is the rule in this particular field supported by special considerations? No direct
answer can be expected from the decisions; they are seldom
articulate on policy. 40
37 James Richardson & Sons v. Conners Marine Co. (C. C. A. 2d 1944)
141 F. (2d) 226. On the discretionary jurisdiction on a charter party between
foreigners made abroad, see The Wilja, Dreyfus v. Wipu (C. C. A. 2d 1940)
II3 F. (2d) 646, and for nonadmiralty cases, Kaufman v. John Block & Co.
(D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1945) 6o F. Supp. 992.
38 ROBINSON, Admiralty 27 § 5·
39 2 WHARTON 1069 f.
40 As BATIFFOL 240 n. 1 notes, the cases, excepting two named by him, even
express their solutions as though they were simply applicable to any kind
of contract.
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The original authority for the application of lex loci contractus, it is submitted, is a decision dating from 1843,
which justifies itself merely by the allegedly well-settled
general rule, citing three cases not involving transportation.41 Since then, this test constantly appears as the normal
connection, sometimes as a "strong presumption," not easily
rebuttable. 42 But close inv'estigation reveals additional
factors. Attempts at such an analysis have already been
made by Wharton, whose result, however, that the true
criterion adopted by the courts was the domicil of the
shipowner, has been refuted by the editor of his own work,
Parmele. 43 The latter suggested the importance of the commencement of the voyage. 44 Reviewed at present, the decisions of the last hundred years demonstrate that in the
opinion of the courts the presumable intention of the parties
governs and that this normally points to the place where,
in the usual phraseology, "the contract was made." More
accurately, the applicable law depends upon one of the following four situations:
( i) In most leading cases, the place of contracting is
identical with the port of dispatch. 45 Statements of American courts may be found purporting to apply a supposedly
well-settled rule: "The contract of carriage was entered
into in Roumania and performance began there, but was to
41
Hale v. New Jersey Steam Navig. Co. (1843) 15 Conn. 538, 546, 39 Am.
Dec. 398.
42 Grand v. Livingston (1896) 4 App. Div. 589, 38 N. Y. Supp. 490 (the
case belongs to group (i) infra.
43 2 WHARTON 1055·
44 2 WHARTON 1063, 1072.
45 Liverpool etc. Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co. (1889) 129 U.S. 397; The
Majestic (C. C. A. 2d 1894) 6o Fed. 624; O'Regan v. Cunard Steamship
Co. (1894) 160 Mass. 356, 35 N. E. 107o; China Mutual Ins. Co. v. Force
(1894) 142 N. Y. 90, 36 N. E. 874; M. & T. Trust Co. v. ExportS. S. Corp.
(1932) 143 Misc. I, 256 N. Y. Supp. 590 (still stressing only the place of
contracting); The Iristo (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1941) 43 F. Supp. 29, 1941 Am.
Marit. Cas. 1744, aff'd (C. C. A. 2d 1943) 137 F. (2d) 619, 1943 Am. Marit.
Cas. 1044, cert. denied, 320 U. S. 8o2.
Interstate: The Henry B. Hyde (D. C. N. D. Cal. 1897) 82 Fed. 681.
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be completed in this country, and therefore the contract 1s
governed by the law of Roumania." 46
( ii) In some cases, the law of the flag coincides with the
above law. 47
(iii) In others, the law applied was that of the port of
dispatch alone, expressly without reference to the lex loci
contractus. 48
(iv) In a few decisions, other points of the journey arc
relied upon, these being regarded as places where performance occurs.
(a) In such connection, the place where the goods are
damaged or lost appears decisive in several cases. 49 In one
case, expressly, in others presumably, the court was anxious
to reach the law of the forum. This view ought to be entirely
46 The Constantinople (D. C. E. D. N. Y. 1926) 15 F. (2d) 97, 98, concerned with a passenger's contract but citing the Liverpool Case, supra n. 45·
47 The Carib Prince (D. C. E. D. N. Y. 1894) 63 Fed. 266; The Titania
(D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1883) 19 Fed. 101; The Frey (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1899)
92 Fed. 667. The first two decisions apply English law, the third, French
(though restricted by the Harter Act). The Dartford, Warren v. Britain
S. S. Co. (C. C. A. 1st 1938) 1938 Am. Marit. Cas. 1548, applied English
law to a bill of lading issued to the charterer; in addition the English form
of a charter party was used.
4 SThe Pehr Ugland (D. C. E. D. Va. 1921) 271 Fed. 340; The Cypria
(D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1942) 46 F. Supp. 816, 1942 Am. Marit. Cas. 985, aff'd,
137 F. (2d) 326, 1943 Am. Marit. Cas. 947,-both expressly rejecting the
foreign lex loci contractus. In the Cypria Case, the court could, however, rely
on the express incorporation of the American Carriage of Goods by Sea Act.
49 Most remarkable was the decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
in Hughes v. Pennsylyania R. Co. (1902) 202 Pa. 222, 51 At!. 990 invalidating a New York exemption clause under the law of the forum, a decision
strongly criticized by PARMELE in 2 Wharton 1056 n. I, 1060 n. 2, 1063 n. 6,
but followed in a railway case, Zahloot v. Adams Exp. Co. (1912) 50 Pa.
Super. Ct. 238, where an exemption clause of Pennsylvania was declared
valid under the law of New York, the place of loss of the goods by negligence
in delivery.
Analogous, Carstens Packing Co. v. Southern Pacific (1910) 58 Wash. 239,
expressly applying lex fori; The Steel Inventor (D. C. Md. 1940) 35 F.
Supp. 986 under the peculiar circumstance that the bill of lading referred
to the Indian Act (as of dispatch) as well as to the United States Act (as
of destination); the court chose the latter, for a loss by unloading in Baltimore. Louis-Dreyfus v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd. (C. C. A. 2d 1930) 43 F.
(zd) 824 reaches a similar result by adopting the splitting theory of the
Restatement. This view is in the minority, cf. e.g., The Miguel di Larrinaga
(D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1914) 217 Fed. 678. It is expressly rejected in Carpenter
v. U.S. Exp. Co. (1912) 120 Minn. 59, 139 N. W. I54·
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abandoned; it is due to a confusion between contract and
tort.
(b) In one case, 50 a vessel went from India to New York;
part of the cargo was shipped in Colombo, Ceylon, and part
in British India. Under the circumstances, the court discarded the Indian Carriage of Goods by Sea Act and without
further motivation applied American law, i.e., the law of
the forum, which was also the law of the port of destination.
(c) Apart from federal or New York public policy at
the American port of destination with respect to clauses
limiting carriers' liability, 51 certain special problems have
been considered, here as in other countries, as most closely
attached to the port of arrival. 52
3· Great Britain
For a long time, numerous Continental writers have been
accustomed to point to an English rule that carriage is
governed by the law of the flag the vessel flies. 53 They still
regard this as an important confirmation of their analogous
postulate. But the English authors who have contributed
to this mistake have been more cautious. 54
In fact, the English decisions have applied the law of
the flag to the extent of the authority given by the shipowner to the master so as to subject the shipowner as well
as the cargo owner to liability. 55 Apart from this, there is
50 Duche v. Brocklebank (D. C. E. D. N. Y. 1929) 35 F. (2d) 184. Against
this argumentation, see infra p. 264.
5 1 Treated at length, Vol. II Ch. 33·
2
5 See infra Ch. 44 n. 94·
5 3 This same mistake also happened to Duff, }., in the Canadian Supreme
Court, in Richardson v. "Burlington" [1930] 4 D. L. R. 527, [1931] S.C. R.
76, while the majority emphasized the lex loci contractus and the domicil of
the parties, the result being the same. 3 jOHNSON 475 hence should not have
made an exception from the lex loci contractus prescribed in art. 8 of the
Quebec C. C.
54 Especially, FooTE 429 and DICEY 687 Rule 166.
55 The Karnak ( r869) L. R. 2 P. C. 505, and The Gaetano and Maria
(r882) 7 P. D. r, 137. Formerly, Duranty v. Hart (1863) 2 Moo. P. C. Cas.
(N. S.) 289, {r864) B. & L. 253, 260, 272, invoked "the ordinary maritime
law," in the Privy Council "the General Maritime Law."
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only one case of somewhat doubtful bearing. In its famous
decision of I 8 6 5, the Court of Exchequer Chamber extended the law of the flag to the question whether the charterer and cargo owner who had paid the deficiency amount
on a bottomry bond burdening ship, freight, and cargo,
could recover from the shipowner. 56 This not only involved
the master's authority to issue a bottomry bond on the
cargo but concerned also the liability to bear the burden
so caused in the internal relationship between the owner and
the cargo. It seems, therefore, a little optimistic for English
judges subsequently to reduce the precedent of Lloyd v.
Guibert to "such contracts as the master may be driven to
make by necessity in the course of the voyage." 57 In addition, the decision of the Exchequer Chamber proclaimed
a far-reaching rule subjecting all liability for sea damage
and its incidents to the law of the flag, and an advocate of
this solution has contended that it could not be overruled
by a decision of the Court of Appeals. 58
Nevertheless, it is quite obvious that the English courts
do not feel bound by the rash pretensions of this old decision. This has been formally stated by Lord Merriman:
"As regards the contract of affreightment as a whole, there
is no necessary presumption that the law of the flag applies."59 Thus, not even the often alleged presumption,
easily displaced by counterinferences, 60 exists. This result
is also amply supported by the cases, as pointed out by the
56 Lloyd v. Guibert ( 1865) L. R. 1 Q. B. us, 128. Under the French law
of the flag, the shipowner was freed by abandon of the vessel; under the
other laws involved, he was not.
57 Lord (then Sir Boyd) Merriman, in The Njegos [ 1936] P. 90 at 107,
on the ground of the distinction made by the Court of Appeals in The
Industrie [ 1894] P. 58. The opinion on the proper law is given, although
the parties did not expressly request it (p. 107) "in case it may be of
assistance" to them.
58 I forget the name.
59 Supra n. 57·
60 M. WoLFF, Priv. Int. Law 441 § 416.
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Supreme Court of the United States as early as 1889. 61
From the time when general maritime law was replaced
by conflicts law, the English courts in reality have never
considered any basic test other than the intention of the
parties. It was most emphatically invoked in Lloyd v.
Guibert itself and despite this precedent in all later cases. 62
And in the other celebrated carriage case, In re Missouri,
where the English law of the flag was applied, this was
regarded as expressly intended, being supported by the
terms of the contract and of the bill of lading as well as
by the English port of destination; the Court of Appeals
confirmed the decision on these grounds only. 63 The lack
of preference for any fixed criterion has occasioned the
complaint of an English admiralty judge tha.t "there is
abundance of authority for practically every proposition
that has been put forward." 64 Nevertheless, there is a certain pattern in the prevailing decisions.
Courts have relied:
( i) On the English forms used in the charter party or
the bill of lading. 65 Some decisions have expressly rejected
inferences from the flag 66 and disregarded the place of
contracting. 67 Others have mentioned only the English
language or English documents in connection with the English port of destination. 68 It is recognized in England as
6l Liverpool etc. Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co. {1889) 129 U. S. 397 at
449"453·
62 See esp. Lindley, L. J., in Chartered Mercantile Bank of India v.
Netherlands India Steam Nav. Co. {1883) 10 Q. B. D. 521 at 540.
63 In re Missouri Steamship Co. (1889) 42 Ch. D. 321.
64 Langton, J., in The Adriatic [x93x] P. 241 at 244.
65 The lndustrie [ 1894] P. 58, 73; Aktieselskab August Freuchen v. Steen
Hansen (I9I9) I Ll. L. Rep. 393; The Adriatic [I93I) P. 24I; The Njegos
[ I936] P. 90, 106 f.
66 The Industrie and Adriatic cases, supra n. 65.
67 The Adriatic and Aktieselskab etc. cases, supra n. 65.
68 The Wilhelm Schmidt {I87I) I Asp. Marit. Cas. (N. S.) 82; The San
Roman (I872) L. R. 3 A. & E. 583, 592; semble, Woodley v. Mitchell (1883)
I I Q. B. D. 47, 51. The first two decisions have been criticized insofar as
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well as everywhere else that language itself is no useful
criterion. Such references presumably meant and at least
today would have to be understood to mean the English
style of maritime affreightment.
At least in one case the English form alone seems to
have been decisive. 69
A judge of the Exchequer Court of Canada has applied
American law, that is, the Harter Act, to a carriage of
grain shipped from Buffalo, N. Y., to Montreal on a Norwegian ship on the ground that the contract was made in
the United States and contained the "Jason Clause" necessary in this country but not necessary under Canadian or
English law. 70
(ii) On. the law of the place of contracting, either because the contract was made in England between domiciled
parties or agents, 71 or simply because the bill of lading was
issued in an English port. 72
The preceding review of leading and other cases may
show a certain preference for the application of English
law, but they favor the lex fori even less than most other
they involve agency of the master by necessity, which should have been
determined by the flag, see editors of SCRUTTON, Charterparties 24.
69 Aktieselskab etc., supra n. 65.
70 Bunge North American Grain Corp. and Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia v.
SS. Skarp [ 1932] Ex. C. R. 212. In regard to the (plaintiff) fire insurance
association, it is added that its insurance certificates contain an express
reference to the Harter Act. The law of the flag is eliminated.
71 Chartered Mercantile Bank of India v. Netherlands India Steam Navigation Co. (1883) 10 Q. B. D. 521 (English port of dispatch and English
parties); The Industrie [1894] P. 58, 72 (charter party made in London
between an English broker of the German shipowner and a London
charterer, in the usual form of English charter parties) ; The Njegos [1936]
P. 90 (charter party made in London in the "Centrocon" form between the
English agent of a Yugoslav steamship company and the English branch
of a French firm, agent of an Argentinian shipper); the bill of lading
follows the presumable law intended in the charter party.
72 The St. Joseph (1933) 45 Ll. L. Rep. 180, 28 Revue Dor (1933) 180:
the shipowner contracts by accepting the goods against the bill of lading.
Hence where this operation occurs, there the contract is made.
Canada: Melady v. Jenkins S. S. Co. (1909) 18 0. L. R. 251 (standard
of pounds contained in a bushel).
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countries. They do not justify in the least the astounding
pronouncement of Dicey that a contract for the carriage
of persons or goods from or to England or by a British ship
is prima facie governed by English law, 73 a statement that
may have stimulated much particularism in other countries.
In the light of a comparison with other courts, the English
follow policies remarkably analogous to the general habits
of courts elsewhere.
4· France and Belgium

Many decisions of the Court of Cassation and the lower
courts have with unusual consistency applied the law of the
place of contracting. 14 This covers not only the form of
charter parties and bills of lading but also the performance
of the contract. 75 Originally this rule was declared imperative, 76 but it persists as a regular conflicts rule, susceptible
of being replaced even by a presumable intention of the
parties. 77
In a series of older cases, it is true, in France and still
more so in Belgium, the law of the port where the goods
arrive or should arrive, has enjoyed a more or less wide
application. 78 It seems certain, however, that this tendency
DICEY 686 ff.
Cass. civ. (Feb. 23, 1864) D. 1864.1.166, S. 1864.1.385; Cass. civ. (June
12, 1894) D. 1895.1.161, Clunet 1894, 8o6, 10 Revue Dor 147; Cass. req.
repeatedly; Cass. civ. {Dec. 5, 1910) S. I9II.1.129, Revue 19II, 395, Clunet
1912, II56 {on principle); for the many decisions of lower courts, see
RIPERT, 2 Droit Marit. §§ 1453 ff.; 5 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT 785 ff. §§ 843 ff.;
1 Repert. 275-278; VAN SLOOTEN 17-22. Recently, Trib. com. Seine (Jan. 22,
1942) Nouv. Revue 1943, 77 applied the French law of the place of contracting as a matter of course.
Belgium: App. Bruxelles (Feb. 6, 1900) 16 Rev. Autran {1900-01) 694;
Trib. com. Antwerp (July 2, 1906) Jur. Port Anvers 1906.1.307; (Jan. 30,
1907) id. 1907, 180 etc.
75 See BATIFFOL § 284.
76 Cass. civ. (Feb. 23, 1864) supra n. 74; cf. BATIFFOL 258.
7 7 Cass. civ. (Dec. 5, 1910) supra n. 74·
78 The law of the port of actual discharge was proclaimed as a rule governing performance in Antwerp (Jan. 14, 1891) Jur. Port Anvers 1893.1.19;
73

74
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has been overcome, and the place of performance has significance merely as a device for special problems. 79
The reasons for emphasizing the place of contracting
are inarticulate in the decisions, since the rules directly derive
from the inherited general contracts principle. But the
writers are conscious that this place is usually identical with
the place where the goods are dispatched. If in rare cases
the two places differ, the courts have been divided, but in
the opinion of the lawyers expert in commercial law, the
port of lading has been preferred. 80 The contrary choice of
law is not supported by a decision of 18 8 5 181 although it
declared that the contract was completed in Norway by
acceptance of an offer; in fact, Norwegian law was also
indicated by the Norwegian flag and, above all, because
the vessel was chartered for a transport from Norway to
England.
The only significant doubt concerns the case where the
parties are of common nationality. This the older writers
were inclined to emphasize. 82 But the practical inconveniences of discriminating among customers according to their
nationality are particularly pronounced when goods are
shipped by the same vessel or on the same voyage. 83 There
is no case supporting such exceptional treatment. 84
App. Gent (May 2, I90I) Clunet I902, 390, I6 Rev. Autran (I9QO-OI)
842 (as dated April 27, I90I); a very faulty decision, 2 FRANKENSTEIN
5I5 n. 66; Trib. com. Antwerp (Jan. 7, I903) I8 Revue Autran (I902-o3) 901.
79 See infra Ch. 44 pp. 28I-283.
8 FROMAGEOT, I8 Revue Autran ( I902-03) 754 f.; 5 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT
792 § 85o; RIPERT, 2 Droit Marit. 423 f. § I465; VAN SLOOTEN 30. Contra:
CRouvE:s, I Repert. 268 n. I8 for the sake of the "general principle."
81 App. Douai (Nov. 10, I885) I Revue Autran (I885-86) 360.
82 I FOELIX §§ 83, 96; I FIORE § I I4; WEISS, 4 Traite 355, and others.
83 Thus the experts on the subject, FROMAGEOT, I8 Revue Autran (I902-03)
749; 5 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT § 848.
84 Of no concern in this connection is Trib. com. Rauen (April 23, I888)
4 Revue Autran (I888-89) 3I, cited by CRouvE:s, I Repert. 267 § I3, where
the parties also signed a bill of lading in their country.

°
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5· Germany
In this field, the German courts have rarely employed
their theory of splitting the contract. 85 But they have deduced from their principle of lex loci solutionis the rule that
maritime affreightment contracts of all kinds are governed
by the law of the port of destination. This rule has been
claimed to possess the widest possible scope. 86 Nevertheless,
after the practice of the Reichsgericht had been subjected
to stringent criticism, 87 experience also considerably modified this questionable theory. At present, the force of the
principle may be regarded as seriously challenged, despite
repeated contrary assertions in the German and international literature.
This does not include, of course, the application of special
laws to certain problems, e.g., of the law of the port of
dispatch to questions connected with lading, but is the
result of actual replacement of the official criterion. Often
enough, the contract has been subjected to a law other than
that of the port of destination:
( i) Contracting by ship brokers or other agents in London who use an English charter party form has consistently
been recognized as indicating submission to English law, 88
quite as in the English case of The lndustrie. This is not
controverted by the fact that a contract of carriage made
in London by the London branch of a Hamburg firm with
Such a case is RG. (May 22, 1897) 39 RGZ. 65.
ROHG. (May go, 1879) 25 ROHGE. 192; RG. (March 21, x88g) 9
RGZ. 51; (May 25, x889) 25 RGZ. 104. 107; (Oct. 24, 1891) 49 Seuff. Arch.
No. 36; (May 2, 1894) 34 RGZ. 72, 78; and other old decisions; RG. (July
8, 1933) IPRspr. 1933, 51 (principle).
87 2 BAR 219 n. 82; id., Int. Handelsrecht 439; RIPERT, 2 Droit Marit. 426
§ 1468; 2 FRANKENSTEIN 517 f.
88 RG. (Jan. 5, x887) 19 RGZ. 33 (English law); OLG. Hamburg (Jan.
30, 1893) 14 Hans. GZ. 1893 HBI. 301, 4 Z. int. R. (1894) 353 (English
law); RG. (April 4, 1908) 68 RGZ. 203, 209 (form of the Rio Tinto Company, Ltd. in London for its usual ore shipping from Huelva, Spain) ; RG.
(Nov. 24, 1928) 122 RGZ. 316 (English law, intended by public policy based
on HGB. § 614).
85
86
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the London broker of another Hamburg firm was determined under the German law. The form employed was
printed in Hamburg, though in English, without references
to English law, as was the usual document of the steamship
agent in Hamburg whose name was carried at the head. 89
In one case, where a German form of a Nitrate charter
party was used in a contract made in Germany, German
law was applied, with the excuse that the port of destination, to be determined by the charterer, was uncertain. 90
In another case, a charter party made in Germany concerning a voyage starting in Germany was regarded without
hesitation as subject to German law. 91
(ii) When persons of common nationality contract in
their own country, the Reichsgericht is satisfied with their
intention to have such country's law applied. 92
(iii) When an English ship was chartered in a German
port for a voyage to Vladivostok, German law was applied. 93
The place of contracting and dispatch thus prevailed over
the port of destination. In another case, the place of contracting and the nationality of the shipowner were theoretically mentioned as criteria. 94
(iv) Other exceptions have been unavoidable when the
89

RG. (Oct. 27, 1904) Hans. GZ. 1905 HBI. No. 28, 15 Z. int. R. (1905)

293-297·

9oRG. (May 6, 1912) Leipz. Z. 1912, 548.
RG. (Jan. 2, 1911) 75 RGZ. 95· The ship was English and the destination Vladivostok.
92RG. (Sept. 27, 1884) 13 RGZ. 122 (German law); (April 29, 1903)
Hans. GZ. 1903 HBI. Nos. 102, 229, 231, 20 Revue Autran (1904-05) So
(English law; also the flag was English; English law implicit, although the
right of the German holder of the bill of lading is distinguished); (Dec. 14,
1910) JW. 1911, 225, 22 Z. int. R. (1912) 182; 24 id. (1914) 319 (German
law; also the port of destination was German); (Oct. 5, 1932) 137 RGZ. 301
(German law; German parties, through bill from a German place to
another German place via Holland).
93 RG. (Jan. 2, 1911) 75 RGZ. 95, 96, affirming OLG. Hamburg (Feb. 10,
1910) Hans. GZ. 1910 HBI. No. 76, correctly commented on by BATIFFOL
253 n. 2 against 2 FRANKENSTEIN 514.
94 OLG. Hamburg (Feb. 13, 1934) Hans. GZ. 1934 Part B, 303 No. 94-.
IPRspr. 1934, 82 No. 38.
91
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port of destination is uncertain. In the very frequent case
where the port of destination is indicated optionally so as
to include several places situated in different countries, such
as a port in the United Kingdom or on the Continent between Le Havre and Hamburg, or on the North American
and Canadian coast, not less than six solutions have appeared.95 No port of destination is given in time charter
contracts; the port of dispatch or the flag must substitute.
Forwarding agents. German law accentuates the particular nature of freight agents contracting with carriers in
their own name, in contrast with selling and buying agents
or carriers. It \s noteworthy that again the application of
lex loci solutionis raises doubt. For the place where a Spediteur is to perform his duties to the shipper is in one view
where he accepts and dispatches the goods, 96 and in another
his commercial domicil. 97
6. The Nether lands
The Law of 1924 amending the Commercial Code on
the occasion of introducing the Hague Rules sought to
enlarge and assure its own force.
The law declares a great number of its prov1s10ns as
compulsory for all ships leaving a Dutch port and with a
certain exception regarding clauses of exemption, even for
ships destined for Dutch ports. 98 In addition, charters are
subjected to certain provisions if the ship flies the Dutch
95 SCHAPS n. 26 before § 556 rejects connection with five advocated places,
viz., the presumable port of destination, the port of distress, the order port,
the place of contracting, and the domicil of the debtor, and accepts the law
of the flag.
96 RG. (Dec. 5, 1896) 38 RGZ. 194; Warn. Rspr. 1925, No. 33; STAUBGADOW in 4 Staub (ed. 1933) 588 § 407 n. 24 (where also two opinions are
reported on the question concerning the place where the goods are redeliverable on request of the shipper).
97 OLG. Kalmar (Feb. 12, 1914) 39 Els. Loth. J. Z. 603 as cited in
LEWALD 220. LEHMANN in Di.iringer-Hachenburg § 383 n. VII.
98 C. Com. (Wetbook van Koophandel) arts. 517d, 517Y, 52ot.
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flag even though they carry freight entirely outside of the
Kingdom. 99 Only time charters are allowed to change this
effect by selecting a foreign law. 100 This attitude exceeds
even the maritime reservations of the United States laws,
and in its extraterritorial scope covers duties newly imposed
by the law.
Nevertheless, even this exercise of public policy is an
exception and not the main rule involving carriage. 101 So
far as can be seen, the courts have quietly continued to apply
the customary principles of conflicts law. 102 If the parties
have not expressly agreed on an applicable law, their socalled intention is sought. The foremost theoretical criterion
has remained the place of contracting, which, however, is
used in at least two combinations, viz., ( i) when the parties
are of the same nationality and contract in their country, 103
or ( ii) when a charter party is signed in London by the
parties or their authorized agents, with English forms, the
forms being more important than other criteria. 104
9 ~ Arts. 5 I 8g, 52of.
1oo Art. 5I8g.
101 Informative: Rb. Amsterdam (June I9, I93I) W. I24IO, N. }. I932,
I77; I VAN HASSELT 4I4·
102 See the long lists in I VAN HASSELT 36Iff.
103 Rb. Rotterdam (March I5, I922) N. J. I923, 245, 248: bill of lading,
the cargo was received in the United States on a United States-owned vessel,
American law. Rb. Rotterdam (Feb. 23, I932) The Aslang, W. I2537, 28
Revue Dor ( I933) 370: charter party concluded in Paris between the Paris
agent of the Danish shipowner and a French company, French law; Rb.
Amsterdam (Dec. 23, I932) N. }. I933 1 953: English insurance company suing
a Dutch carrier for damages is barred by Dutch limitation of action because
the insured shipper was a Netherlander, evidently contracting in Holland.
In Rb. Amsterdam (June I9, I931) supra n. 101, Dutch law applied, as the
Dutch parties contracted in the Netherlands for a Dutch vessel destined for
a Dutch port.
104
Hof s'Gravenhage (Nov. 14, 1913) W. 9615, N. }. 1914, 429; id. (June
19, 1914) N. }. 19I4, 1256; Rb. Rotterdam (Dec. 14, 1928) N. }. 1930, 622:
only the carrier was English, the charterer being the Soviet Corn Export
Co., Ltd. in Moscow, but the ship was English and both charter and bills
of lading were in English style. Rb. Rotterdam (}an. 14, 1929) N. }. 1929,
1361, reversed on other grounds, App. Hague (April 25, 1930) N. }. 1930,
I I I I : the captain of a United States-owned vessel letting it while in Antwerp
harbor to an Antwerp firm for a voyage from Antwerp to a British port;
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7· C6digo Bustamante
The C6digo Bustamante distinguishes between two types.
Contracts concluded by a carrier under his own conditions
which the customer may only "accept totally," fall under
the rule that "contracts of adhesion" are subject to the law
of the carrier (art. I 8 5).
An affreightment not being of this category is governed
by the law of the place from which the goods are dispatched
(art. 2 8 5). But "acts of performance" are placed under
the law of the intended place of performance (art. 28 5
par. 2).
Localla ws and regulations are reserved (art. I 99) .

8. Latin-American Public Policy
Law of the place of performance compulsory. In important codes, the idea that a contract performable in the
territory must be treated under the domestic law/05 has
been repeated 106 for special application to contracts of transportation.107 The place of making the contract108 and the
nationality of the ship are immaterial for this purpose,
although the texts strangely speak only of "foreign" ships,
the parties must have had the English law in view, as the charter party
was in the typical English maritime contract form; Rb. Rotterdam (Oct. 29,
1930) W. 12729, N. }. 1934, 631, I VAN HASSELT 423: voyage charter, a
German coal concern hiring from an Italian shipowner, through London
brokers, the vessel shall take the coal in Rotterdam and carry· it to Ancona.
Contrarily, Rb. Rotterdam (Oct. 16, 1935) N. J. 1936, No. 59 correctly discards American law but fails to justify why Dutch rather than English
law should govern the charter party.
•
105 Vol. II p. 421.
106 Thus, art. 1091 of the Argentine Commercial Code is only a special
application of art. 1209 C. C. (new 1243) ; MALAGARRIGA, 7 Cod. Com.
Coment. 137.
107 Argentina: C. Com. art. 1091; S. Ct. (Nov. 5, 1870) 9 Fallos 492, 495·
Brazil: C. Com. art. 628.
Paraguay: C. Com. art. 1091.
Uruguay: C. Com. art. 1270.
10BBrazil: Sup. Trib. Fed. (July 23, 1930) 16 Arch. Jud. 5, 99 Rev. Dir.
287 (foreign bill of lading).
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which could mean that contracts involving domestic ships
are all under an imperative lex fori. In the prevailing view,
the parties can not validly agree on a foreign court. 109
Law of the place of contracting compulsory. In Chile,
the domestic law is forcibly applied to affreightment "on
foreign ships" made in a port of the Republic although the
master be a foreigner. 110
109Argentina: The majority of the Cam. Fed. Cap. (June 6, 1906) Saens v.
Mala Real, affirmed the right of prorogation, although a dissenting vote
allowed it only where delivery and payment are agreed to be made abroad.
But S. Ct. {Nov. 16, 1936) 36 Revue Dor {1937) 100 has decided for the
prohibition.
Brazil: Not allowed, Sup. Trib. Fed. {May 6, 1925) 83 Rev. Dir. 327
No. 269.
11o Chile: C. Com. art. 975 par. I.
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Maritime Carriage of Goods: Comparative
Conflicts Law
I.
I.

THE

CoNTAcTs

Obsolete Connections

(a) General maritime law. The modern English cases
no longer mention general maritime law with respect to
transportation of goods. In the United States its only
remaining role seems to be to substitute for foreign law
that is not proved; so the term is just another word for
lex fori. 1
(b) Place of accident. Another connecting factor no
longer seriously to be considered is the place where the
goods are lost, destroyed, or damaged. This local connection enjoyed some favor in American 2 and other 3 courts,
but has nothing to recommend it with respect to a voyage
contractually assumed by one carrier on one vessel. Only
by confusion of tort and contract could such a view originate
in actions sounding in contract.
The following local connections are used in the absence
of a law agreed upon by the parties which is respected
everywhere, at least in principle (supra p. 239).
Supra Ch. 43 pp. 241, 246.
Supra Ch. 43 p. 244 at n. 49·
a Belgium: Trib. Antwerp (April 26, 1939) Rechtskund. WB. 1939, c. 409
No. 82: a stipulation limiting to 10 centimes per kilogram the liability of
the carrier, cannot be applied in case of negligent maintenance of the ship
according to the Dutch C. Com. art. 470 (applied through reference in
art. 748), the Belgian law being replaced by the law of the country where
the damage occurred.
1

2
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2.

The Flag

The often-assumed preference of English courts for the
law of the flag to govern affreightment contracts, if it ever
existed, disappeared long since. 4 Much less has it been a
feature of American 5 and other laws until very recently.
Even the reference to the nationality of the ship as an
additional clue to the presumable intention of the parties,
once popular, 6 has practically vanished.
It is difficult for me to ascertain to what degree the stipulations in bills of lading for the law of the flag flown by the
ship have remained in usage. Such clauses may be reasonable and useful to a certain extent, although courts have to
view the problem under quite different considerations in the
absence of a party agreement.
Nevertheless, it is remarkable that the principle abandoned by the courts has encountered increasing favor with
writers of various countries. 7 They had restricted success
in the Dutch law reform of 1924, but quite recently two
Italian writers advocating the law of the flag 8 scored a full
victory in the present Code of Navigation ( 1942) providing
that "contracts of hire, charter, or transport are governed
by the national law of the vessel or the aircraft, in the
absence of a different intention of the parties." 9
The arguments advanced for this view have always
4

Supra pp. 245-247.
Supra p. 241 n. 32. But see for Denmark, BoRUM and MEYER, 6 Repert.
225 No. 91.
6 England and the United States: See supra pp. 244 n. 44, 247, infra p. 259.
Canada: Moore v. Harris (1876) I App. Cas. 318: bill of lading made in
England and English ship.
Germany: RG. (April 14, 1920) 98 RGZ. 335·
7 France: FROMAGEOT, 18 Revue Autran (1902-03) 742,766 f.; RIPERT,
2 Droit Marit. 384 § 1468; J. EYNARD, La loi du pavilion (1926) 164;
BATIFFOL 247 f.
Germany: BAR, Int. Handelsrecht 439; SCHAPS 515; 2 FRANKENSTEIN 518,
523.
Italy: See next note.
s ScERNI 208; MoNAco 135.
9 Art. 10, Disp. Prel. to the Codice della Navigazione of 1942.
5
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culminated in two incontestable advantages. In the first
place, this principle avoids differentiating goods delivered to
the same ship on one voyage according to the nationality or
domicil of each shipper, or to the individual places of shipping or arrival. In the second place, the law indicated by
the flag, besides being uniform, is easy to recognize for all
persons interested and usually regarded as the only one
familiar to the master. This assuredly means superiority
over the many uncertainties connected with the place of
destination. For the Italian solution, it has been added that
this principle secures each of the national maritime laws its
application in exact proportion to the respective country's
participation in the world traffic-an argument truly reminiscent of the ideals once proclaimed by Mancini's theory
of the national law. Would Italy, without this antecedent,
have been converted to the law of the flag?
However, if the virtues of this device are so obvious, how
could they have escaped the attention of the courts in practically all countries? Why did the Anglo-American judges
desert this temporarily much-considered rule? One answer
was given as early as 18 8 6 by an American admiralty judge.
"Practically," he said, "the extreme rule (of the law of the
flag) would require all merchants to acquaint themselves,
at their peril, with all the details of the municipal law of
every nation with whose ships they might deal, even in
ordinary commercial transactions; certainly a most onerous,
if not impracticable, requirement. 1110 This, it is true, has
only the merit of making us aware that every test, including
that of the flag, burdens some of the parties involved with
the dangers of ignoring the applicable law. Why the courts
prefer the law of the port of dispatch to that of the flag,
is a matter of guessing but the fact itself shows that the
1o Brown,

385.

J.,

in The Brantford City (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1886) 29 Fed. 373,
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nationality of the vessel is not regarded as eminently important. With the modern expansion of shipping, the major
ports have a constant stream of incoming and outgoing
vessels; great uniformity of conditions and tariffs prevails
in the shipping pools; and nautical skill appears in comparable equivalence. The date and place of sailing, adequate
space facilities, and personal acquaintances are of greater
weight than the registration of the ship. Freight may be
handled by a broker without naming a ship or even a line.
A maritime agent may announce to his clientele the next
outgoing vessels and their destination but issue the bills
of lading on his own form for an unnamed shipowner. 11
Or, acting for a shipping pool, he may accept the goods
without determining which line will take care of the carriage.12 All this confirms an insight taught by the history
of commercial law. In our time, by a complete change from
ancient economic organization, an enterprise of transportation on the sea is an entity almost independent from the
individual ships and the persons performing navigation and
carriage. If a particular vessel is agreed upon at all, providing the vessel has become a collateral rather than a
principal duty. 13
These may be speculative reasons for an irrefutable phenomenon. But there is one certain disadvantage of applying
the law of the flag in foreign countries, which the courts
must have felt in some way. If the law of the ship governs
the contract and the bill of lading as a whole, its provisions
are added to the imperative prescriptions of the lex fori.
Moreover, prohibitions such as those directed against
clauses of exemption from liability have to be applied inter11 The Iristo (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1941) 43 F. Supp. 29 at 35, supra Ch. 43
n. 45, calls this a "haphazard manner of conducting such a large business."
12 See for the same situation in air carriage, LEMOINE, Traite de droit
aerien ( 1947) 396.
13 See the forceful summary of development by GARRIGUES, Curso de derecho
mercantil, II, 2, esp. 740.
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nationally if they are the law in the country of the port of
dispatch. In the United States and a few other countries,
a court would also have to observe, in addition to the law
of a foreign place of dispatch and the law of the flag, large
portions of its own law if the goods are deliverable in the
country. Business and courts do not even consider complicating the situation in such a manner. The simplicity imagined by the advocates of the flag does not materialize.
Except for its lighthearted adoption in the hasty Italian
compilation of 1942, the law of the flag is positively pertinent only by express agreement and in such problems as
the authority of the master 14 and the limitations on the
shipowner's liability. 15 It has been deliberately disregarded
in the Brussels Convention on bills of lading, with the result
that shipping in foreign trade even in vessels registered in
the United States is not subject to the law of the flag.
3· Domicil of the Shipowner
Some writers have expressed sympathy with the personal
law of the carrier, that is, his domicil, rather than that of
the ship. 16 The shipping companies, it is argued, are vitally
interested in a uniform legal treatment of their affreightments, and uniformity cannot be guaranteed except by the
law of their headquarters. This view has been adopted
by some German decisions and writers, 17 artd the Swiss
14 England: The Industrie; The Njegos; and for other countries, see
supra p. 146.
Denmark: Trib. marit. and com. Co penh ague (Dec. 23, 1931) 28 Revue
Dor (1933) 215 applies the Greek law of the flag simply to the authority of
the master in deciding how to protect the cargo.
1 5 France: 5 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT § 268.
16 2 MElLI 369; BAR, 2 Int. Handelsr. 438 (as to the carrier's duties).
RoLIN, 3 Principes 259 § 1243; RAAPE 260; cf. on land transportation, the
unanimity of the European doctrine, BATIFFOL 104 § u8. Inst. of Int. Law,
22 Annuaire (1908) 291, art. 2 (j).
17 See NussnAU.\1, D. IPR. 231 and n. 2.
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Federal TribunaU 8 The same opinion, in the terms of the
theory of contrats d' adhesion, appears in the C6digo
Bustamante. 19
The logic of this theory is challenged as usual by the
American antimonopolistic tendency. Above all, it is true
for affreightment what in I 84 I Judge Taney said with less
foundation about the law governing the authority of a
master to make a charter. 20 He refused to take into consideration that the shipowner resided in Maryland, for one
thing because Baltimore had no part in the conclusion of a
charter in Chile for carriage to England, and again, because
the domicil of one party is not competent to determine his
own rights and duties in a contract. As in this case, the main
office of the owner or carrier may be far distant from the
scene envisaged by the acting persons. With what justification can a contract made in Argentina with the Argentine
agent of a French shipping company be subjected to French
law ?21 The courts in Argentina are certain not to follow
this law.
These objections are avoided by the international commercial Treaty of Montevideo, of I 889, article 9, making
affreightment dependent on the domicil of the maritime
agency that concludes the contract. If, however, the maritime agency is situated at the port of dispatch, or in the same
country as this port, the result is adequate not because of the
location of the agency but because the port is situated there.
For if, on the other hand, the provision should mean that
Argentine law governs when an agent in Buenos Aires contracts for transportation from Montevideo to Brazil, this
does not make sense. 22
18 BG. (July 12, 1922) 48 BGE. II 281 f.; cf. OsER-SCHOENENBERGER 1608
n. II; 2 ScHNITZER 515; BG. (Jan. 2o, 1948) 74 BGE. II 81, 85.
19 Codigo Bustamante, art. 185
2 0 Naylor v. Baltzell (1841) 17 Fed. Cas. 1254 No. 1o,o61.
21 This remark is borrowed from LEMOINE 395·
22 BUSTAMANTE, Manual 372.
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The section is remarkable only in the fact that in this
instance the Treaty of Montevideo abandons its tenaciously
predicated lex loci solutionis.
4· Place of Contracting

The law of the place of contracting is the prevailing
principle in the American courts, 23 the declared French
rule, 24 and probably the favorite approach in many countries, 25 including Italy until its recent legislation. 26 It is also
sometimes resorted to in individual embarrassing cases. 27
Yet, the familiar objections to the mechanical lex loci
contractus are increased in this special application by the
absurdity of a maritime contract naturally governed by the
tradition of the seafaring nations, depending on the law
of an inland shipper who happens to be in the role of accepting the offer sent by a shipping agent. 28 On the other hand,
in the inverse case where a carrier through his local agent
in the usual course of business accepts applications for transport written on his own standard form, the law of his
23

Supra pp. 242-245.
Supra pp. 249-250.
25 E.g., Belgium: Supra p. 249 n. 74·
Brazil: Implication of C. Com. art. 628, cf. Sup. Trib. Fed. (May 6, 1925)
83 Rev. Dir. 326.
The Netherlands: C. Com. art. 498 (old), changed from former systems,
see VAN SLOOTEN 15; at present prevailing rule of the courts, see supra p. 254·
26 Italy: Cass. (Oct. 15, 1929) Riv. Dir. Com. 1930 II 529; Cass. (June 8,
1933) Rivista 1933, 492; App. Genova (June 17, 1932) Monitore Trib. 1932,
86o, 9 Z. a us!. PR. (1935) 217; App. Trieste (May go, 1933) Rivista 1933,
25o; Trib. Livorno (March 29, 1941) Dir. Int. 1941, 275 (expressly against
the law of the flag).
27 England: Supra p. 248.
Germany: Supra p. 253·
28 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT 793 § 850 and, following them, authors who
advocate the law of the flag, have availed themselves of this convincing
argument by illustrating it with Swiss shippers not having any maritime
law. During the last war, however, Switzerland used a fleet of its own and
provided it with an emergency legislation drawn from the international
conventions and usages. But this change rather confirms that the natural
governing law is not inland.
24
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country is favored not because his agent there completes the
contract by signing, but because he will dispatch the goods
therefrom.

5. Port of Destination
Under the guidance of Savigny's lex loci solutionis, the
German courts proclaimed the law of the port of destination
for charter parties as well as ordinary affreightments. 29 This
doctrine, as seen above, could not be maintained, 30 and with
the exception of Greece, has only sporadically been followed
in other countries. 31 The Treaty of Montevideo has repudiated it. 32
Under a one-sided public policy, it is true, certain LatinAmerican codes impose themselves on foreign-governed
carriages to domestic ports. 33 The motives are very similar
to the true background of the German practice. This, either
in the resule 4 or by intention, 35 protects the German consignees in overseas trade against foreign rules less favorable to innocent holders of bills of lading.
Technically, the alleged rule has often been criticized
as impracticable whenever the ship sails with optional or
uncertain orders or when it does not reach its destination.
From a commercial point of view, the situation should not
differ for a particular ship's journey, possibly for the same
shipper, according to the various foreign places to which
29

Supra Ch. 43 p. 251.
Supra Ch. 43 pp. 251-253.
31 E.g., Belgium: App. Gent (May 2, 1901) Clunet 1902, 390 (lex fori)
and other cases; supra p. 249 n. 78.
Greece: See 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 252 n. 38.
The Netherlands: C. Com. art. 498 (old); Rb. Rotterdam (Jan. 23 1907)
Clunet 1912, 291.
32
Aetas de las Sesiones 560, allegedly because there is no one place of
performance, cf. SEGOVIA, El derecho internacional privado y el Congreso sudamericano de Montevideo (1889) 78.
33 Vol. II p. 421 n. 123; supra p. 255 n. 107.
34 NussBAUM, D. IPR. 283.
35 RAAPE, D. IPR. 260.
30
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the goods are sent. Although the intended place of delivery
may have importance in certain respects for the rights of
the consignee or holder of the bill of lading, it certainly
does not deserve to qualify the entire contract.
6. Port of Dispatch
Much of our preceding survey has shown the sound
tendency of practice to localize carriage in the port where
the goods are brought into the custody of the carrier and
the bill of lading is issued. 36 The introduction of the Hague
Rules has furnished an important, though scarcely noticed,
support to this theory. To illustrate the attitude taken by
most member states of the Brussels Convention, the British
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1924, section I, applies
the Hague Rules to "the carriage of goods by sea in ships
carrying goods from any port in Great Britain or Northern
Ireland to any other port whether in or outside Great
Britain or Northern Ireland." Since the Rules themselves
are restricted to "contracts of carrying covered by a bill
of lading or any similar document" (article I b), the English Act is applicable under two conditions, viz., that carriage starts in England and that it is covered by a bill of
lading. It is immaterial at what place the contract of
affreightment may legally be regarded as concluded. This
method of viewing affreightment is just what the courts must
have in mind when they emphasize the place of contracting
in the same breath with the port of dispatch.
Furthermore, the Dutch law demands application of
numerous provisions to carriage from Dutch ports rather
than to affreightments made in Holland. 37 And a strange
provision of the Soviet law is only explainable by the same
idea. The Maritime Code applies (in the absence of party
36
37

Supra Ch. 43 ns. 45 ff., 71 f., So, 93, 98; C6digo Bustamante, art. 285.
The Netherlands: C. Com. arts. 470, 47oa, 517d, 520t.
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agreement for a foreign law) to all transports from Russian
ports, but to those from foreign to Russian ports only in
suits before Soviet courts. 38 This means evidently that
foreign judgments applying the law of the port of dispatch,
if no party is a Soviet national, will be recognized.
Sometimes this same port has been fitted into the conventional pattern by terming it the place where, in addition
to the contracting, the commencement of the performance
by the carrier occurs. 39 In other cases, doctrinal appearances were saved by emphasizing the beginning of transportation as the most important part of the performance.
On the other hand, legal construction seems to have helped
some writers to prefer the port of dispatch to the place of
contracting if situated in different countries; they have followed the theory reminiscent of the Roman receptum nautarum, which conceived the contract of affreightment as a
kind of real contract, requiring for its formation the delivery of the goods to the carrier. 40 All these overly technical considerations are beside the point. The administrative
provisions of all kinds imposed on outgoing vessels also
affect the business of shipping and the activities of maritime
agents. The stricter policy of the maritime states has been
implemented by imperative rules of private law such as
those restraining exemption clauses in carriage from their
ports. This is the background on which the entire operation
is deemed to be centered at the place where the goods are
delivered for carriage by sea and the all-important bill of
lading, or possibly a bill of receipt for lading, is issued.
The most serious objection to this solution might be
borrowed from the old argument against the law of the
38 Soviet Union: Maritime Law of June 14, 1929, art. 4 (b); FREUND,
Das Seeschiffahrtsrecht der Sowjetunion ( 1930) comments that probably the
port of dispatch is thought to be usually identical with the place of contracting.
39 E.g., The Pehr Ugland (D. C. E. D. Va. 1921) 271 Fed. 340.
40 Thus, probably 5 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT 792 § 850.
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place of contracting: goods loaded on the same ship in
several ports should not be subjected to different laws. But
this disharmony is easily remedied by a clause in the bills
of lading stipulating for the same law. Furthermore, dispatch is at least an indisputable fact, whereas the place of
contracting is not, and it is in the nature of a sea voyage
touching several countries that the law under which goods
are accepted may vary.
7· Subsidiary Lex Fori
The Soviet Maritime Law resorts to the law of the forum
in the absence of an express party agreement on the applicable law in any of the following cases: whenever the
transport is between Russian ports or from Russian to
foreign ports; if both or even only one of the parties is a
Soviet citizen or juristic person, even though the transport
may run between foreign ports; and if the suit is decided in
a Soviet court, with respect to transport from a foreign to
a Russian port. 41 The last provision gives the foreign law
of the port of dispatch a slight concession. 42
8. Public Policy
The law of the forum is prescribed for certain problems
with respect to outgoing vessels everywhere; with respect
to outgoing and incoming vessels in the United States, 43
Holland, 44 and Belgium ;45 for the entire contract with respect to outgoing vessels in Chile ;46 and to incoming vessels
41 Soviet Law of June 14, 1929, art. 4 (b); cf. FREUND, Das Seeschifffahrtsrecht der Sowjetunion ( 1930) 59, 70.
42 Supra n. 3 8.
43 Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1936, § 13, cf. Vol. II p. 420.
44 C. Com. art. 517d, cf. Vol. II p. 420 n. 122.
45 C. Com. art. 91, cf. Vol. II p. 420 n. II9.
46 C. Com. art. 975 par. 2.
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in Argentina and Brazil. 47 This list is not exhaustive, of
course. 48 The climax is reached by the Maritime Code of
French Morocco; all its provisions concerning the rights
and duties of the parties to a carriage "apply to every transport destined to or originating in the ports of the French
zone of Morocco," even though the bill of lading or document of carriage is issued abroad, between foreigners, or
the parties stipulate that the contract of transport should
be governed by a foreign law. Any stipulation of this kind
is null and void. 49
9· Conclusion
Comparative observation results in some positive conclusions on the subject.
(a) Ordinary carriage. In the first place, the legislative
situation of the maritime countries and the circumstances
of the modern line steamers have promoted a universal
tendency of the courts towards a conflicts rule that gives
prevalence to the law of the port of dispatch. The law of
the flag is no longer important, even in England. In Germany the law of the port of destination has been practically
abandoned as the general law of the contract. The few
remains of the mechanical conception of lex loci contractus
can easily be assimilated to the really significant rule.
(b) Charter parties. In the second place, it follows that
all conflicts rules of the world used on this subject are wrong
when they are applied as in the current theories, to all contracts of transportation, if not even to demises. The above
assumed rule has justification only when a bill of lading or
47 Argentina: C. Com. art. 1091.
Brazil: Introd. Law, art. 9; C. Com. art. 628, and see supra p. 255 n. 107.
Treaty of Montevideo on Navigation (1940) art. 26.
4 8 For the normal application of the Hague Rules, in case of outgoing
vessels, see Vol. II, pp. 420, 425.
49 French Morocco: Dahir of March 31, 1919, art. 267; LoUis RIVIERE,
3 Traites, codes et lois du Maroc ( 1925) 88o.
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"a similar document" is issued. It does not have any bearing
on charter parties.
The question of the law adequate to charter parties has
in fact given rise to most of the litigation reviewed above.
Actually, the method regularly followed by the courts,
American, English, German, and others, is always the same,
the so-called method of cumulating connecting factors. Frequently, the courts indulge in another common tendency,
the inclination toward the lex fori. But we also encounter
a common preference for the English law when the parties
are represented in the great center of vessel chartering in
London, and the contract is made there on a standard form
of the trade.
It would seem that in otherwise doubtful cases it is again
the formulary from which the charter has been printed
that decides to which country's legal environment a charter
party belongs. But when the same blank form is uniformly
used in several countries, or throughout the world, as has
been achieved by successful efforts for unification in our
time, this argument loses its value. 50
Negatively, it is also certain that in a charter party the
ports are totally immaterial, 51 except when a vessel lying
in a foreign port is let by the master to a local charterer.
Indeed, if an English firm in Calcutta charters a Norwegian
ship lying in the port of Calcutta for a voyage from the
Straits Settlements to San Francisco, the latter locations
do not support conflicts consideration; the place of contracting ought to prevail.
50 This point of view would justify, for instance, the Appeal Court of
Memel (Oct. u, 1934) 10 Z. ausl. PR. (1936) 142, applying the law of the
forum to a charter party concluded in Memel on the "Baltwood" form of
1926 between a Danish and a French firm, both represented by a local
broker with loading and dispatching to be in Memel.
51 "While bills of lading are ordinarily given at the port of loading,
charter parties are often made elsewhere," Willes, J., in Lloyd v. Guibert
(r865) L. R. r Q. B. us, 127.
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A new problem arises when a charter party is governed
by a law other than that of the country in which a bill of
lading is issued. In this case we shall see that if possible
the former law is deemed to extend to the bill.
II.

ScoPE oF THE LAw oF THE CoNTRAcT

In General
On principle, the law governing any maritime transportation of goods covers conclusion, effects, and termination of
the contract. These include such problems as the common
law presumption that a charter party is not a demise, the
nature of warranties and conditions, the liability of the
shipowner and of the charterer for delay in delivery, damage and loss of the goods, the exemption clauses, the obligation to pay freight, the remedies for breach or recovery
accorded by law or agreement, and the question whether
an action is in rem or in personam. 52 "Particular average"
is nothing else than damages, subject to the law of the
contract. 53
The most important of all clauses, the stipulation eliminating or lessening the carrier's legal liability, as earlier
discussion of this subject has shown, is also subordinated to
the law governing the contract in general. 54
I .

Illustration. Cotton was shipped on an English vessel
from New Orleans to Le Havre. The bill of lading con5 2 Treaty of Montevideo on Int. Com. Law (1889) art. 22.
That limitation of liability, so differently organized at present, should be
classified as substance, but is unfortunately treated as a procedural incident, has been indicated in the discussion of torts, Vol. II p. 351. For a
case demonstrating the monstrous effects of the procedural theory, see
KNAUGHT, "Renvoi and Other Conflicts Problems in Transportation Law,"
49 Col. L. Rev. ( 1949) 3·
53 Cf. The Constantinople (D. C. E. D. N. Y. 1926) 15 F. (2d) 97, 98
(regarding a passenger's suit for breach of contract).
54 Vol. II pp. 418 ff.
Cf. United States: Liverpool etc. Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co. (C. C. E. D.
N. Y. 1889) 129 u. s. 397·
France: Cass. civ. (June 12, 1894) S. I895·1.I6I; 5 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT
791 n. I.
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tained a clause that delivery of the goods should be taken by
the consignee along side board. When fire destroyed a part
of the goods piled on the quay, the effect of the clause was
tested under American and French law. 55 In the prevailing
and correct view, the American law alone should have been
decisive.
This liability of the shipowner based on the contract and
covered by the law of the contract, as may be recalled, ts
concurrent with his liability for tort. 56
The following applications deserve discussion.
2.

Formalities of Contracting

Although the charter party derives its name from the
deed on which it was written, neither this contract nor an
agreement of carriage need be in writing to have legal
existence. But writing is often required for evidence 57 and
as such is subject to the conflicts rules on form, mainly the
rule locus regit actum in its various shades.
In the absence of recognized usages, however, the governing law alone decides whether the shipper is entitled to
demand a bill of lading (as in the United States and Germany) ;58 how many parts a set of bills should have; whether
the costs of the bill are common or whom they burden.
Significantly, the German courts, contrary to their main
rule calling for the law of the port of destination, are forced
55

Trib. Le Havre (April 18, 1899) 15 Revue Autran (1899-1900) 101.
Vol. II pp. 290 ff.
See especially RG. (May 28, 1936) 151 RGZ. 296.
57 E.g., France: C. Com. art. 273, cf. 5 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT 553·
Italy: Cass. (July 14, 1938) 40 Revue Dor 354; C. Navig. (1942) arts. 377,
385, 420.
Peru: C. Com. art. 66 5: form of the "poliza de fletamento."
Soviet Russia: Maritime Law of June 14, 1929, arts. 75, 121, cf. FREUND,
Das Seeschiffahrtsrecht der Sowjetunion (1930) 37·
58 United States: Harter Act, § 4; Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1936,
§ 3 (3)·
Germany: HGB. § 642.
56
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to determine by the law of the port of dispatch whether
the master has to issue a bill of lading. 59
In the Soviet Union it is prescribed that affreightment
contracts must be registered; if they are made abroad, they
have to be registered with the Soviet consul. This provision
is sanctioned not by nullity of the contract but by the prohibition for the vessel to enter or leave a Russian port. 60
Hence, this is no formality; failure may be a cause of nonperformance.
3· Interpretation of the Contract
"Construction" of the contract as a whole, of course, is
subject to the law governing the latter. 61 For example, the
frequent clause in an English charter party saying that the
master will sign the bill of lading as presented by the shipper
without prejudice to the charter party, has been construed
in a German court according to English law. 62
But also in respect to certain terms, courts have developed
detailed presumptions which apply in connection with and
apart from usages. Thus, the French doctrine expounds
that the law of the place of contracting which governs the
contract also determines what is meant by "tons," although
if freight is measured by "tons delivered," the law of the
port of destination is competent to complete the meaning. 63
As to usages, apart from the local customary rules for loading, unloading, and delivery, customs of trade are continuously admitted to "explain ambiguous mercantile expressions"64 under the general conditions for reading them
59 RG. (Dec. 5, I887) zo RGZ. 52, 6I.
so FREUND, Das Seeschiffahrtsrecht der Sowjetunion (I930) I3, 67 f.
61 ScRUTTON, Charterparties I9 ff., art 7, treats the conflicts law under
this denomination.
62 OLG. Hamburg (Feb. 9, I9IO) 26 Revue Autran (I9Io-n) 2I5·
63 App. Rouen (Dec. 30, I874) Clunet I875, 430; 5 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT
790 n. 2; for th-e term "management," see Trib. com. Marseille (May 6,
I 892) Clunet I 892, II49; cited by all writers.
64 ScRUTTON, Charterparties 25.
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into the contract. We may repeat that the universal use of
English clauses is not a reference to English law. 65
Illustration. A charter between German parties held to
be governed by German law contained the familiar English
cesser and lien clauses. What the combination of these two
clauses means, was investigated by the German Reichsgericht66 under the rule of the BGB., § IJJ, prescribing
search for the true meaning of terms, although the result
conformed to the interpretation of the clause found in
Carver's Carriage of Goods by Sea.
4· Rights Flowing from a Bill of Lading
The relationship between an affreightment and the bill
of lading is rarely examined in conflicts law, perhaps because the subject is not all too clear in most municipal
systems. Attention is focused if not exclusively on the general doctrine of negotiable instruments, preferentially on
the function of commercial instruments in the transfer of
title in the goods rather than their obligatory aspect. Our
solution can merely be tentative.
(a) Formalities of issue and endorsement are undoubtedly governed by the rule, locus regit actum. Whether the
bill is special, to order, or to bearer should simply be determined on the same principle; but this is a controversial
matter of more general nature.
(b) The authority of the master. It is universally settled
that the master's power to determine the conditions for a
bottomry on the cargo, or even to pledge the credit of the
cargo owner, etc. are subject to the law of the flag. But
does this law also decide who is bound by the master's signing the bill of lading?
Illustration. A New York corporation, time charterer of
a Norwegian vessel, let it under subcharter to the Canadian
Ocean Dominion Corporation. The vessel took cargo in
Vol. II p. 534·
os RG. (Dec. 14, 1910) JW. 1911, 225.
Gs
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Halifax, N. S., and later in St. Joseph, N. B., and the master
signed bills of lading by a formula causing litigation on
the question who was obligated by them, the shipowner,
the charterer, or the subcharterer. The American court
held, correctly, that Canadian, not Norwegian nor American, law decided and therefore under the circumstances only
the shipowner was liable to the holder. 67
(c) The effects of endorsement are determined by the
law of the place of endorsement, according to the principles
of negotiable instruments. 5 8 When a bill of lading was issued
and endorsed in blank in Czarist Russia, and so sent by the
shipper to the buyer in France, the French court recognized
that under the then Russian law a blank endorsement did
not protect any holder against defenses which the carrier
could oppose to the shipper. 69
(d) Remaining problems. What law, however, decides
the main body of questions, such as the conditions of holding in due course? Or the extent to which the right of an
innocent holder, or the right of the carrier for the payment
of the freight, stipulated in the bill, is independent of a preceding contract between consignor and carrier not referred
to in the bill? What law determines the effect of the muchemployed abbreviated references in the bill to a charter
party? Is it the law of the contract? The problem is not the
same as in the case of a bill of exchange or promissory note.
The rights embodied in a bill of lading are nowhere regarded as independent of the consideration given therefor;
at most, as in German law, they are isolated from the
affreightment by the formal writing, and in many jurisdictions even this theory is not accepted. 70
Law of the port of destination. For a court presuming
67

The Iristo (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1941) 43 F. Supp. 29.
E.g., Greece: App. Athens ( 1925) No. 418, 37 Themis 378.
69 App. Bordeaux (Jan. 24, 188o) Clunet 1881, 358.
7 For recent treatment in Italy, see MESSINEO, 2 I titoli di credito 173;
ScoRZA, 2 La polizza di carico (1936) 218 § 265.
68

°
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that the law of the port of destination is intended by the
parties, a part of the problem is removed. The most justifiable feature of the "German port of destination doctrine 71
is the argument that the rights of the holder ought to be
safeguarded by the law of the country where he is entitled
to request delivery of the goods. In a French appreciation
of this doctrine,, 72 it has been observed that the successive
parties not involved in the original transaction are interested
only in the place of prospective delivery. The effects of
the instrument on transfer of title and the right of obtaining
physical possession of the goods, are thus united under the
same law.
Likewise, if the right of the carrier against the receiver
for payment of the freight, is assigned to the law of the
port of destination, it may simultaneously be based on the
bill of lading and on the contract or the acceptance of the
goods. The Reichsgericht needlessly construed the rights of
the carrier towards the consignee as flowing from the acceptance of the goods rather than from the contract and therefore as subject to a separate conflicts rule. 73 However, the
criticism that the right of the carrier, flowing from acceptance according to § 614 of the German Commercial Code,
is not independent of but substantially identical with the
right created between the original parties, is a domesticminded theory. 74 The conflicts rule should cover any rights
accruing to and against third beneficiaries, however the
municipal theory construes them.
It may be appreciated that by such method the same law
71 Last decision (according to the "General Register," vols. 161-170) 169
RGZ. 257, 259, with the understanding that the bill of lading may refer to
another law such as that agreed upon in the affreightment contract.
Also the Greek practice before the Code of 1940 shared this doctrine, see
2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 253 f. n. 41, on the basis of lex loci solutionis.
7 2 BATIFFOL 255 § 281.
73 RG. (April 29, 1903) Hans. GZ. 1903 Hbl. No. 102, 20 Revue Autran
(1904-05) So.
74 2 FRANKENSTEIN 523, arguing on the German HGB. § 614.
II
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will control the effects of both contract and bill of lading,
in defining the position of a person who is consignee and
holder. But the unity of law so gained is lost in another
respect.
For it has admittedly been impossible to extend the law
of the port of destination to the creation of bills of lading.
Even the German courts determine the substantive conditions for the formation of such bills under the law of the
place where the instrument is issued/ 5 The Reichsgericht
has also admitted that the laws of the contract and of the
bill may differ on the ground of the intention of the parties. 76
But this is true under any theory.
Law of the port of dispatch. When the governing law of
the affreightment is taken from a place where the contractual relationship begins, the solution is less easy. American decisions do not answer the question squarely, but it is
safe to assume that they apply the same law, termed lex
loci contractus in affreightment, also to the creation and
effects of bills of lading. The Italian practice before the new
Code of Navigation was outspoken to this effect. 77
It was again the odious privilege of the German Reichsgericht to deviate from this natural idea. In an old case/ 8
a bill of lading was signed by the master of an English ship
at Bombay, himself and the shippers being Englishmen.
75 ScHAPS § 642 n. g1; STAUB-HEINICHEN in 4 Staub 424 Anhang zu § 382
ns. 62 f.
76 RG. (Nov. 24, 1928) 122 RGZ. g16.
77 Cass. (May 25, 1926) Rivista 1927, 112 (limitation of action); App.
Trieste (May go, 1933) Rivista 19gg, 250 (validity of clause of jurisdiction).
78
RG. (May 2, 1894) g4 RGZ. 72. No such preoccupation is visible in the
earlier decisions of ROHG. (March 28, 1879) 25 ROHGE. 9g (English law
for the charter party because of the form used; fire exemption clause in both
the charter party and the bill of lading, but English construction prevails
over (old) German HGB. art. 659). But ROHG. (May go, 1879) 25 ROHGE.
192 in a case of goods in fact not shipped, rejected an alleged usage in
Wilmington, N. C., allowing the signing of bills of lading before embarkation of the goods on the ground of German law; RG. (Dec. 5, 1887) 20 RGZ.
52, in view of an analogous usage of New Orleans, held it pertinent whether
the holders acquiring the bill knew that in fact it was only a bill received
for shipment.
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There was no question but that English law governed the
contract. The bill stated the loading of a certain cargo and
promised to deliver it in Hamburg. But through a fraud
for which one of the shippers subsequently was jailed, the
goods were not ·bra.ught on board. The court refused to
apply the English rule that the master cannot bind the shipowner by signing bills of lading for goods that were never
shipped at all/ 9 and other English defenses of the owner.
It asserted the German protection of an innocent purchaser
of the bill, whenever the destination is a German port. This
result was precariously based on the old fiction of the
debtor's spontaneous submission to the law of the foreign
place of performance, simply by his agreeing to perform at
that place. But the court went farther and placed the German rule under a compulsory public policy, namely the rule
that the bill of lading constitutes, as between the owner and
the holder in good faith, obligations independent of the
carriage contract and unconditionally performable, whenever delivery is due in Germany. 80 This one-sided policy,
though approved by certain authors, 81 and not overruled,
is an erratic element in the recent practice of the German
courts. 82
Rationale. For the holder of the bill of lading, the goods
are of primary concern. Where the goods will be, or ought
to be, when discharged from the vessel and delivered at
the end of the maritime voyage, is eminently important for
him. But consignees and holders of the bill are not the only
interested persons. In the eyes of the insurance company in
the country of dispatch and of the banker financing the
79 SCRUTI'ON, Charterparties 72 and n. (b). The contrary German rule
prevails also in the United States, Uniform Bills of Lading Act, 1909, § 23;
Pomerene Act, 1916, § 22, cf. KNAUTH, Ocean Bills of Lading 130 f.; and
e.g, in Italy, see Cass. (March 22, 1934) Foro Ita!. 1934 I 929.
80 34 RGZ. at 79; RG. (Sept. 24, 1910) 74 RGZ. 193, 194.
8 1 Lastly, NussBAUM, D. IPR. 284 n. 1.
82
In RG. (Nov. 24, 1928) 122 RGZ. 316, 319 embarrassment is recognizable.
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seller, the port of arrival may be a very far distant place,
often an uncertain one, and ordinarily not a familiar contact.
At any rate, the law governing the contract of carriage
should extend to the bill of lading in the following cases:
( i) An express reference in the bill of lading to a specific
law takes care of the question for everyone concerned.
( ii) Where the bill of lading refers to the conditions in
use by the carrier, or to a charter party, concluded either
between the parties to the bill or between the shipowner and
the carrier, it is natural that one law ought to govern the
entire relationship. Such a reference effectively lessens the
independence of the instrument, allowing the holder to
oppose defenses outside the bill of lading. The problem has
arisen in the English cases.
An English decision of 1933, though strangely complicated, shows the tendency to subject a charter party and
the ensuing bill of lading to one law, "in deviation from
the law where the goods were exchanged against the bill of
lading," which would normally have governed the relationship between the shipowner and the holder. 83
A thorough study, however, was given to the question
by the admiralty counsel and judges in The Njegos. 84 The
charter party was clearly subject to English law-made in
London by agents of the parties (Yugoslav shipowners and
a French company) in English on the Chamber of Shipping
River Plate ("Centrocon") form, and in addition containing
the usual English arbitration clause. The bills of lading, in
83 The St. Joseph (1933) 45 Ll. L. Rep. 18o, 28 Revue Dor (1933) 180.
As far as I understand, Belgian law, in principle, as the law of the port of
dispatch and issuance of the bill of lading, would govern the relationship
between the Norwegian shipowner and the holder, the Guatemalan government. But the charter party between the owner and the French charterers
did not refer to Belgian law and the bill was declared nonnegotiable; the
Hague Rules were not even implicitly referred to in the bill, therefore the
Belgian limitation of the shipowner's liability (Hague Rules) was not
applied.
84 The Njegos [ 1936] P. 90.
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English form and English language, were issued in Buenos
Aires for destinations in Norway and Denmark. The bills
incorporated "all the terms, conditions, and exceptions" of
the charter party, "including the negligence clause," but
were not deemed to include the arbitration clause. The receivers of the goods, Norwegian or Danish nationals, acquired the bills. The President, Sir F. B. Merriman, speaking for the court, held that "the sensible business man must
be assumed to intend that the contract shall be read with
the English interpretation which admittedly attaches to
the charter party as such, though that interpretation is
nowhere expressly stated, but it is to be inferred from
several indications. . . ." 85
A recent Italian writer, Scerni, has given attention to the
subject. He also thinks that where the parties enjoy full
freedom in selecting the law, their intention is that the
reference in a bill of lading to a charter party includes the
applicable law. 86
Where the bill of lading fails to refer to a previously
written document, so as equitably to justify extension of
the law concerned to the bill, it is logical to keep the choice
of law for both sources of obligation separate. The parties
may easily remove this by any clause admitting uniformity.
85

I d. at 105.

86 SCERNI

219. Assuredly, SCERNI denies party autonomy to the then Italian
commercial law (art. 58 C. Com.), a wrong thesis in my opinion, and inadequately requires an express stipulation for the applicable law in the charter
party or the model bill of lading printed in the charter.
A relevant argument is to be found in a Dutch decision, Rb. Rotterdam
. (Oct. 16, 1935) N. ]. 1936, No. 59, upholding an obligation of the holder of
the bill to pay the freight at the value of gold dollars before the American
depreciation. The charter party made in London with a clause for arbitration in London evidently was governed by English law. But the bill of
lading issued in a Dutch port by a Dutch line to an American corporation
referred merely "to all the conditions and exceptions and liberties contained
in the charter-party"; this was not to be extended either to arbitration or
to English law, and Dutch law applied. The court, however, argued on
the basis of the presumable intention of the parties.

280

SPECIAL OBLIGATIONS

4· Distance Freight
Under English and American basic conceptions, the
carrier has to perform an entire undertaking for a specific
sum. 87 Freight is owed only on proper delivery. Consequently, in case of disaster at sea, if no goods are salvaged,
no freight is due. Of course, more recently, usual clauses,
such as "freight to be deemed earned, ship or goods lost
or not lost," reverse the situation. 88 In most civil law
countries, on the contrary, at least the part of the freight
proportional to the voyage accomplished at the place of
loss, is regarded as earned. 89 This distinction is very well
recognized and has been a subject of drafts of unification
from I 907. 90 It has been unanimously understood in the
courts of the world that the solution depends on the law
governing the contract of affreightment which is prevailingly the law of the "place of contracting." 91
This is a perfect example of universal agreement.
87 Blackburn, J., in Appleby v. Myers ( 1867) L. R. 2 C. P. 650 at 661, as
used by ScRUITON, Charterparties art. 143.
88 On the broader meaning of this clause in a case including all freight
due at destination, see Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Guernsey-Westbrook Co.
(C. C. A. 9th 1947) 159 F. (2d) 139, 141.
89 E.g., France: C. Com. art. 296 par. 3·
Italy: C. Com. (1882) art. 570; C. Navig. (1942) art. 436 is interpreted
to the same effect by BRUNETII, C. Navig. Marit. ( 1943) a057 n. IX. Cf. Trib.
Livorno (March 29, 1941) Dir. Int. 1941, 275 (applying the Italian lex loci
contractus on the ground of the former art. 58 C. Com. against the different
German law stipulated.
Spain: C. Com. art. 623.
Argentina: C. Com. art. 1088.
Mexico: C. Com. art. 73 7, etc.
Germany: C. Com. §§ 630, 631, 641.
Japan: C. Com. art. 613; new C. Com. (1938) art. 760.
Sweden: Marit. Law, art. 129, the measure of the freight conditioned
by the circumstances.
90 BERLINGIERI, Verso l'unificazione del diritto del mare (1932) 142.
91 United States: China Mutual Ins. Co. v. Force ( 1894) 142 N. Y. 90,
36 N. E. 874.
England: The Industrie [1894] P. 58; The Adriatic [1931] P. 241.
France: App. Douai (Nov. 10, 1885) 1 Revue Autran (1885-6) 36o; 5 LYoNCAEN et RENAULT§ 849.
Germany: RG. (April 4, 1908) 68 RGZ. 203, 209.
Anglo-German Mixed Arb. Trib. (Oct. 14, 1927) 7 Recueil trib. arb.
mixtes 432, 434·
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5. Right of Payment for Freight after Delivery
Whether a lien on the cargo should be ·regarded as a
property interest, remains subject to the lex situs or depends
on the law of the flag, according to theories not to be discussed here. But commercial liens in favor of the freight
are always based on obligatory rights. A case in the Italian
courts furnishes an excellent illustration.
An Italian firm, subsequently in bankruptcy, chartered by
contract made in London a ship of the Italian shipping company "Garibaldi." The cargo was unloaded on the dock in
Genoa. According to Italian law (C. Com., r882, art. 58o),
the captain was not entitled to retain the goods but could
enforce a claim for the freight. Under English law, however, a master waives the lien by delivering the goods without requiring payment. The Appeal Coure 2 and the Supreme
Court" 3 did not hesitate to apply English law as the lex loci
contractus. The Italian ship should hence have retained the
goods contrary to the Italian legal provision, considered
imperative in municipal law. It was also immaterial that
the act in question was closely connected with delivery.
III.
I.

SPECIAL LAWS

Port Regulations

There seems to be universal agreement that local provisions and usages in both the port of dispatch and that of
arrival are determinative of the rights of the parties with
respect to the technical operations of loading and unloading.94
92

App. Genova {June 17, 1932) Monitore 1932, 86o, 9 Z. ausl. PR. (1935)

217.
93 Cass. (June 8, 1933) Foro Ita!. 1933 I 938, Rivista 1933, 492, 28 Revue
Dor ( 1933) 349·
94 United States: The Dartford (C. C. A. 1st 1938) 1938 Am. Marit. Cas.
1548, 1555 (whether Saturday is a half holiday in Boston), citing Holland
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This rule extends to the formalities to be fulfilled with the
authorities ;95 the beginning, interruption, and speed of loading and unloading, 96 in particular the lay days, when the contract is not specific ;97 the method of stowage ; 98 the computation of weighing expenses and allowance of expenses,
when loading is difficult ;99 the procedure for formal ascertainment of damage, etc. 100 The local standards also govern
the rights of the carrier against a shipper who fails to deliver the goods to the vessel on time. 101 Such rights to demurrage102 do not depend on the question whether the duty
to pay for delay in loading or unloading beyond the permitted period is construed as a supplement to the freight
Gulf S. S. Co. v. Hagar (D. C. E. D. Pa. 1903) 124 Fed. 460, 463; Pool
Shipping Co. v. Samuel (C. C. A. 3rd 1912) 200 Fed. 36.
England: The Thortondale, Hick v. Tweedy ( 1890) 63 L. T. R. 765-C. A.,
6 Revue Autran (1890-91) 474, 7 id. (1891-92) 327: lex loci contractus
governs, but the usages of the port where the charter party ought to be
performed determine such questions as at what moment a vessel is ready
for loading, provided that the usages are recognized also by the foreigners
using the port.
France: 5 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT § 851.
Germany: ScHAPS n. 21 before § 556.
Italy: DIENA, 2 Dir. Com. Int. 358 § 167; ScERNI 209.
The Netherlands: C. Com. art. 517d par. 2 cf. art. 458 (old) of the C. Com.
95 CRouvF:s, I Repert. 269 No. 24; Cass. civ. (April 12, 1938) D. H. 1938,
369.
96 Quebec: C. C. art. 2460.
97 Belgium: Trib. com. Antwerp (Nov. 15, 1905) 22 Revue Autran (190607) 537: whether the excuse of torrents of rain is allowed for delayed action;
25 id. (1909-10) 404.
France: FROMAGEOT1 18 Revue Autran (1902-03) 742; 5 LYON-CAEN et
RENAULT§ 851; 2 DE VALROGER § 69o; but see as to certain citations of
cases, VAN SLOOTEN 23 f.
Germany: OLG. Hamburg (Nov. u, 1889) 45 Seuff. Arch. 258; (March
27, 1913) Hans. GZ. 1913, RBI. 181 No. 86.
98 5 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT § 851.
99 Italy: Cass. (Oct. 15, 1929) Riv. Dir. Com. 1930 II 529, cf. VALERI,
5 Z. ausl. PR. (1931) 845.
10 0Trib com. Bordeaux (April 19, 1888) 4 Revue Autran (1888-89) 299;
see VAN SLOOTEN 30.
101 Germany: Handelsg. Hamburg (July 24, 1872) HGZ. 1872 RBI. No.
226.
10 2 In U. S. v. Ashcraft-Wilkinson Co. (D. C. N. D. Ga. 1927) 18 F. (2d)
977, reversed on other grounds (1929) 29 F. (2d) 961, the suit involving
demurrage is decided without hesitation under American law, the vessel,
probably Italian, having arrived in Savannah.
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(as in the French courts) or as damages (according to the
prevailing conception) .103
Since, however, the contract may dispose of all these
questions, it may also, under certain circumstances, be
deemed to refer these to the law governing the contract in
general. 104
2.

Lex Loci Solutionis

(a) Modalities of performance. According to its usual
role, the law of the place of performance governs modalities of delivery of the goods 105 and of payment of the
freight. 106 The currency of payment is also included. 107
Whether the master has to give notice before unloading/ 08
and in what manner the bill of lading has to be tendered, 109
belongs to the same category.
The law in force at the port of arrival thus serves as
lex loci solutionis to the same effect as in its function just
mentioned sub ( r ) . Other formulations are more doubtful.
(b) Broader statements. In one formulation, the law of
the port of arrival embraces everything involving discharge
of the vessel, receipt of the goods, and measures regarding
damage and deficiencies. 110 The German Reichsgericht, restricting its old rule of the law of the port of destination,
still favors it as a special law for various problems. 111
103
104

See on the controversy, 5 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT 728 § 797·
Swedish S. Ct. (May II, 1939) Nytt Jur. Ark. 1939, 247 No. 69:
charter party made in Sweden between Swedish parties, lay days in a German port, Swedish law; cf. SCHMIDT, Revue Crit. 1948, 430.
105 Trib. Marseille (March 8, 1838) Jur. Mars. 1838.1.246.
1 06 5 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT § 851.
107
3 DESJARDIN 658 § 840; Trib. com. Marseilles (June 25, I895) Jur.
Mars. 1895.1.262, cited I Repert. 277 No. 89.
108
I VAN HASSELT 364. The question is answered in the negative in England
in the absences of stipulation, ScRUTTON, Charterparties 141, 153.
109 Rb. Rotterdam (Oct. 16, I935) W. I936 No. 59·
110 I SMEESTERS and WINKELMOLEN 393·
111
Germany: RG. (Nov. 24, I928) 122 RGZ. 3I6 defines the scope of the
law of the port of destination, when the contract is generally governed by
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The C6digo Bustamante provides that "The acts of performance of the contract (of affreightment) shall be
effectuated in conformity with the law of the place where
they should be performed." (art. 285 par. 2)
It is uncertain, however, whether this formula really
intends to include more than the rules expressed supra (I)
and ( 2) (a). But it does not go so far as a new section of
the Montevideo Treaties submitting the "contract" to the
law of the place of performance if the latter is in a member
state. 112
Finally, some writers, followed temporarily by a few
decisions, have applied the theory by which the contract is
divided into conclusion and performance. 113 Under the
former Italian Commercial Code, this was the doctrine of
the courts, 114 until the Court of Cassation liberally recognized the foreign lex loci contractus. 115
Although the Restatement utilizes the same divisive
method, Judge Learned Hand in his well-known judgment
in a carriage case, 116 has been less outspoken in defining the
scope of the law of the place of performance. Repeating the
alleged rule that the initial validity and interpretation of a
another law, as including: the provisions conforming to the mercantile convenience of holders of bills of lading (thus bowing to 34 RGZ. 72, So, see
supra p. 276 n. 7S) ; the modalities of discharge; and the provisions involving
the conditions under which rights and obligations accrue between carrier and
consignee in the meaning of the German C. Com. §§ 614 ff. It would seem
that all these problems are still treated as subject to public policy. Whether
this would be the attitude at present, I venture to question.
112 Montevideo Treaty on Navigation (1940) art. 26, supra n. 47·
113 AssER-RIVIER, Elements § 33; FROMAGEOT, rS Revue Autran (1902-03)
744; 5 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT§ S51; I Repert. 269 No. 21.
Belgium: Trib. com. Antwerp (Jan. 14, 1S91) Jur. Port Anvers 1S93.1.19;
and App. Gent (May 2, 1901) Clunet 1902, 390. In both cases, loss on the
open seas, law of the Belgian port of destination or discharge, respectively;
Trib. com. Antwerp (Jan. 7, 1903) infra.
114 Italy: C. Com. (1SS2) art. 5S; App. Trieste (May 31, 1932) Rivista
1934, 5S3, 2S Revue Dor (1933) 349: maritime carriage from France to
Italy; notice of damage in Italy has to observe Italian C. Com. art. 415.
115 Cass. (June S, 1933) supra.
116 Louis-Dreyfus v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd. (C. C. A. 2d 1930) 43 F.·
(2d) S24, S26, cf. Vol. II pp. 465, 540 n. So.
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contract are governed by the law of the place of making the
contract, but that any breach or nonperformance is governed
by the law of the place of performance, he nevertheless
started his own investigation by the observation that "th,e
boundaries of this doctrine are not easy to find." The issue,
moreover, was whether a grain shipment from Duluth to
Montreal with transshipment in Pt. Colbourne was subject
to American law with respect to the entire distance or was
governed by the Canadian Water-Carriage of Goods Act
with respect to a loss occurring in the Canadian port. The
decision derives the latter answer from the fact that the
carrier 117 was in the course of performing his duty in Canada
when the negligence of his servant occurred. But this formalistic language reveals the idea that the carrier, by
promising transportation to be made first in the United
States and then in Canada and stipulating for exoneration
from negligence was subject to the American public policy
invalidating the clause only so long as the goods were moving
to the border. This idea is certainly not far from the intentions of the carriers in through routes, as we shall observe.
Personally, I think the decision, as to the result, is right.
Of course, from such a point of view, the contrary construction is not excluded, viz., to the effect that the entire
contract is subject to the American law because it was centered here. This conclusion would be nearer to the tendency
of the great majority of American decisions applying the
lex loci contractus to every problem.
However, which construction to prefer is evidently a
matter of interpretation of the contract, and this interpretation is a legal matter belonging without doubt to the law
governing the contract or, in the language of the American
117 The second ship, carrying the goods from Pt. Colbourne was chartered
by the defendant's agent, and therefore the defendant carrier was liable
for the ship "as for his own."
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judges, including Judge L. Hand, to the law of the place of
contracting.
Unfortunately, no such justification can be furnished for
a subsequent decision of the Second Federal Circuit Court, 118
which comprises within the scope of "performance" the
question whether the carrier's misdelivery of the goods is a
breach, and whether this excuses the cargo owner from
giving notice of nondelivery within five days after discharge,
as stipulated. The court assigns these questions in the instant
case to German law, a decision that is in all too perfect
harmony with the ill-reputed German doctrine. The effect
of a contractual clause in the case of events not foreseen by
the parties is a problem of contractual construction and has
nothing to do with the place of performance. In this case
the rules and regulations of Hamburg properly determined
only the conduct of the carrier's agent for the purpose of
delivery; no question of this sort was involved.
A firmer grip on these exceptions to the general law of
the contract is urgently needed.
The overwhelmingly prevailing conception extends the
unitary law of the contract to the existence, excusability,
and effects of nonperformance. It would seem also that a
stipulation exempting the carrier from damages under certain circumstances on the ground of misdelivery belongs to
this scope. 119
(c) Custody in case of refused acceptance. A case decided by the German Supreme Court is a good illustration.
A German, having sold 2000 pairs of bicycle pedals to a
buyer in Birmingham, England, contracted with an agent
in Hamburg for their carriage which was performed through
118 Bank of California, N. A. v. International Mercantile Marine Co.
(C. C. A. 2d 1933) 64 F. (2d) 97·
119 To this effect, M. & T. Trust Co. v. Export S. S. Corp. (1932) 256
N. Y. Supp. 590, reversed, 259 N. Y. Supp. 393, re-aff'd (1932) 262 N. Y.
92, applies American federal law as lex loci contractus, as against the law
of French Morocco as lex loci destinationis. See also infra n. 124.
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the Hamburg agent of the General Steam Navigation Company by steamer to Norwich, from there by the Great
Eastern Railway to the station at Curzon Street. The buyer
refused to accept the goods, and the railroad notified shipper
and consignee that the goods were stored at the sender's
risk at the railway depot. Delivery was finally delayed by
servants of the railway. The Court, applying English law,
stated that the duty of custody owed by the carrier on the
ground of the affreightment contract was terminated when
the buyer refused to accept the goods in a reasonable time,
and hence the Hamburg agent was not liable for subsequent
events. 120
(d) As imperative law. We have encountered the law of
the place of performance as necessarily governing the liability of carriers in transports to the ports of the United
States, Belgium, and, conditionally, the Netherlands ;121 the
entire contract in Argentina and Brazil ;122 and various problems in Germany. 123
Chile, where affreightments made in a Chilean port are
subject to the lex fori, moreover, imposes its domestic law
"as to everything regarding the unloading or any other act
that should be done on Chilean territory." (C. Com. art.
975 par. 2)
None of these last three extravagances is compatible with
international reciprocity.
IV.
1.

Loss oF RIGHTS oF THE CoNsiGNEE

Failure to Give Notice of Loss or Damage

Legal provisions. Before the introduction of the Brussels
Convention concerning bills of lading, an informative controversy arose in France on the application of article 435
RG. (April 10, 1901) 48 RGZ. 108.
Supra p. 267.
12 2 Supra pp. 255, z68 n. 47·
12s Supra p. 283 n. III.
12o
121
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(par. I) of the French Commercial Code which barred all
actions against the master and the insurers for damage done
to the goods if the goods have been accepted without protest. In one view, this provision was classified under the
incidents of discharging, governed by the law of the port of
arrival, and therefore applied to all ships arriving in French
ports. 124 But the Court of Cassation always .idopted the
opposite theory that the law intended by the parties, or
other general law of the contract, includes time and formalities to be observed by the consignee. 125 This certainly
is the sounder view. To the contrary, an Italian decision
regarded the analogous provisions of the former Italian
Commercial Code, article 4 I 5, as pertaining to the incidents
of delivery; yet this rested on the construction of the then
conflicts rule of the same Code, article 58. 126
The Brussels Convention has been less rigorous. If the
notice of loss is not given at the time when the goods are
removed into the custody of the person entitled to delivery,
only prima facie evidence of acceptance is constituted. 121
Rebuttal by proof to the contrary being possible, the notice
is no longer a necessary prerequisite to suit. 128 In accordance
with our view expounded earlier the new rule ought to be
applied in all courts when the Convention is adopted in the
state of the port of departure. 129 In the United States, of
course, it is applicable also to homeward bills of lading.
The conflicts problem is thereby eliminated in American
courts but remains unsettled for shipments to all other
countries from those which have not adopted the Rules.
124 Trib. com. Marseilles (Dec. 29, 1920) 33 Revue Autran (1922) 93,
Clunet 1922, 10u; RIPERT, 2 Droit Marit. § 1466 n. 4 and in I I Revue Dor
( 1925) 289; 5 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT 793 § 852.
125 Cass. civ. (June 19, 1929) S. 1929.1.309. This opinion has been advocated by DIENA, 2 Dir. Com. Int. 408.
1 2 6App. Trieste (May 31, 1932) 28 Revue Dor (1933) 349·
127 Art. 3 (6); Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46 U. S. C. § 1303.
128 The Southern Cross (1940) 1940 Am. Marit. Cas. 59·
129 See Vol. II p. 426 and supra p. 26 5·
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Stipulation limiting the time for claims. Clauses in bills
of lading requiring that notice should be given to the
carrier and claims brought within a certain period of time,
in principle depends on the law of the contract. This has
been recognized by American courts. 130
Under the Brussels Convention, a clause limiting time to
less than one year is ineffective. 131 On this ground such
clauses have been rejected in American decisions as to both
outward 132 and homeward133 bills of lading. Longer periods
are permitted. 134
Apart from such modification by public policy, the law
of the port of departure ought to govern.
It is a different consideration when public law is declared
to intervene. In a Canadian through bill, the time for claims
after delivery was restricted to four months, and such
stipulation was held inoperative after the shipment passed
the Canadian border into the United States, because a pro130 Before the introduction of the Brussels Convention, in The President
Monroe ( 1935) 286 N. Y. Supp. 990, the clause would have been determined
under the expressly stipulated law of the Strait Settlements, if this had been
proved.
In The Carso ( 1937) 1937 Am. Marit. Cas. 1078, it seems that the governing law was English, but the court did not find a reason for distinguishing English and American authorities holding the clause to be valid.
The decision in M. & T. Trust Co. v. Export S. S. Corp. (1932) 256 N. Y.
Supp. 590, supra p. 243 n. 45, implies the same view.
Recently the clause was upheld in an interstate shipment not considered
subject to the Carriage Act of 1936, Newport Rolling Mills v. Miss. Valley
Lines (1943) 50 F. Supp. 623, 1943 Am. Marit. Cas. 793·
Opposite solutions appeared in Bank of California N. A. v. Int. Mercantile
Marine Co. (C. C. A. 2d 1933) 64 F. (2d) 97 criticized supra n. u8, where,
however, American law was substituted, no proof of German law being
offered; and in Duche v. Brocklebank (D. C. E. D. N. Y. 1929) 35 F. (2d)
184, applying American law as that of the port of arrival.
131 Convention, art. 3 (6); 49 Stat. 1207, § 3, 46 U. S. C. § 1303.
132
The Argentino, Buxton Limitida S. A. v. Rederi (1939) 28 F. Supp.
440, 1939 Am. Marit. Cas. 815.
133
The Zaremba (C. C. A. 2d 1943) 136 F. (2d) 320, 1943 Am. Marit.
Cas. 954·
134 U. S. v. Gydnia American Shipping Lines, Ltd. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1944)
57 F. Supp. 369.
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vision of the Interstate Commerce Act required a minimum
period of nine months. 135
2.

Limitation of Actions

The legal provisions restricting the time during which a
carrier may be sued for nondelivery or defective delivery,
are regarded as substantive in Continental laws. For they
affect the right, although only the action is barred. 136
Although the French writers share this view, 131 the
French Supreme Court disagrees. This court once, precisely
in a case of affreightment, announced the theory that the
domicil of the debtor governs limitation138 and in another
such case has reiterated this questionable idea. 139 N evertheless, the period of limitation is characterized as substantive.
An American court, however, disregarded the French
limitation to one year of the action against a carrier and
applied the lex fori, when the holder sued upon a bill of
lading issued at the French port of departure and stipulating
for French law; this follows the usual approach of common
law lawyers. 140
Goldberg v. Delaware etc. Ry. Co. (1943) 40 N.Y. Supp. (zd) 44·
See Vol. I pp. 64-67 and infra Chs. 52 and 53; for an action against
a carrier see, e.g., App. Bologna (June 2, 1913) Riv. Dir. Com. 19I4 II 43·
1 3 7 5 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT§ 854; LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE § 358; I Repert.
269 § 25; BATIFFOL § 584.
138 Cass. civ. (Jan. I3, I869) D. I869.I.135, S. I869.1.49; followed in Trib.
com. Anvers (Jan. 7, I903) I8 Revue Autran (I902-o3) 90I, under the
theory of lex loci executionis.
139 Cass. civ. (Jan. 9, I934) S. I934·I.20I, D. I934.1.22, Revue Crit. I934,
9I5, Clunet I934, 672; Cass. civ. (July I, 1936) Revue Crit. I937, I75, Clunet
I937. 302.
140 A. Salomon, Inc. v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique (I929) 32 F.
(zd) 283.
135

136
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Other Transportation Contracts
l.

MARITIME TRANSPORTATION OF PERSONS

ARRIAGE of persons by sea, because of certain
features, has become a separate topic in the more
recent municipal enactments. Conflicts law has not
given it much special attention. Some writers, it is true, have
urged the significance of the flag, with more insistence than
for carriage of goods, because a passenger boards the ship
in person, stays under the captain's discipline, and is subject to the national penal jurisdiction of the ship's country. 1
However, not until the Dutch rule for time charters 2 and
the Italian law of 1942 3 did any decision or law declare for
the law of the flag.
Passenger tickets often refer to the law of the vessel, but
this still leaves the subsidiary rule open.

C

I.

Lex Loci Contractus

In addition to the usual advocates, 4 a few American
decisions have characteristically employed the law of the
place of contracting. A Massachusetts decision before the
Harter Act, under the lex loci contractus, enforced an
English exemption clause to which the Cunard Line referred
in the ticket for a voyage from England to the United
1 SCERNI 243; BATIFFOL 260 § 287. NussBAUM, D. IPR. 286 risks the assertion
that the law of the flag governs "without doubt." Most plausibly, this view
is advocated by ToRQUATo GIANNINI, II passaggiero marittimo istruito
(Milano 1939).
2 The Netherlands: C. Com. art. 533 p.
3 Italy: Disp. Prel. C. Navig. art. xo.
4 DIENA, 3 Dir. Com. Int. 376 and cit. n. 5·
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States. 5 The same court, however, again sanctioned the application of English law to a voyage from Ireland to
Massachusetts, although the passage was booked in Boston.
For justification the court construed the contract made in
Boston by the passenger's daughter as a mere preliminary
to the "contract ticket" received in England. 6 A better reason
would have been that the embarking rather than the booking
was decisive. In a more recent case, a ticket was bought
in the United States for a voyage from Alaska to Seattle.
The passenger, an Indian girl, was attacked, probably in
the waters of British Columbia, by two negroes of the crew.
Tort action against the company according to the law of
this Canadian province, was excluded for procedural reasons. But action for damages according to general maritime
law was granted because the carrier had the contractual
duty to protect passengers against violence of its own crew. 7
In this case it would have been immaterial if the ticket
had been bought in British Columbia, or if the vessel had
flown the Norwegian or the Japanese flag. The only consistent theory was expressed by one court when it applied
the law of the place where the journey begins. 8
2.

Other Contacts

Repetitiously, we may briefly note that a few European
writers think that the passenger, subject to the carrier's
fixed conditions, must also be under its law, 9 to which the
C6digo Bustamante agrees. 10 The Treaty of Montevideo
5

Fonseca v. Cunard Steamship Co. (1891) 153 Mass. 553, 27 N. E. 665.
O'Regan v. Cunard Steamship Co. ( 1894) 160 Mass. 356, 35 N. E. 1070.
7 Pacific S. S. Co. v. Sutton (C. C. A. 9th 1925) 7 F. (2d) 579; The Admiral
Evans (1925) 1925 Am. Marit. Cas. 1335.
8 Wiley v. Grand Trunk R. of Canada (D. C. W. D. N. Y. 1915) 227
Fed. 127, 130.
9
FICKER, 4 Rechtsvergl. Handwiirterbuch 481; SCERNI 244 f.
1o C6digo Bustamante, art. 185.
6
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points to the place of the maritime agency, 11 and some
German authors to the port of destination. 12
I
Soviet law declares itself applicable whenever one party
is a citizen. 13
3· Special Laws
The passenger's coming on board and leaving the ship
are subject to local laws, if these are different from the
governing law. Thus, the Dutch law provides that the
(Dutch) provisions including those applicable before or
at embarkation and those applicable at or after disembarking, always apply if the embarkation takes place in a Dutch
harbor. 14
That many local administrative rules are to be observed
by a vessel in leaving and landing and that they have
compulsory force, are facts which the contracting parties are
deemed to contemplate. Emigration laws are not the only
ones so to be observed.
4· Conclusion
As American courts correctly see it, it is no convincing
argument that the monopoly of a carrier points to the tacit
acceptance of his domiciliary law. Nor has the law of the
flag any natural claim to regulate the contractual rights
and duties of a person alien to the ship's nationality. However, it has been persuasively said that it is more awkward
to discriminate among passengers than to differentiate goods
on board a vessel. Is there an objective criterion outside the
ship for establishing a sound local connection?
11

Treaty of Montevideo on Int. Commercial Law (1889) art. 14.
SCHAPS, before § 664 n. 8; contra: BAR, Int. Handelsr. 442; 2 FRANKENSTEIN 536.
13 Law of June 14, 1929, art. 4(2), see FREUND, Das Seeschiffahrtsrecht der
Sowjetunion ( 1930) 70.
14 Dutch C. Com. art. 533c par. 2.
12
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The port of destination must be excluded. An American
acquiring a ticket for China cannot be considered by any
argument to have contracted under Chinese law. But it is
no less a mistake to freeze the applicable law at the technical
point of completing a legally binding contract. Booking in
Rio de Janeiro for a voyage from New York to Southampton, or accepting in Rio a stateroom for such a crossing, offered by cable by a New York travel bureau, does
not establish Brazilian law as dominant.
Where the desirable stipulation for an applicable law is
missing, the agreed port of departure may be accepted as
the important center of the contractual relationship. The objection that the choice of this port is accidental, is not true.
No passenger regards his point of embarkation as immaterial. He may think that he is allowed to board the
ship at a subsequent landing place, in Montevideo instead
of Buenos Aires, in Cherbourg instead of Southampton,
but he will presume that this makes no difference in his
contract, as he also will not expect to recover the price
difference if his berth has remained unfilled. Nevertheless,
as mentioned earlier with regret/ 5 New York applies American law on grounds of public policy where a ticket for
passage between two foreign ports is purchased in the
United States.
The choice, therefore, is between the port of departure
indicated on the ticket and the flag. The latter may be
preferable.
II.

MARITIME TRANSPORTATION OF BAGGAGE

The Continental literature has expounded that the obligation of carriers to transport baggage, at least when
checked for this purpose/ 6 is a collateral pact annexed to
15
16

Vol. II p. 421 f.
Baggage taken by a passenger to his stateroom, in a traditional wide-

OTHER TRANSPORTATION CONTRACTS

295

the contract of passage; but it has been asserted at the
same time that the rights and duties flowing from this agreement are analogous to those relating to the carriage of
goods. 17 It follows in the municipal field that it does not
matter whether the baggage is "free," that is, paid with
the ticket, or must be paid---separately. In the conflicts field,
the consequence is that the rules involving carriage of goods
would be correctly applied.
The well-known decision of the British Privy Council of
r 8 6 518 concerning lost luggage has been considered a leading
case for maritime and even for all contracts. The English
law of the place of contracting was applied, but it happened
to agree with both parties' domicil, the flag of both vessels
engaged in the carriage, and the port of departure. 19 Under
analogous circumstances, an American court, before the
Harter Act, declared valid under English common law a
clause limiting liability of the vessel to a value of ten pounds.
The vessel was English, went from England to the United
States, and the ticket was bought in England. 20
The law of the flag, 21 in this case again, has much
attraction.
III.

FLUVIAL TRANSPORT

The much-needed unification of the law involving international transportation on rivers and canals has failed to
spread opinion, is not subject to contractual obligation. But analogy to the
liability of innkeepers has sometimes been advocated, and more recently the
literature definitely prefers contractual liability for any baggage by sea
or land. See for France, ]HAN lzE, Responsabilite en matiere de transport
des baggages (Paris I936) 34, 38, 42.
17 5 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT § 83I; Dutch C. Com. art. 533 par. I. Contra:
T. GIANNINI, supra n. I.
18 P. & 0. Steam Navigation Co. v. Shand (I865) 3 Moo. P. C, Cas. (N. S.)
272.
19 I d. at 29I.
20 The Majestic (C. C. A. 2d I894) 6o Fed. 624, reversed (I897) I66 U. S.
375, 38I on the same basis of English law, because the clause on the back
of the ticket was not a part of the contract.
21 Advocated by 2 FRANKENSTEIN 536, ScERNI 244, MoNACO I4I, adopted
by Italian C. Navig. Disp. Pre!. art. IO.

296

SPECIAL OBLIGATIONS

materialize despite strenuous efforts before they were temporarily ended by World War II. 22 Territorial law has,
of course, paramount importance with respect to territorial
waters, rivers, lakes, and canals. Nevertheless, many conflicts of laws are possible and should not all be left simply
to the state where the waterway is situated.
In the carriage on the great lakes, canals, and rivers
between the United States and Canada, the conflicts principles are taken without hesitation from the maritime model;
this is an effect of the through bills recognized in both
countries. The port of departure furnishes the applicable
law. 23
The matters not yet covered by international drafts such
as limitation of liability, assistance and salvage, attachment, and documents of transport, deserve unification,
and at least an international clarification of the conflicts
principle. 24
IV.

LAND TRANSPORTATION

Carriage of goods is prominent in conflicts discussion, but
no material difference attaches to the carriage of persons
and baggage.
2 2 On developments since the Vienna Congress and the more recent Barcelona Convention and Statute of 1921, which included nationality and registration of vessels, ownership, and collision, see OsBORNE MANCE, International River and Canal Transport (1944) 4, 21. Of the older literature:
NIBOYET, "Etude de droit international prive fluvial," 5 Revue Dr. Int.
(Bruxelles) ( 1924) 333·
23 Grammer Steamship Co. v. James Richardson & Sons, Ltd.
(D. C.
W. D. N. Y. 1929) 37 F. (2d) 366, 368, aff'd (C. C. A. 2d 1931) 47 F. (2d)
186: lake freighters from Ontario to Buffalo, under two charters and bills
of lading, Canadian law. (The court speaks only of the Canadian place of
making the contract.) See also Louis-Dreyfus v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd.
(C. C. A. 2d 1930) 43 F. (2d) 824 as to the main governing law, but see
supra Ch. 44 p. 27 with respect to the law governing performance. As an
example of an internal American carriage under the New York Produce
Exchange Canal Grain Charter Party No. 1, see ] ames Richardson & Sons,
Ltd. v. Conners Marine Co. (C. C. A. 2d 1944) 141 F. (2d) 226.
2 4 See MANCE, supra n. 22, at 104; SEBBA, "Das Internationale Privatrecht
der Binnenschiffahrt," 10 Mitteilungen dt. Ges. Volker R. ( 1930) 107 ff.,
and proposals, 173 f.
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Interstate commerce legislation in the United States and
the Bern convention on the carriage of goods by rail, now
accompanied by a convention on the carriage of persons and
baggage, in their large scope have practically eliminated
the conflicts of laws. Universally, some progress has been
achieved by the very wide Acceptance of through transportation to the effect that a contract of carriage is considered
"one contract" in certain situations involving successive
earners.
The outstanding model for such unity of contract is the
case where a carrier undertakes transportation over a distance which he does not intend to reach within his own
business. He concludes and signs the only contract to which
the consignor is a party. The subsequent carriers are his
agents in performing the contract. In the absence of an
express provision, he is liable for loss or damage occurring
on any part of the journey. 25 A situation which is equivalent
in many respects arises when the agent dealing with the
consignor acts in his own name and as authorized agent for
preceding or subsequent carriers or the latter are made
liable by law. Where thus all carriers, or the first and the
last, are considered liable, usually each carrier is only responsible for losses on his own line/ 6 but there are exceptions
of joint and several liability for the whole carriage. 27
25 England: Great Western Ry. v. Blake ( z862) 7 H. & N. 987; Thomas
v. Rhymney Ry. ( I87I) L. R. 6 Q. B. 266; ScRU'ITON, Charterparties
84 n. (p).
United States: See infra n. 79· E.g., Uniform Straight Bill of Lading,
issued by a railroad for rail and water carriage from a point in one state
to a point in another state, see Palmer et al., Trustees v. Agwilines, Inc.
(D. C. E. D. N. Y. I94I) 42 F. Supp. 239, I94I Am. Marit. Cas. I556;
Lyons-Magnus v. American HawaiianS. S. Co. (I94I) I94I Am. Marit. Cas.
I29I (through bill from Italy to New York and by coast to San Francisco).
Belgium: I SMEESTERS and WINKELMOLEN § 464.
Germany: HGB. §§ 432 par. I, 449' ("Hauptfrachtfiihrer" and "Unterfrachtfiihrer"); I37 RGZ. 301.
The Netherlands: C. Com. art. 5I7V.
26 United States: E.g., Contracts, Terms, and Conditions on the back of
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In view of the present scarcity of conflicts in the United
States and Europe, Batiffol has referred to the numerous
former American and French decisions. 28
I.

Carriage of Goods

Law of the place of shipping. The ·vast majority of the
American cases of the time previous to interstate regulation
proclaimed the law of the state where the goods were
shipped and the contract of carriage was made, 29 a duality
of premises often stressed in the formulations of the courts.
The same has been the constant position of the French
courts throughout. 30
The revised text of the Montevideo Treaty on commercial law, abandoning the law of the place of destination,
which generally governs, applies the law of the place of
contracting31 to the form, effects, and nature of a unitary conthe Uniform Through Export Bill of Lading,§ 2 (a) (b); and cf. New York
Produce Exchange v. B. & 0. Ry. Co. ( 1917) 46 ICC. 666, 670.
The Netherlands: C. Com. art. 517W par. 2.
Italy: For transport of persons, C. C. (1942) art. 1682; and as to usual
clauses, BRUNETTI, Manuale del diritto della navigazione marittima e interna
( 1947) 259·
27 The Netherlands: C. Com. art. 517w par. I.
Italy: C. C. (1942) art. 1700 cf. VIVANTE, 4 Trattato Dir. Com.§§ 2102 ff.;
AsQUIN!, infra n. 43, 470 § 180 (as to the former C. Com. arts. 399, 4II).
Argentina: C. Com. art. 171; cf. Cam. Ape!. La Plata (May 23, 1947)
47 La Ley ( 1947) 32, 34·
28 BATIFFOL 233 ff.
2 9 See the cases in Beale's many notes recorded by BATIFFOL 23& n. 4 and
in BATIFFOL 239 f. § 267. For example, see the much cited decisions, Grand v.
Livingston (1&96) 4 App. Div. 589, 38 N. Y. Supp. 490; Powers Mercantile
Co. v. Wells-Fargo & Co. ( 1904) 93 Minn. 143, 100 N. W. 735; Carpenter
v. U. S. Export Co. (1912) 120 Minn. 59, 139 N. W. I54·
3 France: A long series of identical decisions, Cass. (March 31, 1874)
8. 1874·1.385 j (Aug. 25, 1875) S. 1875·1-426 j (Aug. 14, 1876) 8. 1876.1.478
etc.; cf. BATIFFOL 243 f. An old decision App. Colmar (June 30, 1865)
S. 1866.2.25 considered the (French) place of contracting rather than the
Alsatian place of dispatch; but Trib. Ceret (April 22, 1921) D. 1921.2.I45
is cited to the opposite effect.
Argentine decisions to this effect and 4 Vrco 151 § 165, have been super·
seded, see infra n. 37, but the Montevideo Treaty on Int. Com. Terr. Law,
art. 14, adopts the law of the place of contracting.
31 Montevi!Leo Treaty on Int. Com. Terr. Law (1940) art. 14.
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tract of through carriage, affecting the territory of several
countries. A contract that promises cumulated services of
several carriers by a single and direct instrument of transport,32 is recognized as unitary.
Law of the place of loss. In a former minority view,
the law of the place where the goods are injured or lost
governed. This theory has been favored by some English
and Continental writers and some French and American
decisions. 33 It was approved by Minor because the result
achieves identity of solutions for tort and contract actions. 34
Such a split may be intended by the parties, 35 and in fact
is very frequently stipulated. But as a confusion of the
spheres of contract and tort, the rule deserved its rejection. 36
There are, however, modern parallels. To some extent,
the Argentine Supreme Court shares the view that each
distance is governed by its own territorial law. 37
A comparable result is reached by the Dutch reform
legislation of 1924. It has been taken for granted that the
carrier contracting for through carriage on his own account
is only responsible according to the laws obtaining in each
territory passed. The same division, a fortiori, characterizes
the liability of several carriers. 38
32 I d. art. 15. A similar provision in art. 259 of C6digo Bustamante probably refers to the law of contracts of adhesion, art. 185.
33 See FooTE 456; BATIFFOL 237 n. 1; for American cases, see 2 BEALE 1163
n. 2 and BATIFFOL 235 n. 4•
34 MINOR 381 § 160.
35 France: Cass. civ. (June 12, 1883) S. 1884.1.164; (Dec. 4, 1894) D.
1895·1.526; opposed by BATIFFOL 236, not rightly in my opinion.
36 See, e.g., Faulkner v. Hart (188o) 82 N. Y. 413, 422; EcHAVARRI, 3 Cod.
Com. 525; BATIFFOL 234 ff. §§ 262, 263.
37 Argentina: S. Ct. (Sept. 28, 1931) 36 Jur. Arg. 839 (Molins & Cia. v.
Ferrocarril Central de Buenos Aires) assumes a unitary enterprise of carriage from Paraguay to Argentina but emphasizes that this does not prejudice
the application of the territorial laws of the states along the line of travel.
This may have been an obiter dictum in a case where the assumption of
delay of the transport depended on the speed territorially prescribed, but
has been understood in a broader meaning. Cf. Cam. Com. Cap. (June 3, 1938)
62 Jur. Arg. 792; Cam. Apel. Mendoza (May 10, 1941) 74 Jur. Arg. 793·
ss The Netherlands: C. Com. art. 517v: The carrier makes himself liable
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Law of the place of destination. While the place of the
loss has sometimes been considered a place of performance,
a few decisions, some of them involving lost baggage, applied the law of the place where delivery is due. 39
The prevailing criterion, disguised as lex loci contractus,
has been defended against the emphasis on performance
by arguing that the contract is one and the performance a
continuous act not restricted to the final delivery ;• 0 that the
shipper is presumed to send the goods under the law he
knows ;41 and that dispatching includes the commencement
of performance, 42 or, under certain theories is essential for
the conclusion of the contract. 43 More often, the plurality
of the places of performance has been said to leave the law
of the place of contracting the only available one. The truth
is that a carriage contract has its only material center in
the place of dispatch, which has little to do with contracting
and more with the delivery to the carrier and his acceptance,
the Roman receptum, than with performance.
Special law. It would seem that the incidents of loading
and unloading should have a special rule analogous to maritime carriage. The Montevideo text of 1940, in fact, establishes as a special rule that the law of the state where
for the whole distance "in conformity with the law applicable to each part
of the transport"; art. 517w par. 1: "Two or more carriers who accept
goods . . . are liable for the entire carriage in conformity with the law in
force for each part of the transport."
3 9 E.g., Brown v. Camden & Atlantic R. Co. (1877) 83 Pa. St. 316 and
other cases cited by BATIFFOL 237 n. 1 and § 265. On baggage, Curtis v. Delaware, Lackawanna R. Co. ( 1878) 74 N. Y. 116; Williams v. Central R. Co.
of N. ]. ( 1904) 93 App. Div. 582, 88 N. Y. Supp. 434·
40 Thomas, D. ]., in Wiley v. Grand Trunk R. of Canada (D. C. W. D.
N. Y. 1915) 227 Fed. 127.
41 Valk v. Erie R. Co. (1909) 130 App. Div. 446, 114 N.Y. Supp. 964.
4 2 Cole, J., in McDaniel v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1868) 24 Iowa 412
stressed that it was necessary to transport the goods consigned to Chicago
on the territory of Iowa. See more cases in BATIFFOL 239 n. 2.
43 See AsQUIN!, Del contratto di trasporto, in Bolaffio e Vivante, 6 II codice
di commercia commentato (ed. 6, 1935) II 147 § 49· The Bern and Rome
Conventions are considered to require the acceptance of the goods, see
ARMINJON, 1 Droit Int. Pr. Com. 431 § 245·
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the delivery is made or should have been made to the consignee, governs the questions concerning its performance
and the form of the delivery. 44 A decision of the French
Supreme Court may really rest on such a consideration;
it determines the formalitid and the time for protest as
well as for the request for examination of the goods according to the (foreign) law of French Morocco rather
than according to the Algerian (French) law of the shipping place. 45
2.

Carriage of Persons

The transportation of passengers on railroads does not
cause much conflict of laws at present. We may take it from
the former practice of the American courts that here, too,
the place of departure as indicated in the ticket supplies
the law. 46 The reason, again, is not that the contract is a
"real" contract needing performance for its completion,
which is a minority opinion. In the majority view, the ticket
is only evidence. 47
A case that has retained some actuality in the United
States concerns "free passes," providing gratuitous transportation but expressly excluding liability for accidents. The
latter stipulation has been recognized under federal law/ 8
44 Montevideo Treaty on Int. Corn. Law, art. 14 in fine. On the interpretation, in part too broad as usual, see LAZCANO, "El trasporte terrestre y rnixto
en el Derecho Internacional Privado," 6 Rev. Arg. Der. Int. (1944) ser. 2,
VII, 252, 264, 343, 355, 357, 363.
45 Cass. civ. (April 12, 1938) 5 Nouv. Revue (1938) 627, reversing a
decision of the App. Cour of Paris which applied the lex loci contractus.
The 1940 text of Montevideo on Corn. Terr. Law, art. 15 par. 2, adopts the
special rule of the place of arrival for questions concerning delivery, see
infra n. 84.
46 Example: Ticket taken in Maine for transport of a person between two
places in Manitoba; Manitoba law applies, Brown v. Can. Pac. Ry. (x887)
4 Man. R. 396.
47 DALLOZ, 1 Nouveau repert. de droit (1947) 770 No. 89.
48 Francis etc. v. Southern Pacific Co. (C. C. A. xoth 1947) 162 F. (2d)
813, aff'd, 333 U. S. 445, cf. Ins. L. J. 1947, 761 (pass issued under the Hepburn Act, 49 U. S. C. § x and based on federal law). A different situation
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and in cases of multiple contacts under the law more favorable to the validity of the clause. 49 It would be simpler and
more satisfactory to realize that such a clause is perfectly
justifiable under any law if, and only if, the grant of free
transportation is a courtesy and not a part of wages.
We may note here a Belgian decision 50 elucidating the
relation between contract and tort from a point of view
not yet mentioned in this work. By judgment of a court in
Rome, Italy, a streetcar company was declared liable
simultaneously upon tort and breach of contract, for the
damage done to the family of a man killed in Tivoli, near
Rome. The action for enforcement in Belgium was denied
for the reason that the damages were wrongly assessed in
Italy. The family could sue only for tort since such claim
is personal. In contract they could sue only for the damage
suffered by the deceased himself, on survival of his action.
To explain this curious case, it may be noted that Italian
legislation did not hold railways responsible for damage
without proof of negligence. 51

v.
1.

AIR TRANSPORTATION

The Warsaw Convention

In commercial law, air transport has essentially the same
position as maritime transport. 52 Charters of planes and
consignments are comparable to charters of ships and bills
existed in Sasinowski v. Boston etc. Ry. (C. C. A. 1st 1935) 74 F. (2d) 628
(a circus train); transportation was held to be agreed upon by the railway
and the employer, a circus, and governed, with its exemption clause, by
the Massachusetts law of the place of contracting because the railroad acted
as a private carrier.
49
Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe R. Co. v. Smith (1913) 38 Okla. 157,
132 Pac. 494·
50 App. Bruxelles (July 14, 1941) Bonacci v. S. A. Belprise, Jur. Com.
Brux. 1942, 34·
51 See VIVANTE, 4 Trattato Dir. Com. §§ 2167 f.
52 MoNACO 146 with citations.
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of lading. 53 Charters are distinguished as flight or voyage
charter, time charter or lease, and charter hire. 54
It has been said that the document of carriage, either of
goods or of persons, regularly CQntains a clause referring
to a specific law, which is ordinarily that of the carrier. 55
In the absence of such clause, conflicts problems would
be particularly hard to solve if the Warsaw Convention and
its almost worldwide adoption 56 had not eliminated the
most conspicuous sources of trouble. Like the Hague Rules
which inspired them, the provisions of the Convention,
cutting through the opposing interests involved and smoothing out the legal distinction of tort and contract, have found
a middle road, more favorable to the air carriers than some
preceding speciallaws. 57 By such enactments as the British 58
and the Brazilian, 59 the rules of the Convention have been
incorporated into the national body of law, to be applied
also with respect to nonmember states.
The Convention fails to provide for the question whether
the parties may choose their law. An English author has
therefore asserted that they may do so. 60 So far as we can
see, it seems certain that the Convention does not tolerate
53 Cf., e.g., Curtiss-Wright Flying Service, Inc. v. Glose (1933) 66 F. (2d)
710; 1933 U. S. Av. R. 26, 30; cert. denied, 290 U. S. 696, 1934 U. S. Av. R.
20.
54 Thus, the U. S. Av. R. Indices.
55 VAN HoUFFE, La responsabilite civile dans les transports aeriens interieurs et internationaux ( 1940) 61.
56 See Vol. II p. 342. A few words are due here to this international
achievement, including tort and contract claims. On the reassumption of
the prewar drafts and amendment proposals to the Convention, see KNAUGHT,
1946 Annual Survey 771.
57
This has been observed with some astonishment in Italy, App. Milano
(April 29, 1938) Giur. Ital. 1939 I 2, 53·
58
British Carriage by Air Act, 1932, 22 and 23 Geo. s., c. 36.
59
Brazil: Codigo do Air, D. Lei No. 483, of June 8, 1938, art. 68 par. un;
see HuGO SIMAS, C6digo brasileiro do air (1939) 164.
60
•
N. H. MoLLER, Law of Civil Aviation ( 1936) 297; CONRADI£, "InternatiOnal Private Law and The [South African] Carriage by Air Act, 1946,"
64 S. A. L. ]. ( 1947) 6o n. 28 repeats the question without answer.
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any deviation by party agreement 61 and being a worldwide
compromise, has a role similar to the Hague Rules. The
General Conditions of the former International Air Traffic
Association, now International Air Transport Association
(both known as lATA), implementing it, assure that the
paramount clause referring to the Convention, if at all
material, is practically never omitted.
It has also been doubted whether the Convention covers
contractual relations or only liability for tort. The Convention, however, not only applies to air transportation
without such distinction but determines its applicability according to certain terms of the contract of carriage between
the carrier and the individual passenger.
2.

Relation to National Laws

The national rules have been reduced by the Convention
to a somewhat obscure scope. The literature distinguishes
between a carriage international in the meaning of the Convention, which is a particular concept, 62 and international
carriage in the "ordinary sense." 63 But the latter is entirely
unnecessary as a technical concept.
The Convention's definition of its own applicability has
recently raised doubts informative for studies of choice of
law. The Convention includes carriage between the territories of two parties to the Convention and the case where,
departure and destination being within the territory of one
contracting power, a stopping place in the territory of any
other power is agreed upon. In postwar discussion it has
been recognized that this delimitation imposes an unwarranted and possibly unenforceable burden upon aircraft of
61 A similar opinion is expressed in Brit. Year Book Int. Law 1938, 254,
and by LEMOINE 390 § 559·
62 Art. 1 (2) of the Convention.
63 Crossing of a border and a single document of transportation are required, cf. LEMOINE 387 § 555·
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nonmember states (e.g., upon a Portuguese air line taking
passengers from New York to Bermuda) and subjects air
lines to different systems of liabilities according to the distances indicated in the tickets. 64 In thf United States, moreover, it has been complained that the maximum amount of
liability, often inadequate for American standards, strangely
differs from the superior compensation due in the same case
of an accident within the United States, to other passengers
with a domestic ticket. 65
Yet it has been replied:
"On the other hand, to base the applicability of the
Convention solely upon the nationality of the aircraft
irrespective of the place of departure or destination, or the
'lex loci contractus' (or, which may be the same thing, upon
the proper law of the contract), would raise difficulties of
jurisdiction, and also practical difficulties since aircraft of
different nationality flying the same route might be operating upon a different liability basis . . . possibly a combination of the two criteria may prove to be the solution." 66
The municipal laws raise questions respecting the relation
of the Convention to federal and state statutes. The few
American cases in point deal with the following questions.
Death of passengers. The Warsaw Convention has been
implemented in Great Britain by certain provisions set out
in the Second Schedule of the Carriage by Air Act, 1932.
Thereby, the liability is enforceable "for the benefit of
such of the members of the passenger's family as sustained
damage by reason of his death." With this complement,
the courts have since applied article 17 of the Warsaw
Convention, stating that "the carrier shall be liable for
damage sustained in the event of death or wounding of a
64 See WILBERFORCE, "The International Technical Committee of Experts in
Air Law," 1 The International Law Quarterly (1947) 498, 502.
65 RHYNE, "International Law and Air Transportation," address of July
r6, 1948, 47 Mich. L. Rev. (1949) 41, 56.
66 WILBERFORCE, supra n. 64.
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passenger.
." 67 Accordingly, the British courts recognize
a cause of action governed by the new law rather than by
Lord Campbell's (Fatal Accidents) Act. 68 Deprived of
such statutory assistance, the American decisions thus far
rendered have not determined "who may be thought to
be injured by a death." 69 It seems that these courts have made
up their mind to the effect that the cause of action for the
death of a passenger is determined by the law of the place
where the death occurred, 70 including the Death on the
High Seas Act. 71 Perhaps, a case could be made for the
death statute of the lex fori; international draftsmen are
likely to think of this first, and the British implementation
rests on such an autarchic ground. But the lex loci delicti
has doubtless a better claim in tort actions.
In another case, 72 the Warsaw Convention was applied
to a death on the high seas, but as the Convention says
nothing about interest on the debt of compensation, the
67 Schedule 2. Cf. for details, SHAWCROSS and BEAUMONT, Air Law ( I945)
I94 § 358.
68 Grein v. Imperial Airways, Ltd. [ I9371 I K. B. so, I936 U. S. Av. R.
I84, and ibid p. 211 reversing the judgment of the K. B.
69 Frank Choy, as Adm. of the Estate of Watson Choy, deceased v. PanAmerican Airways Co. (D. C. N. Y. I94I) I94I U. S. Av. R. 10, I94I Am.
Marit. Cas. 483, I942 U. S. Av. R. 93· Apart from the question "whether the
Convention confers rights or creates causes of action," the Convention is,
of course, self-executing, Rifkind, D. ]., in Indemnity Ins. Co. of North
America v. Pan-American Airways {D. C. S. D. N. Y. I944) 58 F. Supp.
338, I945 U. S. Av. R. 52, 54 f.
Garcia and Alvarez v. Pan-American Airways, Inc. and others (I946)
I83 Misc. 258, 269 App. Div. 287, 55 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 317, aff'd, 295 N. Y.
852, 67 N. E. (zd) 257. See for complete action, I946 U. S. Av. R. 496.
70 The decisions in the cases Choy, Wyman, Garcia, and Indemnity Insurance Co. {ns. 69, ]I, 72) are understood in this sense by ORR, "The Warsaw Convention," in 3I Va. L. Rev. (I945) 434 n. I8; RHYNE, Aviation
Accident Law ( I947) 270; see also GoLDBERG, "] urisdiction and Venue in
Aviation Accident Cases etc.," 36 Cal. L. Rev. (I948) 4I, 55 f. n. 59·
71 Wyman and Bartlett v. Pan-American Airways (S. Ct. N. Y. I943)
I8I Misc. 963, 43 N. Y. Supp. {zd) 420, I943 U. S. Av. R. I, aff'd, 267 App.
Div. 947, 48 N. Y. Supp. {zd) 459, aff'd, 293 N. Y. 878, 59 N. E. {2d) 785,
cert. denied, 324 U. S. 882.
72

Ibid.
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court looked to the Death on the High Seas Act which,
however, is likewise silent on interest. 73
3. The Remaining Problems
Most questions not covered by the Convention have been
uniformly answered in the Genedl Conditions mentioned
above. 74 One of these conditions prescribes that the consignment should be printed in one of the official languages of
the country of departure. This is a new hint in favor of
the law of that country for the remaining questions. However, a Dutch court took it for granted that Dutch law
governed an air passage concluded with the Royal Dutch
Airways in Bankok, Siam. 75 And the Convention itself
seems to point to the law of the forum. 76
VI.

MIXED THROUGH CARRIAGE

Mixed through routes in international trade, with alternating transportation by railway, vessel, and aircraft have
lacked adequate legal and organizational machinery, 77 with
the main exception of the through bills in the traffic between
the United States and Canada/ 8 and the American Ocean
Bill of Lading ;79 the latter as used for export, issued by
a railroad, includes the maritime carriage. Although sepa46 u. s. c. §§ 761, 762.
Supra p. 304. Cf. Grein v. Imperial Airways, supra n. 68: if the carriage
were not international in the meaning of the Warsaw Convention, it would
be governed by the IATA agreement.
75 Rb. s'Gravenhage (Feb. 28, 1935) W. 12884.
76 Vol. II 342 n. 32.
HuGO SIMAS, C6digo brasileiro do air (1939) seems to understand art. 68
par. 2 of the Brazilian Code to the same effect.
77 See the excellent summary by BAGGE, "Der Durchfrachtverkehr," 10 Z.
ausl. PR. ( 1936) 463; also in his article, "International Through Bills of
Lading," Commercial and Financial Chronicle (New York 1945) 1340, 1362.
78 See COYNE, The Railway Law of Canada (1947) 467 f.
79 Uniform Through Export Bills of Lading, prescribed by the Interstate
Commerce Commission, first under the provisions of § 441 of the Transportation Act of 1920 (§ 25 Interstate Commerce Act) see HOTCHKISS, A
Manual on the Law of Bills of Lading etc. (New York 1928) 131 £.
73

74

12
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rate "local" bills of lading may be issued on the subsequent
stages to the signer of the through bill, as shipper, the
original bill is the document intended to represent the goods,
in order to finance the transaction and to assure the right to
delivery. 80 Usually a clause provides that no carrier is liable
for loss, damage, or injury not occurring while the goods
are in its custody. 81 Difficulties in foreign countries in recognizing the American bill to its full extent have probably
diminished. 82
There have been other efforts to create appropriate facilities for through carriage, however. Thus, the International
Union of Railroads has concluded an agreement with the
International Air Transport Association ( IA T A) on combined international air-rail transportation, with implementing accords. 83 The recent Montevideo text extends the unity
of a contract in case of a through bill to mixed transportation on land, sea, and air, but is neither ratified nor implemented. 84
Through bills of lading in any sense of the word very commonly contain a reference to the conditions usual in the bills
of lading of the on-carrying steamer or other carrier. Such a
clause in a maritime through bill of lading has been declared
to be recognizable only insofar as it is consistent with the
original bill. 85 But with this restriction, particularly in mixed
so SCRU1"I'ON, Charterparties 199·
81 See, e.g., The lristo (D. C. S.D. N. Y. 1941) 43 F. Supp. 29.
82 RG. (June 23, 1939) 161 RGZ. 210 refused to consider an American
bill, termed through bill (under which the goods were shipped from New
York to Hamburg to be delivered in Leipzig but not delivered there), because
the bill was not issued in the name of the shipowner. This objection has
been eliminated by the Hague Rules, HGB. §§ 642, 656, as amended by
Law of August 10, 1937.
83 LEMOINE 435 § 629.
8 4 Montevideo Treaty on Com. Terr. Law (1940) art. 15 par. 2.
85 The Idefjord, Blumenthal Import Corp. v. Den Norske Amerikalinje
(C. C. A. 2d 1940) II4 F. (2d) 262, 266. Imperative rules of the original
maritime carriage continue for continued sea carriage. Thus the British
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act is considered applicable even though only
the first part of a through bill of lading refers to a departure from a port
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carriage, the measure of liability is separately determined
for each kind of transportation. In the case of an ocean
through bill, issued by a railway on the basis of the
Pomerene Act, the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of 1936
took care to provide that insofar as the bill relates to the
carriage of goods by sea, the bill is subject to the new Act.
This section has been repealed because it was obviated by'
the federal legislation of I 940.
Clearly, the provisions of the Bern Convention on the
liability of railways do not extend to a continuation of the
transport by sea. 86 Conformably to this, where a cask of
brandy (cognac) was shipped from Cognac to Le Havre
by rail and from Le Havre to New York by sea, and
breakage occurred during the land transit, the exception
from liability for negligence of the servants or agents under
French law was recognized. 87
So far as the scattered attempts to solve the conflicts
problem go, they reflect the present defective organization
of combined international carriage. The consignee may be
relieved by some provision from the necessity of receiving
the goods at an intermediate place, but neither he nor the
consignor is entitled to the benefits of the original bill as an
exclusive embodiment of all rights. It seems to have been
justifiably concluded therefrom in conflicts law that in this
unorganized succession of carriers it is inevitable to let each
part of the distance stand by itself. Hence, rights and
liabilities are determined under the law of the territory
where the individual facts completing the cause of action
in the United Kingdom and transshipment is to be effected in a foreign
port. SCRUTI'ON, Charterparties 476 f. On the other hand, art. I excludes the
distance not by sea, SCRUITON, id. 483.
86 Italy: Cass. (March 21, 1941) Foro !tal. Mass. 1941, 173, cf. MARMO,
ro Giur. Comp. DIP. (1944) 128 No. 28: art. 28 of the Convention doe~ not
provide for combined transportation.
87 Baetjer v. La Compagnie Generale Trans atlantique (D. C. S. D. N. Y.
1894) 59 Fed. 789.
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occur, be it loss or damage during carriage or any incident
of delivery.
Contrarily, the perfection of interstate and export through
bills in the United States and Canada eliminated the former
division of opinions on the same question and has promoted
the application of the law where the original through bill
is issued. Under this approach and with all the usual precautionary stipulations, the exceptions needed in favor of
local laws do not seem to require other consideration than
in the case of ordinary bills of lading issued by one carrier.

CHAPTER
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Insurance
I.

AMERICAN LAW

T

HE question of the law governing insurance contracts
in the United States recurs in three different spheres.
The state courts determine the private law applicable
to insurance contracts, allegedly under the ordinary general
rules for contracts. The state statutes regulate the conditions
for licensing foreign insurance companies with more or less
effect upon the content of the contracts. To what extent
the power of the states to regulate insurance contracts is
restricted by the federal Constitution, has been the object
of a long line of decisions of the Supreme Court. The interrelation among these three levels offers rarely noted problems of its own that reach beyond the task of this work.
1.

Judicial Doctrine

In treatises respecting conflicts law, the Restatement, and
the overwhelming majority of judicial authorities-numbering many hundreds of decisions-, the law applicable to
insurance contracts is determined by the ordinary general
tests of contracts. Among them, the place of contracting
is commonly regarded as the paramount factor. But this is
not an absolutely exclusive rule, and the place where an
insurance contract is located has given rise to a complicated
system of rules of thumb. Complete surveys have been made
by three outstanding writers.
(a) Beale. Only Beale and the Restatement postulate
an exclusive rule of lex loci contractus. 1 The confusion in
1 2 BEALE 1054

ff.
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determining the place of contracting is resolved in the Restatement by a tripartite distinction:
"§ 3I7. When an insurance policy becomes effective upon
delivery by mail, the place of contracting is where the
policy is posted.
"§ 3 I 8. When an insurance policy becomes effective upon
delivery and is sent by the company to its agent and by him
delivered to the assured, the place of contracting is where
it is thus delivered to the assured.
"§ 3 I9. When an offer for an insurance contract is received
by the company through a broker who acts for a client, and
the policy is effective on delivery, the place of contracting
is where the policy is posted or otherwise delivered to the
broker."

This scheme has been suggested by a great number of
cases and has influenced more. Apparently, it furnishes
objectively conceived contacts, favoring the insurer insofar
as he may choose the way of sending the policy, determining
the applicable law. Beale has been receptive to the argument
that the company sends the policy to its agent in order to
keep control of it until the condition is fulfilled which makes
it valid. The courts have certainly assumed that the last
act of contracting is deferred when the agent has still to
ascertain the good health of the insured or to receive payment of the first premium. But the rule expressed in § 3 I 8
has often been used where no continued control by the agent
has been intended.
Whether the obvious oversimplification of the decisions
in this set of rules presents an advance or not is doubtful.
But a cardinal defect is that the Restatement reproduces
merely the ritualistic gestures of the courts. Other authors
have looked to the practical results.
(b) BatiffoP In his delicate research, the French scholar
notes the application of the law of the place of contracting
2 BATIFFOL §§ 330, 338 his, 341 ff.
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in the vast majority of the American decisions, although
in many cases this place coincided with the place of payment
of premiums or with the location of the insured objects.
Batiffol's statistics deserve attention: The place of contracting was found in approximately 7 5 per cent of the
cases at the domicil of the insured. 3 The common law principle that a contract is completed by the dispatch of the
acceptance would stand in the way, whenever the company
simply accepts the initial application (an observation confirmed by the theoretical admission in § 317 of the Restatement quoted above). But the courts have used various
devices to overcome this obstacle such as playing up small
divergences in the policy as compared to the application and
by insisting that the delivery into the hands of the insured
is essential, when the policy is under seal and not mailed,
or the agent has to exercise some control before he delivers
the policy; at times the courts have given no explanation.
Batiffol states expressly that the frequent justification that
the agent had to check on the health of the insured at the
time of the delivery, is rather farfetched. Many decisions
bolster their arguments by defining the domicil of the insured
as the place where the first premium has been paid.
In the remaining 2 5 per cent of the published decisions,
the contract has been held to be made at the home office
of the insurer. This has sometimes been justified by the
fact that the client sent the first premium with his application, but often no reason has been advanced.
The judges believe the insured best protected under his
domiciliary law. In some cases, however, the mechanical
rule has been followed so faithfully as to disregard an
3 I d. § 336. The recent decisions follow the same pattern. Bradford v.
Utica Mut. Ins. Co. (1943) 179 Misc. 919, 39 N. Y. Supp. {zd) 810 is particularly noteworthy; here the court sets a striking example how this practice,
combined with the adventures of husband-wife tort liability, manages to
establish an insurance liability not existing, for one or the other reason, in
either of the two involved states, New York and Massachusetts.
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express stipulation for the insurer's law more advantageous
to the insured4 or to localize the contract at a place where
neither party was domiciled. 5
(c) Carnahan. 6 In the only monograph on the subject,
a specialized voluminous treatise on the conflict of laws
regarding life insurance, the expert author prudently distinguishes life insurance from other insurance and divides
the problems involving life insurance into small compartments. These are concerned with the form of writing insurance, the various modes and conditions of delivering the
policy, the warranties and representations made in applications, the rights of beneficiaries, the assignment of policies,
the various nonforfeiture provisions, the death of the cestui
que vie, limitation of action, incontestability clauses, and
statutory penalties and fees. Within these parts smaller
segments are formed. The basic contention is that within
such a section or segment the courts handle the cases "in
one of a few limited ways." 7 Uniformity limited to these
individual problems is claimed in the sense that there are
majority rules. 8 But the author reveals in the course of his
investigation many more distinctions. Thus, the effectiveness
of delivery for determining the place of contracting is
allegedly decided by the query: Where is the last necessary
act? Yet:
"Actually one often suspects from the cases that selection
was made with the consequence in view. The delivery concept is only a tool and how that tool will be employed in
relation to problems of life insurance cannot accurately be
4 /d. 3II n. 2, citing Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Hathaway
(C. C. A. 9th 1901) 106 Fed. 815.
5 /d. 3II n. 3, citing Hicks v. National Life Ins. Co. (C. C. A. 2d 1894)
6o Fed. 690.
6 CARNAHAN, Conflict of Laws and Life Insurance Contracts (1942).
7 CARNAHAN, supra n. 6, 38, 461.
8 /d. 38.
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determined merely by an inspection of the four corners of
the insurance policy." 9
The last act may be defined in such way that it occurs at
the home office of the carrier [insurer], or at the place of
physical receipt of the policy. But:
"The courts adopt one or another connotation of delivery
which will connect the policy with the law of the state where
the applicant resided and manually received the policy.
Consequently there is not the extent of uncertainty in the
functioning of the delivery concept in conflict of laws as
would at first appear." 10
For the law governing warranties and representations,
"the courts have not consistently enunciated any single rule."
The courts have decided conflict of laws cases as the result
of a weighing and balancing of various factors in their
relation to the laws of several states.
"In six jurisdictions the opinions . . . have stated inconsistent rules. But most courts have explained their decisions
in terms of the rule of the place of making of the contract. 11
. . . The cases reveal that a liberal statutory or decisional
rule of the forum will be applied if the court, by adopting
that connotation of delivery which relates to physical receipt
of the policy by the applicant, finds that the forum was the
place of making of the insurance contract. . . . Thus the
net effect is to apply the law of the insured's residence at the
time he applied for the policy, at least when it is more
favorable to him . . . .12 To the extent that rules of the
applicant's home-state are most liberal, it may be taken
that courts will tend to determine that the contract was
made there and to adhere, with at least verbal consistency,
to the rule of the place of making the contract. 1113
9

/d. 168.
I d. 206.
11 Id. 284.
12 Id. 286.
13 Id. 287.
10
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Carnahan has summarized his findings in a forceful report
in which he also asserts that
"Examples of the tendency to disregard conflict of laws
rules in interstate transactions occur in every phase of
insurance law, even in instances where the policy was taken
out in another state. All too frequently, the court of the
forum adopts and enforces its internal rule . . . . " 14
(d) Conclusion. Carnahan's well-founded criticism is
rather restrained. Viewing the matter under the general
aspect of conflicts law reform, we must state that atomization of the contract by dissolving it into various incidents
is totally unsound and that if conflicts rules are not binding
on the court they are not legal rules. In sum, there is a
certain stability in the method of handling the various situations, but practically no law on conflicts concerning insurance.
This is all that the mechanical rules have achieved.
In the search for the real objective of the courts operating
these rules, one more point seems characteristic. The question of where the contract is made, is largely replaced by
the question of where the policy has been delivered, that
is, the document is manually transferred to the insured;
when this, too, cannot be ascertained, according to a rule
adopted for instance in Pennsylvania, delivery is presumed
to have occurred at the residence of the insured. 15
The courts have had before them an overflowing mass
of litigation in life insurance and relatively infrequent cases
of other types of insurance. To these they have extended
their questionable rules. But differences are notable, and
certain types of contracts, such as especially marine insurance, fall out of the picture. Lex loci contractus and the
14 CARNAHAN, "The Conflict of Laws in Relation to Insurance Contracts,"
American Bar Assoc., Section of Insurance Law, 1937-38, 58 to 59·
15 White v. Empire State Degree of Honor (1911) 47 Pa. Super. Ct. 52,
57; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Levine (C. C. A. 3d 1943) 138 F. (2d) 286,
288; Pierkowskie v. New York Life Ins. Co. (C. C. A. 3d 1944) 147 F. (2d)
928, 932·
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casuistry of delivery are applied also to marine insurance,
but its old history has preserved for it universal principles
of maritime law serving for the construction of the contract
in agreement with the other seafaring nations. The courts
preferably interpret the contracts "in harmony with the
manne msurance laws of England, the great field of this
business. " 16
2.

Statutes

In rare cases, decisions have pointed directly to the importance of the statutes, even to those of the forum. 17 If
they do, it is usually in order to declare that the statutes of
the place of contracting are a part of the contract, which
idea leads to a denial of party autonomy. 18
In reality, most branches of the insurance business are
very intensively regulated in the states and territories and
the statutes have made various attempts to prescribe the
application of domestic law to insurance contracts.
These provisions, however, despite a trend to unification,
still differ on the point here in question and, notwithstanding
many improvements, still need reform. 19 It is a rather obscure matter, somewhat neglected in the literature.
1 6 Queen Ins. Co. of America v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. (1923) 263
U. S. 487, 493; Aetna Ins. Co. v. Houston Oil & Transport Co. (C. C. A.
sth 1931) 49 F. (2d) 121, 124 states too pointedly that "it was a maritime
contract, and therefore governed by the general admiralty law and not by
the law of Texas," deserving correction as by The Anthony D. Nichols
(D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1931) 49 F. (2d) 927. The international community of
maritime insurance law must be kept in view in the problem of reform, as
rightly suggested by KELLY, "Effect of Proposed Conflict of Laws etc.,"
American Bar Assoc., Section of Insurance Law, 1940-1941, 176, 177.
17 As an exception, see, e.g., Yeats v. Dodson (1939) 345 Mo. 196, zo6,
127 S. W. {zd) 652, 656 where the authorization to make insurance contracts
at offices in Kansas City, Missouri and nowhere else is the principal llf four
reasons to apply Missouri law, thus avoiding a clause.
1 8 Cf. BATIFFOL 310 § 347; see Vol. II p. 395·
19 Cf. 0RFIELD, "Improving State Regulations of Insurance," 32 Minn. L.
Rev. ( 1948) 219.
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Tentatively, we may distinguish the following types of
statutory provisions for governing insurance contracts.
(a) In some states, all policies of insurance issued for
delivery or issued and delivered within the state are declared
subject to the provisions of the domestic law, either as a
condition of licensing foreign insurers, 20 or by subjecting
foreign and domestic insurers in one clause to the insurance
statutes. 21
(b) In some statutes all insurance contracts on the life
of residents and property or other interests within the state,
are deemed to be made within the state·and subject to its
law. 22 Contrary stipulations are sometimes declared void. 23
It may be noted marginally that in the flood of statutes
in 1947-1948 mainly regulating insurance rates it has appeared natural to extend their scope to insurance on property or risks located in the state. 24
(c) Many provisions prohibit specific contract stipulations or prescribe certain clauses. 25
Other statutes contain variations or are difficult to place.
In particular, the meaning of many provisions indiscriminately addressed to domestic and foreign insurers is
ambiguous.
The over-all result, however, is a broad claim not only
to regulate insurance business by administrative prescriptions but also to control insurance contracts of domestic
and foreign licensed insurers by the domestic private law.
20 E.g., New Mexico: Stat. (1941) § 60.408; Wisconsin: Stat. (1947)
§ 201.32.
21 E.g., Indiana: Ann. Stat. (1933) § 39-4206; Kentucky: Rev. Stat. (1948}
§ 297.110; Nebraska: Rev. Stat. (1943) § 44.302.
22 E.g., Minnesota: Ann. Stat. (1945) § 60.28; Mississippi: Code (1942)
§ 5633; North Carolina: Gen. Stat. (1943) § 58.28; Tennessee: Code (1934)
§ 6o86. Cf. CARNAHAN 100 ff. § 25.
23 Massachusetts: Ann. Laws (1948} c. 175 § 22.
24 See the list by ELY, "State Rating and Related Laws," Ins. L. J. 1947,
at 877 n. 12.
25 PATTERSON, "The Conflict Problems etc.," American Bar Assoc., Section
of Insurance Law, 1937-38, 69 at 71 calls these statutes the "internal law
group" and describes their criteria at 72 ff.
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In this regard, the statutes are efficiently supplemented by
supervision over the policy forms to be used. 26 Consultations
between the commissioners or superintendents and the companies about intended changes of legislation result, as I
am told, in a satisfactory understanding as well as a vigorous
influence by the state.
Insurance carriers and state legislatures have considerably
simplified the matter by establishing standard policies. These
are nation-wide in the case of insurance against automobile
liability and workmen's compensation, or are similar in all
but a few states, as in fire insurance, or they are uniform
for a group of states, as in theft and burglary insurance.
But although it is possible for the companies to comply
with the various requirements of financial security and
investments in the different states by obeying the highest
standards, 27 the heterogeneous private law provisions may
not be easily satisfied. At the same time, a typical policy
clause says in fact that "terms of this policy which are in
conflict with the statutes of the state wherein this policy is
issued are hereby amended to conform to such statutes."
If this is the living law, working as a whole, it would
appear without much question that the law of the books and
of the decisions is very improperly correlated. How do both
spheres co-operate?
The answer should lie with the definitions of the contracts
which the domestic law claims to govern, or at least of the
contracts under its administrative supervision.
We do not know, however, whether it is a singular pretension or presents the rule generally in mind of the legislatures, when the statute of Alabama prescribes :
26 Michigan: 17 Stat. Ann. (1943) §§ 24.266, 24.267.
Kansas: Gen. Stat. (1935) § 40-216.
South Dakota: Code (1939) § 31.160I.
27 PA'ITERSON, "The Future of State Supervision of Insurance," 23 Tex. L.
Rev. (1944) 18, 31.
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"All contracts of insurance the application for which is
taken within the state, shall be deemed to have been made
within this state and subject to the laws thereof," 28
or what is the exact meaning of the Utah provision:
"Every insurance contract made through an authorized
agent . . . shall be deemed to have been made in the state
of Utah irrespective of where the insurance contract was
written." 29
Usually foreign corporations are not considered doing
business in a state when they maintain only soliciting agents
there, but insurance is a special matter. We encounter, in
fact, divided opinions. 30
The universal trend, of course, towards extension of
government control, in the states of this country as well as
in Europe, produces results such as in Canada. Insurance
contracts "deemed to be made in the Province" will be
assumed subject to its law when a local residence has been
indicated in the policy or application, even though there
is no actual residence in the state. 31 However, the same
result is reached by construction also if the contracts are
2BAJabama: Code (1940) tit. 28 § 10. The Annotation declares that this
is a constitutional provision, citing State Life Ins. Co. v. Westcott (1910)
166 Ala. 192, 52 So. 344·
North Carolina: Stat. (1943) § 58.28.
29 Utah: Code (1943) tit. 43 c. 3 § 23.
3 0 44 C. J. S. Insurance § 82: "A foreign company may be doing business
in the state, if it actively solicits insurance and collects assessments . . .";
to the same effect, 29 Am. Jur., Insurance § 41, Supp. 1948 p. 78 new par.
But compare FLETCHER, 18 Cyc. Corp. § 8725: " . . . the mere solicitation of
insurance through agents in such state, and the mere receipt or collection
of premiums . . . does not constitute business there unless other activities
are engaged in by the foreign corporation in the foreign state."
In a case involving contribution to an unemployment fund, the Supreme
Court, in International Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945) 326 U. S. 310, 320,
found activities carried on through soliciting sales agents so systematic and
continuous throughout years as to justify liability for contribution. This,
certainly, is an exception to the rule.
31 Re Duperreault (Sask.) [1941] I D. L. R. 38, discussing Rev. Stat.
Sask., 1930, c. 101 s. 156.
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really made in the Province. Thus, two jurisdictions are
immediately in a positive conflict.
For all connected questions, an exact definition of doing
insurance business in a state is highly desirable but seldom
afforded. An exception is Illinois where the following acts
if performed within the state are declared to constitute
transacting insurance business:
" (a) Maintaining an agency or office where contracts
are executed which are or purport to be contracts of insurance with citizens of this or any other state; (b) maintaining
files or records of contracts of insurance; or (c) receiving
payment of premiums for contracts of insurance." 33
For describing the insurance contracts subject to supervision, the statutes usually emphasize issuance andjor delivery of the policy in the state. As Patterson has discovered,
delivery, "the crucial word," is ordinarily supposed to occur
at the residence of the applicant who is usually the insured,
whereas domestic ins.1.1rers are normally said to have "issued" the policy. 34
In the entire picture, the most clearly emerging ideas are
that states desire to regulate, partially or wholly, insurance
contracts when ( 1 ) the insured is a resident or ( 2) the
insured property is situated in the state. The first case
conforms to the majority of the decisions. The second point
of view is in direct contrast to the court decisions that in
apparent consistency, for one or the other reason, recognize
the law of the place of contracting even for fire insurance,
although the objects are in another state. 35
82 Re Mutual Benefit Accident Ass'n and Anderson (Ontario) [1941] 4
D. L. R. 347, commenting on Ins. Act, Rev. Stat. Ont., 1937, c. 256 s. 130.
3 3 Illinois: Rev. Stat. (1949) c. 73 § 733·
34PATIERSoN, supra n. 25, at 74·
85 To the same effect, Coffin v. London & Edinburgh Ins. Co. (D. C. N. D.
Ga. 1928) 27 F. (2d) 616, because "fire insurance is a purely personal contract," but the court clearly construed the lex loci contractus as truly intended by the parties, in order to maintain the validity of the contract. The
Seamans v. The Knapp Stout & Co. (1895) 89 Wis. 171, 61 N. W. 757,
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3· Federal Constitution
The impact of federal restnctwns on state power to
regulate insurance has been a controversial subject for a
long time. The fluctuating views of the Supreme Court of
the United States on this subject, often discussed,S 8 have
led ultimately to a minimum of interference with the state
activity. Insurance may be regulated by any state as it
sees fit, provided that the regulation is neither outrageous
nor discriminating and can be justified in any reasonable
manner. 37
The orbit of unchecked state regulation thus permitted,
in turn must be defined. Since Paul v. Virginia, 88 the Supreme
Court has simply used the customary criterion of the place
of contracting. A contract made in Tennessee "was a Tennessee contract. The law of Tennessee entered into and
because insurance does not affect title; Western Massachusetts Mut. Fire
Ins. Co. v. Hilton (1899) 42 App. Div. 52, 58 N. Y. Supp. 996, because the
insurance was payable in Massachusetts; Palmetto Fire Ins. Co. v. Beha
(D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1926) 13 F. (zd) 500, 508, with constitutional argument;
Vermont Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Van Dyke (1933) 105 Vt. 257, 165 Atl. 906,
because of the "ordinary rule" of lex loci contractus. For comment see infra
p. 338.
The location of property is mentioned in addition to countersignature
as supporting choice of law in George L. Squire Mfg. Co. v. Nat'! Fire Ins.
Co. (D. C. W. D. N.Y. 1933) 4 F. Supp. 137.
36 On the background of insurance regulation in the relationship of federation and state, see in particular Mr. Justice Rutledge in Prudential Ins. Co.
v. Benjamin (1946) 328 U. S. 408, 413 ff.
On the prehistory of this decision, see United States v. South-Eastern
Underwriters Association ( 1944) 322 U. S. 533· Note, "Congressional Consent to Discriminatory State Legislation," 45 Col. L. Rev. (1945) 927; and
subsequently the McCarran Act of March 9, 1945, c. 20, 59 Stat. 33, as
amended July 25, 1947, c. 326, 61 Stat. 448, 15 U. S. C. A. §§ 1012-1015; and
bibliography in "Insurance as Interstate Commerce," by the Insurance Section of the American Bar Association, 1946-1947· The ensuing legislative
activity of the states has been described by ELY, supra n. 24, at 867.
37 Mr. Justice Black, dissenting vote, in Order of United Commercial
Travelers of Amer. v. Wolfe (1947) 331 U. S. 586 at 63o: "I had considered
it well settled that if an insurance company does business at all in a state,
its contracts are 'subject to such valid regulations as the state may choose
to adopt.'"
38 Paul v. Virginia (1863) 8 Wail. 168.
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became a part of it." 39 Mississippi overreached its scope
when it claimed control over a contract "made and to be
performed in Tennessee. " 40
However, the Due Process Clause, as in the last-mentioned
case, and the Full Faith and Credit Clause did not operate
so smoothly in other situations. In 1943, an event occurred
of extreme importance for a basic contention of this work.
The criterion for distributing state power over insurance
was readily changed. Mr. Justice Black spoke for the court :41
"In determining the power of a state to apply its own
regulatory laws to insurance business activities, the question
in earlier cases became involved by conceptualistic discussion
of theories of the place of contracting or of performance.
More recently it has been recognized that a state may have
substantial interests in the business of insurance of its people
or property regardless of these isolated factors. This interest may be measured by highly realistic considerations
such as the protection of the citizens insured or the protection of the state from the incidents of loss." (Reference
to the opinions in the workmen's compensation case of
Alaska Packers.) 42
Accordingly in the instant case, the elements connecting
the insurance contract with the state of New York were
enumerated and held to prevail, including activities, visits,
and consultations, prior to and subsequent to the making of
the contract, and the location of the insured object.
This abandoning of the formalized old contacts presents
a progress of immeasurable value. Their replacement by a
39 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken (1924) 266 U. S. 389, 399; New York
Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge (1918) 246 U.S. 357·
40 Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co. (1934)
292 U. S. 143; cf. Vol. II p. 555 n. 15. The Supreme Court of Mississippi has
accordingly revised its view, Protective Life Ins. Co. v. Lamarque (1938)
180 Miss. 243, 177 So. 15.
41 Hoopestone Canning Co. v. Cullen (1943) 318 U. S. 313, 316.
42 Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Ind. Accident Comm. of California (1935)
294 u. s. 532, 542·
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method of balancing state interests in every individual
situation, it is submitted, may not be the last word. It is
too much like the method of ascertaining the most closely
connected law by grouping all local connections, an operation
vastly superior to lex loci contractus, but a source of great
uncertainty. Conflicts law, advancing further, may once more
suggest improvements in the constitutional doctrine.
4· Fraternal Benefit Associations in Particular
The different approaches in the three different spheres
mentioned above are apparent in the treatment of corporations, including insurance of the members among other
social purposes. The ancient Roman collegia funeraticia
have their analogy in the fraternities taking care of the
funerals of their members. From modest beginnings, certain
American fraternal benefit associations have developed into
very powerful companies using the same methods of business
as ordinary insurers. Therefore the problem arose whether
the insurance relationship of the corporation to the members
is governed by the law of the charter state conformably
to the principle of personal law or follows the same law as
an ordinary insurance contract.
(a) The courts were divided. A minority applied the
law of the home state of the corporation. 43 For the most
part, the lex loci contractus prevailed. 44
(b) The state statutes commonly have excluded fraternal
associations from their main provisions on foreign insurance
carriers and subjected them merely to a restricted supervision. Nevertheless, under the title of public policy the
43 More recently, Van de Water v. Order of United Commercial Travelers
of America (C. C. A. 2d 1935) 77 F. (2d) 331; Meyer v. Meyer (C. C. A.
8th 1935) 79 F. (zd) 55; Modern Woodmen of America v. Crudup (1935)
175 Okla. 183, 51 Pac. (2d) 718; Kohler v. Kohler (C. C. A. 9th 1939) 104 F.
(2d) 38.
44 Supreme Lodge Knights of Pythias v. Meyer ( 1905) 198 U. S. 508; for
the other cases, cf. 2 BEALE 1056 n. 6.

INSURANCE

325

home law has been disregarded in several cases which have
raised the question of federal restraint. 45
(c) Recently the Supreme Court has declared by a narrow
majority the prevalence of the charter state over the state
where a member resides. 46 An essential part of the reasoning, however, seems to rest on the argument that the state
of South Dakota had licensed the association and thereby
acquired full knowledge of the terms of its insurance conditions ;47 "if a state gives some faith and credit" to the
organization of a fraternal benefit society by another state,
permitting its own citizens to become members of, and
benefit from, it, "then it must give full faith and credit" to
the burdens and restrictions inherent in the membership. 48
The practical significance of the decision is doubtful,
since the plaintiff corporation itself subsequently changed
the clause in issue (for a short limitation on members'
suits) 49 and states are now expected to admit foreign fraternal associations less easily. 50

5. A Reform Attempt
In excellent reports to the American Bar Association in
1937, it was explained that the conflicts practice concerning
insurance contracts is defective, 51 and subsequently a committee under the chairmanship of Professor Patterson submitted a tentative draft of a Uniform Statute. 52 Its first
45 See Note, "Full Faith and Credit: Preferential Treatment of Fraternal
Insurers," 57 Yale L. J. (1947) 139.
4 6 Order of United Commercial Travelers of America v. Wolfe (1947)
331 u. s. 586.
47 /d. p. 624·

48
49
50

/d. p. 625.

See Note, supra n. 45, at 143.
I d. at 144.
51 American Bar Association, Section of Insurance Law, 1937-1938, Kansas City Meeting, 58 ff.
52 American Bar Association, Section of Insurance Law, Program and
Committee Reports (for the Meeting at) San Francisco, July 10-12, 1939·
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section was based on the principle that an insurance contract
should be governed by the law of the state where the insured
risk is situated. Life insurance should, for this purpose, be
localized at the residence of the insured; insurance against
loss or damage to property at the situation of the property;
automobile liability insurance at the place where the vehicle
is principally garaged, et cetera. Section 2 limits the application of the domestic law to the contracts delivered or
issued in the state. Section 3 exempts coverage of risks
located in different states.
The draft has been abandoned because of opposition
from a number of representatives of insurance companies. 53
Apart from certain amendments, they advanced the thesis,
doubly astonishing in the mouth of insurers, that the present
conflicts rules are all to the good and exclude any doubt. At
the same time it was contended that the proposed local
connections would provoke litigation. Force of habit is a
strong force with lawyers! Professor Patterson's authority
reinforces the conviction that in all three sets of American
rules a change is maturing from legalistic tests to criteria
indicating a connection with the scope of state supervision
and with the risk insured. An analogous development of
the European doctrines confirms the adequacy of the new
method and contributes further suggestions for its use. There
the conflicts literature has largely adopted the view of the
specialists of insurance law that insurance contracts are of a ·
peculiar nature due to the extensive influence of the supervising state which "directs" or "dictates" the contents of
the contracts. 54
53 American Bar Association, Section of Insurance Law, Philadelphia
Meeting I940-194I, 176 ff., reports by AMBROSE B. KELLY, RoBERT E. HALL,
and HERVEY J. DRAKE. HENRY, id. 173 sub (1) recognizes that the companies
"escape liability" only by exception. The apprehensive arguments of KELLY,
id. 178 f. against Patterson on the ground of unconstitutionality of rules other
than the law of the place of contracting have since quickly lost their value.
5 4 See, e.g., LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIIlRE (ed. 4) 285 § 251.
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I.

FoREIGN LAws

Traditional Tests

Lex loci contractus. As in other contracts, the law of the
place of contracting has exercised a strong hold on insurance
contracts. This is true, not only of the United States, as
well as France and Italy, countries professing this principle,
but also of several other countries. 55 Particularly for maritime insurance, lex loci contractus is favored. 56
The C6digo Bustamante repeats this rule if it is not a
contract "by adhesion," for all insurance contracts, except
fire insurance between parties of different personal law. 57
But a group of writers have adjusted the law of the place
of contracting to the phenomenon of contracts of adhesion.
Because the application is on the standard form of the
insurer, the contract is completed by the insurer at his home
office. 58
Law common to the parties. Nationality or domicil common to the parties has been stressed particularly if they are
subjects of the forum, 59 but this is an awkward rule.
55 Canada: Re Mutual Benefit & Accident Ass'n ( 1941) 4 D. L. R. 347·
France: Cass. req. (Dec. 18, 1872) S. 1873.1.35, Clunet 1874, 235; Cass.
civ. (Dec. 28, 1936) Revue Crit. 1937, 682: an English styled policy.
Germany: RG. (Feb. 13, 1891) 47 Seuff. Arch. 3 (domicil of insurer);
{Nov. II, 1928) 122 RGZ. 233· For other cases, see BATIFFOL § 350.
Italy: Former C. Com. art. 58; C. C. Disp. Pre!. (1942) art. 25; CAVAGLIERI,
Dir. Int. Com. 466 ff.
56 See RIPERT, 3 Droit Marit. § 2377; 2 ]ACOBS § 681; (most cases cited
supra n. 55 concern maritime insurance) ; 2 Repert. 180 n. 5·
Belgium: App. Bruxelles {March 17, 1925) Jur. Port Anvers 1925, 97·
France: Cass. req. (April 24, 1854) S. 1856.1.339; Trib. consulaire Alexand de (June 29, 1874), aff'd, App. Aix (April 15, 1875), 2 Repert. 183
No. 29.
Germany: RG. {April 13, 1898) JW. 1898, 371, Clunet 1899, 295.
The Netherlands: See infra n. 63.
57 Codigo Bustamante, art. 262, omits a reference to art. 185, but is considered to imply it by BusTAMANTE, La Commission de Jurisconsultes de
Rio 147; id., 2 Der. Int. Priv. 294 § 1377.
58 RIPERT, 3 Droit Marit. 434 § 2409; DE SMET § 36; DrENA, 2 Dir. Com.
Int. 462; CAVAGLIERI, Dir. Int. Com. 476 (thus evading art. 58 of the former
Italian C. Com.). Cf. also Note, 22 Revue Dor (1930) 287.
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Lex loci solutionis. A few decisions have localized insurance at the insurer's place, apparently as a place of
performance, 60 but they rest on the assumption that the
prevailing circumstances point to this place.
2.

Proper Law

The English doctrine has consistently maintained the
force of express and presumptive party intention. "It is no
doubt competent to an underwriter on an English policy to
stipulate . . . according to the law of any foreign state." 61
Subsidiarily, the circumstances of the case may supersede
even the English law of the place of contracting. 62 The
prevailing Continental theory has been to the same effect.
Express agreement, presumptive intention, or the law most
closely connected with the contract have been looked for
as a rule. 63 Particularly maritime insurance, naturally free
59 England: DICEY, Rule I7o: where an English merchant ships goods
from England and insures them with English underwriter, English law,
despite a foreign flag.
France: App. Aix (March 22, I923) S. I924.2.I24 (maritime insurance;
common nationality and flag).
Germany: RG. (Jan 27, I928) I2o RGZ. 70, 73 (German law for life
insurance taken out in Vienna, Austria, by a German domiciled in Vienna
from the local general representative of a German company; expressly
overruling RG. (Feb. I3, I89I) 47 Seuff. Arch. 3· Contra: NussBAUM,
JW. 1928, II98; BRUCK 30 n. 84; ]AEGER in 4 Roelli's Komm. 9I.
Italy: Disp. Pre!. C. C. (I942) art. 25 par. I.
60 Germany: RG. (Dec. 5, I902) 53 RGZ. 138; (Jan. I6, I925) 34 Z. int. R.
(I925) 427; Bay. ObLG. (June 24, I93I) IPRspr. I931 No. s; OLG. Kiiln
(Sept. 9, I934) IPRspr. I934, No. 94·
Switzerland: BG. (Nov. z, I945) 7I BGE. II 287, 29I.
61 Greer v. Poole (I88o) 5 Q. B. D. 272, per Lush, J., cited by DICEY 698
as a general rule.
62 Maritime Ins. Co. v. Assecuranz Union von I865 (I935) 79 Sol. J. 403,
52 Ll. L. Rep. I6 per Goddard, J.: reassurance with a German reassurer,
signed in Liverpool and Hamburg respectively; the English arbitration
clause, though merely "an honorable agreement," points to English law under
which the contract is void (an illustration to Vol. II p. 387 n. uS).
63 Belgium: App. Bruxelles (Feb. 6, I9oo) and other cases, see DESMET 49·
France: PICARD et BESSON, I Traite § 303 (for contracts that are not forcibly
French, see infra p. 335).
Germany: RG. (Dec. 23, 193I) IPRspr. 1932, 61 No. 30 with respect to the
consent of the parties in form (separated from the contract against the better
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from intensive state supervision, has enjoyed a long tradition of free choice. Among the criteria of choice of law, use
of a national standard form has much importance as m
maritime carriage. 64
The Swiss Federal Tribunal, however, seems only to
recogmze an express agreement, formulated by at least
one party. 65
3· The Law of the Insurer
More recently a theory has found great favor which
again starts by recognizing the group of "contracts of adhesion," concluded on the terms of one party through
mere acceptance by the other. The contract of insurance is
certainly an outstanding example. The need for protecting
the interests of the insured is evident and well known. 66
But this is a consideration of municipal policy everywhere.
methods of the same court); (April II, 1933) IPRspr. 1933, 40 No. 21.
OLG. Stettin {Feb. 22, 1932) IPRspr. I932, 79 No. 35 (party intention for
the law of the German insurer according to all circumstances).
Greece: FRAGISTAS, I Symmikta Streit at 347, proves full liberty of the
parties to exist.
The Netherlands: H. R. (June 13, I924) N. J. I924, 859, 8 Revue Dor
319 {reversing the decision by App. den Haag cited in Vol. II p. 387 n. n8;
see also p. 388 n. 120). App. den Haag (Oct. 19, 1934) W. 12889, N. J. 1934,
1660 {two Belgians contract in the Netherlands on a Dutch policy for
insurance of Dutch agricultural products).
64 Congress of Antwerp on Commercial Law (I 88 5) Actes 129 quest. 52.
Belgium: App. Bruxelles (May 13, 1936) 35 Revue Dor 96.
England: The Penthames, Boag v. Standard Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. (1937)
57 Ll. L. Rep. 83 {implicitly).
France: App. Aix (March 22, 1923) S. I924.2.124: goods shipped from
the Philippines, where contract made, to Marseilles, English insurance form;
contra: Cass. req. {Dec. z8, 1936) Revue Crit. I937, 682.
Germany: RG. (Dec. 23, 1931) IPRspr. 1932, 6I No. 30: English law for
a contract of participation in an insurance risk, because of policy clauses.
OLG. Hamburg (Nov. 23, 1934) Hans. RGZ. 1935 B 31: insurance taken
in Istanbul with reference to Lloyd's usages, no application of the General
German Marine Insurance Conditions.
65 BG. {Nov. z, 1945) 71 BGE. 287, 290 in this case acknowledges intention to apply German law. On the subsidiary rule, see infra p. 334 n. So.
66 A book by A. MrssoL, L'assurance contrat d'adhesion, et Ie probleme de
Ia protection de l'assure (Paris I934) is announced in 34 Revue Trim. D.
Civ. (1935) 344 No. I6.
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In conflicts law it has been inferred that the place of the
insurer is the center of the contract. In addition to the
authors mentioned above who to this effect construe the
place of the insurer as the place of contracting, increasing
authority has directly adopted this law. 67 A sound formulation has been achieved by the leading German scholar in
insurance law, Ernst Bruck. 68 He argues as follows:
In exceptional cases, individual agreements may be concluded in insurance of transport, vessels, credit, or against
loss by money exchange. Other insurance contracts, however,
usually follow a definite pattern, although some individual
clauses may be modified or inserted. The totality of the
contracts of one class form an economic unit conditioned
by their essentially identical legal structure. To assume a
risk requires technical as well as legal uniform planning.
We must focus not on the isolated contract but on the group
of similar contracts, when we look for adequate localization. Consequently, the contract centers in the country where
the insurer uses his particular technique under national
supervisiOn.
Or to quote a French author:
It seems more normal to localize the contract at the
seat of the insurer, because of the technical organization
of insurance and the insurer's duty of basing statistics on
similar conditions, in order to calculate with some certainty.
Often the idea of protecting the assured is invoked for
justifying the application of the law of the place of contracting, but if the assured knows the law of his domicil,
it is not shown that this law protects him better than the
law of the insurer's domicil. 69
Nevertheless, the concentration on the domicil of the
insurer, by this reasoning, turns to its exact opposite in case
67 2 BAR I48, 226; 2 MElLI 375; DIENA, 2 Dir. Com. Int. 458, 3 id. 468;
}riTA, I Substance 393; JosEPH, i. Z. int. R. (I9I3) 492.
Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. 8 No. 5·
68 BRUCK Io f.; id., Privatversich. R. 40 ff.
e9 PicARD et BE880N, I Traite 624 § 304.
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of a branch or agency established in a foreign country since
it forms a partial nucleus of contracts. Even on this basis
several systems are possible. But in the majority 70 of European and Latin-American countries, insurance contracts made
through the general representative of a foreign insurer are
in a compulsory manner subjected to the domestic law.
This seems to have been suggested by the particular nature
of the license needed by any insurer, which includes a grant
depending on numerous prerequisites. The subjection of
the contracts to the domestic law has been inferred from
their presumptive intention, or voluntary submission, or by
implication from the grant of the license. 71
The impact of the territorial law on establishments of
a foreign insurer is commonly very large in Europe and
Latin America. The authority of the general representative
whom foreign insurers must appoint, is broad, if not unlimited and unlimitable as in Germany. Often a company
is not allowed to make contracts otherwise than by the
local agent with residents of the state or with respect to
domestic immovables. 72 The local requirements of financial
security and investment contribute to complete the division
of an international insurer's business into separate territorial
compartments.
An illustration existed in the Peace Treaty of Versailles.
An Allied or Associated Power could cancel the insurance
contracts of its nationals with a German company, in which
7
0 See, as an example, Brazil, Decreto-Lei of March 7, 1940, No. 2063
art. 7·
We do not hear much of the minority to which England belongs and
in which FRAGISTAS, "The Contract of Insurance in Private International
Law (Greek)" in I Symmikta Streit 341, 345 counts Greece. He maintains
that a Greek license to do business subjects the foreign insurance carrier
to the Greek laws but does not force application of Greek (private) law
upon contracts made in Greece.
71 BRUCK 30 n. 84.
72 BRUCK, Privatversich. R. 112, II4. The method is familiar; see, for
instance, Palmetto Fire Ins. Co. v. Conn (D. C. S. D. Ohio 1925) 9 F. {2d)
202, based on a provision of the Ohio Code respecting property in Ohio.
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case the company had to hand over "the proportion of its
assets attributable to the policies so cancelled." In the case
of a branch in a victor country, subject to the latter's right
to liquidation, conflicts rules were expressed:
"Where contracts of life insurance have been entered into
by a local branch . . . in a country which subsequently
became an enemy country, the contract shall, in the absence
of any stipulation to the contary in the contract itself, be
governed by the local law . . . .
"In any case where by the law applicable to the contract
the insurer remains bound by the contract . . . until notice
is given to the insured, etc." 73
The local state control over business establishments issuing policies played a role also in other problems after the
First World War. A well-known New York decision went so
far as to attribute to the New York branch of a nationalized
Russian insurance company a distinct personality sufficient
to keep it alive. 74 The Swiss Federal Tribunal, in analogous
reasoning, mentioned the importance of the obligatory
Swiss general representative of any foreign insurer and the
security furnished by the latter, and held that where a
German obtained a policy through the Swiss branch of a
German company, his rights were inaccessible to a French
war liquidation. 75 The German Supreme Court similarly
assumed that an insurance policy issued by an Indian branch
of the New York Life Insurance Company, but later wholly
transferred to the Berlin branch of the company, could not
be validly seized by the British custodian in India:
It may be left undecided whether the Berlin branch is
an independent legal person. In any case it is represented by
73 Treaty of Versailles, Part X, V, Annex III, MARTENS, Recueil Ser. 3, XI,
580 ff., §§ 13, 14. In the Peace Treaty with Italy of 1947, Annex XVI, No. 4,
insurance contracts are reserved for separate conventions between the Allied
or Associated Power interested and the Italian Government.
7 4 Lehman, J., in Moscow Fire Ins. Co. v. Bank of New York & Trust Co.
(1939) 280 N.Y. 286, 2o N. E. (2d) 758, aff'd (1940) 309 U.S. 624.
75 Swiss BG. (Nov. 4, 1920) 46 BGE. II 421.
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the general agent, entitled in its external relation to acquire
rights independently and must therefore be treated like
an independent legal person in domestic transactions/ 6
Correspondingly, an American court, refusing jurisdiction
in a test case for recovery of the cash surrender value from
the New York Life Insurance Company, states that the
policy was issued by the branch in Germany to a German
resident and:
"The agency in Germany was established as a distinct
entity, a German creation under German law. A reserve
fund was made and all premiums received were placed in
that fund and invested in Germany under German official
approval." 77
Numerous consequences of this situation are perceptible. 78
The entire theory calling for the law of the insurer's headquarters or its branch office, respectively, has been endorsed
by contemporary writers/ 9 German and Swiss courts, 80 and
the Montevideo Draft of 1940.81
76

RG. (Nov. 26, 1920) JW. 1921, 245.
Heine v. New York Life Ins. Co. (C. C. A. 9th 1931) 50 F. (2d) 382,
385. The court says that 28,ooo policies executed in Germany were sought to
be enforced in this country.
78 E.g., Italy: Cass. (April 8, 1938) Foro Ital. I938 I 823, Giur. Ital. I938
I 755, 7 Giur. Comp. DIP. I938, 323: the Italian "general agency" of a
foreign insurer is an independent enterprise, hence its assets in the country
may be separately liquidated; Cass. (Jan. xo, 194I) Foro I tal. Mass. I94I,
I2, IO Giur. Comp. DIP. (I944) I25 No. 25: hence, also, the Italian stock of
insurances with reserves is a possible object of separate transfer.
79 Argentina: HALPERIN, El contra to de seguro (seguros terrestres) (Buenos
Aires I946) 64 § 57·
Austria: ALBERT EHRENZWEIG, I Versicherungsvertragsrecht (I935) 47, Ill.
France: PICARD et BESSON, x Traite 624 § 304, supra n. 69; ARMIN JON,
Droit Int. Pr. Com. 47I § 281.
Germany: BAR in Ehrenberg's Handb. 4I3; NussBAUM, D. IPR. 23I. An
opponent has been criticized by MoLLER, 9 Z. ausl. PR. ( I935) 336; HAGEN,
Z. f. d. Ges. Versicherungs-Wissenschaft (I935) 76.
Italy: LORDI, I Istituzioni di diritto commerciale ( I943) 34, referring to
his work, 2 Obbligazioni commerciali I032 § 831; CAVAGLIERI, Dir. Int. Com.
501.
Switzerland: JAEGER in 4 Roelli's Komm. 9I No. 34; BG. (Nov. 2, 1945)
71 BGE. II 287, 292.
80 Germany: OLG. Konigsberg (Dec. 9, 1930) Bl. IPR. 1931, 2n; Bay.
77
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If, however, the applicable law is to be dependent on
the influence of state supervision, the delimitation of the
administrative state supervision is of primary importance.
In the same connection the situation of the insured risk
requires consideration.
4· State Supervision and the Situation of the Risk
The European doctrine concedes great influence to the
scope claimed by the state for administrative control of
insurance contracts.
In contrast to the traditional American emphasis on the
legal completion of contract-making, the most thorough
Continental authors have stated that doing insurance business requires carrying on of insurance operations, whereas
the making of contracts is neither necessary nor sufficient.
In the German opinion, any activities preparatory to or
subsequent to contracting such as soliciting, advising, cashing of premiums, or watching the development of the risk,
may be grounds for state supervision even though the contract may be concluded in a foreign country. 82
Even taking this broad definition of the agent's co-operation in the individual contract as a criterion, delimitation
of the scope of the domestic law requires additional facts.
Definition of the scope of control in general is given by
each state as it sees fit, and is often left to the controlling
board of commissioners. 83 But the laws leave gaps, and
choice of law is sufficiently distinguishable from discretionary
delimitation of the scope of supervision, to be subjected,
for instance in Germany, to court jurisdiction. 84
ObLG. (June 24, 1931) IPRspr. 1931, 13; RG. (April u, 1933) IPRspr.
1933, 40; see the comment by BATIFFOL 313 n. 6.
Switzerland: BG. (Nov. 2, 1945) 71 BGE. 287, 291, referring to its independently developed previous thesis, 51 BGE. II 409, that insurance of Swiss
inhabitants by foreign insurers is subject to Swiss law.
81 Montevideo Treaty on Int. Com. Terr. Law (1940) art. 12 sent. 2 for
life insurance: where the company is domiciled or has its branch or agency.
82 NEUMEYER, 2 Int. Verwaltungs R. 329.
83 NEUMEYER, id. 343 ff.
84 This seems to be the true thesis of RG. (Feb. 21, 1930) 127 RGZ. 360.
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The literature has sought a desirable method of defining
the limits of state control for the purpose of choice of law.
Among the numerous solutions, 85 one has been prevailingly
favored: In the insurance of persons their residence, in the
insurance of property rights the situation of the property,
and generally the place of the risk insured, are decisive. 86
The similarity of these results with the order of ideas
leading in the United States to the recent theory of the
Supreme Court and to the proposals of the Patterson
Committee is obvious.
A recent French development is of particular interest.
First conceived for fiscal purposes, a theory emphasizing
the locality of the risk has been extended to the application
of private law. Foreign insurers submit reports on all contracts "signed or performed in France or Algiers . . . or
any contract of assurance accepted by them and concerning
a person, an asset, or a liability in these territories." It is
further provided that any contract of insurance not registered within a month from its date is void. 87 According to
authoritative writers, this recent law implies that all activities of foreign insurers in France are compulsorily subjected
to all "imperative French laws." 88 Hence French law is
applicable, not only 'the fiscal but also the private law,
NEUMEYER, 2 Int. Verwaltungs R. 348 f.
Montevideo Treaty on Int. Commercial Law (1889) art. 8 for insurance
"on land" and transportation: where the object is at the time of contracting.
NEUMEYER, id. 350 advocates localization of the risk as to movables at
their ordinary place; and of liability and reinsurance at the center of the
assets and liabilities of the insured.
87 Decree-Law of October 30, 1935, amending art. 2 of the Law of Feb. 15,
1917, complemented by Decree of Jan. 12, 1937 concerning the foreign enterprises or insurers doing business in France and Algiers. These provisions
have been maintained in the Insurance Law, Decree-Law of June 14, 1938,
art. 42.
88 PicARD et BEssoN, I Traite 618 § 301 arguing particularly (1) as to
life insurance, cf. Laws of March 17, 1905 and July 13, 1930, (2) as to
workmen's accident insurance, cf. Decree of Feb. 28, 1899, (3) as to automobile accident insurance, cf. Decree-Law of August 8, 1935, and Decree of
June 3, 1936, art. 6, and generally cf. Decree-Law of August 25, I937· For
other literature to the same effect, see DALLOZ, I Nouveau repertoire de
droit ( 1947) 313.
85
86
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whenever the risk covered is situated in France. This means
that life insurance or an individually agreed accident or
health insurance is localized at the domicil or the habitual
residence of the insured, if in France. A liability insurance
is French, when the act involving responsibility covered
should normally or principally occur in France. The object
insured against fire, hail, and the like must be in France.
In this view, French law does not necessarily govern
marine, credit, or fluvial insurance and reinsurance if they
have foreign elements, nor are contracts signed in a foreign
country and covering a risk situated outside France, subject
to its law. These contracts are said to be the only subject
matters of conflict of laws which follow the lines designed by
Bruck.89
III.

CoNCLUSIONs

The basic problems of conflicts of insurance laws could
not by any means be exhausted in the foregoing report. 90
But the fundamental trend in the efforts to reach conflicts
rules more adequate to the real situation, is rather obvious.
The old rules clinging to the formation of the contract or its
fulfillment are in this field particularly obnoxious, and intensive state control over the insurance business is recognized
as the most powerful force localizing insurance activities of all sorts. When the Canadian provinces adopted
the Uniform Life Insurance Act, the fact was stated with
regard to alien insurers "that the very natural intention
of the parties, who live and who do business here, legalized
and protected by our laws, is that the insurance law of this
89
90

I d. 623 § 302.

Still less are special problems discussed. See for Continental literature
on double insurance, 2 BAR§§ 267, 335; BRUCK 48; 3 SMEESTERS and WINKELMOLEN I I § 940; DE SMET 369 § 402; and on reinsurance, BRUCK 15; 2 Repert.
183 § 31; BATIFFOL 317 n. 4; ARMIN JON, Droit Int. Pr. Com. 487 § 297·
On the scope of the conflicts rule concerning insurance contracts, see
BRUCK 16 f.; FRAGISTAS, supra n. 70, 356 ff.
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country will govern the contract and rights which anse
thereunder.'' 91
I.

Special Choice of Law

It must be remembered even m this field that despite
extremely large inroads of imperative norms into the contractual law, 92 disposition by the parties is the primary
principle and that the rules demanded are merely intended
for use in the typical standard contracts.
(a) Party autonomy. As a principle, the right of parties
also to stipulate for the applicable law in insurance contracts has been strictly affirmed in Europe. 93 In the United
States it has sometimes been denied. 94 But apart from the
philosophy of private law, admitting for the sake of the
argument the very system of a compulsory law of the place
of contracting, it must always be remembered that in this
country a state cannot impose its insurance law on parties
contracting in another state. 95 The forum, thus, is powerless
91 FRANK HODGINS, 22 Can. L. T. (1902)
r, quoted with approval by
PIERSON, Am. Bar Assoc., Section of Insurance Law, 1937-1938, 8r, a lawyer
connected with a New York life insurance company.
92 On the compulsory rules applied to the contract, as a whole, and public
policy opposing foreign law recognized as applicable in general, see in particular 44 C. J. S. 516 §54; BATIFFOL 310 § 347; BRUCK 26 ff., 37 ff.; }AEGER
in 4 Roelli's Komm. 93 No. 37·
An example of an illicit object of insurance, much discussed in Continental literature, involves the old prohibition against insuring the wages
of master and crew of a vessel, still existing in German C. Com. § 780 but
restricted in Belgian C. Com. art. 191; see 2 BAR 227 n. 109; 3 SMEESTERS and
WINKELMOLEN 62 § 972 and cit.
Another nice question: Is insurance with insurers in Johannesburg for
transport (from Portuguese Africa to Belgium) of diamonds smuggled out
of Transvaal, lawful? App. Bruxelles (May 13, 1936) Belg. Jud. 1937, 4·
93
Inst. Int. Law, Florence, Resol. art. 2 n. f, 22 Annuaire (1908) 290.
Germany: BRUCK, Privatversich. R. 39 § 5 n. 3; HAGEN, Seeversicherungsrecht (Berlin 1938) 19 ("German conception").
Greece: FRAGISTAS, supra pp. 331 n. 70, at 347 and n. 2.
Italy: DIENA, 2 Dir. Com. Int. 462.
France: SUMIEN, 2 Repert. 151 Nos. 15, r6. Contra: ARMIN JON, Droit Int.
Pr. Com. 478 § 288.
Switzerland: }AEGER in 4 Roelli's Komm. 92 No. 35·
94
See Vol. II p. 412, cf. the Mississippi case referred to id. p. 526 n. 38. ·
05
See, e.g., Palmetto Fire Ins. Co. v. Beha (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1926) 13 F.
(2d) 500.
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to prevent the parties from eluding all of the applicable
provisions of the forum, including its most vital "interests."
It would be strange if they were not allowed to contract
in the forum and stipulate for a foreign law, which nevertheless would not remove the imperative part of the domestic
statute. This more considerate approach, under the presentday practice, even preserves extraterritorial effect to the
public policy of the forum.
Now, as we are to abandon the system of mechanical
rules, we have to discover the most suitable rules to replace
them. But adequate conflicts rules for various types of
insurance contracts cannot be stated except in a subsidiary
function. The task would be forbidding, if these rules were
to be imposed upon the parties with ironclad necessity.
(b) Special situations. Analogous considerations are due
to the atypical cases. If we, for instance, postulate as a
sound rule that fire or windstorm insurance should be
governed by the law of the state where the insured object
lies, we must yet recognize that two parties residing and
contracting in one state to insure a risk located in Japan
may be subjected to the law of the place of residence, in
contrast to the case where they contract through their local
agents in J apan. 96 This consideration is entirely different
from those on account of which fire and windstorm insurance
has been held not to fall under the law of the situs. 97
Dealing next with the subsidiary rule referring to the
law of the residence of the insured, we shall concentrate
on life insurance where this test points in an appropriate
direction.
96 See the analogous German reinsurance case, Vol. II p. 524; and BG.
(Jan. 20, 1948). 74 BGE. II 81, 88: Italian parties to an insurance of a
transport from Rotterdam to Basle, Italian law, including Italian subrogation
in contractual claims.
97 Supra p. 321 n. 35 and see the analogous situations in sales of immovables,
supra p. 106.
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Life Insurance: Law of the Residence of the Insured

A majority of the American court decisions, by applying
the law of the place of contracting in all insurance contracts,
have reached the law of the domicil or residence of the
insured. Many American statutes obtain a similar result
through various formulas. European doctrines use the same
criterion in restriction to insurance of persons, such as life,
health, and accident insurance.
Yet if the results seem similar, the ideas underlying the
localization vary, and the exact choice of the decisive
contact must be shaped accordingly.
(a) Delivery of policy. American courts contemplate
the place where the insured manually receives the insurance
policy. As such, this place is so casual as to defy the purpose
of conflicts law. The application of this test has been made
tolerable only through added fictions.
(b) Inhabitants. The statutes may certainly be presumed
to extend their protection to the inhabitants of the state,
in prescribing standards of fair dealing and fair competition
between insurers. 98 This formula seems to include citizens
of the state, residents and also probably even. people temporarily present in the state.
Logically, the formula implies that the domestic law
should govern all contracts of residents and exclude all
contracts of nonresidents (at least, with foreign insurers).
A proposal understood to this effect was opposed, advancing
the example that life insurance has been obtainable only
with exclusion of risk by flying, although some states prohibited "aviation riders"; a resident of such a state would
be prevented from going to another state where he may
obtain the usual policy. 99 This objection is of doubtful
value, but such meaning should not be ascribed to the rule.
98

PATTERSON, "The Conflict Problems etc.," supra n. 25, at 74·
Amer. Bar Assoc., Section of Ins. Law I940-194I, 173 No. 2 and 185
No.4·
99
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In the United States, the constitutional restrictions on state
power and, elsewhere, principles of reasonable interpretation require more than domiciliary or residential conditions,
as shown in the following essentially different constructions.
(c) Law of licensing state. If the applicable law is conceived as that of the licensing state rather than that of
the insured's domicil, two basic conditions are required, to
which the personal location of the insured in the state may
or may not be a precondition. One of these conditions is
that the insurer must do business in the state so as to need
licensing. The other is that the local agent whom every
foreign insurer is bound to appoint must be in some way
connected with the individual contract.
The latter connection can be imagined in various manners.
The minimum requirement has been indicated, for instance,
in Germany and Alabama: any activity of a foreign corporation through its agent with respect to a contract suffices
to justify the application of the domestic law, soliciting,
receiving the application, delivering the policy, collecting
the first premium, etc. Often making the contract is a condition. The Patterson Draft (Section 2) requires in all
cases of insurance that the contract should be:
"Either delivered in this state by or through an agent or
other representative of the insurer, or issued by the insurer
in this state for delivery by or through a person other than
an agent or other representative of the insurer, . . . "
which in case of life, accident, or health insurance is additional to the condition that the insured is a resident of the
state when the contract becomes effective. (Section 1 a)
In all these variants, a policy is not affected, if the local
agent has no part whatever in its negotiation. Many statutes,
seeking to avoid evasion, therefore declare that any insurance concluded abroad with an insurer licensed in the state
should be deemed as made in the state or declared void.
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Whether challengeable or not/ such provisions transgress
the reasonable limits of state power.
Insurance procured merely by correspondence with a
foreign insurer, at least one not having a local agent, is
left free. This agrees with the American practice 101 and
the German doctrine. 102
Thus far, however, we have presupposed that the conflicts rule selects its own criterion with respect to all life
insurance contracts.
(d) Law of the state supervising the contract. Since
many states refrain from imposing the imperative part of
their private law upon insurance contracts not "made" in
the state, it is a possible solution to make the application
of the local law dependent on the individual regulation
of doing business in the state. This would avoid applying
the law of a state which does not impose it and thus
obviate some complications. But the uncertainty now prevailing in many states with respect to what contracts are
subject to supervision, would extend to private law.
The least uncertain term for a permanent living center
is "habitual residence." Whether temporary residence should
suffice ought to be expressly stated in the statutes.
3· The Law of Situs
Insurance of immovables against risks such as fire, storm,
or hail, damage to glass, machines, or waterpipes, manifestly
10 0 As illustration, see for the United States supra pp. 320, 322; for Brazil,
McDoWELL, "Contratos de seguro celebrados no estrangeiro," 26 Rev. Jur.
252 (against the then existing decrees); and inversely in France, SUMIEN,
"Des conflits de lois relatifs aux assurances sur Ia vie contractees irregulierement avec des societes etrangeres," Revue Crit. 1934, so, against a
liberal decision of Cass. req. (March 21, 1933) published ibid. On the
corresponding German controversy, see BRUCK, Privatversich. R. 46 f.
On the ground of a decision by the German Reichsgericht of 1930, }AEGER
in 4 Roelli's Komm. 91 No. 34 and n. d recognizes in Switzerland that a
Swiss insurer doing business abroad and contracting there even with a Swiss
insured, is under foreign law.
1o1 E.g., Huntington v. Sheehan (1912) 206 N.Y. 486, 489, 100 N. E. 41.
102 BRUCK 33·
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belongs to the sphere of the state of the situation. State
care for agriculture, industry, and housing has become of
such importance as to require intensive control over preventive policy as well as over the recovery of damage to
domestic resources and investments. 103 It is reasonable
to apply the same test to movables "insured in a fixed
location. " 104
4· Various Kinds of Insurance
It is interesting that the American proposals of 1939
and likewise the French doctrine locate the center of liability for automobile accidents at the place where the car
is principally garaged (or principally used, adds the American draft). Normally, this results in the law of the car
owner's or user's residence and to that extent it does not
justify the fear of uncertainty. But the residence by itself
may well suffice for localizing all types of insurance not
connected with another unquestionable central point. If
it is the state control over territorial acts of the residents
rather than the residence itself (as localizing the risk)
that justifies the imposition of the state's law, a fidelity or
surety contract, or a group insurance covering health or
accident, is correctly centered at the headquarters of the
insured enterprise, as courts have generally held.
When workmen's compensation insurance is brought
under the law of the state where "the principal place of
employment" of the employee is when the contract becomes
effective/05 this approach comes close to the localization of
the employer's liability to which modern development tends,
as discussed earlier .106
103 NEUMEYER, 2 Int. Verwaltungs R. 352; BRUCK, Privatversich. R. 47·
This kind of consideration seems to have escaped the opponents to Professor
Patterson's proposal, Amer. Bar Assoc., Section of Ins. Law, 1940·I941, 17S.
104 Draft of the Patterson Committee, Amer. Bar Assoc., Section of Ins.
Law, Program 1939, 51 s. I (b), supra n. 52.
105 Draft, id. § 1 (d).
106Supra pp. xSS (employment), 21S, 229 (workmen's compensation).
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5. Proposals
Continued studies by insurance experts will be needed
to reconcile the possible differences of opinion on the precise
local connections for various types of risks. But the desirable
approach to the conflicts problem can scarcely be doubtful.
As an attempt to show roughly the resulting principle, the
following formulation is advanced with respect to life insurance and fire insurance, in the absence of a stipulation
for the applicable law and of special circumstances.
A contract of life insurance is governed by the law of the
state where the insured has his habitual residence, provided
that this state claims administrative supervision over the
contract, and that an agent of the insurer in the state has
participated in the negotiation of the contract.
A fire insurance contract respecting immovables, movables, or other interests in a fixed location, is governed by
the law of the state of the situation.
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Suretyship 1
I.
I.

SuRVEY

The Object of the Rule

AST and existing legal systems provide for various
types of contracts in which a person promises either
to perform another person's duty in case of noncompliance, or to indemnify the creditor therefor. The basic
types of suretyship and guaranty at common law are impregnated by this contrast. But a rich variety of forms has
overgrown the historic dualism. In civil law, the present
representative types of transactions have developed from
the late Roman categories from which, however, they differ.
They include suretyship (fideiussio )-with certain aspects
of common law guaranty-; mandate of credit (mandatum
qualificatum) ; guaranty (different from the common law
institution of the same name) ; and assumption of subsidiary
liability as codebtor. The differences in the various kinds of
promises reach from formalities to defenses and enforcement.
The terminology varies greatly in covering this wide and
practically important ground. Also, its external boundaries

P

1 LETZGus, "Die Biirgschaft" (in private international law), 3 Z.ausi.PR.
( 1929) 837; K. RILLING, Die Biirgschaft nach Deutsch em IPR. (Thesis,
Tiibingen 1935).
Comparative municipal law: Articles, HANS SCHULZE, "Garantievertrag,"
and ANDREAS B. ScHWARZ, "Biirgschaft," in 3 Rechtsvergl. Handworterbuch
593-622; for the main South-American codes: RAMIRO NAVA, La fianza y Ia
unidad en las legislaciones (Caracas 1927).
On the modern "compensated surety" (Restatement of Security § 82
comment i), see for the United States: G. W. CRIST, Corporate Suretyship
(1939); for Switzerland and Germany: RAAFLAUB, "Die Solidarbiirgschaft
im Bankverkehr," Gmiir's Abh. (N. F.) No. 73 (1932).
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are not delimited on the same lines. The Restatement of
the Law of Security, after thoughtful exploration of the
diverse terms used in American legal language, decided to
embrace the entire doctrine under the name of suretyship
and to use guaranty as a synonym. This all-comprehensive
concept is defined as :
"The relation which exists where one person has undertaken an obligation and another person is also under an
obligation or other duty to the obligee, who is entitled to but
one performance, and as between the two who are bound,
one rather than the other should perform." ( § 8 2)
Such broad terms are particularly suitable to conflicts
law. For it seems to be agreed that conflicts rules do not
discriminate among all the possible kinds of such promises. 2
Far from any characterization according to the law of the
forum, the terms suretyship, cautionnement, Biirgschaft,
fiant;a, are used to cover every contract creating a personal
obligation to the creditor, securing his claim against another
person.
The Restatement of Security ( § 83) includes, in addition
to contracts with the creditor whereby the obligor directly
intends to become a surety, other transactions having similar
results. These situations and the various cases in which
persons are treated by law as if they were sureties, may
be passed over here.
2.

Independence of the Rule

It was once assumed 3 that because a surety's obligation
is "accessory" to the principal debt, that is, depends on its
validity and extent, it is necessarily subject to the same law.
The only English leading case, seemingly still in authority,
2

LETZGUS, supra n. I, 842.
BoUHIER, I Observations sur Ia coutume du Duche de Bourgogne (I742)
ch. 2I, 4I3 § I97, citing a decision of the Parliament of Toulouse of 1655.
3
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is definitely to this effect/ and so are possibly a few American
decisions. 5 Some modern writers believe in this view. 6
The contrary opinion is undoubtedly correct. Quite as a
surety or a guarantor is bound by his own agreement with
the creditor, as distinguished from the undertaking giving
rise to the obligation of the principal debtor, suretyship
is governed by its own law independently, in principle, from
that controlling the main debt. This theory is firmly maintained by consistent doctrine in Germany 7 and other countries,8 and is dominant in the civil law literature. 9 Story
and Wharton thought along the same lines. 10 The American
decisions, in great majority though usually without express
mention, are consonant when they apply the law of the
place where the contract of suretyship is made, or that of
the place where this contract, distinguished from the principal debt, is performable. 11
The principle was adequately formulated by Zitelmann:
The law governing suretyship determines the extent to
4 England: Rouquette v. Overmann and Schou (I875) L. R. IO Q, B. 525,
per Cockburn, C. J.; BuRGE, 2 Commentaries 39·
5 United States: Cases cited by BATIFFOL 424 n. I.
Also in Germany: RG. (Feb. II, I896) 7 Z.int.R. (I897) 262.
6 Italy: 3 FIORE § I240; DE AMICIS, I contratti accessorii ( I909) 46, cited
by FEDOZZI-CERETI 760.
Recently to a similar effect, GuTZWILLER, 6 Z.ausi.PR. ( I932) 98.
7 RG. (May 23, I883) 9 RGZ. I85, I87; (April 23, I903) 54 RGZ. 3II,
Clunet I905, 1050; and many other decisions in constant practice. The
literature is unanimous to the same effect, see e.g., NEUMEYER, IPR. 30;
LETZGUS, supra n. I, 839; LEWALD 257; NussBAUM, D. IPR. 267.
8 Austria: OGH. (June II, I929) Clunet I930, 740.
France: The literature in the absence of cases, cf. 3 Repert. I65 No. IO.
Switzerland: BG. (July I8, I927) 53 BGE. II 347, Clunet I928, 508 and
passim,· 2 MElLI 42; 2 SCHNITZER 575·
Anglo-German Mixed Arb. Trib., Campbells v. Blank, 8 Recueil trib. arb.
mixtes I7 1 I9.
9 See, in addition to the citations in n. 8, e.g., }ITTA 495; 3 FIORE § I237;
FEDOZZI-CERETI 76o; BATIFFOL 423 § 52I.
10 STORY 360 § 267; 2 WHARTON 934 § 427.
11 See in particular, Cowles v. Townsend and Milliken (I86o) 37 Ala. 77;
Tolman v. Reed (I897) II5 Mich. 7I, 72 N. W. uo4; Compagnie Generale
de Fourrures v. Simon Herzig & Sons Co. (I9I5) 89 Misc. 573, I53 N. Y.
Supp. 7I7-
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which the liability of the surety depends on the validity and
content of the liability of the principal debtor. 12 Aiming at
the same idea, the Reichsgericht has often used the succinct
but inaccurate formula, that the law of the principal debt
decides what the surety owes, whereas the law of the suretyship indicates whether he owes. 13 In fact, the contrast is not
between existence and extent of the obligation, but is presented by the difference in the scope of the two obligations.
Illustrations. (i) Campbell Renfroe, in delegating his
paternal powers to a trustee, delivered a note to him for
the support of his children, and Gates signed the note as
surety. All this happened in Georgia, the law of which was
applied by the Louisiana court. Gates, who had paid the
note to the trustee without being sued, was unable to recover from the debtor or his cosurety, either as surety or
as holder of the note. The surety obligation did not exist
because the debt was void. 14
(ii) A creditor in France agreed with the debtor that
the sum due should be paid in pounds sterling instead of
francs. The French Court of Cassation held that the modification of currency was not a novation discharging the surety
(C. C. article I 27 I No. I), but neither did it bind the surety
to pay otherwise than in francs. 15 Both points pertain to
the law of suretyship.
(iii) Where someone wrongly believed himself to be a
surety and paid the true creditor, the question was from
whom he might recover. The Swiss Federal Tribunal held
that in the first place the creditor was unduly enriched and
owed restitution. But if an action against the creditor were
2 ZITELMANN 388.
RG. (April 23, 1903) 54 RGZ. 311, 315; (Jan. 21, 1926) IPRspr. 1929
No. 30. Various criticism has been addressed to this formulation by 2 FRANKENSTEIN 348 n. 79; NUSSBAUM, D. IPR. 268 (but see BATIFFOL 425 § 524); and
especially RILLING, suPra n. 1, 13 ff.
14 Gates v. Renfroe (1852) 7 La. Ann. s6<). In Louisiana C. C. § 3025
(now § 3056) cited by the court, the surety is said to have no recourse
against the principal debtor, if he pays without being sued and without
informing the principal; but this is expressly subordinated to the condition
that the debt did not exist at the time of the payment.
1 5 French Cass. civ. (Dec. 17, 1928) Clunet 1929, 1286.
12
13
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barred by limitation or waived by the surety, he was entitled
to compensation from the debtor, who had been eventually
discharged of his obligation. 16 This interesting theory of
unjust enrichment presupposes a relation based on an invalid suretyship and another resulting from discharge of
the principal debt. Thus two laws may have to be ascertained, both distinguishable from that governing the principal debt.
Yet, while the law need not necessarily be the same for
the debt and its guaranty, it is a reasonable wish that it
should be identical as often as possible. The problem of
establishing the adequate local connection for suretyship is
similar to that arising with respect to a contract to sell an
immovable, for which situs is not a compulsory but a
desirable contact.
II.
I.

CONTACTS

United States

Apart from old cases applying the law of the forum, 17
the courts in this country have generally adhered either to
the law of the place of contracting18 or to the law of the
place of performance. 19 But, as usual, these are merely the
labels.
The largest group of decisions is characterized by the
essential role of the creditor's domicil. The surety may
have had his residence in the same jurisdiction 20 or the
written guaranty may have been mailed to the creditor and
accepted by him, 21 thereby localizing the making of the
16

Swiss BG. (Oct. 17, 1944) 70 BGE. II 271, 34 Praxis No. 33·
Toomer v. Dickerson (r867) 37 Ga. 428. Expressly contra, Tenant v.
Tenant (r885) no Pa. 478, r Ad. 532.
18
2 WHARTON § 427s; BATIFFOL 423 § 522.
19 BATIFFOL 423 n. 6.
20 Walker v. Forbes (1857) 31 Ala. 9; Colston v. Pemberton (1897) 20
Misc. 410, 45 N. Y. Supp. 1034; Hays v. King ( 1914) 44 Okla. r8o, 143 Pac.
1142.
21 E.g., Watkins Co. v. Daniel ( 1934) 228 Ala. 399, 153 So. 771.
17
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contract; or performance by the surety allegedly was due
at the creditor's place so as to call for the law of the place
of performance. 22 A characteristic category was presented
by the customary official surety bonds delivered to the federal government as security for the service of employees;
they were localized at the seat of the government in Washington, D. C. 23
Ordinarily, the law applied also governed the principal
debt. 24 The courts sometimes stress this fact, 25 although at
other times they do not mention it.
Another notable situation may be mentioned, although
some writers minimize its importance. 26 Where a guaranty
is written on the instrument embodying the principal debt,
courts are probably inclined to let both be controlled by
one law. 27 In one case, it was expressly declared immaterial
that the surety signed the note of the debtor at a different
place. 28 When a financial operation was negotiated in New
York, the main contract executed in Nebraska, and the
guaranty appended in Illinois, the gambling statute of Illinois was eliminated. 29 In twin cases, the wives of two
22 John A. Tolman Co. v. Reed (1897) IIS Mich. 71, 72 N. W. 1104;
Alexandria etc. R. R. Co. v. Johnson (1900) 61 Kan. 417, 59 Pac. 1063;
Johnson v. Charles D. Norton Co. (C. C. A. 6th 1908) 159 Fed. 361; Fox v.
Corry ( 1921) 149 La. 445, 89 So. 410.
Canada: Scandinavian Amer. Nat') Bank v. Kneeland (Manitoba 1914)
24 Man. R. I68, 16 D. L. R. s6s.
23 Cox and Dick v. United States ( 1832) 6 Pet. 172; Duncan v. United
States ( 1833) 7 Pet. 435· Cf. STORY § 290, commented on by 2 BAR IIO n. II:
here the surety must know that his obligation is not accepted unless it conforms to the law at the seat of the government.
24 Compagnie General de Fourrures etc. v. Simon Herzig & Sons (1915)
89 Misc. 573, 153 N.Y. Supp. 717; Halloran v. Schmidt Brewing Co. (1917)
137 Minn. 141, 162 N. W. 1082; Furst and Thomas v. Sandlin (1922) 208
Ala. 490, 94 So. 740; Watkins Co. v: Hill (1926) 214 Ala. 507, 108 So. 244.
25 See the collection of cases by BATIFFOL 424 n. 1.
26 E.g., RILLING, supra n. 1, 95 before n. 2.
27 Continental & Commercial Nat') Bank of Chicago v. Cobb (C. C. A. 1st
1912) 200 Fed. SII, 516, 517; Fisk Rubber Co. v. Muller (1914) 42 App.
D. C. 49·
2 8Pugh v. Cameron's Adm'r (1877) II W.Va. 523.
29 Richter v. Frank (C. C. N. D. Ill. 1890) 41 Fed. 859.
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brothers and debtors, domiciled in Michigan, signed mortgage guaranties for property in Ohio. One note was signed
by one defendant when she was temporarily there with her
husband in the bank office; the other note was signed at
home. But in both cases the contracting was held to have
occurred in Ohio. 30
The bulk of the decisions may be summarized, notwithstanding their varying formal terms, to the effect that contracts of guaranty or suretyship are preferably subjected to
the law of the principal debt, especially when the latter is
governed by the law of the domicil of the creditor.
2.

Other Countries

Apart from the abandoned test of nationality of the
surety, 31 most Continental opinions have been divided between the domiciliary law of the surety 32 and the law of the
place of his performance. 33 The law of the place of contracting which is provided in so many laws as a general
rule, 34 does not app~ar often in practice.
The law of the domicil of the surety has been justified
by the Swiss Federal Tribunal as suitable to the nature of
his unilateral and onerous obligation, 35 because such an
obligor ought to be considered bound to a minimum, i. e.,
30 Butzel, J., in State of Ohio v. James N. Purse and State of Ohio v. Artie
Purse (1935) 273 Mich. 502, 507, 263 N. W. 872 and 874 although speaking
in terms of lex loci contractus and of the Restatement.
31 2 ZITELMANN 366; 2 FRANKENSTEIN 123 ff., 349·
3 2 3 FIORE § 1243 (but see § 1238 for lex fori); ]ITTA 495; 2 BAR 24;
NEUMEYER, IPR. 27; WALKER 496; 3 ROLIN § 1412.
Denmark: Copenhague (Feb. 2, 1885) Clunet 1887, 223.
Germany: Decisions of the temporary sixth senate of the RG., see (Oct.
12, 1905) 61 RGZ. 343·
Switzerland: See n. 3 5·
33 Germany: RG. (Oct. 4, 1894) 34 RGZ. 16 and constant practice; see
list of decisions, LETZGUS, supra n. I, 837, 840; LEWALD §§ 314-317; RAAPE,
D. IPR. 294·
34 Italian writers mention Disp. Prel. C. C. (1865) art. 9 par. 2; (1942)
art. 25.
35 53 BGE. II 344. 347; 61 id. II 181; 63 id. II 308; 67 id. II 215, 220.
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to not more than his own law indicates. Where a guaranty
is given for consideration, such as by a bank in the course
of its business, the circumstances and particularly the connection with the entire financial arrangement are decisive. 36
The comprehensive treatment in the German cases assumes that suretyship is governed by the law of the place
of its performance, but since according to the general German principle the surety like any debtor owes performance
at his domicil, the result is regularly the same as in the
view mentioned above. 37
Through this emphasis on the domicil of the person
giving the guaranty, it happens more often and more strikingly than in other systems that principal debt and guaranty
are controlled by different laws.

Illustration. In a case where creditor, debtor and a surety
lived in Luxembourg, the Reichsgericht did not doubt that
all their relationships were governed by the law of Luxembourg (substantially French law). This included the question
whether the surety was to be subrogated by payment to
the creditor's rights. But at the time of the original transaction, the wife of the debtor assumed (I) cosuretyship
with the surety to the creditor and ( 2) countersecurity to
the surety. She expressed both these obligations simply by
signing the loan instrument "as cosurety and countersurety"
( als Mitburge und Ruckburge). When the surety later
sued the woman, the Reichsgericht determined the recovery
under German law because the woman had always lived in
Germany and therefore had to pay there. 38
This surprising conflicts· decision could have been avoided
by presuming a unitary law. The practical result may be
strange. Supposing the first surety paid and was subrogated,
according to his own law, to the creditor, the cosurety,
reimbursing him partially, may not be subrogated under
36

BG. (Sept. 23, 1941) 67 BGE. II 215, 220, reported Vol. II p. 435·
Cf. NussBAUM, D. IPR. 268 n. 2.
ss RG. (Oct. 12, 1905) 61 RGZ. 343, 16 Z.int.R. ( 1906) 324.
37
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his law. The debtor would be discharged to such extent,
contrary to the law governing debt and suretyship.
3. Conclusion
Although the legal situation of an accessory codebtor
may be independently defined in conflicts law, in most cases
it would be desirable to subordinate it to the law of the principal debt. 39 More recently, study of the American decisions
has suggested to Batiffol a general presumption in favor of
this law.
At least, in the spirit of the American decisions, we may
propose such extension when no counterindicia appear in
the individual cases, in the following situations:
(a) Where surety and principal enter into obligation, by
signing the same instrument, or otherwise in common;
(b) Where the principal debt is governed by the law of
the creditor's domicil; and we may add as a suggestion( c) Where an accessory debtor intervened upon agreement with the principal debtor, to the knowledge of the
creditor.
Finally, it may be assumed that, likewise as in the United
States, 40 bonds required by a state to secure the fidelity or
aptitude of its servants or compliance with the laws of the
state by a foreign corporation are exclusively subject to
the law of that state as are the principal obligations. 41

III.

ScoPE oF THE RuLE

Apart from formalities 42 and capacity, 43 presenting the
usual problems, the validity, effects, and extinction of guar39 FEDOZZ!-CERETI 761; LEWALD 258 advocates the law of the principal
debtor's domicil.
40 BAT!FFOL 424 § 523.
41 See for the United States, supra n. 23, and the observations by 2 MElLI
44·
4 2 United States: Allshouse v. Ramsay (1841) 6 Whart. (Pa.) 331; Halloran v. Schmidt Brewing Co. (1917) 137 Minn. 141, 162 N. Y. 1082.
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anty or suretyship are controlled by the governing law. 44
Some particulars have been elaborated and may be mentioned. We should also notice some intricate questions connected with the fact that statutory regulations of collateral
obligations usually include the use of defenses belonging to
the principal debtor and the recourse against the latter.
Apparently a part of the law of suretyship, these provisions
go substantially beyond its primary scope.
1.

Extent of Liability

The law of the guaranty or suretyship, as said before,
determines the extent to which the legal effect of the principal debt influences the liability of the obligor. It decides
whether an obligor accedes to the debt merely to the extent
of the debtor's liability, or more independently, either as a
subsidiary or as an original promisor. Sued by the obligee,
the promisor may (like a typical guarantor) or may not
(like an ordinary surety) be entitled to object that the
creditor should have first attempted enforcement against
the principal debtor (beneficium excussionis personalis),
that he indulged in neglect, or that he failed to give notice
or written notice of the debtor's default to the defendant,
according to the contract made between the parties and the
law governing it. 45 For it has been universally recognized
Germany: 9 RGZ. 176; 61 id. 343·
On intricate special problems cf. MANNL, I I Z.ausl.PR. (1937) 802.
43 United States: See the well-known decisions on guaranty by married
women, such as Milliken v. Pratt (1878) 125 Mass. 374, 28 Am. Rep. 241;
Nichols & Shepard Co. v. Marshall (1899) 108 Ia. 518, 79 N. W. 282; Freeman's Appeal (1897) 68 Conn. 533, 37 Atl. 420. Cf. Vol. I pp. 103, 182.
Germany: RG. (July 7, 1903) 13 Z.int.R. (1903) 442, Clunet 1905, 1049.
44 United States: See lists of cases in 50 C. J. 14.
Germany: LETZGUS, supra n. 1, 844.
45 United States: Walker v. Forbes (1857) 31 Ala. 9: guaranty in Louisiana, defense of failure of due diligence dismissed; Toomer v. Dickerson
(1867) 37 Ga. 428: presumably South Carolina contract, promisee lost a
pledge of slaves by negligent failure to register them in Georgia, the court
regards the enforcement against the surety as remedy; Johnson v. Charles
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since Stort 6 that it is a substantive, not a procedural, question whether the creditor may sue the principal and surety
jointly or severally and whether he has to comply with a
prescribed order of suits. Obviously, it is the contract between creditor and surety, rather than the contract between
creditor and debtor, that decides whether the surety bears
an absolute or conditional liability.
If the burden of proof regarding the diligence of the
obligee is regulated in the law of guaranty, this provision
is also binding. On the same theory, the law of suretyship
determines whether the surety may assert against the creditor the defenses of the principal.47
This is obvious but for one point, viz., the faculty of
the surety to set off a counterclaim belonging to the principal
debtor. Under the prevailing opinion in the J]nited States,
a surety sued alone by the creditor is not entitled to such
setoff except in certain cases, 48 although contrary statutes
exist. Analogous differences are found in Europe. Like the
American reasoning that the setoff claim of the debtor cannot be brought to final decision without his consent, 49 the
German Code 50 is motivated by the consideration that a
surety may not use another's right without his consent. If
the contract of suretyship is under ordinary American law,
"setoff" is undoubtedly excluded. But can it be considered
to be permitted to a surety bound under French law accordD. Norton Co. (C. C. A. 6th 1908) 159 Fed. 361, 363: guaranty executed in
Ohio but centered in Pennsylvania whose law decides whether it is conditional on pursuing the principal to insolvency.
Denmark: Landesiiverret Copenhague (Feb. 2, 1885) Clunet 1887, 223.
Germany: 9 RGZ. 185, 188; 10 id. 282; 34 id. 15; 54 id. 3II, 314.
4 6Howard v. Fletcher (1879) 59 N.H. 151; STORY§ 322 b; RoLIN, 3
Principes §§ 1410, 1417; 2 BAR 109.
47 Germany: RG. (July 6, 1910) 74 RGz: 46.
48 Note, 46 Yale L. ]. (1937) 833, 842.
49 Restatement of Security § 133 comment b.
50 BGB. § 768; Swiss C. Obi. art. 502 (as amended 1941). The surety
may, however, suspend payment, at least if the creditor can compensate
against the debtor. See RG. (June 16, 1932) 137 RGZ. 34·
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ing to the French Code 51 when the principal debt follows
American law? The difficulty is twofold. One involves the
disposition over the debtor's ownership of a claim. It is
scarcely possible to leave this question to the law governing
the suretyship; it rather belongs to the law controlling the
relationship surety-principal. The other difficulty arises on
the fundamental theoretical problem which law or laws
have to be consulted for permitting setoff between persons
not identical with the original parties to a claim. This problem of setoff is discussed further in Chapter 51 on setoff.
2.

Paying Surety as Assignee

According to Roman law and a series of codes, a surety
is entitled to require, as a condition of his payment to the
creditor, that the latter assign him the principal debt, commonly with the securities attached to it (beneficium cedendarum actionum). In common law as well as in the French
law which is followed by practically all modern codes, the
debt is transferred to the paying surety by operation of
law (subrogation) .52
Either effect of the payment, tending towards a succession
to the creditor's claim rather than its -discharge, pertains
to the law governing the suretyship. German decisions are
precise on this point. 53 But doubt arises when such a subrogation is not simultaneously supported by the law of the
principal debt. This problem must be referred to the doctrine
of legal assignment. 54
51 C. C. art. I294 par. I.
Italy: C. C. (I86s) art. I290 par. I, (I942) art. I247 par. x.
Spain: C. C. art. 1197, etc.
52 For civil law, see BrAsiO, Der tlbergang der Gliiubigerrechte auf den
Biirgen und dessen Regressrechte, Gmiirs Abh. (N. F.) No. 211 (I944).
5 3 Germany: RG. (April 23, 1903) 54 RGZ. 311, 316, Clunet 1905, 1050;
and constant practice. On related German and Swiss decisions, see infra
p. 436 and n. 3·
54 Infra pp. 436-438.
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3· Termination
Extinction of the principal debt, for instance, by setoff
or release, 55 or a bar of limitation on the principal debt, as
a defense for the surety, 56 affects the latter's obligation in
correspondence with the law governing the debt.
Moreover, of course, suretyship has its own limitation
of action. 57
4· Retribution and Exoneration
When a surety, after payment to the creditor but without
obtaining from him subrogation or assignment, seeks to
recover from the principal debtor, it seems logical that this
is not part of the law governing suretyship. His claim to
be discharged after the principal obligation has matured
is on the same footing. Ordinarily there is a contract between the debtor and surety such as agency or partnership.
However, it would often be desirable to have the same law
govern the recovery as that under which the surety must
pay. An example of how such a result may be reached was
set a century ago.

Illustration. Thomas, a resident of Kentucky, brought an
alleged slave to Louisiana and there authorized Beckman
to sell the slave with guaranty of title. This the latter did
under his own guaranty, but the purchaser was evicted by
a suit for freedom and had to pay 450 dollars for services
of the illegally detained person; Beckman was bound to
5 5 Cf. Howard v. Fletcher (1879) 59 N.H. 151: deferment of maturity of
the principal debt (in the instant case all three parties resided in Vermont) ;
RG. (Dec. 17, 1907) 33 Els. L. Z. 314 cited by LEWALD § 317.
That discharge of the principal by federal bankruptcy proceedings does
not extend to the surety either under federal or Louisiana surety law, was
stated in Serra e Hijo v. Hoffman & Co. ( 1878) 30 La. Ann. 67, and with
respect to a Norwegian bankruptcy and a German surety in OLG. Hamburg
(Feb. 12, 1903) 6 ROLG. 365.
56 RG. (July 6, 1910) 74 RGZ. 46: the surety liable under German law
may invoke the limitation having run for the principal under French law.
5 7 OLG. Karlsruhe (Nov. 10, 1927) IPRspr. 1928 No. 32.
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make restitution under Louisiana law, including the damages. Thomas was held liable to Beckman to the same extent,
notwithstanding a limitation of liability under the law of
Kentucky, which was the law of the forum, Thomas "having
sanctioned the contract, as made." 58

If the surety intervenes as a voluntary agent, he may
sue in quasi contract (negotiorum gestio or unjust enrichment), Security Restatement§ 104 (2). Under which law
he may do so will be mentioned in the next chapter.
IV. PLuRALITY

OF

SuRETIEs

r. Law Common to Cosureties
Where several obligors contract by common contract,
they are ordinarily liable under the law of the principal
debt. Furthermore the law defining their liability to the
obligee is generally extended to their internal relationship.
Both propositions are not necessary but convenient, and
evidently favored by the courts in the case of cosureties.
Illustrations. ( i) The Alexandria Railroad advanced
money for construction of a road in Louisiana, whereas its
partner, the Kansas City Railroad also of Louisiana, procured an agreement from their members to indemnify the
Alexandria if the Kansas failed to pay. Although all the
signers of the guaranty were residents of Kansas, the
forum, their liability was determined under the law of
Louisiana, "where the delinquency indemnified against was to
occur and did occur." 59
(ii) Where three guarantors signed a bond jointly and
severally for a bank in Laurel, Mississippi, in agreement
with the cashier, to secure loans made by that bank to a
Mississippi company, the Louisiana court applied Missis58 Thomas v. Beckman (1840) I B. Mon. (40 Ky.) 29.
59Alexandria, Arcadia & Fort Smith R. R. Co. v. Johnson (1900) 61
Kan. 417, 59 Pac. 1063, 1064. Cynically, one might note that in thi~ manner
the residents of the forum were spared the common law liability in solidum.
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sippi law to determine rights and duties among the coguarantors, without further investigation. 60
(iii) A resident of Winnipeg, Manitoba, signed jointly
with others a written guaranty, dated and apparently executed in Minnesota, to secure a credit given by a Minneapolis bank to a corporation doing business there. The
bank released one guarantor after partial payment. The
Manitoba court decided according to Minnesota law and
contrary to its own law that even in the case of joint obligors release of one of them did not discharge the others. 61
The German Supreme Court has taken an identical attitude to the effect that when the cosureties are bound
under one law to the creditor, they are presumed to be bound
under the same law as to contribution among themselves. 62
Different Laws

2.

Codebtors in the absence of a common source of obligation, are considered to be subject each to his own law. 63
According to this principle, the situation of cosureties may
become complicated.
In the relation to the creditor, this principle leads to a
different treatment of the cosureties.

Illustration. The Swedish Supreme Court had to decide
the extent of liability of two cosureties, one domiciled in
Sweden and one in Germany. Determining the applicable
law according to the places of performance and identifying
them with the domicils of the debtors, the court held the
Swedish cosurety liable for a part and the German liable
jointly and severally for the entire debt. 64
6

° Fox v.

Corry {1921) 149 La. 445, 89 So. 410.
Scandinavian Amer. Nat') Bank v. Kneeland (1914) 24 Man. R. 168,
16 D. L. R. 565.
62 RG. (May 13, 1929) IPRspr. 1929 No. 3·
63 PARMELE in 2 Wharton 930 A; 2 ZITELMANN 389; 0SER-SCHOENENBERGER, Allgemeine Einleitung No. 92.
64 See SODERQUIST, Revue 1923, 465.
61
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This method of measuring each codebt under its separate
law, has been declared to be consistent and natural. 65
If this may be taken as the correct view, what is the
law controlling contribution by cosureties if they are not
connected by agreement among themselves? A German
court resorted to the law of the place where the duty of
contribution should be fulfilled. 66 The solution may depend
on the conflicts rule suitable to extracontractual legal
obligations.
V.

CuRRENCY REsTRICTIONs

Can a surety avail himself of the defense that legal or
factual impossibility of payment has been caused by currency
restrictions applying either to him or to the principal? The
question has come up repeatedly and the answer lies, apart
from stringent public policy, in the dominant role of the
law governing the debt, 67 which in the case of a surety
means the law governing suretyship as an independent contract. Correctly, therefore, the Austrian Supreme Court
has decided for an Austrian surety against the Belgian
creditor on the ground of the restrictions in the German
law of Devisen because the suretyship was contracted
along with the principal debt under German law. 68 The same
court likewise followed the principle when it did not allow
a suretyship obligation governed by Austrian law to be
65 3 FIORE § 1243; 2 MElLI 43 ; 2 FRANKENSTEIN 349 n. 86. Likewise, as it
seems, RG. (Dec. 6, 1884) 1 Bolze No. 88, cited in the literature, not available here.
66 OLG. Hamburg (May 5, 1933) IPRspr. 1933 No. 17.
In Frew v. Scoular (1917) 101 Neb. 131, 162 N. W. 496, one cosurety seems
to have been subject to Scottish law, while the court had no opportunity to
say whether the other, the defendant, was under Nebraska law. The Scottish
limitation of action had not run its 40 years when the Scottish cosurety paid
the local creditor; the Nebraska court applied the domestic statute of limitation but assumed that its s-year period began only with the payment.
67 Supra p. 48.
6 8 Austria: OGH. (April 24, 1936) 18 SZ. 211 No. 72.
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affected by the German restrictions excusing the German
debtor. 69
The Swiss Federal Court forcefully sustained this solution, explaining that the faculty of a surety to use the defenses of the principal debtor is limited to normal excuses
and does not extend to the abnormal interference of a
foreign state in political and economic emergency. 70 Even
though a German debtor were discharged under the German currency laws, a Swiss surety would be liable according
to the law of his Swiss place of performance. 71 This court,
moreover, in pursuance of its absolute public policy rejecting any resort to foreign measures of economic warfare,
enforced claims against a surety even when his obligation
was governed by German law. 72 In view of repeated criticism, more recently the court seems to reserve an ultimate
formulation. 73 It distinguished the case of a discharge obtained by the Italian principal debtor in the clearing procedure operated between Italy and Belgium in accordance
with a treaty. Since credit in these proceedings is considered
full payment, the Swiss surety was entitled to avail himself
of the defense. 74
69
70

3I

Austria: OGH. (Sept. 5, 1934) 16 SZ. 447 No. 162.
Switzerland: See the discussion in BG. (Sept. 21, 1937) 63 BGE. II 303,

I.
71

BG. (Sept. 18, 1934) 6o BGE. II 294, 304 ff.
BG. (Sept. 18, 1934) 6o BGE. II 294, 311 ff; (June 19, 1935) 61 BGE.
II 181, Revue 1936, 692, S. 1936, 415.
73 BG. (Sept. 21, 1937) 63 BGE. II 303, 311.
72
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lbid.

CHAPTER

48

Extracontractual Obligations
OME codifications have stated as a general rule that
all obligations arising without contract are governed
by the law of the place where the act creating the obligation is done. 1 This rule is either trite or wrong. Our conflicts rule determines whether we recognize a foreign law
as the origin of an obligation and the law so recognized
decides what elements create the obligation.
Nothing better is achieved by general rules placing "quasi
contracts" under the law of the place where the obligating
act is done. 2 Quasi contract is not a useful term. From its
range, three topics require a report on the actual state of
the doctrine.

S

I.

VoLUNTARY AGENcY

(NEGOTIORUM GEsrw) 3

In the old doctrine of civil law derived from Roman and
Byzantine sources, altruistic intervention in the interest of
another person is considered as a praiseworthy activity,
suitable to Christian readiness to help. English courts have
taken the contrary attitude in damning "officious meddling."
In the United States, this hostility to voluntary taking care
1 Italy: Disp. Prel. C.C. (1942) art. 25 par. 2.
Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. II par. 1.
Rumania: C. C. ( 1940) art. 42.
Treaty of Montevideo on Int. Civ. Law (1889) art. 38. Contra, e.g.,
BEVILAQUA, Dir. Int. Priv. 372.
2 Belgian Congo: C. C. art. II par. 3·
Spanish Morocco: Dahir of 1914, art. 21.
Tangier: Dahir of 1925, art. 16 par. 2.
C6digo Bustamante, art. 222.
3 Comparative municipal law, American and Roman laws: HEILMAN,
"Rights of the Voluntary Agent Against His Principal in Roman Law and
in Anglo-American Law," 4 Tenn. L. Rev. (1926) 34-54, 76-95.

361

SPECIAL OBLIGATIONS

of the business of another has been maintained in principle,
but it is riddled with a great many exceptions. Occasionally, American law has been more generous than certain
civilian doctrines. Where there is a duty implied by law to
preserve human life or property, the work and labor spent
to this end may be compensable in American courts, a result
not always reached by German courts. 4
Due to the contrasts in history and development, it is
understandable that the conflicts problems of this subject
have been discussed almost exclusively in the Continental
literature.
1.

Usual Conflicts Theories

The traditional doctrine, basically territorial in its origin,
has split on a systematic question. Roman law establishes
two actions. The actio directa belongs to the person in
whose business or sphere the intervention occurred, the
dominus negotii, and is directed to recovery of the gain the
gestor may have made and of the damage he may have
caused by negligence. By the actio contraria, the acting
person, if conditions are present, sues for restitution of expenses. Writers regarding the existence of these two actions
as the only effect of voluntary intervention concluded that
each action had its own law. The direct action would be
localized at the place where the act of interference is done,
and the counterclaim would be governed by the law of the
principal. When, to the contrary, the medieval construction
4 HEILMAN, supra n. 3, at 83 ff.; American Law Institute, SEAVEY and
ScOIT, Notes on Certain Important Sections of Restatement of Restitution
171 ff. § 117.
Germany: The problem whether more than expenses is recoverable, has
been controversial. OLG. Celie (Nov. 10, 1905) 12 ROLG. 272 and OLG.
Kiel (Oct. 9, 1906) 18 id. 22 granted physicians' fees, characterizing labor
spent by a professional man as expenses. In ENNECCERUS-LEHMANN, 2 Derecho
de obligaciones (Recht der Schuldverhiiltnisse, translation by PEREZ
GONZALES y ALGUER, 1933) 353, note to § 164, it is noted that in Spain
probably all useful expenditures may be recovered.
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of the actions as flowing from a phenomenon similar to a
contract, a quasi contract, was followed, the entire effects
were subjected to a single law. 5 With various motivations,
the modern theory has preferred the latter result. The applicable law has been ·found in the place where the agent
accomplishes his intervention. 6
In one opinion, however, exceptions are made in case
the agent takes care of an entire unity of assets; in the
absence of a single place of acting the law of the principal
should be stressed. 7
On the other hand, the domicil of the principal has been
indicated as the dominating contact because his interest
prevails in the institution. 8
2.

Distinctions

Some authors have noticed that the circumstances of the
cases must be considered. 9 In this view, where a contractual
relation connects the principal and agent, the law governing
the contract must extend to the effects of acts by the agent
that exceed his authority. 10 This is the correct point of view
and should be enlarged to include any preceding contractual
or legal relationship.
5 For the first opinion, REGELSBERGER, Pandekten I75 and n. (g); 2 MElLI
86; WEISS, 4 Traite 4I3; 2 FRANKENSTEIN 395· Contra: PILLET, 2 Traite 3IO f.
(nationality of the principal); POULLET 352 f.; PACCHIONI 332 f.; SAUSERHALL, 44 Z. Schweiz. R. (N. F.) (I925) 296a. The same result is based on
the presumptive intention of the agent by RoLIN, I Principes §§ 358, 362;
3 id. § I059 f.; contra: 2 ARMIN JON § II8, e.g., BusTAMANTE, 2 Der. Int.
Priv. 3I2.
6 China: Int. Priv. Law, art. 24.
Japan: Int. Priv. Law, art. II par. I.
C6digo Bustamante, art. 220.
See e.g., FIORE, Clunet I900, 458; Note, RICCI-BUZATTI, I Rivista ( I906)
213; PILLET, 2 Traite 3I0 § 547 bis.
7 PILLET, 2 Traite 3II; 2 ARMINJON § II8.
8 NussBAUM, D. IPR. 295 and n. 3 in fine; Swiss BG. (Nov. 25, I905) 3I
BGE. II 662, 665.
9 NEUMEYER, IPR. 32; 2 FRANKENSTEIN 394 n. 44·
10 See in particular, M. WoLFF, Priv. Int. Law 507 § 48I.
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After the First World War, it was a situation familiar to
the mixed arbitral tribunals that a contract involving some
kind of custody-sale, agency, bailment, etc.-was deemed
retroactively dissolved by the Treaty of Versailles as of
the time when the parties became enemies, but the custodian
had continued to act during the war. This was done either
in his own interest on the basis of the contract or to safeguard the interest of the other party. In the latter case, his
acting, deprived of its contractual foundation, could be construed as voluntary agency. Acting in self-interest could
possibly constitute a so-called quasi negotiorum gestio, that
is, intervention of a person in the business of another person
in the belief that it is his own. 11 The mixed arbitral tribunals
were first inclined to deny a German party any excuse for
continuing to act, but finally considered the war period of
suspension as a sequel to the contract. Hence, the law governing the contract extended to the additional relationship.
The same result obtained ex fortiori when the contract
remained in force by exception.
Illustration. A Rumanian firm before the war deposited
ten oil tank cars with a German firm. This contract was not
dissolved by the Treaty. At a time when it seemed reasonable, the cars were sold in the interest of the owner but
with loss. The court justified the application of German
law to the contract of deposit and concluded without any
question that the German provisions on negotiorum gestio
should be applied. 12

If the German firm would have had to sell the cars in
Belgium, it would be absurd to apply Belgian law. Suppose
the contract had been dissolved by the war. The extension
11 Germany: BGB. § 687, applied by Gerrnano-Belgian Mixed Arb. Trib.
(May 27, 1924) Pres. Moriaud, Sturbelle v. Netter, 4 Recueil trib. arb.
rnixtes 342, 345·
12 Rurnano-Gerrnan Mixed Arb. Trib. (Jan. 11, 1929) Pres. Fazy, 8 Recueil
trib. arb. rnixtes 917, 921.
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of the law governing the former contract would be equally
satisfactory.
3· Maritime Assistance and Salvage
When in a famous dictum, Lord Bowen formulated the
aversion of common law to voluntary agency, he contrasted
the principle, "liabilities are not to be forced upon people
behind their backs," with the recognized exceptions of maritime law as to salvage, general average, and contribution. 13
Despite the universal background of general maritime law,
however, national differences in the treatment of assistance and salvage were numerous, and conflicts theories
abounded,u while very few laws attempted a solution. 15 The
multilateral Brussels Convention of September 23, 1910,
adopted by the United States and many other countries, 16
has eliminated most, though not all, conflicts among the
participant powers and is applied in member states even
though the other state involved is not a member. 17 Some
conflicts rules are included in the Convention. 18
Remaining problems seem to be considered subject to the
lex fori as general maritime law when jurisdiction is taken
in an English or American admiralty court. In civil law
they are at present prevailingly treated by the law of the
flag if it is common to both parties, 19 and otherwise by the
13

Falcke v. Scottish Imperial Ins. Co. (I886) 34 Ch. D. 234, 248.
For surveys, see 2 Repert. (I929) 69 ff.; 2 ARMINJON (ed. 2) 338 ns. 2-7;
2 STREIT- VALLINDAS 268; 2 FRANKENSTEIN 553 ff.
15 Portugal: C. Com. art. 690 is known as an exception.
16 International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating
to the Salvage of Vessels at Sea, 37 Stat. I658, I667; The Salvage Act, I9I2,
37 Stat. 242, 46 U. S. C. §§ 727-73I, BENEDICT, 6 American Admiralty 200.
17 Art. I5.
On the distinction between contractual and extracontractual duties, see
LE BRUN, "Assistance, sauvetage et obligation de service," I Revue Trim. D.
Com. ( I948) 388.
18 Arts. 6 par. 1, 9 par. I, 10 par. 2, I5 par. 2.
19 Germany: RG. (June I5, I927) II7 RGZ. 249.
14
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national law in force in territorial waters. 20 But where
the act occurs on the high seas, or begins there and terminates in a port, the opinions are extremely divided. 21
A convention on assistance and salvage of aircraft, of
Brussels, 1938, has not gathered sufficient ratifications. 22
The efforts to fill the gaps of unification are being continued.
II.

UNJUST ENRICHMENT

23

A. IN GENERAL

Restitution of enrichment obtained without just cause,
a favorite of Justinian's compilators and of the Continental
common practice at the time of the natural law, has found
its most complete development in the German Civil Code
and comments, and recently in the American Restatement
of Restitution. An enormous mass of apparently heterogeneous situations is covered thereby. In France and other
20 Portugal: C. Com. art. 690.
Treaty of Montevideo on Int. Com. Navigation ( 1940) art. 12; DIENA, 3
Dir. Com. Int. 396; WEiss, 3 Traite 413 n. 2.
21 Particularly: Law of the salvaging vessel, or of the salvaged vessel,
or [ex fori. See for France, DESPAGNET 931; 2 ARMIN JON (ed. 2) 338; RIPERT,
3 Droit Marit. § 2207; 2 Repert. 72 f; NIBOYET, 54 Traite 506.
For Germany: NEUMEYER, IPR. 33, incorrectly opposed by 2 FRANKENSTEIN
558 n. 226.
Treaty of Montevideo on Int. Com. N avig. ( 1940) art. 12 applies the law
of the flag of the salvaging vessel.
22 See 1 Int. L. Q. ( 1947) 505, and the Convention Draft of September 28,
1938 in BENEDICT, 6 American Admiralty 203.
Guatemala has ratified, see MATOS 566.
23 Comparative writing on municipal laws: FRIEDMANN, Die Bereicherungshaftung im anglo-amerikanischen Rechtskreis ( 1930) ; id., "The Principle of Unjust Enrichment," 16 Can. Bar Rev. (1938) 243, 365; GuTTERIDGE
and DAVID, "The Doctrine of Unjustified Enrichment," 5 Cambr. L. J. (1934)
204. Instructive with respect to the divergence of American and English laws,
ScoTT and SEAVEY, "Restitution," 54 Law Q. Rev. (1938) 29. A comprehensive, comparative article in 7 Rechtsvergl. Handwiirterbuch is not
available.
Comparative conflicts law: surveys of literary opinions have been afforded
by GuTTERIDGE and LIPSTEIN, "Conflicts of Law in matters of Unjustifiable
Enrichment," 7 Cambr. L. J. ( 1941) So; Anon., xo Repert 776; FICKER, 4
Rechtsvergl. Handwiirterbuch (1929) 387; and most Continental and LatinAmerican treatises. There is not even accord among these reports about the
views attributable to the sketchy treatment by writers.
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civil law countries, the codes have prevailingly restricted
their attention to condictio indebiti, the recovery of a payment not due, which is therefore alone considered in the
bulk of the conflicts literature, while the more recent French
doctrine using the name of action de in rem verso 24 has been
scarcely noted. The English action of indebitatus assumpsit
produced in an early period the actions for money had and
received and quantum meruit, with an important though by
no means exhaustive scope.
Heavy problems burden not only the less advanced
theories of unjust enrichment; new problems arise with
elaboration of the system. At the same time the slowly
growing popularity of the subject multiplies the cases revealing divergent solutions.
The differences are caused much more by legal intricacies
of technique than by contrasting ideas of justice. But there
exist also divergencies of the latter kind. Although the entire
institution rests everywhere upon equity, the concept of
equity varies. If, for instance, someone in the mistaken
belief that he owns a motor car, causes it to be painted, in
this country it is thought unfair to let him have compensation for the plus value of the car ;25 in this special case
Romanistic doctrine does not even need the action for
unjust enrichment since compensation is provided by the
principles of vindication. 26
In conflicts literature, including the Restatement, the
subject has often been discussed, but in an offhand manner
until very recently when the real problem was discovered.
But only tentative propositions in illustrative cases have
been advanced. A promising study on the same basis of
24 With more justification, the Austrian doctrine has taken § 1041, Allg.
BGB. as the starting point for developing a modern actio de in rem verso
different from the action based on enrichment. (A good illustration of the
distinction: 97 RGZ. 61 at 65.)
25 ScOIT and SEAVY, "Restitution," 54 Law Q. Rev. (1938) 29 at 36.
26 German BGB. § 996; cf. § 818 par. 2.
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comparative research as underlies the present work is
announced, 27 and should provide the needed monograph
for which the following remarks are no substitute.
Judicial decisions have been declared missing m the
United States and England. 28 Few are available on the
Continent.
At least it is certain that however narrow the domestic
scope of unjust enrichment may be, foreign application of
this institution is definitely recognized. With regard to the
peculiar English treatment of foreign tort actions, it has
been noted that recovery of values based on an applicable
foreign law of unjust enrichment is enforceable without
requiring an English parallel. This thesis finds support in
a decision of the Court of AppeaU 9
B. THE CONFLICTS THEORIES

1.

Connection with a Fact

(a) Place of enriching act. In Belgian and French literature it has often been proclaimed that the decisive place is
where the defendant completes the acquisition said to be
his enrichment. Thus the law of the place where a sum not
due is paid governs its recovery. This widely held, 30 though
27 By Professor KoNRAD ZwEIGERT in Tiibingen who defines his method in
an article "Bereicherungsanspriiche im internationalen Privatrecht," 2 Siiddeutsche J uristen-Zeitung ( I947) 247·
28 2 BEALE I429; GUTTERIDGE, 7 Cambr. L. ]., supra n. 23, at 82. Universal
Credit Co. v. Marks (I933) I64 Md. I30, I63 At!. 8Io, 8I6 does not speak
of an obligation but only of a burden to pay unless a lien be lost under Maryland law.
29 Batthyany v. Walford (I887} 36 Ch. D. 269; GuTTERIDGE, supra n. 23,
83 f. (the case mentioned awakens my early personal memory since my father
was one of the plaintiff prince's experts heard by the court on the law of
family fideicommisses).
BO Belgium: RoLIN, I Principes 568 § 362; POULLET § 3 I5.
Brazil: BEVILACQUA 371.
France: I FOELIX 238; BARTIN, I Principes 187; LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE
§ 252; BATIFFOL, Traite 564 § 564.
Italy: CERETI, Obblig. § 76.
Japan: Int. Priv. Law, art. I I par. 1.
Switzerland: BG. (June 5, I886} I2 BGE. 339, 342, Clunet I889, 350; (April
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by no means overwhelmingly supported, 31 rule has Been
readily adopted by Beale and the Restatement. In two
obscurely related sections the Restatement 32 asserts, regarding "benefits or other enrichment," 33 that the law of
the place where a benefit is conferred or unjust enrichment
is rendered, determines compensation or repayment. The
illustrations show that this means the place of a physical act.
In England, Gutteridge, as the first to take a stand in
that country, 34 has adhered to this view.
Various codifications include this rule in their broader
provisions. 35
It should be noted that in the few known cases decided
by courts, all possible theories usually coincide in the result.
But the basis of this idea is obvious. Trying to localize the
action of enrichment and missing another purely material
attachment to a territory, the authors believed that they
were compelled to select the place of the act of enrichment.
Territorialism so practiced was naturally attractive to
Beale.
A Belgian-French group of writers has argued that restitution of payment of money not due, as based on a "quasi
contract, " 36 or "rather a quasi delict, " 37 allows a presumption of party intention for an applicable law. This, again,
has led to the place where the sum is paid.
(b) Other connections. Many contacts have been con28, 1900) 26 BGE. II 268, 272; (Nov. 25, 1905) 31 id. II 66o, 665; 2 MElLI
86; 2 BRaCHER 138; FRITZSCHE, 44 Z. Schweiz. R. (N. F.) (1925) 243a;
SAUSER-HALL, id. 295a; 2 ScHNITZER 549·
C6digo Bustamante, art. 221.
31 This is also the conclusion of ESPINOLA, 2 Lei Introd. 534 § 236: "Niio
existe acordo"; 3 Vrco 128 § 146: "Son diversas las soluciones propuestas .
. . ." Otherwise, LIPSTEIN, 7 Cambr. L. ]., supra n. 23, at 86 and n. 11.
32 Restatement §§ 452, 453·
33 Thus 2 BEALE 1429 § 452.1 formulates the common topic of §§ 452, 453·
34 Supra n. 23.
35 See supra ns. 1 and 2.
36 8 LAURENT 8 j WEISS, 4 Traite 415 n. I.
37 DESPAGNET 934 § 321.
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sidered such as the nationality common to both parties, 38
or the nationality39 or the domicil40 of the defendant, or the
place where he has to make restitution of the enrichment, 41
which is usually both his domicil and the place of enrichment. The lex fori has also found an advocate. 42
All these haphazard theories have no following. Their
feeble justification, however, consists in the grave doubt
inherent in the theory under (a), concerning exactly what
event should make the alleged territorial contact. It is
generally assumed that it is the enrichment of the defendant
rather than the impoverishment of the plaintiff which must
be localized. But when in a case before the Swiss Federal
Tribunal a draft was paid in Paris by mistake of the local
cashier 43 of a certain bank, the enrichment of the defendant,
a Swiss bank, must have occurred at his domicil, the center
of his assets, and not in Paris as the court assumed. In fact,
a subsequent decision of the same Swiss court applies "the
law of the place where the enrichment is said to have occurred, hence, as a rule, at the place of the domicil of the
acquirer. " 44
2.

Law of the Relationship Causing Enrichment

Should it not be feasible to localize internationally the
duty of restitution by contemplating the legal origin of the
enrichment, rather than its territorial origin or the vicissi38 LAURENT and WEiss, supra n. 34· RoLIN, I Principes 566 § 36o; PoULLET
467; C6digo Bustamante, art. 22I (common personal law); 2 PoNTES DE
MIRANDA I 84.
39 2 ZITELMANN 528.
40 GEBHARD in Niemeyer, Vorgeschichte I 56; WALKER 546.
41Germany: RG. (Nov. 8, I9o6) I8 Z. int. R. (I9o8) 159; (July 5, 1910)
74 RGZ. I7I; (March 16, I928) 82 Seuff. Arch. 205 No. IZI, IPRspr. I928, 58
No. 37; (July 7, I932) IPRspr. I932 No. 39; 2 FRANKENSTEIN 384, 392;
NussBAUM, D. IPR. 294.
42 VALERY 970 § 67I; Cour Paris (May I8, 1893) Clunet I893, 827; App.
Alger (May 5, I896) D. I899.2-4I2.
43 BG. (April 28, 1900) 26 BGE. II 268.
4 4 BG. (Nov. 25, 1905) 3I BGE. II 662, 665.
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tudes of its future development? Despite all the variety
in the laws respecting the conditions of a duty of restitution, there is a common pattern. Whatever else motivates a
law to recognize a claim for unjust enrichment, the aim is
always to disallow on account of some initial or subsequent
vice an acquisition duly made in accordance with the formal
laws. Following this common idea and neglecting the technical differences by which the systems of law operate, our
attention moves back to the various situations that need
correction. No mechanically ascertainable contact is adequate for all cases. Choice of law must depend on the nature
of the source from which the enrichment stems.
This experience has slowly emerged from frequent though
casual observations that all legal obligations cannot be
bound to one territorial connection, 45 and gradual awareness that in particular the law governing a frustrated contract should extend to the actions enforcing the return of
a performance made on the contract. Niemeyer and N euner 46
in Germany, and with respect to undue payment Pillet and
Arminjon 47 in France, have prepared an appropriate theory,
now tentatively but with increasing assurance expressed by
the most recent German authors, particularly Martin
Wolff, Raape, and Zweigert.48 Various German decisions
have followed the same view. 49 At the same time, the
British Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act, 1943, has
instinctively chosen an identical method. The new law prescribes restitution of all sums paid in pursuance of a contract discharged by impossibility of performance or other
45

E.g., z ARMIN JON (ed. z) 335; xo Repert. 776 No. z.

NIEMEYER, Vorschliige und Materialien zur Kodifikation des IPR. ( 1895)
244;NEUNER, z Z.ausi.PR.(x928) 122 n. 1.
47 PILLET, 2 Traite 311 § 547a; z ARMINJON (ed. 2) 338.
48 GUTZWILLER 1623; NussBAUM, D. IPR. 295 n. 2; M. WoLFF, D. IPR. 104;
id., Priv. Int. Law 505 If.§ 481; 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 267; RAPPE, 2 D. 1PR.
296 f.; ZWEIGERT, supra n. Z7·
4 9 Bay. ObLG. (Nov. x6, x88z) 38 Seuff. Arch. z6o; RG. (June 18, x887)
4 Bolze No. 26 (unavailable); and citations of recent decisions below.
46

14
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frustration, and applies to contracts "governed by English
law." The place where the sum is paid, thus, is without
importance. Although this deviation fr9m the orthodox
criterion has been criticized by some writers, it has been
welcomed and extensively interpreted by Falconbridge. 50
Also, the draftsmen of the revised draft of the Montevideo Treaty (art. 43) in 1940, must have felt in a similar
way. To the rule that obligations arising without contract
are governed by the law of the place where the "licit or
illicit fact" occurs, they add the words: "and in an appropriate case, by the law governing the legal relations to
which they correspond."
This approach will doubtless be improved by thorough
exploration. Here we may briefly contemplate the theoretical ground and a few typical applications.
C. RATIONALE

1.

Theoretical Approach

It is generally agreed that the question whether an enrichment is justified must be determined by the law under
which its acquisition takes effect. 51 It is submitted that the
same law governs the action for restitution as a whole.
Suppose a seller has delivered the goods but rescinded
the contract because of the buyer's default. This means in
American and German laws the destruction of the contract.
If he, then, sues for the return of the goods on the theory
of unjust enrichment (rather than of ownership), the provisions on enrichment of the legal system governing the
contract must apply. It is quite true that the enrichment is
50 See Vol. II pp. 540 f.; FALCONBRIDGE, Conflict of Laws 355, 366; MoRRIS,
"The Choice of Law Clause in Statutes," 62 Law Q. Rev. (I946) I7o, I8o
in case of frustration of a contract.
51 GEBHARD in Niemeyer, Vorgeschichte I 56 n. I; PILLET, 2 Traite 3II;
ROLIN, 3 Principes 62; 2 ZITELMANN I94, 525; NEUMEYER, IPR. (ed. I) 32;
2 FRANKENSTEIN 392 n. 32.
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unjust only because the contract has ceased to exist. But if
it has been therefore objected that it is "illogical" to extend
the law of the former contract to its sequelae, 52 this is the
typical wrong logic by which it has been declared impossible
that the formation of a contract should be governed by the
law applicable if the contract is valid. 53
Any comparison of the municipal systems shows that
restitution on the ground of failure of consideration is
afforded by different technical means, such as a claim of
ownership reverting to the seller; a "condictio" or claim
for unjust enrichment properly termed; an action intermediate between those for enrichment and breach; or a
remedy sounding purely in contract. Even the elaborate
German Civil_Code has failed to make it clear to what category exactly the action based on recission belongs. 54 It is
imperative to subject all of these-merely with certain
reservations concerning property-to one conflicts rule.
Where ownership is transferred irrespective of the validity
of the sales or other contract, as may occur under German
law, the absence of the presupposed cause leads to unjust
enrichment. Since the transfer was caused by the contractone might say, was done to satisfy the law of the contractthis law ought to determine what should happen to restore
balance. The law of the place of transfer has no importance
whatever.
Even when a contract is termed void ab initio or by annulment, this is proper juridical language, but it should not
be stressed too literally. There may be an aftereffect, such
as when damages for fault in contracting or innocent representation are recoverable; without any doubt they are
subject to contract rules. 55 There is no obstacle in theory to
52 2 SCHNITZER 549 verbally followed by LIPSTEIN, 7 Cambr. L.
n. 23, 86.
5 3 Vol. 1 p. 69; Vol. II p. 521 n. 17.
54 See the commentaries to BGB. §§ 327, 348.
55 RABEL, 27 Z. Schweiz. R. (N. F.) 291.

J.,

supra
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applying the law of such a contract t? actions for return
of performance. The common law doctrine of constructive
trust is commonly applied where there is a violation of a
fiduciary relationship. The unjust enrichment of the agent
should therefore be subjected to the law governing the
relationship and not necessarily to that of the place of the
enriching act.
That a contractual debtor pays more than he finally is
found to owe, is an analogous occurrence. Where a seller
delivers more goods than he should and the surplus quantity
is finally rejected, ownership may or may not have passed,
according to the system and the circumstances. No distinction in this respect can be made in a conflicts rule concerning
the obligatory claim. We may, however, even go farther.
A claim for violation of a legal or beneficial property
right is commonly regarded in isolation; and therefore, no
local contact seems possible other than the lex situs. But
the relationship between the parties may not be so simple.
A distinct example is the resulting trust at common law; a
legal transfer of property in the absence of consideration is
understood to create, by a tacit agreement, an obligation to
return the beneficial interest therein. Is the lex situs competent to govern this construction or rather the law controlling the transaction of the parties?
Inversely, ownership or any property interest may vanish,
leaving an obligation for restitution. Of such nature is innocent conversion at civil law where it is conceived as unjust
enrichment rather than as tort. For instance, Justinianto show himself as the protector of art-ending an old
school controversy, adopted the opinion that a table used
for painting but belonging to another person, should become
the property of the artist who, however, ought to pay the
value of the table to the former owner. 56 These are two
56 Inst. Just. 2, I, 34, incorporating Gai. Inst. II 78, cf. GArus, Dig. 4I, I, 9,

§

2; PAULUS,

Dig. 6,

I, 23,

§

3·
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parts of one solution and cannot be divided between two
laws. The lex situs, indispensable for the disposition of
property, hence, must also furnish the rule on enrichment.
If goods have been shipped to Rio de Janeiro and there
delivered to a wrong address, viz., to the local agent of a
New York firm, enrichment is probably deemed to occur in
New York, but Brazilian law must govern. It decides
whether, at what time, and to whom, property passes and
ought also to determine what duty of restitution burdens
the new owner.
2.

Historical Reminder

It is a curious observation that juridical elaboration of
our system may tempt us to overestimate the value of the
differentiation of categories brought about by our professional development. We should not forget that all direct
and indirect effects of agreement have originated upon one
basis, first of tort, later of contract. The Roman classic
process formula of actio certae creditae pecuniae served
for the recovery of a valid loan but, if the contract was
void, for instance, because the borrower was a lunatic, or
because he was in error about the person of the lender,
the same formula was good for the repayment of the enrichment. 57 The same formal writ used for ages in England to
enforce repayment of a loan was employed when the money
given appeared to belong to the plaintiff without a recognized type of contract or tort. 58 The primitive notion that
the lender may claim "my money," recurs to this day. "Debt"
is really detinue, as the Roman condictio is based on nonjustified habere. Our ineluctable division between property
and obligations is not meant to establish barriers separating
naturally connected problems. Conflicts law must rigorously
strive to avoid this danger.
57 ]ULIANUs,
I,

Dig.

12, I, I9,

32.
58 8 HoLDSWORTH 88, 92.

§

I

(despite interpolation);

CELSUS,

Dig.

12,
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D. ILLUSTRATIONS

1.

Family Law

A German recognized in Switzerland his paternity of
certain children. He sued for revocation of the recognition
as unjustly obtained by deceit ( BGB. § 8 12 par. 2). A German court correctly applied Swiss law to this claim. 59
Rescission and Avoidance of Contract

2.

( i) A buyer not paying the price has to restore the goods
on the request of the seller, because the return is implied
in the synallagma, that is, the exchange of price and delivery, essential to sale. Hence, the law governing the sales
contract extends to the action for restitution, however it
may be legally construed.
(ii) Dissolution of contracts by war. The Treaty of
Versailles dissolved contracts between persons having become enemies, with certain exceptions. What became of a
partial performance by one party? Judge Algot Bagge as
president of a division of the Anglo-German Mixed Arbitral
Tribunal ascertained that under German and Scotch laws
an action would lie for recovery as unjust enrichment, but
that in England under the rule of Chandler v. Webster 60
the acts of performance done before the dissolution were
not recoverable. To escape such different results, under the
Treaty, Bagge decided that the Treaty must have intended
to recognize and maintain a money obligation for restitution every time the parties had not distributed the risks
otherwise. 61 Thus he rightly took it for granted that restitution of a performance is essentially connected with the
law destroying the basis of the obligation. In several decisions by another Swedish president, a division of the same
court turned to the application of the national law of un59

LG. Frankfurt (Aug. 17, 1932) IPRspr. 1933, 105 No. 48.
[1904] r K. B. 493-but overruled by the Fibrosa Case and the Act of
1943, see Vol. II p. 541.
61 Anglo-German Mixed Arb. Trib. (Jan. 19, 1926) Burroughs Wellcome
& Co. v. Chemi'sche Fabrik auf Aktien, 6 Recueil trib. arb. mixtes 13, r6.
Followed by British-Turkish Mixed Arb. Trib. (Dec. 19, 1928) Gouv. Turc
v. Armstrong Whitworth & Co. Ltd. et Vickers Ltd., 8 Recueil trib. arb.
mixtes 996, 1001.
60

EXTRACONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS

377

just enrichment, but this, again, was in all cases taken from
the system governing the contract. 62 The same question
of whether a claim for the repayment of advances made in
performance of contracts is implied in the peace treaty
dissolving contracts or to be based on the applicable national law, has recurred under the obscure texts of the five
peace treaties of 1947. 63
3· Performance Without Just Cause-Upon an Assumed
Pre-existing Obligation
( i) Suppose a legacy left by a testator domiciled in
Argentina to a citizen of New Orleans is paid to him in
New York. The Argentine law of inheritance competent
to state whether a valid legacy obligation exists, is the right
law also to determine the effects of payment in case of
avoidance of the legacy. What import has the place of payment or the domicil of the receiving person ?64
(ii) Before 1900, A, in a place under Prussian law, having bought a house in Brunswick from a vendor domiciled
there, paid more than he owed, by a payment in Magdeburg, a place under common law. The sale was naturally
governed by the lex situs (Brunswick) and rightly the
Reichsgericht applied the same law to the limitation of
action for the repayment of that which was not due. It
should not have invoked the place of performance, but it
was right in pointing to the connection between the seller's
duty to repay and his contractual obligations. 65 The place of
payment was immaterial.
(iii) A German company, owner of a German-registered
steamer, created a first mortgage in Dutch currency to a
Dutch firm. The vessel was sold at auction in England, and
62
Anglo-German Mixed Arb. Trib. President Klaestad (July 21, 1926)
Alexander Davidson v. Gebriider Dammann, 6 Recueil trib. arb. mixtes
588; (Oct. 20, 1926) Arnold and Foster, Ltd. v. J. W. Erkens, 6 id. 6o6;
(Dec. r, 1926) The Dunderland Iron Ore Co., Ltd. v. Friedr. Krupp A. G.
6 id. 639; and in 7 id. 372, 375, 379, 418, 493; 8 id. 7, 283.
6a For the first construction, MARTIN, "Private Property etc. in the Paris
Peace Treaties," 24 Brit. Year Book Int. Law 273, 297 n. 6; for the second,
ERNST WoLFF repeatedly, and most recently in his book, Vorkriegsvertrage
in Friedensvertragen ( 1949) ror.
6 4 RAAPE, D. IPR. 296 (2) b.
65
RG. (July 5, 1910) 74 RGZ. 171.
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the Dutch mortgagee-under an English rule deemed to
be substantive-received the amount of the mortgage by
conversion of the guilders into pounds according to the
exchange rate of the day of the creation of the mortgage.
The Hamburg Appeal Court stated that the loan and mortgage contract expressly stipulated for German law and as
this law included a rule for conversion according to the date
of payment, it extended to the claim for unjust enrichment
to recover whatever excess had been paid in England. 66
4· Without an Assumed Pre-existing Obligation
(i) A German firm assigned all its claims, arising from
sales to Dutch customers, to a German bank for security
of credit, but subsequently assigned one of the Dutch drafts
involved to another German firm. The first assignee obtained restitution from the second under a German rule
applicable, as the court said, under all conflicts theories
concerning enrichment. 67 But the decision could not have
been different, if the second assignee had received the draft
by indorsement in Holland or had cashed it there. Nor is
the circumstance that both assignees were nationals and
domiciliaries of Germany of any significance. The real reason for acknowledging the right of the plaintiff was the
priority of his claim against the debtor (according to the
law of the assignor's domicil) 68 effective in the field of enrichment even after he lost the claim.
( ii) If a surety has entered into his obligation without
agreement with the principal debtor and by payment is not
subrogated in the principal debt, he may have a claim on
the ground of unjust enrichment against the debtor-according to what law? The traditional opinions point to the places
either where the surety paid or wherever he could pay, or
where the debtor is enriched by liberation, probably at his
domicil. 69 But as generally in suretyship matters, it is de66

OLG. Hamburg (May IS, I9Z9) Hans. RGZ. I9Z9 B No. 227, IPRspr.

I929, 74 No. 51.

67 RG. (July 7, I932) IPRspr. I932 No. 39, cf. BGB. § 8I6 par. 2. Cf. an
analogous case of wrong delivery of a cargo, OLG. Hamburg (July I, 1932)
id. No. 40·
ss Infra Ch. 49·
69 Thus FEDOZZI-CERETI 764.
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sirable to apply the law under which the surety is liable,
which wherever feasible 70 is to be identified with the law
of the principal debt.
III.

GENERAL AvERAGE

From ancient times the sacrifice of goods carried on the
seas in order to save other goods and particularly the
vessel has produced rules for equitable distribution of the
loss. The underlying idea is at present regarded as the
community of risk involved in a sea carriage rather than
unjust enrichJTient. 71 A common legal history has not prevented, however, a great many differences of regulations,
accompanied by a chaos of conflicts rules. Unification was
therefore early sought by the International Law Association
at the Congresses of York, r 864, and Antwerp, 1877, with
the resulting rules, reformed at Stockholm, 1924.72 These
"York-Antwerp Rules" have obtained almost universal
force by insertion or reference in bills of lading and contracts of affreightment. Such a clause may run as in the
Argentine governmental form: General average is subject
to the York-Antwerp Rules, 1924, and insofar as these do
not decide, to the Argentine Commercial Code and usage.
The place of the adjustment will be Buenos Aires and the
carrier will appoint the adjuster or adjusters. 73
Unfortunately, some forms still refer to the older draft
of the Rules, and even the rules of 1924, though more comSupra Ch. 47, III, I, I'· 352.
L. MassA, 2 Derecho mercantil (1940) 549 (Spanish ed. of Diritto commerciale) and cited authors.
72 Reports of the 33rd Conference (1925) 670 ff.; BENEDICT, 6 American
Admiralty 334; CROUVES, 2 Repert. 269 ff. Revision of the Convention was
begun at the Conference of the Comite Maritime in Antwerp, on September
24> 1947·
73 Rep. Argentina, Ministerio de Marina, Admin. Gen. de la Flota Mercante del Estado, s. 34, printed in MALVAGNI, Curso de derecho de la navegacion ( 1946) (Pocket Ann.). For analogous clauses recommended in the
United States, see BENEDICT, 6 American Admiralty 346; KNAUTH, Ocean
Bills of Lading (ed. 3) 253·
70

71
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plete, have left gaps and are not used for every carriage.
Hence there is still great force in the age-old principle that
the adjustment of the claims should be made at the port
of destination, or in case the voyage cannot be carried to
its end, the port of refuge where ship and goods are separated.74 Some formulations use less distinctive indications,
such as the Portuguese Code referring to the port "where
the goods will be delivered.m 5
Many writers have attacked this very old practice and
favored the law of the flag or the law of the contract. 76
Their arguments are rather deceptive. Nor is the customary
rule to be explained as lex loci solutionis or on some other
theory. It is simply the practical need that points to the
14United States: Charter Shipping Co. v. Bowring, Jones & Tidy (I930)
28I U. S. SIS; and cases cited by 2 BEALE I332 § 411.2; 2 WHARTON 962.
England: Lloyd v. Guibert ( I865) L. R. I Q. B. 115, 126; WESTLAKE
§ 220; DICEY 696 Rule I68; LOWNDES and RUDOLF, Law of General Average
and the York-Antwerp Rules (ed. 7, I948) 223.
France: RIPERT, 3 Droit Marit. 2I9 §§ 2227 ff., CRouvF:s, 2 Repert. 287
No. 88.
Germany: WAGNER, Seerecht I42; ScRAPS, Seerecht § 700 No. 30 and n. 2.
Greece: App. Athens (April 8, I895) Clunet I897, I92.
Italy: Former practice, see SCERNI 278.
The Netherlands: C. Com. arts. 722, 723, 745 (distinguishing several
cases); H. R. (June 22, I928) 22 Revue Dor 434·
Norway: S. Ct. (March 25, I886) Clunet I888, ISI.
Portugal: C. Com. art. 6 so.
Spain: C. Com. art. 847 par. 2.
Brazil: Sup. Trib. (Sept. 10, I926) 82 Rev. Dir. III; (April 27, I927)
ss id. 460.
Guatamala: C. Com. art. 96I; MATOS 56 I § 402.
Treaty of Montevideo on Int. Com. Navig. (I940) art. I7 (excepting the
formalities and conditions of the stipulation on average reserved for the
law of the flag, in accordance with the restriction on locus regit actum, see
GoWLAND, Report in Republica Argentina, Segundo Congreso Sudamericano
at 303.
75 Portugal: C. Com. art. 650. Often "port de reste" and "port de destination" are used synonymously, which is confusing.
7 6 Survey of laws and literature in CROUVES, 2 Repert. 265 ff.; Note, 22
Revue Dor 46I; cf. 2 BAR 22I2; MElLI 369; LYON-CAEN, Clunet I882, 593;
EYNARD I8o; Inst. Droit Internat., 8 Annuaire (I886) I24; 6 LYON-CAEN et
RENAULT § 983; DESPAGNET 930; BONNECASE, Dr. Com. Mar. 700 § 791.
Montevideo Treaty on Int. Commercial Law (I889) art. 2I (reversed by
the text of I94o) ; C6digo Bustamante, art. 288.
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place where the last remaining goods are discharged. As
an English judge said in I 8 24: "The place at which the
average shall be adjusted . . . is the place of the ship's
destination or delivery of her cargo," and the shipper of
goods "by assenting to general average, must be understood
to consent also to its adjustment, according to the usage
and law of the place at which the adjustment is to be
made." 78 The adjuster is not expected to study the laws
of all the parties concerned, nor is there a reason why the
law of the vessel which is a party to the community of
interests, should be preferred to the other laws. The persons
primarily interested are the consignees and the insurers.
The binding force of foreign adjustment, undoubted as
to the coadventurers, has been subject to certain questions
with regard to the underwriters. But legal provisions and
the revised clauses of the insurance policies have taken care
of the doubts. 79
The scope of the local law of the port is not always easy
to trace. English and American discussions seem to be
missing. In the Continental literature, the doubts have been
increased by the frequent claim that the law of the flag
should control, if not the whole matter, at least special problems. Of course, the law of the flag may adequately dete;-mine whether the master has to consult the crew before
sacrificing goods, 80 and in what cases he obligates the shipowner. But the relation between the shipowner and the
cargo owners is the subject of the carriage contract, complemented by usages. 81
77 Excellent, Note, 22 Revue Dor at 465. See also MONACO, Studi per Ia
codificazione ( 1940) 142.
7 8 Abbott, ]., in Simonds and Loder v. White ( 1824) 2 B. & C. 8os, 8n, 813.
79 For a comprehensive discussion, see ARNOULD, On Marine Insurance
and Average {ed. 12, 1939) §§ 99+ ff.
8o France: Cass req. (Feb. u, 1862) D. 1862.1.247·
81 Germany: OLG. Hamburg (June 12, 1922) Hans. RGZ. 1922 No. 175,
78 Seuff. Arch. No. 96, approving ScHAPS, Seerecht § 700 n. 29; Note, 22
Revue Dor at 468.
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Other questions discussed are: the meaning of maritime
voyage in the average doctrine; who ought to contribute
and to what extent (if not covered by the York-Antwerp
Rules) ; and whether the obligation of the ship owner is
personal or only ad rem.
The German courts apparently resort indiscriminately to
the law of the port of destination, applied by them to
affreightment. All other courts, in the true meaning of the
tradition, look to the law applied by the adjuster. His conclusions are internationally respected, provided-and this
should never be forgotten-that they are vested with the
judicial authority of the country where the port lies. Thus,
the Dutch courts, construing their new code provisions as
the consecration of the universal custom, have recognized
that a Swedish adjustment following the local law, had
authority not only as respects the damage and the amounts
assessed, but also in determining the parties liable. 82
B2 H. R. (June 22, 1928) The Thabetta I, 22 Revue Dor 458. On connected
doubtful questions in England, see DICEY (ed. 6, 1949, by Morris et al.) 677.
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MODIFICATION AND DISCHARGE
OF OBLIGATIONS
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Voluntary Assignment of Simple Debts
I.
1.

THE PROBLEM

Municipal Differences

HE full transfer of choses of action has become
recognized in almost every municipal system. But the
methods of dealing with the specific problems of this
institution are not identicaU These problems arise out of
the coexistence of three interested parties, the assignor,
the debtor, and the assignee, and the additional possibility of conflicts between two or more assignees and their
creditors. The influences coming from the bordering fields
of attachment, garnishment, and bankruptcy, least favored
by international co-operation, further complicate the matter.
Most of the legal diversity is caused by residua from
former periods. There is, however, a difficult conflict between the interest of the debtor whose situation should not
be altered by the act of two other parties· without his consent,
and the modern desire for unhampered mobilization of
values. A creditor ordinarily may vest any other person
with his right, not only without the debtor's consent but
without his knowledge. Notice, essentially required in the
older codes, such as the influential French Code, in modern
systems is only a means for improving the position of the
assignee. Particulars in the protection of the debtor, on one
hand, and of the assignee and his successors, on the other,
vary and are often obscure.

T

1 For comparative
municipal law, see KARL ARNDT, Zessionsrecht, 7
Beitrage zum auslandischen und internationalen Privatrecht (Berlin, Leipzig, 1932).
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The involved and delicate structure of the municipal rules
has caused a peculiar contrast in classifying the incidents
of assignment. This diversity demands a thorough investigation before definitive conclusions are reached with respect
to the advisable conflicts rules.
The American decisions in point are numerous but mostly
confined to life insurance policies. Appointment of a beneficiary to insurance is not an assignment of the policy but
has been adequately treated in conflicts law in an analogous
manner. On the other hand, cases concerning bills and notes
have been mixed into the discussion, which we must strictly
avoid. Transfer of rights through the endorsement of
negotiable instruments follows special principles in municipal law as well as in conflicts law, although the differences
are not equally accentuated in all systems. In some situations, endorsement has the effect of assignment, but even
then the distinction is useful.
To introduce the reader to the conflicts arising from the
variety of municipal laws despite the modern tendency to
uniform development, the following examples may serve:
(i) Capacity of parties. Cabrera, President of Guatemala, deposited a sum of money with a London bank and
later requested the bank to transfer this sum to Nunez, his
illegitimate minor son. The English courts held the transfer
void under Guatemalan law under which the son could not
accept the assignment, although it would have been valid
by English law. 2 In the concurring, though entirely diverse,
opinions, the former law was applied either as lex loci actus,
or the proper law of the assignment, or the lex domicilii of
the assignor and assignee. English law was considered as
the lex situs of the debt and as its proper law.
(ii) Assignability of the debt. Carr, injured in a railway
accident in Iowa, assigned his claim for damages on the
ground of tort by an assignment made in Illinois. The claim
could be transferred in Iowa but not in Illinois where tort
2

Republica de Guatemala v. Nufiez, see infra n. 23.
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obligations were nonassignable under common law. The
Iowa court applied its own law as that under which the debt
arose. 3
(iii) Requirement of notification. The English creditor
of a French debtor assigns in Switzerland the debt to an
American, without giving the debtor notice through formal
signification, as required by the French Civil Code, art.
1690, although not in Switzerland. Supposing that French
law governs the debt, most European courts hold the transfer incomplete, either because French law governs the debt
(Swiss conflicts rule) or because the debtor is domiciled
in France (French conflicts rule). In the most frequently
expressed American view, however, the transfer is perfected
because made in Switzerland.
(iv) Warranty of solvency of the debtor. German parties
once made an assignment in Niirnberg of a debt governed
by Austrian law. The German courts denied liability of the
assignor for the debtor's solvency according to the Austrian
Code, following the Roman law in force in Niirnberg. 4
( v) Priority between successive assignees. A firm in the
state of New York assigned its accounts receivable as
security for a loan to a finance corporation in Philadelphia.
The debtors in numerous states were not notified. Afterward, the firm assigned one of these debts in payment to
another creditor, who collected the money. At the time
(before 1945) in Pennsylvania failure to n·otify allowed a
subsequent bona fide assignee by giving notice to the debtor
to acquire a right superior to that of an earlier assignee. According to the "New York rule" (similar to German law)
however, a prior assignee is not only to be preferred before
payment of the debt but may recover from the subsequent
assignee what the latter collects from the debtor. In the
United States, under the theory of law of the place of assignment, it is uncertain which law would be applied. The English
and French conflicts rules call for neither of these laws but
for those of the various domicils of the debtors. The Ger3 Vimont v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1886) 69 Iowa 296, 22 N. W. 906,
aff'd, 28 N. W. 612, infra n. 75·
4 RG. (Dec. 3, 1891) 2 Z.int.R. (1892) 162, Clunet 1892, 1039.
See infra p. 413 n. 106.
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man conflicts rule points to the laws governing the individual
single debts assigned.
2.

The Nature of Assignment

Since in ancient laws obligations were strictly personal,
neither in English nor in Roman law could a creditor put
another person in his own place as holder of an obligatory
right. The auxiliary practices developed in both laws for
approaching this purpose were exactly the same. The
creditor appointed the intended assignee as his agent for
enforcing the claim and retaining the proceeds (mandatum
agendi to a procurator in rem suam). Reflections of this
stage of history persist in the Anglo-American literature.
Notably, the question whether an assignee may sue the
debtor in his own name has preserved an anachronistic
importance. 5 Also, the distinction between legal and equitable assignment is still significant in common law, although
it should not affect the structure of the conflicts rules. 6 Full
and present transfer of the complete right of the creditor
is the basic form of assignment. Modern efforts, to be sure,
have tended to split the right into segments such as legal
and beneficiary ownership, or substance of the right and
its exercise. These differences are included in what is termed
assignability in conflicts law. 7
It is opportune, however, to be clearly aware of the
elements of a voluntary transaction in the course of which
a chose in action is transferred from the owner to another
person. The Romans spoke of the sale of a debt (emptio
venditio nominis) or of an estate ( hereditatis). N evertheless, only a century ago, the German literature had to be
5 See 2 WHARTON 1482 § 735; CHESHIRE (ed. 3) 614 f., 842-843; ROBERTSON,
Characterization 273, 278.
6 2 BEALE §§ 348-3 50, 3 53 (by implication).
7 2 BEALE 1251 § 348.2. E. g., if the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust assigns
his interest, he constitutes only a revocable power of attorney, GRISWOLD,
Spendthrift Trusts 378.
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admonished to observe the duality of an obligatory contract containing a promise to assign and a quasi-real contract effecting the assignment. The distinction even now is
not very familiar to many lawyers, 8 and sometimes a court
in this country thinks it necessary to recall it to the readers
of its decision. But the distinction between sale or security
arrangement and actual assignment is so well known 9 that
it may be surprising that no such distinction appears in any
discussion of the conflicts problems. American courts and
the Restatement ( § 350) seem to consider only a law governing the assignment, and German courts and writers
speak exclusively of the law governing the underlying relationship. The Restatement illustrates its rule exactly by
mentioning warranty of the "assignor" for the existence
of the debt, although in the modern doctrine (if not in the
codes) this particular liability has always been the most
characteristic incident, not of assignment, but of a promise
to assign for value.
The American attitude is the more striking, as in the
most frequent language "assignment" evidently does not
mean the entire contract, including the promise to transfer
and the transfer, but is thought of as a unilateral manifestation of transferring the right, hence as a part of the
all-inclusive transaction. Its definition in the Restatement
of the Law of Contracts suggests the same idea. 10 Nevertheless, common law assignment is a bilateral transaction,
a true contract, requiring acceptance, actual or presumptive,
8 According to the original doctrine laid down in French C. C. art. 1583,
sale or gift of a debt includes assignment. Only its effects as to third persons,
including the debtor, depend on notice, C. C. art. 1690. However, in modern
theory and practice, the situation is very similar to the rules of American
statutes requiring notice. Therefore, the transfer of the debt in French law,
even though simultaneously with the sale etc., is not a transfer by law, as
GuLDENER 89 construes it, naturally without French confirmation, but rests
on the presumed intention of the parties.
9 See the cases in 6 C. }. S. 1048 n. 50 distinguishing sale and assignment.
10 Restatement of Contracts § 149·
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or better said, constructive. The language mentioned may
have originated from the ancient appointment of an agent
for enforcing the debt and at present may refer more precisely to the customary and useful separate instrument of
assignment, evidencing the transfer especially to third
parties.
Scope of discussion. Although in the United States and
most Latin-American countries assignment is distinguished
from conventional subrogation, the kind of subrogation
whereby the creditor and a voluntary payor agree on transfer of the debt, is very nearly related to assignment. The
practical analogy is so great that the assignment rules are
generally applied. 11 The same must be true of conflicts rules.
In American conflicts treatment, the subject is sometimes
termed assignment of contracts, which is too broad, since the
transfer of an entire contract, occurring in modern commerce, cannot be adequately explained by a mere division
into transfers of claims and debts. 12 We must be satisfied
with the transfer of single or several claims. On the other
hand, the Restatement is not justified in restricting the topic
to the transfer of contractual rightsP The source of an
obligatory claim is immaterial so long as the claim is
transferable.
The term "debt" is used in the broad sense of common
usage, not restricted to monetary obligations nor to the
duty to pay a fixed amount. It means here the right to
claim that which is due (French creance, German Forderung), rather than the corresponding duty.
11 WENGLER,

"Surrogation," 6 Rechtsvergl. Handwiirterbuch at 493 f.
See. recently, also for the literature, FRUH, Die Vertragsiibertragung im
schweizerischen Recht, Ziircher Beitriige zur Rechtswissenschaft, N. F. Heft
III (1945).
13 Restatement §§ 348 If.
12
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3· The Relationships Involved
Simplification is always desirable in conflicts laws. Yet
before deciding to what extent it may be reached through
rules covering more than one of the relationships involved,
we have to note them exhaustively. Although we limit our
discussion to those assignments of debt that rest on voluntary obligatory contracts to assign, we have to distinguish
four aspects of the problem:
( 1) The original debt between C ( reditor) and D ( ebtor),
doubtless governed by its own law (lex obligationis) ;
( 2) The contract containing the promise to assign (causa
cessionis) between C and P( urchaser), following its own
law according to its nature as sale, gift, security, substitution for payment, etc.;
( 3) The assignment between C and P, the present transfer of the debt;
( 4) The relation between P and D which may be altered
by new events, such as payment, release, setoff, etc. between
C and D.
II.
1.

THE MAIN CoNFLICTS SvsTEJ,VIS

Situs Doctrine

The statutists felt constrained by their territorial dogma
to subject even intangibles to the statute real and had, therefore, to give them a local situation in a territory. 14 Assignments of debts were sometimes localized at the domicil of
the debtor/ 5 but the vast majority of authors, particularly
of the French scholars of the eighteenth century, accentuated the situs of the property which a debt represents and
located it at the domicil of the assignor as the party disposing of his property. 16
Fundamental: z LAINE 265-278.
Questions et responses etc. ( 1634} quest. 237.
1a See 2 LAINE z65 f.
14

15 GuY CoQUILLE,
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This past has left its traces in the conflicts doctrine of
the nineteenth century. In England and the United States,
the domicil of the owner of a claim has been characteristically identified with the situs of the claim, in analogy to
his other movables. 17 Notably in the French and Italian
literature, the same old view has found expression 18 with
some effect on codification. 19 Sometimes the domicil has
been replaced by nationality. 20
The modern French doctrine has taken the side of the
small minority of statutists and consistently favored the
law of the debtor. Also in this view the basis of the situs
theory may sometimes be recognized. 21 The Treaty of
Montevideo declares the situs of the debt generally to be
at the place of performance. 22
Nevertheless, in the present literature it is universally
settled that chases in action do not really have any situs,
and that if some fictitious situs must be construed in such
matters as taxation, jurisdiction, seizure, or administration
17 United States: STORY§§ 397 ff; I WHARTON 792 § 363; Vanbuskirk v.
Hartford Fire Ins. (I842) I4 Conn. 582: personal property in contemplation
of law has no situs but follows the person of the owner. Speed v. May ( I851)
I7 Pa. St. 9I for general assignments: the actual situs of personal property
protects local creditors only against transfer by operation of law. Otherwise,
the personal property follows the domicil of the owner, effective against
attachment by resident creditors (at the debtor's domicil). This reasoning
recurs in Cole v. Cunningham (I889) I33 U. S. at I29 and Barnett v. Kinney

( I893) I47

u. s. 476.

England: 4 PHILLIMORE 611 § 759, with citations.
18 France: I FOEL!X § 6I; DEMOLOMBE, 9 Cours § 6I; SuRVILLE, "La
cession et Ia mise en gage des creances en droit international prive," Clunet
I897, 67I, 673 (for the cessibility of the claim); SuRVILLE 280 § I7I and n. 3;
ROGUIN, Regie de droit (I889) I4I·
Norway: The law of the creditor's domicil (perhaps not as lex situs) is
adopted according to CHRISTIANSEN, 6 Repert. 580 No. I6I.
Germany: OLG. Frankfurt (March 4, I892) 2 Z.int.R. ( I892) 477·
19 Japan: Int. Priv. Law, art. 12.
Belgium: Draft of I887, tit. pre!., art. 5, I9 Bull. Soc. Legis!. Comp.
(I 889-90) 449·
20 E.g., 2 ZITELMANN 394; 2 PONTES DE MIRANDA 222.
21England: In re Queensland Mercantile & Agency Co. [I89I] 1 Ch. 536,
per North, ]. ; aff'd [I892] I Ch. 2I9. DICEY, Rule I 53·
France: WEISs, 4 Traite 43 I f.
22Treaty of Montevideo on Int. Civ. Law (I889) art. 29; (I940) art. 33·
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of estates, the voluntary transfer of debts needs no such
fixed relation to a territory. In fact, there is no reasonable
ground for denying the parties to an assignment the full
freedom in choosing the law applicable to it.
Where the domicil of the debtor has been taken as decisive in the modern literature, ordinarily other reasons
have prevailed. But the old doctrine did include an insight
into the subject matter that should not be entirely forgotten.
The creditor's domicil must be important, in the absence of
more weighty connections, as the center of the assignor's
assets, in relation to his act of surrendering a right, part of
these assets. A subsidiary rule, exclusively based on the
domicil of the debtor, is condemned thereby. The dilemma
of the old and still active controversy, whether the domicil
of the creditor or that of the debtor of the assigned debt
is decisive, is wrong in itself.
2.

England

In the principal English leading case, it was declared that
no clear statement of the law applicable to assignment was
available ;23 the four jurists, namely, the first judge and the
three justices of the Court of Appeal, advanced no less than
five different theories on the law determining the validity
of, and the capacity to make, an assignrrient. 24
Falconbridge offers three theories for choice, 25 and Foote,
Cheshire, and Wolff have suggested to supersede the present
confusion by a rule similar to the German, extending to the
assignment the law that governs the debt assigned. 26
23 Scrutton, L. J., in Republica de Guatemala v. Nufiez [ 1927] 1 K. B.
669 at 688.
24 See the satirical remark by FosTER, "Some Defects in the English Rules
of Conflict of Laws," 16 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1935) 84, 94·
25 F ALCONBRIDGE, Conflict of Laws 423.
26 FOOTE 426, 296; CHESHIRE (ed. 3) 599 ft.; M. WoLFF, Priv. Int. Law
§§ 511 fl.
CHESHIRE, 51 Law Q. Rev. (1935) 76, 85 and Priv. Int. Law 6o2, 610 reads

394

MODIFICATION OF OBLIGATIONS

Doubtless, the authorities are entirely inconclusive. We
may find only some preference for two theories, one that a
voluntary transfer of a chose in action is governed by the
law of the debtor's domicil, 27 and the other that it has its
own proper law, 28 which is presumably to be found at the
place of assigning, either by mechanical rule 29 or with better
reason m case both parties are domiciled in the same
jurisdiction. 30
The judicial indecision is moderated, however, by the
incipient insight that the three parties involved in an assignment of rights are connected by different relationships.
Thus, the assignment of an English life insurance as a gift
from a husband to his wife in Cape Colony was correctly
subjected to their domiciliary local law. 31 And in Canada
it was clearly distinguished that a life insurance policy was
under the law of Ontario, but the "assignment of or dealing
with the benefits of the policy made by the assured in Manitoba" belonged to the law of the latter province. 32
to this effect a dictum by Warrington, ]., in Kelly v. Selwyn [I905] 2 Ch.
u7; against this argument, M. WoLFF, Priv. Int. Law 548 § 5I2. But this
decision concerns the question of notification, on which see infra II, 7·
2 7 Lawrence, L. ]., in Republica de Guatemala v. Nufiez, supra n. 23, at
697; approved by FREDERIC POLLOCK, 43 Law Q. Rev. (I927) 296.
28 Lee v. Abdy (I886) I7 Q. B. D. 309, 3I3; Greer, J., and Scrutton, L. J.,
in Republica de Guatemala v. Nufiez ( I926) 42 T. L. R. 625, 629, 95 L. ].
Q. B. 955; [I927] I K. B. 669, 688; Chaugham, J., in In re Ansiani [I930]
I Ch. 407, 420.
29 See CHESHIRE ( ed. 3) 6o8 who therefore emphasizes the "retrogression
to the days when Private International Law of contracts was still inchoate
and undeveloped."
so Bankes, L. ]., in Republica de Guatemala v. Nufiez [ I927] I K. B. at
686; Luxmore, J., in Finska Angfartygs A/B v. Baring Brothers & Co.
(I937) 54 T. L. R. I47, I48. The case was, however, finally decided on the
finding that the Russian proceeding was an unfinished direction by the
government rather than an assignment not completed under the domiciliary
Russian law, H. L. [ I940] I All E. R. 20, 65 Ll. L. Rep. I89.
s1 Lee v. Abdy, supra n. 28.
32 Headnote of Nat'! Trust Co. v. Hughes (I902) I4 Man. R. 4I concerning
an analogous situation, quoted with approval in In re Sawtell [ I9331
2 D. L. R. at 399·
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3· United States
During the nineteenth century and sometimes even at
present, 38 the law applicable to assignment has been regarded as a very uncertain matter, as in England. But now
the courts are more often said to have settled upon a short
and definite formula: voluntary assignment is governed by
the law of the place where the assigning takes place, except
that the question whether the debt is assignable is determined by the law of the place where it is made. 84 In various
instances, however, the need for amplifying this formula
has been evident. We may take an appropriate suggestion,
for instance, from a remarkable dictum of Peaslee, C. J.,
in the New Hampshire Superior Court. A life insurance
policy in a Massachusetts corporation was assigned for
security by the insured, a resident of New Hampshire, to
a New Hampshire bank, despite the fact that his daughters were beneficiaries. Massachusetts law was held not
applicable:
"The rights of the insurer, or of any party against the
insurer, are not involved. Nor is there any question as to
the power of the assured to take this insurance from his
children and give it to. his creditors, or make it a part of
his estate. The issue is whether his dealings with the policies
in this state amounted to such action. The extent of the
assignment made by the pledge of the policies as collateral
security is the controlling factor in the case. This pledge
was made in this state by and to local residents, and the
designated beneficiaries also resided here. Such an undertaking is to be dealt with according to locallaw." 35
sa See KoESSLER, "New Legislation Affecting Non-Notification Financing
of Accounts Receivable," 44 Mich. L. Rev. ( 1946) 563, 614.
34 See, e.g., LORENZEN, 6 Repert. 319 § 183 and in Cases (ed. 5) at 496;
GooDRICH 292; PUTMAN, 1945 Annual Survey 44; 6 C. J. S. 1053 § 7;
FREUTEL, 56 Harv. L. Rev. (1942) at 68 n. x6o.
See also references in RG., 87 Seuff. Arch. 161 ff.
SG Barbin v. Moore (1932) 85 N. H. 362, 364, 159 Ad. 409.
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This distinction between the rights of any party flowing
from the insurance contract and "the extent of the assignment" ought to be remembered.
The Restatement has made an attempt to establish more
specific rules. Only assignability of the debt, again, is mentioned in § 348 as subject to the law of the place where the
assigned contract was made; § 350 determines "the effect
of an assignment of a contract right as between the assignor
and the assignee" by the law of the place of assignment.
Capacity of the assignor and formalities are subjected to
the same law (§§ 351, 352). Finally, in application of the
broad scope of the law of the place of performance in
Beale's scheme, the law of the place where the assigned
contract (sic) should be performed, decides "whether the
right of an assignee can be destroyed by payment to the
assignor" ( § 353), and "whether payment by the obligor
to a second assignee destroys the right to performance of
the first assignee" ( § 35 3). Beale later changed his mind
with respect to §§ 353 and 354· In his treatise he advocates,
for all questions involving priority among successive assignees, the law of the place of assignment. 36
Both these attempts at classification are incomplete and
doubtful. The local contacts employed to localize both the
debt assigned and the assignment, are the familiar and
misleading mechanical references. No regard is given to
the promise to assign. Even so, the American doctrine has
the notable merit of giving the transfer of debt a clearly
independent function, if an exaggerated one.
4· Germany and Switzerland
The most comprehensive system has been developed and
unanimously adopted by the courts and writers in Ger36
TON,

2 BEALE § 354.1 j cf. MALCOLM, Jetter published by
32 Va. L. Rev. (1946) at 925.

KUPFER

and

LIVINGS-
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many. 37 It is contained in two rules. On the one hand, the
law governing the obligation assigned determines not only
whether the debt can be transferred, but also all other requirements of a transfer, and even the effect of the assignment on the debt. As the most important consequence, which
forms the issue in the great majority of the numerous cases,
the law of the debt assigned determines whether notice of
the assignment is essential to the change of the person of
the creditor. Therefore, a debt of a French domiciliary,
governed by German law, does not need the formal signification, prescribed by the French Civil Code, article 1690, 38
regardless of where the assignment is made. Conversely, if
a debt is governed by French law, the assignment wherever
made needs signification (or a formal acknowledgment by
the debtor) as an essential condition. 39 The law of the debt
also governs a number of other problems which we shall
examine later.
On the other hand, the law that governs the relationship
motivating the assignment (causa) such as sale, giving in
payment, security, determines the rights and duties arising
as between the assignor and assignee. An often-mentioned
consequence concerns the liability of a seller of a right for
the existence of the debt and possibly for the solvency of
the debtor. 40
The Swiss doctrine has espoused these rules. 41
37 FoRSTER-ECCIUS, Preussisches Privatrecht § II n. 33; GEBHARD, Materialien 160 If.; 2 ZITELMANN 304; NEUMEYER, IPR. § 3 3; GUTZWILLER
1616; LEWALD 270 §§ 328 ff.; NussBAuM, D. IPR. 265; M. WoLFF, D. IPR. 94·
38 OLG. Koln (Oct. 14, 1890) 2 Z.int.R. (1892) 161; (Nov. 4, 1892)
4 Z.int.R. (1894) 65; OLG. Colmar (June 23, 1905) Clunet 1908, 536.
39 RG. (June 2, 1908) 18 Z.int.R. (1908) 449, Revue 1909, 298 with
French exequatur, App. Paris (June 24, 1909) Clunet 1910, 162; RG. (March
23, 1897) 39 RGZ. 371, Clunet 1900, 634 (debt under Egyptian law, assignment under then French law of Cologne).
40 RG. (Dec. 3, 1891) 2 Z. int. R. (1892) 162, Clunet 1892, 1039.
41 BG. (Sept. 17, 1892) 18 BGE. 516, 522; (Oct. 8, 1935) 61 BGE. II 242,
245; (Feb. 19, 1936) 62 BGE. II 108, no, Clunet 1938, 963; 2 ScHNITZER
530.
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5· France
The decisions, 42 none of which were rendered by the
Court of Cassation, share the often-proclaimed opinion that
the law of the debtor's domicil at the time of the suit governs assignment. The once almost solitary precursor of
this theory, Guy Coquille (A. D. 1523-1603)/8 considered
debts localized with the debtor because by his honesty or
fraudulent manipulations, by the care or carelessness applied to his business, the obligor makes the claim valuable
or fruitless. 44 The outstanding problem to which most
decisions and literary utterances have been devoted, however, concerns the application of the French provisions
prescribing notification of the assignment to the debtor.
The contemporary authors agree, without believing in a
fictitious situs, that the effects of an assignment for third
persons, including the debtor, are made dependent by the
Code on measures procuring publicity in the interest of
"public credit." Technically, these provisions are regarded
as prescribing formalities, subject to the law of the place
where they should be performed. 45 These statements have
often sounded as though assignments were governed entirely by the domiciliary law of the debtor. But the literature has become conscious of the importance of the law
42 Trib. Nancy (Mar. 25, 1890) Clunet 1891, 923; Trib. com. Seine (Mar.
5, 1892) Clunet 1893, 166; Cour Paris (Feb. 16, 1910) S. 1912.2.276, Clunet
1913, 555; Cour Paris (Nov. 18, 1927) Clunet 1928, 972, Revue Crit.

1934. I2I.
43 CoQUILLE, Questions et responses etc. ( 1634) quest. 237; I LAINE 297;
2 id. 263.
44 2 LAINE 265, in an often-cited passage, approves.
45 WEiss, 4 Traite 431; DESPAGNET 1140 § 396; BARTIN, Etudes 197;
BARTIN, Principes 3 I § 374; PILLET, Principes 409; PILLET, Traite 760 § 371;
NIBOYET 820 § 702; 2 ARMIN JON §§ 141 f.; LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE § 357;
ARMINJON, Droit Int. Pr. Com. 505 § 308.
For Belgium, POULLET § 280.
For Japan, YAMADA, "Le droit international prive du J apon," Clunet
1901, 637·
Institute of International Law, Draft 1927, art. 2, 33 Annuaire (1927)
III 198, 217.
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governing the debt, citing German decisions, and in principle also recognizes that the validity and effect of the
assignment, i.e., the relation between assignor and assignee,
must have its own domain. The law of the debtor's domicil
seems to be retained for the relation between the assignee
and the debtor. 46 This includes, e.g., the right of the debtor
to set off a counterclaim that arose against the assignor. 47
Niboyet, finally, has advocated that the law of the domicil
of the debtor be neatly restricted to the question of notification.48

6. The Netherlands
While the last-mentioned theory combines elements of
the French and German conceptions, the Dutch courts have
lately combined regard for the debtor, as in French law,
with an independent status for the transfer. They hold the
transaction between assignor and assignee governed by its
own law. Due to the argument, however, that a Dutch debtor
cannot be subject to a foreign law by an act in which he
does not participate, 49 the effect as to the debtor is determined by the law of his own domicil. 50
46 See BEQUIGNON, 5. Repert. 334 No. 7 and Note, Clunet 1937, at 784;
BATIFFOL, Traite 541 f. § 540, who, however, extends further the Jaw governing the debt.
4 7 This has been assumed by App. Colmar (Nov. 16, 1935) Clunet 1937,
781 and approved by the author of the Note, ibid., although he criticizes that
the decision (as usual) asserts the law of the debtor's domicil as the general
principle of assignment. Cf. infra n. 95·
48 NIBOYET 819 § 70z; NIBOYET, 4 Traite 669, 679; see also DESPAGNET
1139 § 398.
49 Rb. Utrecht (April 11, 19z8) W. 11898; KosTERS 803 ff.
50 See the five cases in 1 VAN HASSELT 135 and the three in id., Supp. 40,
where assignment was in Germany between Germans and the debtor was
in the Netherlands. In Rb. Haarlem (Feb. 22, 19z7) W. 11664, German law
was applied to the assignment as between a German assignor and a Dutch
assignee, see infra p. 4IZ n. 102.
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7. Comparison
Leaving aside the uncertain English choice of law and
the abandoned situs theories, three systems are recognizable. If adequately developed, they agree in distinguishing
the relation, Assignor-Assignee, from that of AssigneeDebtor. But they disagree with respect to both the decisive
contacts and the classification of problems. The American
doctrine emphasizes the law of the place of assignment and
gives it wide scope; the German doctrine resorts to the
usual individualized contacts and broadly extends the influence of the law governing the original debt; and the
French prefer the law of the place of the debtor's domicil
at least with respect to the problems concerning notice of
the assignment. Moreover, between assignor and assignee
the Germans and Swiss emphasize the underlying contract
(causa) in contrast to the theoretically abstract act of transfer, whereas in the Latin countries little distinction is made,
and in the United States the promise to assign disappears
behind the act of assignment when the choice of law is made.
All three systems are visibly defective, which explains
the existing uncertainty. Roughly speaking, only in the
United States and Germany has the doctrine developed
shape. But the American formulations are inexhaustive and
use the vague and mechanical contacts of lex loci contractus
and the like. The German and Swiss conception has committed the mistake of determining who is the creditor in
all respects by the law governing the debt merely because
the debtor must be assured against a change in the governing law which might injure his situation. The governing law
may, indeed, prevent the debt from being assigned at all
or preclude assignment to the particular purchaser, which
is, by the way, not a frequent occurrence in present business
law (as compared with marital law and succession). Yet,
where the debt is assignable, since modern law has adopted
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the institution of full transfer of debts either without knowledge of the debtor, or at least without his consent, the
debtor has no legitimate interest whatever in the motive,
form, and effects of an assignment. As a Dutch court said
quite adequately, the debtor may challenge a plaintiff because there was no valid assignment, but he has nothing to
do with the events underlying the assignment. 51 Hence, while
the defenses of the debtor inherent in his contract must be
preserved, nevertheless the debt may be transferred anywhere in the world and to anybody, without his consent as
well as without interference from the original law of the
debt.
III.

CLASSIFICATION

r. Formalities

Although older requirements of form have vanished, the
laws are divided in some respects, as on the effect of oral
assignments. Writing is required, for instance, for an assignment at law in England, generally in Switzerland, and
in many Latin jurisdictions. In the United States, except
for local statutes of frauds, ordinary oral assignments for
value are practically operative and irrevocable, although
more doubts prevail when the transfer is made without consideration. The general conflicts rule, asserted by Beale,
would strictly invoke the law of the place of ·the assignment
on the question of form. 52 But although this was the rule
followed in old cases of general assignments for the benefit
of creditors, 53 there is no corresponding authority for single
assignments. 54 An analogous dictum by an English Judge
has been justly criticized. 55
Rb. Maastricht (Feb. 7, 1935) N. J. 1936, No. 550.
2 BEALE 1255·
53 Speed v. May (1851) 17 Pa. St. 91; Birdseye v. Underhill (1888) 82
Ga. 142. Cf. Barnett v. Kinney ( 1893) 147 U. S. 476 and 2 BEALE 987 § 263.1.
54 Of BEALE's (1255 n. 6) two American decisions allegedly in point, neither
is concerned with simple debt. In Capital Finance v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
51

52
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In the countries following the optional principle of locus
regit actum, the transfer of a claim may comply with the
formalities (or formlessness) either of the law of the place
where it is made or of the law governing its contents. A
number of Continental writers, however, make the application of the principle dependent on its adoption by the law
of the debtor as identified with that governing the assigned
debt. 56 Hence, a French-governed debt would be transferable in the United States according to French formalities,
even though the principle were not recognized here. This
contention is one of the exorbitant inferences from the
alleged paramount role of the law of the debtor or of the
debt, but may be refuted also on the ground that the principle locus regit actum operates on its own merits at the
forum itsel£. 57
It has been insisted, however, that the formalities prescribed by the law of the debt should always be observed
in the interest of the debtor, so as to give him an easy
opportunity to ascertain his creditor. A debtor owing under
Swiss law should be able to rely only on a written assignment in accordance with article 16 5 of the Code of Obligations.58 But this formality is merely one of the conditions
for acquiring title. What the debtor needs in order to
obtain certainty about the right and the identity of a claimant, is a different matter and may be conveniently left to a
local law, either of the debtor's domicil or of the place of
performance.
Formalities to be observed in an assignment, or in the
Co. (1926) 75 Mont. 46o, as BEALE notes (n. s), the assignment was made
at the place also considered determining the law of the assigned insurance
policy.
55 Scrutton, L. J., in Republica de Guatemala v. Nuiiez [1927] I K. B.
at 689. See contra, CHESHIRE ( ed. 3) 6os, also against the dicta by Lawrence,
L. J., in the same case.
56 2 ZITELMANN 394; VALERY 905; 2 FRANKENSTEIN 258.
5 1 In this respect, see RAAPE, D. IPR. 45 f., 279 illus. 1.
58 GULDENER 34 f.
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appointment of a beneficiary, are often stipulated in insurance contracts. These agreements naturally participate
in the law governing the contract; 59 they are no concern of
locus regit actum.
The French provision (Civil Code, article I 690) that
the debtor must be notified by signification or must accept
the transfer in an acte authentique, has been consistently
characterized in French conflicts law as constituting a
formality, 60 without, however, subordinating it to the principle locus regit actum. In Germany, the question whether
it is really a formal requirement and therefore is replaceable
by domestic formlessness has been much discussed and
unanimously answered in the negative. 61 The requirement
goes to the substance of the assignment and as such causes
an outstanding problem, 62 important because the French
provisions are the model for numerous enactments and
certain minority rules in the United States. Only the details
of the intimation to be performed under French law by a
huissier or the public recognition of acceptance by the debtor
are subject to substitution by local equivalents. 5 3
An analogous question arises on the characterization of
the various provisions for regulating priority of claims by
means of recording, registration, or annotation in the
ledgers of the assignor. Also, these provisions are certainly
no mere formalities. 64
59

Infra p. 407.
WEiss, 4 Traite 425; VALERY 5I7.
61 RG. (June I, I88o) I RGZ. 435; (March 20, I883) IO RG.Z 273 and
many times thereafter.
62 Infra pp. 420 ff.
aa RG. (June 2, I«JJ8) IS Z.int.R. (I9o8) 449·
64 Cf. infra p. 432. In an English decision, In re Pilkington's Will Trusts
[I937] Ch. 574, cf. 9 Giur. Comp. DIP. (1943) No. 64, a deed of assignment for the benefit of creditors in Scotland was exempted from the
duty of registration under the English Deeds of Arrangement Act, 1914,
despite the English domicil of the debtor company. The court applied Scottish
law as the law intended by the parties. If the court had considered registration as a formality, it would probably have only emphasized the Scottish
place of executing the deed. In fact, the assignor was in Scotland, ·rvhich
would be decisive under the approach submitted infra p. 432.
60

IS
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Capacity

In principle, the capacity required for the assignor and
assignee has no relation to the original debt. While in most
countries the personal law governs, American decisions have
generally preferred the law governing the assignment to
that of a party's domicil. 65
New York, however, has sometimes claimed supremacy
for its insurance statutes over the laws of the state of
assignment. Thus an old New York statute provided that
a married woman could not assign without the written consent of her husband a policy of insurance upon the life of
her husband for her sole benefit if issued under the laws
of New York. 66 In such case, it was held that her capacity
should be governed neither by the state of the assignor's
domicil nor by that of the place of assignment. 67 On the
other hand, the Connecticut court, by unusual reasoning,
avoided the application of this statute in a case where New
York was the domicil of the husband and wife, and the
policy was delivered to them there by the New York agent
of the Connecticut insurance company. The court tenuously
declared that either the law of New Jersey where the
assignment was "completed and delivered" or the law of
Connecticut where the contract of insurance was performable, governed, and under either law the assignment was
valid. 68 The true choice should have been between New
65 Thus, Miller, Executor v. Campbell ( 1893) 140 N. Y. 457 (married
woman, lex loci cessionis against law governing insurance); Newcomb v.
Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1879) Fed. Cas. No. 10,147 (lex loci cessionis, also
of the domicil of both parties, against the law governing insurance).
66 New York: Laws 1879, c. 248.
67 Hanna Milhous v. Johnson (1889) 21 N.Y. St. Rep. 382, 4 N.Y. Supp.
199: married woman, in Ohio, beneficiary of a New York policy, assigned
it in Ohio for security without the express consent of her husband; the New
York court declares the act void under its own statute, applied under
peculiar criteria.
68 Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Westervelt (1884) 52 Conn. 586,
592. The case wrongly goes under the head of "cessibility."

VOLUNTARY ASSIGNMENT OF SIMPLE DEBTS 405
York law protecting its domiciliary and New Jersey as the
alleged center of the assignment.
Under the French Civil Code, judges, prosecutors,
sheriffs, solicitors, etc. cannot be assigned choses in action
that might be in the jurisdiction of the court in whose
forum they exercise their functions. 69 This is a provision
of exclusively domestic application. 70
How is the requirement of an insurable interest, by
which American statutes restrict the persons able to acquire
life insurance policies by assignment, to be classified? The
American decisions treat it as a part of the law of the
"place of assignment." 71 This may be based either on the
normal classification of capacity under the law of the contract, or on the idea of protecting the assignor who in every
case was domiciled in the state of the assignment. Considering that the doctrine of this requirement is "a complex of
rules of public policy designed to avert a number of harmful social and economic tendencies," 72 it may turn up primarily as an obstacle to assignability because of the nature
of the debt, and pertain to the law of the original contract.
Yet in any case, the states establishing the requirement may
feel impelled to enforce their public policy. 73
69

C. C. art. 1597; see ARNDT, supra n. r.
See 2 BAR 85 n. 14.
71 Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v. Cohen (Tex. Civ. App. 19u) 139 S. W. 51,
aff'd ( 1914) 234 U. S. 123: law of the place of assignment, also of the
making of the insurance and the domicil of the assignor, against the domicil
of the insurance company and the domicil of the assignee. Haase v. First
Nat' I Bank of Anniston ( 1920) 203 Ala. 624, 84 So. 761: place of assignment
and domicil of both parties to it.
7 2 EDWIN W. PATTERSON, "Insurable Interest in Life," 18 Col. L. Rev.
70

( 1918) 421.
73 See Griffin v. McCoach (1941) 313 U. S. 498: public policy of Texas,
domicil of the insured, may refuse to enforce the rights of beneficiaries who
have no insurable interest despite the New Y ark law of the insurance contract recognized by the lower Texas federal courts. HARPER, "Policy Bases
of the Conflict of Laws," 56 Yale L. J. ( 1947) at II75 n. 63, stresses the
conflict with New York law and the interest vested under this law, but is
sympathetic to the decision. On certain earlier decisions, see CARNAHAN,
Conflict of Laws and Life Insurance Contracts ( 1942) 429 § 87 with a
strong argument for the liberal attitude.
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3· Assignability
As noted before, the American doctrine concedes, apparently as the sole exception to the law of the assignment,
that the transferability of a debt is controlled by the law
governing the debt. Hence, it may be stated that on this
classification all conflicts systems agree. 74
(a) Legal restrictions on assignment. Hostility to the
institution of assignment or to the full transfer of obligatory rights has all but disappeared. But prohibitions are
frequently imposed, whether on account of the special nature
of certain debts, or for the protection of legal policies, or
through contractual limitations, which are prevailingly held
valid in the United States and abroad.
Thus we may note cases extending the law governing the
debt to such questions as-whether a tort action may be
assigned ;75 whether an unconditional beneficiary of an insurance policy rna y be replaced, 76 or replaced without his
consent ;77 in particular, under what circumstances a wife as
beneficiary of a life insurance policy acquires a vested
right ;78 whether an insurance policy may be assigned without the consent of the insurer and may be pledged 79 to the
74 WESTLAKE § 237; RG. (Nov. 28, 1887) 20 RGZ. 234; GEBHARD, Ma- ·
terialien 160; DIENA, 2 Dir. Com. Int. 26o; 2 ZITELMANN 394; NEUMEYER,
IPR. 29; 2 FRANKENSTEIN 260 n. 85.
75 Vimont v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1886) 69 Iowa 296, 22 N. W.
906, aff'd, 28 N. W. 612.
Switzerland: Similarly, for an alimony claim, BG. (Feb. 13, 1897) 23 BGE.
I 136, 140.
76 Wilde v. Wilde ( 1911) 209 Mass. 205.
Canada, Sask.: In re Duperreault [ 1940] 3 W. W. R. 385.
Switzerland: App. Zurich (Nov. 23, 1934) and BG. (March 7, 1935)
10 Z.ausi.PR. (1936) 587.
77 Haven v. Home Ins. Co. ( 1910) 149 Mo. App. 291, 130 S. W. 73·
Contra: Fourth Nat') Bank of Montgomery v. Norfolk (1929) 220 Ala.
344, probably to protect the woman, a citizen, but without invoking public
policy.
78 N. W. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Adams (1914) 155 Wis. 335, 144 N. W.
1108 grants the vested right to the husband; incidentally, the court eliminates classification of the problem as one of family law depending on the
domicil.
79 For the legal prohibitions in Italy, see VIVANTE, Trattato Dir. Com.
§ 1877; in Argentina, I. HALPERIN, El contrato de seguro (1946) 522.
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company ;80 and whether an employee may assign his right
to wages, 81 once wrongly subjected to the law of the place
of assignment. 82
Conversely, an analogous classification is suitable to a
legal provision that the debtor cannot avail himself of a
contractual agreement not to assign the debt, as against an
assignee who did not know of this agreement at the time
of the assignment. 83 Although the assignee is protected
thereby, the debt is so directly affected that its law should
govern.
(b) Formalities or conditions stipulated. The law governing an insurance contract applies when the policy requires
written notice of assignment, 84 or when the by-laws of an
insurance company make a change in the beneficiary void
unless certain formalities are observed. 85 The gold bonds
of the United States Treasury have been an outstanding
illustration. The text printed on the bonds indicated as
creditor a named person or his assignee registered in the
books of the Treasury, and provided for the making of
assignments in a foreign country before a diplomatic or
consular officer of the United States. On the occasion of
the assignment of such gold bonds by notarial instrument
in Germany, the Reichsgericht had difficulty in interpreting
these clauses and co-ordinating them with the German conflicts rules. 86 It is quite certain, however, that American
so Eagle v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. (1911) 48 Ind. App. 284.
Coleman v. American Sheet & Tin Plate Co. (1936) 2 N. E. (2d) 349
(statute of Indiana); see also St. Louis etc. R. Co. v. Crews (1915) 51 Okla.
744, 151 Pac. 879.
82 Monarch Discount Co. v. Chesapeake and Ohio Ry. Co. of Indiana
(1918) 285 Ill. 233, in fact applying the law of the forum, and deciding
against the loan corppany on other grounds such as usury. I do not regard
this decision as justified by the lack of specifying the place of performance,
as BATIFFOL 430 n. 4 suggests.
83 Italy: C. C. (1942) art. 1260 par. 2.
84 Colburn's Appeal (1902) 74 Conn. 463.
85 Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Adams (1928) 222 Mo. App. 689.
86 RG. (Nov. 5, 1932) 87 Seuff. Arch. 161 No. 87, IPRspr. 1933 No. 20,
criticized by M. WoLFF, 7 Z.ausl.PR. (1933) 794·
81
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law governed the entirety of the effects of these stipulations
and, according to the prevailing opinion, recognized their
force as against third persons. If it were true that in the
United States the law of the place of assignment governs
such question, this would include a renvoi to the German
law of the locus contractus. 87 But it is submitted that American law, as governing the original debt on every possible
theory, extends to the contractual restrictions on its transfer.
(c) Under the lex Anastasiana, which continued in force
in various parts of Germany before I 900, the assignee of a
debt was not allowed to collect more from the original
debtor than the consideration stipulated in the assignment. 88
By constant court practice, this rule was applied when it
was included in the law governing the original debt. 89 The
French Code, article I 699, and many codes following it,
have maintained the late Roman rule with regard to debts
in litigation. Continental conflicts literature is extremely ·
divided in this regard, mainly because it is not clear whether
the retrait litigieux serves primarily to protect the debtor
against a virtual deterioration of his situation, to discourage
unsound law suits, or to avoid exploitation of creditors by
professional traders in dubious debts. Moved by this doubt,
Pillet has preferred the lex fori. 90 In my opinion, this doubt
should lead to the law of the assignment, since technically
the effects of the transfer are modified.
(d) Partial assignment. Finally, whether a debt can be
divided and partially transferred, is subject to the law of
the debt. Thus, it was decided as early as I 840, in the case
of a claim payable by a debtor in Maryland and assigned
in Tennessee, that the assigned claim was enforceable in
Thus, M. WoLFF, ibid.
Cod. 4, 35, 22; 23.
89 Oberapp. Ger. Mi.inchen (]an. 7, I845) I Seuff. Arch. No. 402; Prussian
Obertribunal (Nov. I6, I858) 30 Striethorst 353; 2 BAR § 276; 2 ZITELMANN
394; WALKER 43I; 2 BROCHER I99·
90 PILLET, I Traite 763 ; 2 id. 499 § 646.
87
88
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equity in Louisiana to the extent that it would be in
Maryland. 91
4· Relation between Assignee and Debtor
An assignee has no more rights than his assignor. Hence
the debtor can use defenses that would be available to him
as against the assignor, in addition to those which he may
have against the new creditor. The German doctrine is
unanimous in declaring that, since the law under which the
obligor owes cannot be changed by the act of other parties,
all his defenses are determined by the law governing the
debt. 92
It is scarcely believable that under American conflicts
rules the law of the debt should be restricted to the question
of its "assignability." In the above-quoted dictum of 1932,
the Supreme Court of New Hampshire referred to the law
of the original insurance debt in considering the rights of
the insurer andjor any party claiming rights against him
as well as the right of changing the beneficiary. 93 Defenses
of lack or failure of consideration, of frustration of a condition or breach of contract, 94 are obviously determined by the
same law. This law ought no less to govern defenses against
the assignee on the ground of his own behavior or of setoff
(if characterized as substantive) of the debtor's own
counterclaims.
Compensation, setoff, and recoupment available to the
debtor against the assignor at the time of assignment or
before notice of it to the debtor, are clearly in the same
91 Jackson v. Tiernan (1840) 15 La. 485. The place of the payment was
also the place of the debtor's domicil but not of the assignment, as BAT!FFOL
430 n. 4 thought.
92 WALKER 490 and n. IZ simply concludes: the law controlling the debt also
governs the relation between assignee and debtor.
93 Barbin v. Moore, supra n. 35·
94 No confirmation, though, seems to be afforded by Bankers Life Co. v.
Perkins (1936) 284 Ill. App. IZZ, I N. E. (zd) IIZ, mentioned by BATIFFOL
431 n. z.
•
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class, provided they are considered to be substantive. Such
counterclaims, hence, are subjected to the law of the debt
by the Germans, to the law of the debtor's domicil by the
French, and probably to the law of the forum in jurisdictions where they are regarded as merely procedural means
of defense.
Illustration. Buschel in Berlin assigned a claim against
a buyer in Strassburg to a bank in Berlin. The buyer
countered the action of the assignee by claiming une exception
de compensation against the assignor. The court of Colmar
assumed that primarily under the French doctrine the law
of the domicil of the debtor governed the problem; the defendant, having recognized the assignment by letter, would
not be permitted to resort to compensation (C. C. art.
1 29 5). The parties seemed to agree on the application of
German law which perhaps governed the debt and allowed
the debtor compensation (BGB. § 404); this right, however, was waived, as the court held. 95

The German doctrine includes in the law of the debt also
the rules permitting the debtor in good faith to pay to the
assignor or a wrong assignee, or to transact with him to the
detriment of the assignee. We shall have to examine this
point specifically. 96
5. The Promise to Assign

Limiting our discussion to cases where the assignment
is based on an obligatory contract rather than on obligations ex lege, we have to deal with such transactions as sale
of a debt, agreement to assign for accord and satisfaction
or for security of payment, agency and partnership including the duty to confer claims acquired upon the principal
or partner, etc. According to the distinction discussed in
the beginning of this chapter (p. 389), the validity of
95
96

App. Colmar (Nov. 16, 1935) Clunet 1937, 781, cf. supra n. 47·
Infra pp. 417 ff.
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such contracts is tested by their governing laws, not that
of the assignments. The American decisions have not faced
the question. They inquire into the efficacity of assignments
in view of usury, 97 gambling, 98 and absence of valuable consideration, 99 or the lack of insurable interest. 100 But in the
cases decided, the places of the promise to assign and of
assigning were indistinguishable.
In the German doctrine, it has been characteristically
regarded as a matter of course that the law governing the
9 7 In Runkle v. Smith (1918) 89 N. J. Eq. 103, an interest in a trust in
New Jersey was assigned as security for a loan to a loan company in
Pennsylvania. It seems that the court localized both the loan and the assignment in Pennsylvania, although the court speaks only of the latter. The
interest was excessive under both laws. In In re Eby (1929) 39 F. (2d) 76,
the parties, in contracts including assignment of book accounts, stipulated
for the law of Delaware although the Commercial Credit Co. was incorporated and had its home office in Maryland. The court localized "the
contracts" either in Maryland ("last act") or Delaware, both having no
usury law. It would seem that if the court incorrectly emphasized the
assignment as such, it should reasonably have considered the law of North
Carolina where the assignor was a merchant and kept his books. Cf. infra

IV, 3·
Personal Finance Co. v. Gilinsky Fruit Co. (1934) 127 Neb. 450, 255 N. W.
558, 256 N. W. 511, LoRENZEN, Cases 472 deviates by declaring the excessive
interest on the loan for which the assignment was made as security, contrary
to the settled public policy of the forum, the domicil of the debtor; perhaps
the court had a hidden feeling that wages should not have been assigned
for a small loan at 3!% a month. But juridically the dissenting vote was
right.
9 BManhattan Life Ins. Co. v. Cohen (1911) 139 S. W. 51: assignor, citizen
of Texas, and the agent of the assignee made the agreement as to the assignment of two life insurance policies in Texas, also place of the insurance
company. Under Texas law, it was a gambling contract. Cf. Phillips v.
Green ( 1922) 194 Ky. 254: draft given in a gambling house to carry on
gambling; Bernstein v. Fuerth ( 1928) 132 Misc. 343, 229 N. Y. Supp. 791:
check endorsed on board a ship moving along the coast for a gambling loss,
but no place of endorsement where gambling was illegal "was proved."
99 Glover v. Wells {1891) 40 Ill. App. 350: assignment for security for a
pre-existent loan which was held to be a sufficient consideration under Iowa
law; evidently the entire arrangement took place in Iowa. Colburn's Appeal
( 1902) 74 Conn. 463: while the policy was governed by New York law and
the prescribed written notice was observed, the question whether the transfer
of the interest of the insured to his wife was for valuable consideration,
depended on the law of Massachusetts where the couple was domiciled.
Contra, for the law of the debt: GULDENER 59, stressing the basic nature
of consideration in common law, but forgetting that it regards only the
relation Assignor-Assignee.
10o Supra n. 71.
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original debt should decide whether a change of creditor
requires the existence of a valid underlying cause (e.g., promise) between assignor and assignee. The law governing the
promise to assign (the "cause" of assignment), then, should
determine whether this requirement is fulfilled. Since the
Dutch courts are firm in classifying the conditions of assignment with the law governing the latter, 101 the following
Dutch case has been criticized in Germany :102
A German in Germany made a loan to another German
domiciled in Holland and assigned the claim to a Dutchman
by correspondence. The debtor questioned that there was
valid title, essential for the transfer under Dutch law. But
the court held that the assignment was made in Germany
where an assignment is valid by itself (as an "abstract"
transaction) and it was immaterial, therefore, to inquire
into the consideration. German writers object that if the
loan was governed by Dutch law, the Dutch requirement of
a cause was peremptory. 103
The decision was correct as to the classification. A debtor
is not entitled to reject an assignee purchasing an entirely
assignable claim under a foreign law. Whether the assignor
or- the assignee is the true creditor, is an exclusive matter
for the law governing their relationship. The American
view is in full harmony with this conception, which has an
analogue in the English rule: A debtor may not decline performance to an assignee on the ground that there is no consideration for the assignment as between assignee and
assignor .104
Effects. The underlying transaction between assignor and
assignee determines what accessory rights, liens, securities
or preferences ought to be transferred together with the
Supra p. 399·
Rb. Haarlem (Feb. 22, 1927) W. n664.
103 LEWALD 272, followed by RAAPE, D. IPR. 277·
104 In re Westerton [ 1919] 2 Ch. 104; Holt v. Heatherfield Trust, Ltd.
fx942l 2 K. B. I; JENKS-WINFIELD § 287.
101
102
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main object105 and whether the grantor enters into a warranty for the existence of the debt, and possibly for the
solvency of the debtor ;106 also what steps to enforce the
debt must be taken by the assignee in case of legal or contractual warranty of solvency; for what period a warranty
is presumed to last, and what may be recovered on this or
other grounds from the assignor. 107
The law governing the internal relationship also decides
whether a person is entitled to have a chose in action transferred on the ground of such claims as may belong to a
principal, a partner, a surety paying the debt, a codebtor
paying, et cetera.
6. The Transfer

Formation. Assignment may be conceived as a unilateral
declaration by the assignor, but in any reasonable view
requires at least tacit acceptance. The consent must be
serious, not simulated. 108 These requirements have nothing
to do with the original debt. Likewise, essentials, such as
notice, recording, and registration, pertain to the orbit of
the transfer, but not of the debt.
The same is true of the admission of a fiduciary assign105 This is usually confused with the question whether such collateral
rights actually follow the assigned right without an express clause.
1 06 Bay. ObLG. (Oct. 19, 1891) 2 Z.int.R. (1892) 370, Clunet 1893, 904;
RG. (Dec. 3, 1891) 2 Z.int.R. (1902) 162, 164, Austrian debt. German sale
of it, no warranty of solvency contrary to Austrian Allg. BGB. § 1397;
See also RG. (May 25, 1928) JW. 1928, 2013, IPRspr. 1928 No. 13. The
literature underlines this point specifically.
107 Cf. Austria: C. C. §§ 1398, 1399; Swiss C. Obi. arts. 171 par. 2, 173;
Italy: C. C. (1942) art. 1267; Cuba: C. C. art. 1530.
In the decision of the Bavarian Supreme Court, supra n. 106, the assignor
paid the assignee the deficiency, and after the debtor had come to fortune
again, sued the assignee for recovery; also this incident was correctly
subjected to the law of the sale.
1os BG. (June 3, 1897) 23 BGE. II 818, 8 Z.int.R. (1898) 170 applied
the law of the assignor, meant to be the law governing the act of transfer.
But the same court (Nov. 24, 1906) 32 BGE. II 696 subjected the problem
to the law of the debt, as also 2 FRANKENSTEIN 26 advocates.
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ment for the purpose of collecting the debt/ 09 and the
conditions of a security assignment. Also, if the law of the
assignment were to recognize a unilateral act of the assignor
as constituting the transfer, this ought to suffice even though
unknown to the law of the debt. 110
This is contrary to the German and Swiss principle that
a mode of transfer not permitted by the law governing the
debt has no effect against the debtor; although the obligatory contract may follow a different law, its fulfillment
by assignment should be amenable to the law of the debt.
This principle is a curious obstacle to the international
negotiation of claims, subjecting without any justification
cause and transfer necessarily to different laws. 111 A doubt
in this respect may arise in the case of future and conditional debts. Thus, where a French real-estate broker
assigned his Swiss-governed claim for a conditional fee in
France under French law, the Swiss Federal Tribunal classified the problem whether this claim was assignable, without
hesitation under the law of the debt; on this ground the
court was able to affirm its jurisdiction which is restricted
to revising the application of Swiss law. 112 The American
theory leads to the opposite result, since the law of the assignment is considered independent. 113 The latter view is the
10 9 Moore v. Robertson (1891) 17 N. Y. Supp. 554, assignment executed
in England, but see infra n. 168.
Contra: OLG. Hamburg (Dec. 31, 1924) 34 Z.int.R. (1925) 447, though
stating that such a trust is known to both English and German law, applies
German law as the "national law" of the debtor. {Recognition of fiduciary
assignment as a full transfer is not yet a matter of course; in Switzerland,
doubts have been dispersed only by BG. (June 12, 1945) 71 BGE. II 167).
11o Contra: GuLDENER 25 f.
111 On this point, GuLDENER 41, as the only Continental writer, has seen
the right solution.
112 BG. (Feb. 24, 1915) 41 BGE. II 132, 134.
113 In Monarch Discount Co. v. Chesapeake and Ohio Ry. of Indiana
( 1918) 285 Ill. 233, the assignability of future wages is determined under
the law believed to govern the assignment, cf. supra n. 71. In the decision
In re New York, New Haven and Hartford R. Co. (D. C. Conn. 1938)
25 F. Supp. 874. 876, it is not certain for what reason the assignment of a
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correct one, so far as classification is concerned and thereby
the state competent to protect the assignor is indicated.
The Dutch courts hold likewise. 114 The objections against
transfer of future or conditional debts are well known;
they continue in a great number of countries and of American states to produce the requirement that the contract
from which the debt should flow must exist at the time of
the assignment. 115 Historically, the reluctance to treat a
half-completed chose in action as an object of disposition
is quite comparable to the slow process by which a future
crop was admitted as the res for a sale. 116 In addition to
remainders of this conceptual difficulty, there is always a
suspicion of fraudulent acts to deprive creditors of an
asset. 117 Surrender of future means of livelihood or of
entire stocks of assets has been disapproved also in the
manifest interest of the assignor. 118 But no interest whatever of the original debtor is involved. His situation remains
unchanged, since the debt can only be enforced when it is
mature.
Scope. Two cases may illustrate the question of the scope
of an assignment:
A seller of merchandise in Le Havre, France, drew a
draft on his German buyer and discounted it at his local
banker. Did he impliedly assign to the banker his right to
recover the price on the ground of the sale? Under French
law, indorsement in fact transfers the provision, the claim
of the drawer against the drawee. 119 The Reichsgericht
abandoned the rigid observance of German concepts120 and
partly conditional right as collateral security is determined under New
York law; probably because this choice of law was not disputed.
114 Hof Amsterdam (March 4, I936) N. ]. 1936, No. 746.
115 Restatement of Contracts I 54; WILLISTON, 2 Contracts § 4I3, cf.
§ I68I A.
116 See in the Roman development, PAULUS, Dig. I8, I, 8.
117 Thus, in Germany see ARNDT, supra n. I, 33 ff.
118 2 WILLISTON II83 and 5 id. § I652.
119 C. Com. art. u6. See infra Ch. 49, I, 2.
l2o OLG. Hamburg (Dec. IS, I9oo) 56 Seuff. Arch. 260, Clunet I905, 669,
had expounded these principles.
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followed the French law, excusing this application by reference to French business practice. French law was not
thought to be applicable because the debt was under German
law, and notification therefore was declared unnecessary. 121
Without such prejudice, it would have been obvious that
French law governed the scope of the transfer. This result
is laid down at present in the Geneva Convention on the
conflict of laws relating to bills of exchange (article 6)
as incidental to the law creating the draft.
Potter & Co. in Augusta, Georgia, drew a draft representing the price of fifty bales of cotton sold by them to a
firm in Winterthur, Switzerland. The draft was successively
endorsed to a broker, a firm in New York, and a banker
in Paris who sent the paper for collection to a bank in
Winterthur. The Paris banker sued the buyer exclusively
on the basis of the sales contract. The assignments conditioning his right were inferred by the Appeal Court from
the special usages of the cotton trade, whereas the Swiss
Federal Tribunal recognized that American law governed
the original endorsements and assumed that the lower court
could, without so stating, base its recognition of the usages
upon American law. The claim for the price itself was
considered governed by the Swiss law of the debt. 122
A last example may show the effect of an assignment as
between the parties :
An American case was decided upon the following assumptions.123 Under the law of Louisiana, if the holder
of a claim secured by a lien assigns part of this claim, the
assignor loses his priority to the assignee insofar as the
proceeds of the lien are insufficient to pay both assignor
and assignee; under Mississippi law, assignor and assignee
share the proceeds equally pro rata. The court rested its
choice of law on the place of the assignment and could have
supported this choice by the situs of the lands subject to
the lien.
121 RG. (March 19, 1907) 65 RGZ. 357, Clunet 1908, 531; 1910, 227; cf.
KUHN, Comp. Com. 258; GULDENER 46.
122 BG. (Sept. 17, 1892) Kindlimann v. Marcuard, Krauss & Cie., 18 BGE.
516.
123 Couret v. Conner (1918) uS Miss. 374·
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IV.
I.

PROTECTION OF

Goon

FAITH

Fundamental Distinction

Since a debtor should not be harmed by a transfer of the
claim to a new creditor without his consent, it is a universal
principle that he may deal with his original creditor, or with
an assignee, so long as he may in good faith believe him to
be the owner of the claim. The older legal systems prescribed, for this purpose, that notification to the debtor or
his acceptance of the assignment should be an essential
requisite of the transfer. Noncompliance with such provisions prevents the completion of the assignment and certainly belongs to the law governing its formation (supra

II, 6).
By modern methods, mere agreement to transfer constitutes assignment. Separate rules have to safeguard the
interest of debtors, despite the validly completed transfer,rules forming a distinct complex closely connected with the
debtor rather than with the parties to the transfer.
From the situation of a bona fide debtor, however, we
have thoroughly to distinguish the somewhat analogous
problems occurring when the claims of several successive
assignees conflict with each other, or an assignee comes into
competition with an attaching creditor of the assignor or
with his trustee in bankruptcy. Confusion with the firstmentioned group of problems is facilitated by their twofold
similarity: bona fide ignorance of a prior assignment may
favor a later purchaser of a claim, and notification to the
debtor often has been made a decisive factor also in acquisition of priority by an assignee or garnishor. In the older
systems, best represented by the French Code, in fact, the
same ((signification" to or acceptance by the debtor, decisive
for the debtor's position, likewise determines the effects of
assignment as to all other "third persons." In England "it
is established, in the case of statutory and equitable assign-
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ments, that an assignee must give notice to the debtor in
order to secure his title against later assignees." 124 In fact,
English and some American courts make no distinction
between conflicts involving protection of the debtor and
those which concern priority between successive assignees.
The German courts do not even see the problem. French
writers emphasize strongly that notification to the debtor
serves as a general measure of publicity, guaranteeing the
notifying assignee priority of rank over any other claimant.125 Insofar as this argument reaches unity of criterion
for the effect of all assignees and other claimants, it has
great force. But the "publicity" resulting from knowledge
by the debtor is not very impressive. There is no law anywhere constraining a debtor to impart his knowledge to
someone else, except in actual garnishment proceedings.
However, that there is a great difference of policy and
purpose between protecting the debtor and marshalling
priorities, becomes manifest in considering the modern form
of assignment by formless agreement. Nothing can demonstrate this better than the most recent American development of the technique for ascertaining priority. From 1945,
numerous new American statutes have established recording
in public files or marking in the books of the assignor of
accounts receivable as the method to secure priority of
claims. These devices illustrate the fact that priority is a
matter connected with the assignor rather than with the
debtor.
These statutes, however, have been necessitated by
another confusion ensuing upon a mysterious amendment
of 1938 to the Bankruptcy Act. Transfers by an insolvent
debtor to one of his creditors, in preference to others of
the same class, for an antecedent debt are vitiated by Section 6o (a) of the Act if made within a certain period before
124
125

CHESHIRE and FIFOOT, Law of Contracts (1945) 336.
BARTIN, 3 Principes 33 f. § 374i NIBOYET, 4 Traite 672 f.
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the petition for bankruptcy is filed. A transfer falls within
the critical period if it is not "perfected" previously. The
former Bankruptcy Act required for this purpose that recording or registering should be done if it was required or
even only permitted "by law." 126 The amended test requires
for perfection:
"That no bona fide purchaser from the debtor 127 and no
creditor could thereafter have acquired any rights in the
property so transferred superior to the rights of the transferee therein."
This formulation introduced a new test, the "hypothetical
bona fide purchaser test," not defined in the Act. It is common opinion that even in the old version the federal provision referred to the state law applicable according to the
rules of conflicts law, and this view is upheld upon the
amended test. 128
To the surprise of many lawyers and the finance institutions concerned, the courts have applied the section to the
assignment of book accounts for security, which are in most
cases made without notice to the debtors. Such application
by the Supreme Court of the United States in the Klauder
Case 129 was the more striking, because the section deals with
preferences given to antecedent debts to the detriment of
other creditors of the same class and in the case at bar the
bank assignees of the debt, with consent of a consortium of
creditors, furnished new capital to the now bankrupt assignor. The assignment was held imperfect because under the
then law of Pennsylvania the debtors in their various states
126 Judicial construction seems to have distorted this provision by giving
publication a retroactive effect.
127 Debtor, here, of course, means the bankrupt, not the person of whom
we speak as debtor in our context.
128 Mr. Justice Jackson in Corn Exchange Nat' I Bank & Trust Co. v.
Klauder (1942) 318 U.S. 434, 437 with citations; Judge Goodrich in In re
Rosen (1946) 157 F. (2d) 997; McKenzie v. Irving Trust Co. (1944) 292
N. Y. 347, 55 N. E. (2d) 192, aff'd ( 1945) 323 U. S. 365, 369, per Stone, C. J.
129 The Klauder Case, supra n. 128.
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should have been notified, and therefore a subsequent assignee in good faith could have acquired a right superior to
the bank.
This and other decisions, prejudicial to nonnotification
financing of accounts receivable/ 30 have provoked the large
series of new statutes assuring measures of publicity. Their
confusing variety adds to the present difficulties of the
courts in interstate cases. 131 Thereby the conflicts problem,
unsolved thus far, has become particularly acute, and it
would seem time for agreement on an adequate rule.
2.

Protection of the Debtor

(a) Municipal systems .132 The debtor obtains his most
secure position in those jurisdictions where, according to
the repeatedly mentioned French model, notification by
either the assignor or the assignee is rigorously required for
completion of the transfer. 133 In English equity and in a
number of codes, positive knowledge is equivalent to notification ;134 in contrast, the French Court of Cassation allows
130 See in particular, MALCOLM, "Explanation and Analysis of Massachusetts House Bill No. 642 relative to Assignments of Accounts Receivable
and other Choses in Action," 30 Mass. L. Q. (1945) No.2, 26; KUPFER and
LIVINGSTON, "Corn Exchange National Bank and Trust Co. v. Klauder
Revisited: The Aftermath of its Implications," 32 Va. L. Rev. (1946) 910;
ALAN V. LowENSTEIN, "Assignments of Accounts Receivable and the Bankruptcy Act," 1 Rutgers U. L. Rep. (I947) I.
1 31 KoESSLER, "Assignment of Accounts Receivable," 33 Cal. L. Rev. (I945)
46, 86; id., "New Legislation Affecting Non-Notification Financing of
Accounts Receivable," 44 Mich. L. Rev. ( 1946) 563 at 6oo, 604. See on recent
proposals, Note, "Inventory and Account Financing," 62 Harv. L. Rev. (1948)
588, 593 f. and n. I5.
1 32 SCHUMANN, 2 Rechtsvergl. Handwiirterbuch at 37; ARNDT, supra, n. I,
83 ff.
133 See, e.g., England: Law of Property Act, I925, s. I36; Holt v. Heather·
field Trust, Ltd. [ I942l 2 K. B. I clarifies that the decisive time is when
the debtor receives the written notice.
Italy: C. C. ( I942) art. 1264 par. r.
Mexico: C. C. art. 2047.
Portugal: C. C. arts. 789, 790.
Switzerland: C. Obi. art. I67.
134 E.g., Austria: Allg. BGB. § I395·
Cuba: C. C. art. I527.
Germany: BGB. § 407.
Italy: C. C. (I942) art. I264 par. 2.
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the debtor to resist an assignment of which no notice has
been given, although known to him. 135 In some laws, including the United States, not even a debtor without knowledge is protected, if he has reason to inquire at the time of
payment to his original creditor. 136 In Germany, the debtor
is entitled to require presentation of a written assignment
or a formal notice by the assignor. 137
The provisions vary greatly with respect to the form of
notification. In the United States, it is immaterial who
notifies and whether he does it orally or by writing. The
French Civil Code demands a formal signification by the
assignee employing a huissicr, the enforcement officer, or
an acceptance of the assignment by the debtor in an acte
authentique (article r 690). A written document of assignment shown to the debtor is enough to be effective in the
United States and Germany. 138
The French provision, however, following the Coutume
de Paris, speaks only of the relation as between the debtor
and third parties. A widespread theory contrasts the relation inter partes, between assignor and assignee, as independent of notification. 139 In the numerous countries following the French lead, it is often said accordingly that notification is not a requisite of validity of the assignment but a
condition of its effect as to third persons. 140 In similar
135 After a long controversy, Cass. civ. (June 20, 1938) D. 1939.1.26;
(Nov. 27, 1944) Gaz. Pal. 1945.1.13, strongly criticized as illogical and
inequitable by BoiTARD, 43 Revue Trim. D. Civ. (1945) 119 f.
136 Restatement of Contracts § 170; Switzerland: C. Obi. art. 167; Germany: broad judicial construction of § 407 cit.
137 BGB. § 410.
138 Restatement of Contracts § 170, comment to sub sec. 2 and ill us. 6;
BGB. § 410.
139 Arg. C. C. art. 1138; see ALBERT WAHL, Note, S. 1898.1.113. Against
this dominant opinion, PLANIOL et RIPERT, 7 Traite § 1128.
140 See, e.g., for Argentina, C. C. arts. 1493 (1459), 1501 (1467); cf.
I. HALPERIN, El contra to de seguro ( 1946) 522.
Brazil: C. C. arts. 1067, 1069 distinguishes even three effects: before
notification as between the parties; after notification as to the debtor; and
with regard to various requirements of publicity, as to other interested
persons.
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formulas, the present English literature states that to perfect title as between assignor and assignee no notice to the
debtor is necessary, but notice serves to prevent the debtor
from paying the assignor. 141 The Supreme Court of Tennessee having proclaimed the minority rule essentially requiring notification, subsequently dispensed with it as between
assignor and assignee. 142 The meaning of these distinctions
is not exactly the same everywhere and often doubtful. 143
But their mere existence helps to underline the dual relationship, too often disregarded in conflicts law.
In the United States, the prevailing system is closely
analogous to the legal provisions of the German Code. As
the Supreme Court expressed it, after one nonnotified assignment, a subsequent assignee takes nothing by his assignment because the assignor has nothing to give. 144 If Williston objects that according to the same decision an assignor
retains the power to discharge the claim by settlement until
notice is given to the debtor, 145 this is only a means to
protect the debtor. The transfer of a claim resembles that
of a chattel, the possession of which, retained by the vendor,
helps a bona fide purchaser to acquire title. Until the
debtor's good faith is broken, he may pay the debt, or be
released, or acquire defenses for value, irrespective of the
transfer. 146
(b) Conflicts rules. Again, three systems are in dispute.
(i) Law of the assignment. American courts, subjecting
an assignment to the law of the place where it is made, could
be expected to include the provisions concerning notifica141 England: PoLLOCK, Contracts ( ed. 12) 172; Gorringe v. Irwell India
Rubber Works (1887) 34 Ch. D. 128.
14 2 Peters v. Goetz (1916) 136 Tenn. 257, 188 S. W. II44; Naill & Naill
v. Blackwell (1932) 164 Tenn. 615, 51 S. W. (2d) 835.
143
ARNDT, supra n. 1, at 89 denies any real importance to the distinction in
France.
144 Salem Trust Co. v. Manufacturers' Ins. Co. (1923) 264 U. S. 182, I97·
145 WILLISTON, 2 Contracts 1258.
146 WILLISTON, 2 Contracts § 433; Restatement of Contracts §§ 167, 170.
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tion. This has been the method of dealing with general assignments for the benefit of creditors in the last century when
such transactions were frequent. A general assignment, good
where made, has been deemed to be good everywhere, irrespective of a requirement of notice in other states, 141 although with certain reservations for other local creditors. 148
Also ordinary assignments have been treated likewise in a
few decisions, 149 and by Beale. 150
(ii) Law of the debt. Squarely opposed, the established
German doctrine asserts that it depends on the law governing the original claim, not only what effect an unknown
assignment has on the debtor's position but even whether
its transfer is completed by the agreement or only by notification. The literature has insisted upon this result with
emphasis. 151 As mentioned before, when a debt governed
by French law is assigned in Germany, the solemnities of
signification have been held indispensable/ 52 while assignment in France of a German-governed debt is considered
complete without any notification/ 53 Accordingly, the law
of the debt decides the effect of a payment by the debtor to
his original creditor ;154 the debtor is supposed to rely on
147 Train v. Kendall ( 1884) 137 Mass. 366; First Nat'! Bank v. Walker
(1891) 6r Conn. 154; Barnett v. Kinney (1893) 147 U.S. 476.
148 Cf. STUMBERG 369 n. 6o.
149 Vanbuskirk v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. {1842) 14 Conn. 582; Clark v.
Connecticut Peat Co. ( r868) 35 Conn. 303; Hanna v. Lichtenhein ( 1918)
182 Am. Dec. 94, 169 N. Y. Supp. s8o.
To the same effect once in Germany, Oberapp. Ger. Liibeck (Nov. 29, 1855)
cited by 2 BAR 81 n. 2 {at least where the lex loci was more favorable to
the assignee) and in France, Trib. Seine (March 15, 1907) Clunet 1908,
1118, Revue 1908, 182 {superseded).
150 2 BEALE § 354.1, abandoning the position taken in Restatement §§ 353,
354; see MALCOLM, letter printed by KUPFER and LIVINGSTON, supra n. 36,
at 925.
1512 BAR 82; GEBHARD, Materialien 162; 2 ZITELMANN 394; 2 FRANKENSTEIN 261; NEUMEYER, IPR. § 33; LEWALD 271 f.; NUSSBAUM 265; GUTZ·
WILLER r6r6; M. WoLFF, IPR. 94; RAAPE, D. IPR. 277 I r.
152
See supra n. 39·
158 See supra n. 38.
154 WALKER 487.
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it. 155 The Swiss courts follow this view, 156 which has been
recommended also for England 157 and France. 158
(iii) Law of the debtor's domicil. The French courts
firmly apply the local law of the debtor's domicil/ 5 " allegedly
as a general rule for assignments, but in fact dealing usually
with the requisite of signification/ 50 More or less in the
same application, this theory is shared by most French and
Italian writers, 161 and has found favor also in England 162
and sometimes in the United States. 163 Even the German
Supreme Court has twice spoken of the debtor's domicil
as if it were decisive by itself, instead of being only the
presumptive place of performance of the debt ;164 and the
Hanseatic Appeal Court has concluded that every debtor
may rely on the protection afforded by such provisions as
the Belgian Civil Code, article 1690, as well as the German
Civil Code, § 410, according to the laws and usages in his
country. 165
The same current of thought can be found in American
decisions, sometimes influenced, as in France, by the conflict of assignment and garnishment. Thus, in 1 8 74, notice
was declared necessary in Tennessee for the protection of
its own citizens, even in the case of a foreign general assign155

Germany: OLG. Hamburg (Jan. 29, 1906) 16 Z.int.R. (1906) 331.
BG. (Oct. 8, 1935) 61 BGE. II 242; (Feb. 19, 1936) 62 BGE. II 108.
157 FooTE 296; CHESHIRE 445; M. WoLFF, Priv. Int. Law 548 § 512.
158
BATJFFOL 429, 432.
159 Supra n. 42.
160 BATIFFOL §§ 530, 531; cf. NmoYET, cited supra n. 48.
161 See citations supra n. 45·
Italy: Cass. Rome (Nov. 7, 1895) S. I895·4·I3; Clunet I895, 664 speaks
of the national law of the debtor.
162 In re Queensland etc. Co. [ I89I] I Ch. 536; [ 189:;:) I Ch. ZI9, C. A.
In this connection, Kelly v. Selwyn [ I905] z Ch. 117, IZI f., requiring notification, in contrast to New York law, makes sense, as it adopts English
law, because an interest in an English trust is assigned. Cf. WESTLAKE I52·
163 See PARMELE in 1 Wharton 796 and the cases collected infra ns. I66 ff.
164 RG. (March 7, I907) 65 RGZ. 357 stressed the fact of the debtor's
German domicil, and RG. (Nov. 5, 1932) IPRspr. I933 No. 20 subjects the
requirements of assignment to American law because of the domicil of the
debtor which was also deemed to be the place of performance.
1 65 OLG. Hamburg (July 30, 1934) IPRspr. 1934 No. 15.
156
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166

ment.
In an 1883 case, the Minnesota court stated that
the assignment was executed in Illinois and as far as the
rights of assignor and assignees were concerned inter se,
they were governed by Illinois law, that is, they were valid
without notification, but in a garnishment suit affecting attaching creditors, Minnesota, the debtor's domicil, "cannot
permit the laws of another state to be imported and override the settled policy of our own laws. In such a case comity
must yield to policy, otherwise . . . a citizen of our own
state who had been debtor to a nonresident would never
be certain to whom he was liable, for his liability would
be as uncertain and variable as might be the domicile of
his creditor." 167 A decision of a New York court held the
collecting agent of English creditors, suing for tort, capable
of standing in court as a fiduciary assignee, according to
New York law. 168 This holding was not based on local
procedures/ 69 but on the argument that under New York
· law the assignment was full and complete, although it was
executed in England and under English law its validity
required a written notice to the debtor. English law "cannot
control the law of this state," of which the defendants (the
debtors) are residents. A more recent New York case may
be mentioned as a parallel, although exclusively dealing
with the priority problem. It was recognized that despite
the facts pointing to New York as the place where the
assignment was to be localized, Missouri law applied in
granting priority to the second assignee giving first notice
to the debtor, an insurance company of that state, the insurance contract having been made there with a resident to
Flickey v. Soney (1874) 4 Baxt. (Tenn.) 169.
Lewis v. Bush (1883) 30 Minn. 244 at 247. Only at the end the opinion
verges to the qualification of Minnesota also as place of performance.
168 Moore v. Robertson ( 1891) 17 N. Y. Supp. 554·
169 Also the precedents cited for the capacity to sue of an assignee appointed for the purpose of collection use substantive reasoning: Church,
C. ]., in Sheridan v. Mayor ( 1876) 68 N. Y. 30, 32; Ruger, C. ]., in Greenwood v. Marvin (z888) III N.Y. 423, 440.
166
1 67
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be performable there. 170 These additional factors, of course,
may also support the application of the law of the debt or
of the place of performance.
(iv) Lex loci solutionis. Finally, the Restatement intervenes on the ground of its theory that the place of performance always determines the person to whom performance is due. Consequently, this law, that is, the law governing performance of the original debt, determines whether
the debtor can effectively pay to the assignor ( § 3 54).
Such fragmentary rules at least indicate a tendency to
abandon the application of the law of the assignment to
this problem. Others have reached the same approach on
the general principle of lex loci solutionis, 171 which is the
normal judicial rule in Germany because this law would
generally govern the debt and effects of the assignment on
the debt.
( v) Rationale. The problems regarding the protection
of an innocent debtor are not solved adequately either by
the Germans, indiscriminately applying the law governing
the debt, 172 or by Beale's ubiquitous law of the place of
assignment. Take the simplest cases. Under the German
approach, an American debtor does not effectively pay
anywhere to any assignee without formal signification, if
the debt is governed by Argentine law as in the case of a
credit given by a bank in Buenos Aires. And according to
Beale, a French debtor in Paris may effectively pay to an
assignee if the latter purchased the claim in the United
States, contrary to French law which would not recognize
the payment.
170 Wishnick v. Preserves & Honey (1934) 275 N. Y. Supp. 420; cf.
CARNAHAN, Conflict of Laws and Life Insurance Contracts (1942) 433·
171
BATIFFOL 433 § 537; STUMBERG 235·
172 When 8 LAURENT 198, 200 § 131 declared that he did not understand
why the law of the debt should govern as to third persons, 2 BARSon. 1 (b)
replied that Laurent stayed in the dark, because he assumed a statute real of
a debt. But Bar and the other German writers have, in their turn, lumped
too many things together under the law of the debt.
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We should think, on the contrary, that existence of a
debt is one thing, transfer of a claim as an asset is another
thing, and sure identification of the actual creditor is something still different. The German provision that the debtor
may require a written instrument stating the assignment
is an example. From the Swiss requirement of written assignment, it follows that a debtor domiciled in Switzerland must
not pay without a written document or otherwise assuring
guarantee.
Certainly a debtor must know that the possibility of
foreign assignments imposes on him the risk incurred by
ignorance of foreign laws. But it is legitimate for his domiciliary law to mitigate his difficulties.
Forced by the conflicts situation, we may discover that
the principal rules in discussion are no part of the effects
of assignment with which the codes naturally associate them.
Recently, Judge Goodrich found that the privilege, if any,
of a second assignee having notified the debtor, "comes not
from his status as bona fide purchaser, but from his activities
following his belated assignment." 173 The situation is
changed after his assignment by a new event. We may say
that the legal systems, each in its way, modify the result of
their rules regulating assignment by a separate set of rules
regulating the conditions and effects of an excused ignorance
of these results by the debtor. It seems perfectly natural
to think of the law at the debtor's domicil as competent
to do so.
If, instead, the place of payment should be urged, it
is true that the question concerning the right of the debtor
to deposit the sum due in court or with a public office, differently treated by the laws, has the closest connection with
the mode of payment. 174 But the debtor may well have, in
In re Rosen (C. C. A. 3d 1946) 157 F. (2d) 997 at 1001.
For the law of the place of payment, WEISS, 4 Traite 398;
§ 311. For the Jaw of the debt, 2 ZITELMANN 399; WALKER 450.
173
174

DESPAGNET
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addition, a special right of deposit in the case of a pretended assignment, dependent on the law of his domicil.
More important, we should not forget that payment is
not the only subject of this class of rules, which includes
release, deferment of the time of performance, acquisition
of counterclaims against the assignor, the effect of judgments, etc. Likewise, the debtor may be entitled to deal
at any place with a pseudo assignee showing him a genuine
token or written instrument of assignment, with effect
against his true creditor. 175 At the same time, it may be seen
again, that all these are not incidents of the original contract
or of the assignment, to which they run counter.
It is true that the debtor may change his domicil whereas
he cannot unilaterally change the place of performance.
But the latter place is too often uncertain, 176 and has other
well-known drawbacks.
3· Priority of Assignees
(a) Municipal systems. Two opposite solutions are provided in the French and the German laws. In the former,
not until notification is the assignment perfected as against
all "third" parties, including the creditors of the assignor
and subsequent assignees from the assignor. Also the new
Italian Code seems to give absolute preference to the assignment first notified to the debtor or first accepted by the
latter by an act provided with a certain date. The German
Code simply perfects the transfer through the contract of
assignment; the assignee hence has a complete priority over
175 Cf., for instance, Restatement of Contracts §§ 166, 167, 170, 173; German Civil Code §§ 406-410.
176 In an interesting section of his work on Spendthrift Trusts (ed. 2,
1947) 114 § 113, GRISWOLD looks for a subsidiary conflicts rule for the application of the statutes restraining the beneficiary of a trust in disposing of
his interest in life insurance proceeds. He decides in favor of the place
where the proceeds are payable, but concedes that when the policy gives
no clear indication of this place, it is difficult to choose between the domicil
of the insurance company and the domicil of the beneficiary.
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all other pretenders. Consequently, if the debtor is discharged in good faith by payment to a subsequent purchaser,
really a pseudo assignee, the prior assignee is entitled to
recovery from the second on the ground of unjust enrichment.177
In the United States, there has been for a long time an
"irreconcilable conflict" on the question whether notification is necessary for the priority of an assignment. 178 The
federal courts, for a time, operating a separate doctrine of
"general law" in diverse citizenship cases did not require
notification, but reserved undetermined equitable exceptions
for a second assignee where notice was given only by the
latter. 179 At present, in the great majority of states, choses
in action are transferred by the agreement between assignor
and assignee, with full effect against all parties. Within this
group, however, there are differences. In particular, the
so-called "New York rule" agrees with the German conception, whereas according to the "Massachusetts rule" a
subsequent assignee may retain what he collects on the
ground of his notification. 180 The latter variant, adopted
by the Restatement on contracts is usually explained by the
assumption of negligence or estoppel on the part of the
prior assignee, which, however, is nonexistent in nonnotification financing.
The more suitable new statutes have adopted the methods
of filing in a public record, or notation in book accounts. 181
177 France: C. C. art. I69o; Germany: BGB. §§ 398, 408, 8r6 par. 2;
Italy: C. C. (I942) art. I265.
178 6 C. J. S. rr45, Assignment § 91. Cf. list for I923 in 264 U. S. I9I ns.
3 and 5; and see the article by KOESSLER, supra n. I3I.
1 79 Salem Trust Co. v. Manufacturer's Finance Co. (C. C. A. Ist I922)
280 Fed. 803; rev'd (I923) 264 U. S. I82. The decision is superseded by the
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Case (I938) 304 U. S. 64, also n. 8 in 3I8 U. S.
437; but has been mentioned more recently as representing the "federal
rule" expressed in Judson v. Corcoran (I854) I7 How. 6I2, by Chief Justice
Stone in McKenzie v. Irving Trust Co. (I945) 323 U.S. 365, 373·
180 See the articles by KOESSLER, and that by KUPFER and LIVINGSTON,
supra ns. I 30, I 3I.
181 Ibid.
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(b) Conflicts law. In the jurisdictions directing priority
among domestic claims by the test of notification, following
some idea of publicity, the competition of foreign-governed
claims is apparently subordinated to the same principle.
On the other hand, in the German type of system if the law
governing the first assignment recognizes its validity, the
subsequent transfers are ineffective. Beyond these partial
results, no certain conflicts rule is discoverable anywhere.
In an English decision, the place of the debtor was preferred to all other local connections, without any convincing
reason. 182 Some examination of the problem involved has
been occasioned by recent discussion in the United States
on the following subject.
(c) United States: Accounts receivable. The scarce authority includes two cases in which the parties to a security transfer of accounts receivable stipulated for the
law at the place of the financing bank, and in each case the
court disregarded this stipulation. In the extravagent decision by a federal district court in In re J7 ardaman Shoe
Company/ 83 it was held that such a clause could not be
opposed to the trustee in bankruptcy, he being "a stranger
to the contract." 184 The judge refers to the law of the
assignor's place as the situs of the debt. In the remarkable
decision in In re Rosen/ 85 Judge Goodrich eliminated the
agreement which most clearly referred to Pennsylvania law
for all rights of the parties, validity, construction, and
enforcement and "in all respects," for the reason that this
clause was part of the general arrangement of financing
and assigning, while the claims and even the contracts pro182 In re Queensland Mercantile & Agency Co. [ I89I] I Ch. 536, aff'd
[ I892] I Ch. 2I9·
183
(I942) 52 F. Supp. 562, 565.
184 See against this thesis, KUPFER and LIVINGSTON, supra n. 130, 32 Va. L.
Rev. (1946) at 917.
185
(C. C. A. 3d 1946) 157 F. (2d) 997, 999, aff'g (1946) 66 F. Supp. 174

on other motives.

VOLUNTARY ASSIGNMENT OF SIMPLE DEBTS 431
clueing them were not yet all in existence. This was contrasted with the actual transfer, not of the claims which
did not take place, but of the money collected by the debtor
bank. But it would seem that the court was moved rather
by the striking fact that routine had led the Philadelphia
bank to a stipulation for Pennsylvania law manifestly disastrous to its own interests in view of the notification requirement, 186 which was in force in Pennsylvania at that time and
was thereafter quickly repealed. 187 The pleadings themselves referred to the law of New Jersey, where the assignor
carried on his business and the debtors were domiciled. No
general conclusion against party disposition of the applicable
law should, hence, be inferred from either case.
The same two decisions, however, in pointing to the
assignor's place of business, provide us with a strong hint
respecting the needed rule in the absence of stipulation for
the applicable law. Thus far, every writer states that the
courts are very inconsistent in this matter. A qualified
observer has noted only with diffidence that the courts "confine their attention to the laws of either the borrower's
domicil or the lender's domicil." 188 The immense increase
of financing by assignment of existent and future business
accounts should be bolstered by an absolutely sure and
more adequate law.
The place of the debtor has, indeed, been unanimously
discarded in recent American legislation. "It is virtually
impossible to base a course of conduct upon the laws of
the states of domicile of the account-debtors because the
mechanical problems arising from any such theory of operation would be so complex as to be prohibitive." 189 This was
said against the Supreme Court decision in the Klauder
Id. at 998.
Pennsylvania: 69 Purdon's Stat. ( 1941) § 561.
188 MALCOLM, "Conflicts of Laws, Accounts Receivable," 30 Mass. L. Q.
( 1945) 38, 41.
189 MALCOLM, id. at 41.
186

187
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Case 190 and may likewise be objected to an old decision of
the German Supreme Court. 191 The place of the lending
bank192 has no visible merits either.
The only suitable contact of accounts receivable is with
the business place where the books are conducted. Two
American courts, long ago, understood this need. 193 In the
case of In re Rosen, the result reached was practically
identical through the consideration that assignor and debtor
made and had to perform their original contract in New
Jersey and the actual assignment wa!i to be localized there. 194
In In re Vardaman, the judge emphasized that the situs of
the debt was at the debtor's place of business, although he
pointed out that the result would not be different under the
law of the place where the assignment was executed. 195
The situation is finally clarified by the weight accorded
to recording or "book-marking" in the statutes. If these
publicity measures in the state of the assignor were merely
regarded as territorial, they would exclusively operate by .
public law within their jurisdiction. Such a theory would be
irreconcilable with Section 6o (a) of the Bankruptcy Act.
It is indispensable that these provisions should be respected
everywhere.
(d) Other assignments. The domicil of the assignor
should be competent to determine priority in all cases. This
is the true reason behind the situs doctrine.
Supra p. 419 n. 128.
RG. (March 23, 1897) 39 RGZ. 371, 374 f.
192 Thus, Note, "What Law Governs the Assignment of a Bank Account,"
40 H arv. L. Rev. ( 1927) 989, 993 ..
1 9 3 Trust Comp. v. Bulkeley Union (C. C. A. 6th 1906) 150 Fed. 510, and
the result agrees with Engelhard v. Schroeder (1920) 92 N. J. Eq. 663: the
parties resided in New Jersey, but the firm was in New York and New
York law was applied as lex loci contractus,
1 94 Supra n. 185.
1 95 52 F. Supp. 562, 565 f., supra n. 183.
190

1 91
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V.

CoNTACTs

The American doctrine overestimates the scope of the
law that may govern the assignment, and is obscure on the
scope of the law of the original debt. The German doctrine
commits the opposite, and worse, mistake of extending the
law of the debt, against reason, to the questions whether
the transfer may be "abstract," 196 what its form should
be, 197 whether the transfer requires notification to the debtor
or his knowledge, 198 at what time it may take place/ 99
whether future and conditional claims are assignable, 200
and connected problems. 201
These two best developed systems, furthermore, contrast
in emphasis; Americans stress the actual transfer of a
chose in action, Germans, the underlying relationship causing the transfer. Without doubt, it is desirable to have one
conflicts rule covering the entire relationship between assignor and assignee, particularly in view of the theory prevailing in the majority of systems that an assignment is
not valid without a valid promise to assign.
From these premises, we reach the following conclusions.
Assignee-debtor. The law governing the debt (by no
means necessarily the law of the place of contracting) determines the rights and obligations between assignee and
debtor, excepting the provisions respecting a debtor ignoring the assignment in good faith.
Assignor-assignee. Where assignor and assignee are domiciled in one jurisdiction and there enter into both the agreement to assign and the assignment, this determines the law
in every opinion. Judge Learned Hand's proposal to subject
272; RAAPE 277.
273; RAAPE 277.
271.
273 § 332.
200 BG. (Feb. 24, 1915) 41 BGE. II 132.
201 LEWALD §§ 333, 334·
196 LEWALD

197 LEWALD
19 8 LEWALD
199 LEWALD
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voluntary assignments to the formula lex loci contractus
contemplated precisely this situation. 202
In the rare cases where promise and transfer occur at
different places, the analogy to sales of chattels and also
due regard to the interests of third persons in intangible
things that have no visible situs, give prime consideration
to the actual transfer. The American theory is right also on
this point.
Where assignor and assignee are domiciled in different
jurisdictions, the old idea that the debt is located at the
assignor's domicil furnishes the most convincing test for the
relationship between the parties to the assignment. 203
This same test has been in particular deduced above from
the needs of a transfer of accounts receivable for security,
and more generally as the most advisable criterion for
determining the priority of successive assignments by the
original creditor.
Debtor's protection. With respect to the protection of a
bona fide debtor, a third rule is desirable. The law of his
domicil should determine the conditions and effects of his
dealing with a person whom he is entitled to believe his
creditor, although this person is not really his creditor. This
contact, used by French and Dutch courts, is preferable to
the law of the place of performance indicated in the Restatement ( §§ 3 53, 3 54) , a place often uncertain or left to the
option of the creditor. Above all, the statutes are more or
less understood to intend the protection of their domiciliaries and must be applied accordingly, if unnecessary
conflicts are to be avoided.
2o2 New England Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Spence (C. C. A. 2d 1939)
104 F. (2d) 665, 125 A. L. R. 1281, CHEATHAM, Cases 804.
2oa With regard to the assignment of an insurance claim, the same opinion
is suggested as a matter of course by BRUCK, Privatversich. R. ( 1930) 722.
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Other Transfers of Simple Debts
I.
1.

TRANSFER OF CLAIMS BY LAw

Subrogation by Law1

UBROGATION, the substitution by law of one who
pays a debt in place of the creditor, is related to the
voluntary assignment which a third party satisfying
the creditor may be entitled to request instead of discharge.
For instance, a surety paying the creditor may demand such
assignment under Roman law (beneficium cedendarum
actionum). In fact, the analogy between such compulsory
"voluntary" assignment and immediate transfer by force
of law (or judicial proceedings) is rather close. Subrogation is merely a technical improvement in the interest of
the payor securing his position, particularly in the case of
the creditor's insolvency. Because of this functional similarity, the modern codes declare the rules of assignment
applicable by analogy to the legal transfer of claims. 2
Whether the effect of a subrogation is a clear succession
to the title or the practical equivalent, e.g., acquisition of
the right of collection, is of no concern for our purpose.
It follows for the conflict of laws that subrogation is to
be governed by the same law under which the payor might
demand assignment of the debt. This is the law governing
the contractual or legal relationship between the payor

S

1 Comparative municipal law: WENGLER, "Surrogation," 6 Rechtsvergl.
Handworterbuch (1938) 460, 483 ff. {subrogation of a person).
Conflicts Jaw: GULDENER 125 ff.
2 Germany: BGB. § 412.
Switzerland: C. Obi. art. 166.
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and the creditor, not the law governing the principal debt.
Courts have sensed this better than some writers.
Illustration. Bales of Swedish cellulose, consigned to the
Snia Viscosa Company in Milano, Italy, sank in Holland in
fluvial transportation by a Swiss carrier. The buyer had
insured the loss in Italy with Italian insurers and recovered
from them. The insurers were allowed to take recourse
against the Swiss carrier. Although the claim of the insured
against the carrier was governed by Swiss law, this claim
was transferred by subrogation to the insurer according to
the Italian Commercial Code, then in force, article 438 paragraph I. This provision did not restrict subrogation to tort
actions as the Swiss law on insurance contracts, article 72,
does. Swiss BG. (May 7, 1948) 74 BGE. II 81, 88.
Where, for instance, a surety pays to the creditor, it is
the task of the law governing suretyship, 3 and not of the
law governing the principal debt, 4 to determine whether
the surety has to demand assignment before paying, or
acquires the claim by virtue of the payment. This law includes conditions and effects, although the transfer of
accessory rights thereby involved, according to the situation, may require additional consultation of other laws. 5
Similarly, it has been held in Germany that a Belgian by
paying customs duties to the Belgian state according to
Belgian law, acquired the right of that state, effective in the
German bankruptcy of the debtor. 6
The law of the principal debt, of course, determines the
transferability of the debt. 7 The tendency of the German
and Swiss doctrine to enlarge the role of this law, inconsistent with what is plainly suitable here, has nevertheless
3
See particularly German RG. (April 23, I903) 54 RGZ. 3II, 3I6;
LETZGUS, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (I929) 849; BATIFFOL 425 n. 6 § 54I and Traite 62I
§ 628; DoMKE, Clunet I938, 4I7; ARMIN JON, Droit Int. Pr. Com. 485 § 293·
4 Thus 2 ZITELMANN 394; NEUMEYER, lPR. 29.
5 See PILLET, I Traite I76 for the problems; RILLING, supra Ch. 47 n. I,
76•79·
6 OLG. Hamm (April 27, I9I2) 23 Z.int.R. (I9I3) 358, Revue I9I4 460.
1
7 I FIORE § 196; 2 ROLIN § 979·
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influenced a decision of the Swiss Federal Tribunal8 and its
commentators.
A German engineer employed by the Swiss federal railroads was injured in the Swiss service and awarded compensation by the German board of accident insurance.
According to the German law of social insurance, the tort
claim against the Swiss railroads passed automatically
to the German board. The Federal Tribunal acknowledged
this effect of the law governing the relation between injured
and payor, considering under Swiss law that the tort debt
also was assignable and that although the debt was not
ipso jure transferred to the social insurance office, the institution of subrogation was familiar. From this decision,
writers have inferred the proviso that the law governing
the transfer can operate only if the law of the debt recognizes the transfer. 9
Even this restricted reference to the debtor's law is unnecessary and confusing. It suffices that under the law
governing the debt, it can be transferred to any other person. If it is transferable, the debtor has no justifiable interest in the form and the modalities of the transfer, and
still less has the law of the debt any bearing.
The wrong approach was followed by a Dutch decision
in an analogous case. Two German postal officials serving on
through trains were injured in accidents on Dutch territory
and pensioned under the German social security scheme.
The Appeals Court of Amsterdam rejected the recourse of
the German board against the Dutch railroads, because
Dutch law did not acknowledge subrogation in analogous
cases and therefore the tort obligation was satisfied by the
8

BG. (Feb. 28, 1913) 39 BGE. II 77, 2 Praxis 171.
LEWALD 277 § 336, followed by RAAPE, 2 D. IPR. 278, 295 (the German
law can only order the transfer and it was up to the Swiss law to carry
it out) ; M. WoLFF, IPR. 95 and Priv. Int. Law 555 § 518. GuLDENER 139
even criticizes the decision because it should have applied only Swiss law.
9
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award of pensions granted by the board to discharge its
own liability.10
This naive reasoning overlooks the entire modern development of concurrence of debts where the ultimate loss
falls on one codebtor. In the conflicts field, it demonstrates
the mistake of allowing the law of the debt to interfere.
A different answer is contained in a French decision. 11
A Dutch car owner, insured against fire with an English
company, lost the car in a fire at a French garage. The
company paid the damage to the owner and recovered from
the garage company. The insurance contract was deemed
to be governed by Dutch law and produced legal subrogation (Dutch C. Com. article 284) at the time of the payment. The French-governed obligation of the garage company was ascertained as soon as plaintiff showed himself
to be regularly subrogated under Dutch law. This result
conforms to our own conclusions, but the court based it on
obscure reasoning and the alleged rule for "quasi contracts"
that the law of the place of the generating fact, that is, of
the payment, governs. 12
Likewise, in another case involving insurance against
risks of carriage, a New Y ark insurance company was
recognized as subrogated to the insured because it had paid
the client in France and subrogation at that time had become known to French law. 13 If the lawyers concerned had
cared to consult the law of New Y ark, they would probably
have reasoned otherwise.
Considering the great and ever-increasing importance of
subrogation in modern relationships, its fate cannot be
Hof Amsterdam (April 12, 1921) N. J. 1922, 8oi.
App. Riom (Jan. 29, 1932) Gaz. Pal. 1932.1.707, Revue gen. des assurances terrestres 1932, 295 with note by PERROULD.
12 See PERROULD, ibid., and contra, supra p. 368.
13 Trib. civ. Seine (Jan. z, I 935) Revue gen. des assurances terrestres
1935, 346 and note by PERROULD, also approved by PICARD et BESSON, I Traite
624 § 305.
10

11
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reasonably made dependent on the accidental place of payment. Subrogation flows from the law governing the underlying obligation, 14 which we have found also to influence
the law granting recovery of unjust enrichment. Where, for
instance, an injured driver of an automobile has released
the tortfeaser but cashed the insurance money, he is bound
to refund this money, according to American views. 15 How
could this rest on the law of the place of the payment?
The relationship insurer-insured dominates the entire
problem.
In the case of accident insurance, we have found earlier
that a direct action by the injured party against the insurer,
when granted by the law of the place of the accident, ought
to be allowed elsewhere. 16 It is added here that if the insured
has been satisfied by the insurer, their relationship determines the transfer of the tort action.
This would also seem to furnish the right solution to the
recent controversy whether an insurer against liability is
subrogated in a claim based on the Federal Tort Claims
Act of 1946, 17 which assimilates the United States as wrongdoer to private persons. The Act presupposes that an individual in an identical case would be liable under the law
of the place where the loss or damage occurred. It is entirely
unjustified to require another federal law to extend the right
to sue especially to a subrogee. 18 At least one circuit court
14 This should be true even in a system where subrogation, e.g., of the
insurer, is merely based on the law plus the payment, in minimizing the
(insurance) contract, as in the doctrine of the Italian courts on the ground
of former C. Com. art. 438, see Cass. Ita!. (Feb. 19, 1937) 39 Dir. Marit.
(1937) 80 and note by BERLINGIERI.
15 See on this and related questions, BILLINGs, "The Significance of Subrogation in Automobile Insurance Practice," Ins. L. J, 1948, 707.
16 See Vol. II p. 263.
17 6o Stat. 842 § 41o(a), 28 U.S. C.§ 931 (a). See BRENTON, "The Case
for Subrogees under the Federal Tort Claims Act," Ins. L. J. 1948, z89.
18 Thus, as claimed by the government and sustained in several decisions
dismissing actions by insurers, Old Colony Ins. Co. v. United States (D. C.
S. D. Ohio 1949) 74 F. Supp. 723; Cascade City, Mont. v. U. S. (D. C.
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has recognized the subrogation. 19 Where a transferable
claim arises from the tort according to the law of the place
of wrong, its transfer to the insurer by operation of law
depends simply on the law governing the insurance contract.
One difficult problem should be briefly noted. Subrogation as respects the same debt is often granted by statute
to persons differing in their relationships to the debtor.
For instance, it has been discussed in Germany that the Code
entitles a surety paying the creditor to avail himself of a
mortgage securing the debt, 20 but the Code also subrogates
the owner of the mortgaged property if he is not the
principal debtor to the creditor, apparently including the
right against the surety. 21 Can such owner recover from
the surety? Is this a question of who first manages to pay?
Or is it a case of equal distribution? Prevailing German
opinion has recognized that the surety's position is superior;
he may recover from the owner but the latter cannot recover
from him. 22
Analogous delicate questions have been raised in the
United States; 23 some judicial decisions have been justifiably
criticized. Thus, a tortfeasor without doubt is responsible
to the subrogated insurer. Hence, in the better opinion, the
insurer of one of two tortfeasors may recover from the
other tortfeasor half of what he pays to the injured party. 2 !
An employer paying compensation to an employee ought to
Mont. 1947) 75 F. Supp. 85o; Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. U. S. (D. C. E. D.
N.Y. 1948) 76 F. Supp. 333·
19
Employer's Fire Ins. Co. v. U. S. (C. C. A. 9th 1948) 167 F. (2d) 655
reversing Rusconi v. U. S. (D. C. S. D. Cal. 1947) 74 F. Supp. 669.
20
BGB. §§ 774, 412, 401.
21
BGB. §§ 1143, 1249, 412, 401.
22
STROHAL, 61 Jherings Jahrb. (1912) 59 ff.; RG., 76 Seuff. Arch. 135.
In Austria followed by 2 EHREN ZWEIG I § 293 and n. 36; 2 id. 2 § 3 II n. 20.
23 LANGMAID, "Some Recent Subrogation Problems in the Law of Suretyship and Insurance," 47 Harv. L. Rev. ( 1934) 976, also in Legal Essays in
Tribute to Orrin Kip McMurray (1935) 245·
24 LANGMAID, id. 998 (264) against decisions.
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have recourse against the insurer of a workman's accident. 25
Other cases are more doubtful.
In conflicts law, the difficulty is increased at least in the
cases, probably infrequent, where the persons potentially
entitled to subrogation enter into the connection independently of each other.
However, modern legal science ought to solve the municipal problem in a uniform manner, establishing a gradation of liabilities, preliminary to the rank of rights subject
to subrogation.
Other Transfers by Law

2.

"Provision." 26 The only topic ordinarily attracting attention in the Continental literature on this subject has been
the transfer of the so-called "provision" to the successive
endorsees of a bill of exchange under French law and those
following the French doctrine. The rights to funds covering
the draft and belonging to the drawer, including obligatory
rights such as claims or credits due him by the drawee, are
transferred to the payee by the negotiation of the bill and
successively to the endorsees with every further endorsement. 27 But this means only that the holder of the bill is
entitled to such claims as the drawer may happen to have
against the drawee at the time of maturity to the extent of
the amount indicated in the bill. Text and construction make
it clear that this is not an ordinary implied assignment; it
does not necessarily have a present object and does not
25

LANGMAID, id. 1007 (272) against decisions.
Basic: ERNST E. HIRSCH, Der Rechtsbegriff Provision im franziisischen
und internationalen Wechselrecht ( 1930) 146 If.
27 France: C. Com. art. 116, as amended by Law of Feb. 8, 1922.
Italy: Law No. 48 of Jan 15, 1934, art. 1.
Scotland: British Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, s. 53 (2).
The problem was discussed formerly in American courts but has been
liquidated by the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act, § 127, cf. 5 U. L. A.
§ 127, and for the distinction of transactions to be observed, Guggenhime &
Co. v. Lamantia (1929) 207 Cal. 96, 99, 276 Pac. 995·
26
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prevent the drawer from disposing of the funds before
maturity. Hence, it is a transfer created and peculiarly conditioned by law. And this law is correctly and prevailingly
identified with that governing the creation of the bill of
exchange, which is, in the predominant opinion, rightly or
wrongly, the law of the place of issue. 28 That this law also
should intervene in transferring the right of cover from one
endorsee to the other, although the endorsement is governed by the law of its own place, has seemed impossible
to some dissenters, 29 while the German courts look for
circumstances suggesting a tacit assignment of the accessory
right. 30
The prevailing simple solution was inserted in the Geneva
Convention of 1930, 31 adopting the controversial rule that
rights once acquired by the first endorsee pass to each
successor, without regard to the respective rule of the place
of endorsement, and that such rights correspondingly revert
in the case of recourse for nonpayment. Of course, the
drawee has his normal defenses against any transferee;
this is no exception to the rule.
2s HIRSCH, supra n. 26, at 162.
France: Cass. civ. (Feb. 6, 1900) S. 1900.1.161, Clunet 1900, 6os; 4 LvoNCAEN et RENAULT§ 644.
Italy: CAVAGLIERI, Dir. Int. Com. 373 ff.
Germany: OLG. Kolmar, decisions cited by HIRSCH, supra n. 26, 168, 170.
Contrarily, in Illinois cases, before the uniform law, the law of the place
of payment has been applied. National Bank of America v. Indiana Banking
Co. ( r885) II4 IJI. 483, 2 N. E. 401 concerning a check, in which case there
are doubts on the correct localization, see HIRSCH, supra n. 26, at 154· Abt v.
The American Trust & Savings Bank (1896) 159 Ill. 467, 42 N. E. 856
(draft).
29 DIENA, 3 Dir. Com. Int. §§ 217, 223; GAETANO ARANGIO-RUIZ, "La
cambiale nel diritto interna2ionale privato," 12 Studi di diritto internazionale (Milano 1946) 238, arguing on the analogy of voluntary assignment; see for other writings, GULDENER 50 f.
30 RG. (March 19, 1907) 65 RGZ. 357, and other decisions, see HIRSCH,
supra n. 26, at 168 ff.
81 Convention for the Settlement of Certain Conflicts of Laws in connection with Bills of Exchange etc., art. 6: "The question whether there has
been an assignment to the holder of the debt which has given rise to the
issue of the instrument is determined by the Jaw of the place where the
instrument was issued." HuosoN, 5 Int. Legislation 554·
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The connection with the doctrine of negotiable instru·
ments justifies this solution which, in itself, would be ex·
orbitant.
A General Rule? Some statutes, that of Texas being ap·
parently the last left in this country, provide that the beneficial interest of a spouse granted him in an insurance on the
life of the other spouse automatically returns to the grantor
in the event of divorce. In an older case, such effect of a
Hawaiian divorce decree was disregarded in California in
a matter of jurisdiction. 82 In another case, it was held that
the law governing the insurance determines whether the
right of the beneficiary is lost by a divorce. 33 But more
recently, the Second Federal Circuit Court decided by a
majority that the designation of the wife as beneficiary in
an insurance contract made in New York state, giving an
irrevocable right under New York law, was destroyed as
an effect of divorce in Texas where the spouses had moved.
Judge Learned Hand based this decision on a general rule;
he held that there was no reason why a legal transfer should
not be subject to the same conflicts rule as a voluntary
assignment, and thus to the law of the place of assignment,
which he assumed should govern. 34 That this rule should
sanction the surprising effect of the exorbitant Texas rule
on a right irrevocable under a New York insurance contract,
has been convincingly criticized. 35 In the rule itself, the
reference to the mechanical law of the place of assignment
should be eliminated. Apart from this, however, it may be
contended that an expropriation of a debt does not depend
32 McGrew v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y. (1901) 132 Cal. 85, 64 Pac.
103, criticized by 2 BEALE 1254 because the woman and the policy had been
under the jurisdiction of the Hawaiian court from the beginning.
33 Pendleton v. Great Southern L. I. Co. (1929) 135 Okla. 40, 273 Pac.
1007; 2 BEALE 1212 n. 2.
34 New England Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Spence (C. C. A. 2d 1939) 104 F.
(2d) 665.
36 See Clark, J., dissenting opinion id. 668 If.; Note, 49 Yale L. J. (1939)
335·
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upon the permission of the law governing the debt, unless
the right is personal. But the local contacts appropriate in
this matter can scarcely be stated in terms of one simple conflicts rule. 36
II.

TRANSFER OF LIABILITY 37

The most important situations involving a change of
debtor occur in connection with inheritance and transfer
of an enterprise, 38 both of which belong primarily to the
doctrines of property.
By voluntary act of the debtor, an individual debt cannot
be transferred to another debtor without the creditor's
assent. He can, where his duty is not strictly personal, accept
the promise of another person to perform the duty. 39 Such
assumption by agreement, taken as merely constituting a
relation between the debtor and his substitute (the expromissor) participates in the law of the sale, lease, or other
transaction in which it is included, or may be subject to an
independent law.
Modern laws, however, have brought forth various institutions resulting in the addition of a new debtor ( "cumulative" assumption of liability), or the replacement of the
old by the new debtor ("privative" assumption of liability).
In the latter case, the idea that the new promisor succeeds
in place of the old obligor without any other change of the
substance of the obligation and its accessories, is more or
less developed. Whereas the German Civil Code has estab36 LETZGUS, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (I929) 852; GULDENER III ff.; RILLING, supra
Ch. 47 n. I, 71.
37 BRINER, "Die Schuldiibernahme im Schweizerischen Internationalprivatrecht," 127 N. F. Ziircher Beitrlige zur Rechtswissenschaft ( I947).
38 RG. (March 27, I905) 15 Z.int.R. (I905) 306 does not contribute much:
a German bought a business in England taking over all assets and liabilities;
the obligations arising have been naturally subjected to English law.
39 This is what is usually termed assignment of liability; 7 HALSBURY
302 § 420; Restatement of Contracts § I6o (3); German BGB. § 329: "Erfiillungsiibernahme"; Swiss C. Obi. art. 175: usually termed "Interne Schuldiibernahme."
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lished a fullfledged succession in the debt by agreement of
the new promisor either with the creditor, or with the old
debtor plus consent of the creditor, 40 the French doctrine, in
the absence of sufficient provisions of the Code, has approached the desired results by adjusting institutions like
novation, delegation, third-party contracts. 41 In the United
States, direct action by the creditor against the new debtor
has been provided by using novation and reducing the new
obligation to the conditions and amount of the original
liability, 42 or by construing the creditor as the beneficiary
of the assignment of liability, 43 or under certain conditions
by operation of law. 44
Again, in the German doctrine, the law of the original
debt has been applied to determine conditions and effects
of the acts and agreements in question. 45

Illustration. Two women, domiciled nationals of Czechoslovakia, purchased in 1922 a house in Dresden, and by
agreement assumed personal liability on a debt secured
by a mortgage. Although they discharged it by payment in
depreciated marks, they were held subject to the German
law of revalorization, because the debt was governed by
German law. Their domicil, important under other circumstances, was considered immateriaU 6
4 0 Germany: BGB. §§ 414, 415: "Schuldiibernahme"; Switzerland: C. Obi.
art. 176; Mexico: C. C. ( 1928) art. 2051: cesi6n de deudas.
41 PLANIOL et RIPERT, 7 Traite Pratique §§ 1142-1145; cf. in the Italian
C. C. ( 1942) arts. 1272, 1273.
42 Restatement of Contracts §§ 427, 428; WILLISTON, 3 Contracts § 1865.
43 Restatement of Contracts §§ 13 5, 136; CaRBIN, "Contracts for the Benefit
of Third Persons," 46 Law Q. Rev. ( 1930) 12.
44 Restatement of Contracts § 164. See in particular, GRISMORE, "Is the
Assignee of a Contract Liable for the Non-Performance of Delegated
Duties?", 18 Mich. L. Rev. (1920) 284, 287 ff.
45 Germany: RG. (June 13, 1932) JW. 1932, 3810; WALKER 494·
Switzerland: 2 SCHNITZER 532.
46 RG. (Oct. 17, 1932) IPRspr. 1932 No. 34· NusSBAUM, D. IPR. 267. The
case of assumption of a mortgage debt on the occasion of purchase of land,
specifically regulated in BGB. § 416, has been simply subjected to lex situs
by RG. (March 22, 1928) JW. 1928, 1447, but the mortgage debt is not
necessarily under lex situs, cf. 2 BEALE 946 and n. 7·
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But, quite as a promise of suretyship and an assignment
of right, any agreement introducing a new promisor of the
original debt, has an independent existence. A proper law
governing it may follow from a stipulation for the applicable
law or be inferred from the circumstances. As in the other
types of transactions mentioned, of course, the law governing the original debt is presumably the most closely connected law. 47
To presume, to the contrary, that the new promise should
be governed by the law of the domicil of the new promisor,
as the Swiss Federal Tribunal has done, 48 is an instance of
exaggerated emphasis on the debtor's domicil.
The law governing the original debt, it is true, determines whether the original debtor is discharged. But even
when the new promise is governed by another law, practical
difficulties are improbable since discharge and new promise
are essentially connected, by one or the other construction,
m every legal system. 49
III.

NovATION

The problem may be illustrated by adding foreign elements to an American case :50
Sharp had a contract with the baker Voight to deliver
flour. Voight sold his bakery to Mansre and notified Sharp
that he had to deal exclusively with the successor. Sharp
acknowledged this letter and wrote Mansre insisting on
47 This view was propounded by 2 ZITELMANN 395 2 FRANKENSTEIN 268,
1
although they postulated the personal laws of the two debtors and complicated the problem by their formulations.
In cases where the buyer of land has assumed the mortgage debt, the lex
situs may reasonably apply; thus the German RG. (Jan. u, 1887) 4 Bolze
No. 22, and the Austrian OGH. (June 26, 1930) JW. 1931, 635.
48 Swiss BG. (Nov. n, 1941) 41 Bl. f. Ziirch. Rspr. 100 reported by
BRINER, supra n. 37, 56, dealing with cumulative assumption of liability,
but apparently applicable "a fortiori" to transactions freeing the original
obligor, see BRINER, supra n. 37, at 68.
49 See on these problems, M. WoLFF, IPR. 95; BRINER, supra n. 37, 44 f.
5o Manfre v. Sharp (1930) 210 Cal. 479, 292 Pac. 465.
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strict compliance with the contract terms. But later Sharp
demanded cash payments and in their absence refused delivery. The court held that by his letters Sharp discharged
the old contract totally and substituted a new contract of
analogous content with Mansre. The court preferred the
view that the old contract was rescinded to construing a
novation as some courts would have done.

If Sharp should be in state X and Voight in state Y and
the laws of X and Y differ on the question of interpreting
the intention of the parties or on a presumption of survival
of the original debt, which law governs? The problem has
come up in Europe in the case of the peculiar Swiss certificate of deficiency issued to a creditor who has not been
satisfied because of the debtor's insolvency. This certificate
creates a new title for enforcement, not subject to limitation
of time. 51 A French court has termed this transformation
a novation. 52 In a Swiss case, the creditor of a French-governed debt claimed that the amount originally expressed
in French francs was transformed by novation into Swiss
francs as of the time when the certificate was issued. The
French currency had declined afterwards. The Federal
Tribunal, however, stated that the conversion of the sum
had been made merely for the purpose of the first enforcement. It was then asked whether the fact that the defendant
had consented to the conversion at the time created a contract of novation in favor of the amount in Swiss francs
appearing in the certificate. The court denied this under
Swiss law, held applicable either as that of the assumed place
of contracting or as that intended by the parties. 53
The agreement, thus, was subjected to an independent
law rather than to the (French) law governing the principal
debt. But the problem concerned the interpretation of the
51 Switzerland: A Federal Enforcement and Bankruptcy Act, art. 149
par. 5; on the international force of the imprescriptibility, see infra p. 516.
5 2 App. Colmar (May 31, 1933) Revue Crit. 1934, 468.
5 3 BG. (June 3, 1947) 73 BGE. II 1oz, 105.
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agreement of the parties, not the permissibility of novation.
Since novation is known in practice to every system, the
Swiss solution is obviously correct in the case at bar of an
agreement between the two original parties to the obligation.
More complicated cases may cause doubts. But it may
be generally said that the extinguishing effect depends on
the law of the debt, although the new obligation is governed
by its own law, 54 that may or may not be identical with the
first. It is important that we should treat all transactions
modifying an obligation under analogous principles, since
they are overlapping and varying in the different systems.
IV.

JURISDICTION FOR GARNISHMENT55

Although enforcement of a claim is a topic of adjective
law, forcible satisfaction of money obligations by resort to
obligatory claims against third persons is frequently included in treatises on conflicts law. Certain problems of
jurisdiction present international interest and have influenced other important subject matters, such as war seizures.
Close historical and systematic connections with the traditional situs doctrines are evident.
However, this exceptional discussion of a jurisdictional
and procedural subject merely involves the transfer, for
the purpose of execution, of a debt from the creditor to
his own creditor. This includes seizure of the debt only so
far as it is preparatory to this transfer. We are not dealing
with attachment in any other function, such as founding
54 PILLET, 2 Traite 214, generally followed. A similar contrast between
the effect of discharging the old and creating a new obligation is made with
respect to deeds and judgments, see M. WoLFF, Priv. Int. Law 559 § 524,
subjects not to be dealt with here. Private autonomy is recognized by ROLIN,
2 Principes §§ 989 ff., DESPAGNET § 313; its limitation, 2 ARMIN JON § 156.
55 BEALE, "The Exercise of Jurisdiction In Rem to Compel Payment of a
Debt" 27 Harv. L. Rev. ( 1913) 107; RHEIN STEIN, "Die inliindische Bedeutung einer ausliindischen Zwangsvollstreckung in Geldforderungen," 8 Z.ausl.
PR. ( 1934) 277; RABEL, "Situs Problems etc.," II Law and Cont. Probl.
(1945) u8, 126, infra n. 79·

OTHER TRANSFERS OF SIMPLE DEBTS

449

jurisdiction or as a conservatory measure, despite the historical and practical connections between these institutions.
Orderly garnishment procet::dings (as contrasted with
interim proceedings for conservatory 56 purposes) should
consist in a desirable system of three phases. The garnishee
would be (I) forbidden to pay his debt to his creditor,
the original debtor; he would be ( 2) finally ordered to
pay it to the garnishor; and (3) the original debtor would
at least be duly notified of any measure that may affect his
interests.
If appropriate international co-operation existed, these
three steps could be carried out conveniently even though
two or three countries were involved. Such harmony, however, is far from being established, and not even within
the United States is the justified postulate achieved, expressed by Stumberg, that the proceedings should be conducted against both the creditor and the debtor in their
respective jurisdictions. 57
I.

Domicil of the Original Debtor

As things stand, the old idea that a claim is situated at
the domicil of the creditor and therefore must be attached
there, is often recognized in domestic law but is rarely
observed in taking jurisdiction for garnishment. Some states
of the Union seem still exclusively to permit garnishment at
the domicil of the original debtor. 58 The Swiss courts, considering a debt situated at the place of the creditor's domicil,
56 As to this latter, the older Continental tendency connected with the
situs theory regarding the court at the creditor's domicil as the competent
forum {see also Chirkasky v. Pride, 41 Harv. L. Rev. {1927) 924), has been
given up. The forum makes its jurisdictional rules freely and largely, c/.
ANZILOTTI, Rivista 1')08, 180.
57 STUMBERG 104.
58 Louisville and N. R. Co. v. Nash {1897) u8 Ala. 477, 23 So. 825;
STUMBERG 102 n. 33 adds: "cf. apparently in accord, Beasley v. LennoxHaldeman Co. (1902) u6 Ga. 13, 42 S. E. 385; Bullard and Hoagland v.
Chaffee (1900) 61 Neb. 83, 84 N. W. 6o4; cf. 38 C. J. S. 338 § 125.
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take jurisdiction when the original debtor is domiciled in
the forum/ 9 and also when he is domiciled abroad and the
garnishee is domiciled in the forum ;60 but as a recent decision has made clear, garnishment is ordered only under
the condition that official notification to the debtor by letter
rogatory is effected. 61
Most systems, at present, localize the debt in connection
with the debtor's debtor rather than with the original debtor.
They disagree, however, on the exact localization: whether
the domicil of the garnishee or the place where he can personally be sued.
2.

The Garnishee's Domicil

In the prevailing Continental doctrine, it is recognized
by tradition from the statutists that the situs of a debt for
the purpose of executive attachment is at the domicil of
the debtor.
France. This proposition has found its clearest expression in France. 62 The reasoning rests on the old twofold
ground that the court at the debtor's domicil has general
jurisdiction over him (actor sequitur forum rei) and that
his movable assets, the objects of enforcement, are deemed
to be assembled there (mobilia ossibus inhaerent). Modern
authors know that to speak of situs is figurative but add
that the domicil is the most readily ascertainable of all
places involved.
The French Court of Cassation has rigorously carried
59 BG. (Dec. 9, 1930) 56 BGE. III 228, 230 referring to 53 id. III 45 and
citations.
60 The older decisions of the Federal Tribunal on jurisdiction for attachment, up to (March n, 1930) 56 BGE. III 49, so, recognizing this, have been
interpreted as including garnishment; see 2 SCHNITZER 660 n. 71, but really
deal with provisional attachment.
61 BG. (Feb. 20, 1942) 68 BGE. III 10, 14.
6 2 WEiss, 4 Traite 430; GLASSON, MoREL et TISSIER, 4 Traite de procedure civile (ed. 3, 1925-36) 1166; LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE (ed. 4) 443
§ 357·
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out this theory in international relations. On the subject of
executive attachment and garnishment (saisie-arret and
saisie-execution), it maintains that the court of the garnishee's domicil has exclusive jurisdiction for seizing the
debt. If the original debtor is domiciled in France but the
garnishee is domiciled abroad, no French court has jurisdiction, just as in the case of seizure of other property situated
in a foreign country. 63 In a part of the literature, the situs
theory is even taken more literally and either explained
by a statute real 64 or anchored in the territorial nature of
enforcement. 65
Germany. Section 23 of the German Code of Civil Procedure on jurisdiction, construed by the courts as a general
principle for the situs of debts, localizes debts at the
debtor's domicil. On this basis, jurisdiction in attachment
and garnishment 66 is assumed when the garnishee has his
domicil in the forum; this excludes recognition of foreign
jurisdiction even at the domicil of the original debtor. 67
Correspondingly, a garnishment at the domicil of the garnishee in a foreign country is recognized, 68 when it is not
in conflict with a domestic measure. 69
63 Cass. civ. {May u, 1931) S. 1932.1.137, D. 1933.1.60; Cour Paris (Dec.
13, 1932) Clunet 1934, 1207. Consequently, courts in Alsace have assumed
jurisdiction at the domicil of the garnishee, applying their own local civil
procedure differing from the French; see App. Colmar (March 23, 1938)
Koechlin v. Risacher, 19 Rev. Juridique d'Alsace et de Lorraine (1938) 587.
On jurisdiction in the Netherlands, see PoLENAAR, Procesrecht (1937)
273 ff., 83.
64 See LEREBOURS-PIGEONNillRil § 357, criticizing this theory because local
sovereignty, rather than the statute real, is respected.
65 NIBOYET, Note, S. 1932.1.137·
66 "Forderungspfiindung" and ""Oberweisung," the latter either as assignment at the nominal sum in lieu of payment (an Zahlungsstatt) or for collection ( zur Einziehung), ZPO. §§ 829, 83 5·
67 REICHEL, "Internationale Forderungspfiindung," 131 Arch. Civ. Prax.
(1929) 293· Cf. RG. (June 2, 1923) 107 RGZ. 44, 46 (on war seizures).
68 RG. (Oct. 12, 1895) 36 RGZ. 355: the debt is situated not at the place
of performance in Germany, but at the domicil of the {debtor's) debtor
either in Rumania or in Vienna; RG. (June 18, 1907) 63 Seuff. Arch. 41
No. 27: the debt is situated in Switzerland at the domicil of the debtor's
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Where the garnishee is domiciled abroad but the original
debtor has his domicil in the forum, in one opinion the
forum on grounds of comity should not render a garnishment order; this would even violate international law. 70
This opinion has been rejected. 71 In the prevailing view
confirmed by the Reichsgericht, the order, notified to the
original debtor, is valid within the forum if notice can be
served on the garnishee within the forum or abroad. 72 This
service, however, is an essential part of the proceedings,
the efficacy of which therefore normally depends upon the
co-operation of the foreign state, which is not likely to be
granted. 73
The guaranties provided in the domestic sphere to safeguard the interests of all parties involved are deficient in
the international field. Res judicata and the effects of notice
of suit to a third party and of failure to give such notice
usually are not effective beyond the borders of the state
where garnishment is sought or, on the other hand, the
debtor is in litigation with the garnishor or the garnishee. 74
This may or may not be in the interest of the various parties.
Remarkably, in the United States, the emphasis on the
domicil of the garnishee has had some following. 75
debtor and subject to the local power of enforcement. RG. (May 16, 1933)
140 RGZ. 340 restates energetically the principle.
Austria: J urisdictionsnorm § 99 par. 2.
69STEIN-}ONAS, ZPO. § 829 I 3·
70 See HUGO KAUFMANN, JW. 1929, 416; KG. (April 5, 1929) JW. 1929,
2360.
71 JoNAS, JW. 1932, 668; STEIN-}ONAS, ZPO. § 829 I 3; RHEIN STEIN, supra
n. 40, 282-284.
72 RG. (May 16, 1933) 140 RGZ. 340.
Similarly, Austria: OGH. (Aug. 12, 1927) 9 SZ. 516 No. 174·
73 Austria and Czechoslovakia: Exekutionsordnung of May 27, 1896,
RGBL. No. 79, § 294; WALKER 490; OGH. (Dec. 23, 1925) 7 SZ. 1006 No. 406.
Germany (itself): STEIN-}ONAS, ZPO. § 829 I 3·
Switzerland: 2 ScHNITZER 659.
Other countries: I Z.ausi.PR. (1927) 407.
74 See RG. (July 3, 1903) 55 RGZ. 236, 239; (Sept. 26, 1913) 83 RGZ. u6.
75 MINOR 287 § 125.
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3· Personal Jurisdiction over the Garnishee
The common law doctrine seems also to derive from certain statutist teachings. A basic difference from the Continental variant is due to interpretation of the Roman rule,
actor sequitur forum rei, as basing personal jurisdiction
upon the presence or submission of the defendant rather
than upon his domicil. When the English courts in garnish·
ment proceedings abandoned the in rem theory of the
custom of London 76 and analyzed the situation of simple
debts in terms of personal jurisdiction, they emphasized
the place where the debt is "properly recoverable." It is
not exact, however, that personal service on the garnishee
is the only requirement. The courts consider, as it seems,
all the circumstances. Thus, Lord Scrutton, in a leading
case where the theory was applied to the war seizure of a
deposit in a London bank, 77 pointed out that the debt arose
in London and that the original debtor made an appearance
in the lawsuit and submitted to the jurisdiction, obtaining
a benefit thereby. Lord Scrutton thought that any foreign
country would recognize such jurisdiction. In fact, in another
case of war seizure concerning life insurance policies, Atkins,
then L. J., states as a rule derived from the ecclesiastical
authorities:
"That in the case of an ordinary individual . . . for a
long time the situation of a simple contract debt under
ordinary circumstances has been held to be where the debtor
resides; that being the place where under ordinary circumstances the debt is enforceable, because it is only by bringing
suit against the debtor that the amount can be recovered." 78
Hence, the mere fact that the third debtor, the New York
Life Insurance Company, had a branch office in London
Harv. L. Rev., supra n. 55, at 112; I BEALE 458.
Swiss Bank Corp. v. Boehmische Industrial Bank [ I923] I K. B. 673,

76 BEALE, 27
77

682.
78

New York Life Ins. Co. v. Public Trustee [1924] 2 Ch.

IOI,

119.
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was not held sufficient to locate the debt because this was
only one of several places of business, but something more
was needed for the localization of the debt; in the instant
case, this additional element was found in the promise included in the policy to pay sterling in London. "That right
is situate in this country, and only in this country." Uncertain as the law in England remains, it seems that a mere
temporary sojourn of the garnishee, in the absence of the
original debtor, would not induce an English court to render
a garnishment order. All judges in the last-mentioned case
regretted that they had to decide without having the policy
holders in court, who should have been necessary partiesa point worth noting.
United States. 19 American courts, in the great majority,
have construed the proceedings as directed against a debt
located for jurisdiction purposes wherever the garnishee
could validly be served with process. The debt is where the
garnishee may be sued personally by his creditor. Under
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, as the Supreme Court
has stated in approving this view, any other state must
recognize the double effect of the proceedings, divesting
the original debtor and investing the garnishor. 80 The courts,
conformably, take jurisdiction wherever the garnishee is
found and process is personally served on him within the
state, although it is sometimes required in addition that his
debt be payable there. 81
Normally, of course, a debtor is found at his domicil.
Moreover, in several states domicil is sufficient for assuming
jurisdiction even in the absence of the debtor; this ap79 When I wrote first on the matter ("Situs Problems in Enemy Property
Measures," I I Law and Cont. Probl. (1945) at IZ6), Professor SUNDERLAND
aided me with enlightening remarks, which I am using again with gratitude.
80 Harris v. Balk (1905) 198 U. S. 215; Louisville and Nashville R R. v.
Deer (1906) 200 U. S. 176; Baltimore and Ohio R. R. v. Hostetter (1915)
240 U. S. 62o; Restatement § 108.
81 State ex rel. Fielder v. Kirkwood (1940) 345 Mo. 1089, 138 S. W. (2d)
1009·
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proaches the Continental reasoning. As explanation, It IS
said that the domicil is the situs of the debt fixed by the
legislature, or that it is the actual, as distinguished from the
legal, situs, or that the debt is treated as a fund in the hands
of the debtor at his domicil.B 2
But the fact that domicil does increasingly determine
jurisdiction and that this seems to enjoy interstate effect
if fair notice is given to the debtor, 83 only increases the
number of jurisdictions having power to dispose of the debt.
The American writers 84 have noted two defects of this
mechanism, more serious than the Continental shortcomings
because they apply primarily to the relation among sister
states.
The original debtor is not necessary to the essential
judicial proceedings. It is generally desired that he should
be notified of a garnishment proceeding. But not even this
requirement of fair justice is rigorously observed in all
courts. The Restatement is satisfied with a reasonable attempt to give notice. If notice is given, he is supposed to
appear at any place in the vastness of the United States
where his alleged creditor happens to find and sue his
alleged debtor. Federal interpleader 85 may force him to
similar sacrifices. If he is not made aware of the proceedings, he will probably be able to defend against full faith
and credit of the judgment, and ought to be able also to
deny that it is res judicata against him. 86 But not always is
he certain of such protection.
The risk imposed upon the garnishee, on the other hand,
is the following.
MINOR 287 ff. § 125; STUMBERG 102 with citations.
See Mr. Justice Holmes in McDonald v. Mabee (1917) 243 U. S. 90 and
comment by STUMBERG 75·
84 BEALE, 27 Harv. L. Rev., supra n. 55, uo; GOODRICH § 68.
85 See the interesting complications described by CHAFEE, "Federal Interpleader," 49 Yale L. ]. (1940) 377, 423.
8 6 GooDRICH 146 § 68; but cf. the restricted formula in 38 C. ]. S. § 577·
82

83
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4· Double Payment of the Debt
English and American courts have dealt with cases where
a garnishee objected that he may be compelled to pay the
same debt again if his creditor should sue him in a foreign
country where the domestic garnishment is not recognized
as res judicata. Where this danger was convincingly proved,
the garnishment order has been denied. 87 When proceedings
are pending in another state, American courts are anxious
to protect the garnishee against double proceedings by divergent methods, such as abatement of the action, stay pending
foreign decision, or mere suspension of enforcement. 88
The German Supreme Court did not believe that it possessed such discretionary power.
A German seller had a claim for the price of delivered
locomotives against a Portuguese buyer and owed the commission fee to the Portuguese broker. The claim of the
broker against the seller was garnished in Germany by a
German creditor of the broker. The court rejected the
defense of the garnishee seller that in Portugal the broker
had garnished the price owed by the buyer who was forced
to pay. 89
In view of this situation, an authoritative German
writer has contended that actual exercise of foreign jurisdiction should be recognized, when under its compulsion a
87 England: Martin v. Nadel [1906] 2 K. B. 26 and cit.
Canada, C. App. Ontario: Richer v. Borden Farm Products Co. ( 1921)
49 0. L. R. 172, 64 D. L. R. 70 and cit.
Quebec: The Equitable Life Assur. Co. v. Perrault (1882) 26 L. C. ].
382, 385, 389; Harris v. Cordingley (1899) 16 Que. S. C. 501; Fraser v.
The Beyers-Allen Lumber Co. etc. (1913) 45 Que. S. C. 42; 3 JoHNSON
803 ff.
United States: Parker, Peebles and Knox v. Nat'! Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford (1930) 111 Conn. 383, 150 At!. 313; cf. Notes, 40 Yale L. ]. (1930)
139; 69 A. L. R. (1930) 609. Weitzel v. Weitzel (1924) 27 Ariz. 117, 230
Pac. uo6; Clark-Wilcox Co. v. Northwest Eng. Co. (1943) 314 Mass. 402,
50 N. E. (zd) 53·
88 Note, 91 A. L. R. 959, 964; 5 Am. Jur. 34 §§ 698 f.
89 RG. (Nov. 3, 1911) 77 RGZ. 25o; cf. RHEINSTEIN, supra n. 55, 287 n. I;
2 FRANKENSTEIN 265 who approves the decision.

OTHER TRANSFERS OF SIMPLE DEBTS

457

debtor has paid either to his creditor despite a German attachment or to the creditor of his creditor on the ground
of foreign attachment. 90

5. Conclusion
Evidently, no system has been found suitable to organize
harmonious international proceedings. One difficulty is nonrecognition of foreign seizures, another the hardships for
individual parties to appear in foreign jurisdictions. In both
respects, however, improvements have been found in part
and could be amplified. A common basis of recognition is
afforded by the widespread idea that a debt may be seized
at the domicil of the debtor. 91 It seems exaggerated that in
the United States mere feasibility of service of process,
whatever its merits as a foundation of personal jurisdiction,
suffices to create rights to the detriment of out-of-state
creditors.
On the other hand, the methods by which the American
courts are enabled to avoid the danger of double payment
by the garnishee ought to be followed in the civil law courts.
The promising development of federal interpleader is
another progress mitigating the difficulties of the parties
involved.
Notification to the foreign original debtor should be
required more distinctly and more forcefully.
9o JoNAS, JW. 1932, 668 and STEIN-JoNAS, 2 ZPO. § 829 n. VI 3; VII 1 b.
On the defenses based on unjust enrichment, see RHE!NSTEIN, 8 Z.ausi.PR.,
supra n. 55, at 288 and n. 1.
91 See particularly RHE!NSTEIN, supra n. 55·
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Setoff and Counterclaim (Compensation)

1

"COMPENSAT/0 est debiti et crediti inter se contributio,"2 is a definition from the end of the classical
Roman period. At that time, as it seems, it had become a general habit to allow a defendant in a lawsuit a
defense by claiming against the plaintiff a debt due by the
latter to the defendant. 3 The history of this institution
before and after this momentous stage has been agitated
and has led in the modern codes to related but differentiated
regulations, all parts of substantive private law. In England, an entirely independent doctrine slowly emerging shows
various parallels to the Roman development, but has remained original and, in contrast to the Continental systems,
confined within the framework of judicial procedure.
In this matter, we must separate not only the two groups
of municipal bodies of law but also their application in
conflicts law.
I.
1.

ANGLO-AMERICAN LAw

Institutions Involved

The English methods of setoff and counterclaim are
clothed in terms of procedural remedies to be used by a
1 SACERDOTI, "Des confiits des lois en matiere de compensation des obligations," Clunet 1896, 57; Tosi-BELLUCci, "La compensazione nel diritto internazionale privato," 84 Archivio giuridico ( 1910) 9; DoLLE, "Die Kompensation im internationalen Privatrecht," 13 Rheinische Z. f. Zivil- und Prozessrecht ( 1924) 32, with illustrations; DE NovA, L'estinzione delle obbligazioni convenzionali nel diritto internazionale privato (1931) 209. Comparative municipal law: GERHARD KEGEL, Probleme der Aufrechnung: Gegenseitigkeit und Liquiditiit, rechtsvergleichend dargestellt, 13 Beitriige zum
ausliind. und int. Privatrecht ( 1938).
2 MODESTINUS, Dig. 16, 2, I.
8 BoNFANTI!, Istituzioni di diritto romano (ed. 8) 401.
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defendant against a plaintiff. A rich and differentiated development from this origin in the United States has produced a variety of regulations of setoff, recoupment, and
cross action, and of the so-called counterclaim in the "code
states," comprising setoff and recoupment. The many statutory changes, differences between state and federal jurisdictions, and the influence of equity have resulted in a progressive adjustment to practical needs. Perhaps for the same reasons, however, the subject is so loaded with particularistic
complications that no serious effort has ever been made to
reconsider the entire matter from the viewpoint of substantive law. It still remains in the common opinion a topic
of procedure, subject, as a matter of course, to the law of
the forum.
Following the language of the Restatement of the Law
of Contracts, we shall speak of "setoff and counterclaim,"
or more briefly, according to English models, of "setoff," to
cover the ground taken in civil law by compensatio. The
exceptional rules on bankruptcy and judgment debts must
be reserved. Mutual accounts by agreement are a separate
topic to be discussed later.
English and American lawyers are extremely firm in asserting that setoff and its associates are procedural institutions. As a particularly impressing feature, there is no
extrajudicial setoff, except in case of insolvency. A debtor:
"Cannot, in the absence of agreement, apply a set-off in
reduction of his debt, on a tender of the residue; but he
may avail himself of such set-off by way of defence or
counter-claim in an action by the creditor." 4
Undoubtedly, many a time thoughtful judges and writers
have penetrated behind the procedural aspect into the situation of the parties. No one, in fact, denies that under the
conditions of the law the parties have a right to a setoff.
4 }ENKS-WINFIELD

§

216.
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The well-known dictum of Judge Mack (1923) may be
remembered:
"The right of a counterclaim and set-off having been
first introduced as a part of our procedural law, halting
recognition is just beginning to be given to the fact that
the right as between litigants is something more than a
procedural convenience and is really a requirement of substantive justice. That the right of set-off and counterclaim
is regarded in our law today as affecting, in important aspects, the substantive relations between the parties, is clearly
seen in the rules as to the assignment of choses in action
being subject to existing set-offs or counterclaims." 5
The Contracts Restatement is the most eloquent testimony to the substantive nature of the party relations involved. Nevertheless, its classification as procedural seems
unchallenged.
2.

Conflicts Principle

In consistency with their general attitude in the municipal
sphere, common law lawyers do not hesitate to state the
simple rule that setoff and counterclaim follow the law of
the forum. 6 To preclude excessive application, the meaning
of this rule has been clarified by Minor : how the defense
is pleaded and what effect the plea has is regulated by the
procedural law of a court, but the validity and effect of
each claim is measured according to the law governing ie
Only on an express or implied agreement of the original
5 The Gloria {D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1923) 286 Fed. 188, 192. Rosenberry, ].,
in Shawano Oil Co. v. Citizens State Bank ( 1936) 223 Wis. IOo, 269 N. W.
675: "A right of offset is more than a procedural matter. Under § 331.07 the
plaintiff was entitled to set off . . . upon the payment of its note."
6 England: MacFarlane v. Norris {1862) 2 B. & S. 783; Meyer v. Dresser
{1864) 16 C. B. (N. S.) 646, 664; WESTLAKE § 346; FOOTE 555; DICEY 857
Rule 203.
United States: STORY§ 575; WHARTON§ 788; MINOR§ 2II; 3 BEALE 1606
§ 593.1, citing decisions from 1846 to 1932; GOODRICH 192.
7 MINOR 525 § 211.
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parties to an instrument, may setoff be considered an equity
attaching to the instrument. 8
3· Foreign Compensation m Common Law Courts
How should civil law compensation, a substantive institution, be treated in a common law court? Authority is
scarce. But the oldest American decision relating to the
matter recognized a setoff allowed in a sister state and
expressly stated that the setoff "does not relate to the form
of proceeding but goes to the merits of the case; and shews,
that no recovery ought to be had. So far from relating to
the form of the remedy, it shews there ought to be no
remedy." 9 This line of thinking seldom has been followed/ 0
but may be regarded as allowing a common law court to
admit an allegation that compensation has been achieved
under the law of a civil law country. 11 At least, the writers
seem in agreement that foreign discharge of an obligation
by compensation is recognizable/ 2 Moreover, if two debts
face each other in compensable condition according to French
law governing both debts, their extinction may be claimed
by either party in an American court. It is immaterial where
either debt arose. But if the two debts are governed by
different laws, it may be doubtful which law, or whether
8

MINOR 526; F ALCONBRIDGE, Conflict of Laws 325 n. ( q).
Vermont State Bank v. Porter {1812) 5 Day (Conn.) 316 at 321; 5 Am.
Dec. 157.
1 0 United States: Fidelity Insurance, Trust & Safe-Deposit Co. v. Mechanics'
Savings Bank (C. C. A. 3d 1899) 97 Fed. 297, 56 L. R. A. 228: the statutory
liability of a stockholder, resident of Pennsylvania, to the creditor of an
insolvent Kansas corporation would have been extinguished by the claim
of the stockholder against the corporation for the payment of bonds under
Kansas law, governing both claims; this equitable defense is recognized.
To interpret it as a defense at law, in order to serve in the federal court,
has been disapproved. See Anglo-American Land, M. and A. Co. v. Lombard
{C. C. A. 8th 1904) 132 Fed. 721, 733·
11 England: Allen v. Kemble (1848) 6 Moo. P. C. C. 314, 321: discharge
of a debt by compensation under Roman Dutch law was recognized, although
the decision is inconclusive with respect to the conflicts rule, FALCONBRIDGE,
Conflict of Laws 326.
1 2 DICEY 679 and ill us. 3·
9
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both simultaneously, should be applied. This is a problem
very controversial in Europe, which we must consider later.
On the other hand, it has been concluded that the law of
the forum is free to authorize, by its judicial discretion, a
setoff not permissible in the governing foreign law. 13
4· Application in Civil Law Courts
The Continental literature, aware of the different characterization of setoff and compensation in the unanimous
Anglo-American view has responded by assuming that the
English and American remedies are inapplicable in civil law
courts. Generally, it seems to be felt that such a court has
to apply the law of the forum, on an assumed renvoi from
the governing law. 14
This solution has been challenged, however. In a thorough
comparative study, conforming to the standards reaffirmed
in the present work, Gerhard Kegel15 has examined the
general function and two of the main conditions of compensation and the common law remedies in question. As
a result of his analysis, the author states that, under present
concepts of analytical jurisprudence, counterclaim in England, New Jersey, Arkansas, and Connecticut is in fact a
strictly procedural defense, but English and American setoff
and recoupment, and counterclaim in the code states, contain
a mixture of substantive and procedural elements. He draws
this conclusion from the common roots of setoff in judicial
practice and in bankruptcy law which is a substantive institution, the analogous structure of setoff in bankruptcy
and insolvency cases, the language of certain decisions, and
the existence of extrajudicial setoff in installment sales and
bank accounts. Despite some doubts, the author is inclined
1s M. WoLFE, Priv. Int. Law 464 f. § 439·
14 NEUNER, Privatrecht und Prozessrecht (1925)

at 34·
15 KEGEL,

supra n.

1,

esp.

41

ff.

59, 133;

DoLLE,

supra n.

I,
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to think that it should be possible to extract the substantive
rules and apply them in a civil law court/ 6 For instance,
conflicts law as understood on the Continent, may be able
to observe the rules usual in a specific American court on
the question whether the defendant may plead a debt which
is owed by or owing to certain third persons. 17 In contrast,
the requirement of a liquidated sum, where it still exists,
is so dominated by procedural convenience as to dissuade
us from transplanting it to a foreign forum/ 8 This interesting inquiry deserves to be extended to the remaining problems. Some day a common platform will be found.
In the meantime, so long as no American court applies
the rules of another state on this subject, it will be inadvisable for a civil law court to proceed differently. The difficulty
of extracting the substantive rules or of ascertaining the
actual law of an American state is very great. 19 Any attempt
to transform setoff and counterclaim into pure private law,
seems premature. In the phase reached by these institutions
up to the present time, foreign conflicts law ought to leave
them totally unobserved.
All European writers seem to agree, however, that in a
case governed by English or American law compensation
is not effective except if invoked as a defense or by crossaction in court. 20 In such cases, the court treats compensation
as pleaded exclusively on the ground of a procedural party
declaration, not on the ground of an extrajudicial act and,
16 KEGEL, supra
17 Id. at 153.

18

n.

I,

48 f.

I d. at I74·
As an example, it may be considered that in the United States, even
where a claim barred by a statute of limitations may be used for pleading
setoff, various theories exist concerning the effect of the plea. While the
question whether a claim barred by limitation may be pleaded is substantive
in the Continental view, the effect of a successful plea, in an American
court, representing a claim exceeding the plaintiff's demand regards the extent of the bar procedurally conceived. For three different solutions of the
latter problem, see WooD, I Limitations 307 ns. IS-I7.
2o DoLLE, supra n. I, 42.
19
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hence, applies its own procedural rules involving unconditional and conditional compensation,-the latter occurring when the defendant avails himself of his counterclaim
only on the condition that the plaintiff's claim is held
effective. The private law of the forum serves to fill the
gaps left by the procedural rules.
II.
1.

CIVIL LAW

Institutions Involved

ucompensatio" of debts appears in various kinds, the
most important of which are at present effectuated either
by operation of law or by extrajudicial informal declaration
of either party. "Legal compensation" stems from the unconsidered generalization, in the Corpus Juris, of a classical
dictum, ((ipso iure compensatur," which had been said of a
certain type of banker who was compelled by the Praetor,
in suing customers, to restrict his petitions to the balance
of current accounts. 21 This slogan, as finally adopted in
the French and Austrian Civil Codes and many subsequent
laws/ 2 means that the two debts extinguish each other at
the first moment of their coexistence in compensable condition. Although this construction still produces its consequences if the compensation is considered "definitely" established, its peculiar automatic working has been abandoned.
The defendant in a lawsuit must invoke the fact of the
compensation or be deemed to renounce it and revive the
discharged debt. 23
21 GAlUS IV §§ 64-68; LENEL, Edictum perpetuum § 100; Dig. 16, 2, 21;
C. 4, 31, 14; PERNICE, Labeo, Vol. II, I, 279; LENEL, Palingenesia Paulus
No. 1273.
2 2 Argentina: C. C. art. 818.
Austria: C. C. §§ 143 8 ff.
Brazil: C. C. art. 1009.
France: C. C. arts. 1290 ff.
Italy: C. C. (1865) art. 1285; C. C. (1942) art. 1241 says even expressly:
"i due debiti si estinguono."
Portugal: C. C. art. 768.
2 3 2 CoLIN et CAPITANT 123; PLANIOL et RIPERT, 7 Traite Pratique 623.
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The modern type of compensation proclaimed by the
German Civil Code4 rests upon a declaration of one party
to the other, either extrajudicially or in pleading. When this
is done, the effect is retroactive so that the debts are deemed
extinguished as of the first moment of their simultaneous
existence in the condition required for setoff. Thus, in both
the French and German systems, for instance, the running
of interests of any percentage is terminated on both sides
from that time.
The conditions in the civil law systems also are roughly
the same, to the extent that two persons must be reciprocally
and personally bound by obligations, existent and enforceable, to the payment of money or other fungible things of
like nature.
These parallels in operation and prerequisites have
afforded a sufficient basis for the dominant conflicts doctrine in Europe, comprising all Continental laws in a joint
conflicts rule concerning compensation. 25 What the rule
should prescribe, is another question.
2.

Conflicts Theories

As usual, a variety of theories has been set forth. 26 At
present, only three deserve mention and only two of these
seriously compete for prevalence.
As in common law, the law governing the debt will determine whether it is in existence, mature, liquid, and enforceable,27 if the law or laws controlling the compensation
24 Germany: BGB. § 387.
Japan: C. C. art. 505.
Switzer( and: C. Obi. art. I20.
25 Tosr-BELLUccr, supra n. I, 26-28, often cited.
26 See the critical surveys by 2 ARMIN JON § I 55; DE NovA I8I ff. An individual theory has also been hinted at by 2 PoNTES DE MIRANDA 234·
27 E.g., RG. (July I, I89o) 26 RGZ. 66: French-Rhenish law is consulted
for the question whether a legacy claim is exigible. It was wrong that OLG.
Frankfurt (April 27, 1923) }W. I924, 7I5 applied German bankruptcy law to
decide premature compensability of a debt in a Dutch bankruptcy.
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require these conditions. We are interested only m what
law or laws are in fact controlling.
(a) Lex fori. The law of the forum has been postulated,
sometimes invoking the common law, by a series of authors.
Some have had in view lawsuits exclusively ;28 others have
assumed that the connection with procedural rules should
prevail, 29 or that the court ought to be able to decide according to equity. 80 These views have repeatedly been criticized
and are commonly rejected. Characterization of compensation as a remedy or as procedural is regarded as a grave
mistake. 81
(b) Laws of both debts cumulatively. Many French
authors, 82 supported by Zitelmann and other writers, 33 have
required that when claim and counterclaim are governed
by different laws, compensation must be simultaneously
authorized and made effective by each law. They argue that
discharge of both debts requires consent of both laws. Although the principal claim depends only on its own law,
the counterclaim is not extinguished unless the law governing it so provides, and without such extinction not even the
principal claim would be discharged. Against the objection
that this method gives preference to the law according to
which setoff is not effective, 34 it has been replied that favoring the less exacting law would harm the authority of the
more severe law; either law has "equal authority." 35
28 2 BAR 9I (with important qualifications); VALERY I008 § 700; and to
some extent in an elaborate way, SACERDOTI, supra n. I, at 57·
29 WALKER 5I5; see also VAREILLES-SOMMIERES §§ 4I5-4I8.
30 ROLIN, 2 Principes 578 §§ 996-998.
31 See especially Tosi-BELLUCCI, 84 Archivio giuridico ( I9IO) at 47 If.;
DE NovA I47 ff.
S2 SURVILLE 380 § 267; PILLET, 2 Traite 2I5 § 502; 2 ARMIN JON § I 55; and
others.
33 2 ZITELMANN 397 ff.; KOSTERS 8I2; see for Brazil the citations by
2 PoNTES DE MIRANDA 233, cf. ESPINOLA, 2 Lei Introd. 624 n. (b). DoLLE,
supra n. I, 32; DE NovA 234 ff.; two German decisions cited by LEWALD
§ 348 (b).
34 CERETI, Obblig. I48.
35 DE NovA I64 f.
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The precise meaning of this theory seems to vary. In
the most consistent variant, however, the entire problem
whether compensation by unilateral act is effective in the
individual situation, must be decided by both laws. The
total facts are tested by both legal systems cumulatively. 36
We shall see what this means.
(c) Law of the principal claim. A vigorous third theory,
at present prevailing in the German and Swiss doctrine, is
satisfied with the observance of the provisions which govern
the claim against which compensation is declared. If the
law governing the principal debt predicates that the debt
is discharged, this is all that is needed. 37 Or in terms of procedure, the law that governs the debt sought to be enforced
and alleged to be discharged by setoff, is competent.
The followers of this theory effectively refute the main
argument of the adversaries, viz., that because of the nature
of compensation both laws must agree in extinguishing both
debts. The party claiming the setoff avails himself of a
means of discharge by which a unilateral use of a counterclaim is substituted for payment. This must be permissible
under the law determining the modes of discharge. Insofar,
however, as this party employs his own claim, he does so not
by any forcible method of self-help, but by a voluntary
disposition, to which he is entitled under the law governing
his claim. It remains merely to ask whether this law frees
the debtor; this will always be true, since the creditor has
received satisfaction, except when setoff is not known to
this law. 38
36 Thus expressly, DoLLE, supra n. 1, 40; and seemingly, 2 ARMIN JON 343;
DE NOVA 240; BATIFFOL 450 § 567.
37 BAR, Lehrbuch u8 j 2 BAR 91 j NEUMEYER, IPR. 29
(in principle) j
M. WoLFF, IPR. 93·
Germany: ROHG. (June 4, 1873) 10 ROHGE. 226; RG. (July 1, 1890)
26 RGZ. 66; OLG. Augsburg (Nov. 6, 1917) 36 ROLG. 105.
Danzig: OLG. (Feb. 28, 1934) 10 Z.ausi.PR. (1936) 107.
Switzerland: BG. (Oct. 26, 1937) 63 BGE. 383, 384, and cit.; 2 MElLI 35
§ 107; 0SER-SCHOENENBERGER, Allg. Einleitung No. Sr.
88 LEWALD 283 f.

17
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3· Rationale
The arguments used for the two antagonistic Continental
opinions have not sufficed to convince either party. It would
seem that these theories are too much dependent on the
municipal doctrines, and moreover that they are framed
in all too general terms.
Where the axiom, ipso iure compensatur, is the basic concept, as in France and Italy, it might be natural to assume
that automatic termination of two debts by "law" presupposes approval by both laws. This idea, however, should
have been discarded when it was settled that one of the
parties must act to set the mechanism of the double discharge in motion.
The modern German doctrine, on the other hand, may be
inclined to consider the claim to be discharged by declaration of the debtor as the main problem. Also some common
law writers may think that, if any law other than the law
of the forum is considered, it is the law governing the debt
sued upon. But the matter is not so simple.
In fact, the subject is so involved as to suggest future
special investigation. Only some of the problems may be
illustrated here.
Although we surmise that the mode of operation by procedural defense or extrajudicial declaration is immaterial,
and disregard the variety existing in the effects of compensation, the conditions to be fulfilled are still not all susceptible of the same treatment.
(a) The innumerable provisions by which compensation
is excluded because of the nature of a debt may be divided
into two classes : prohibitions to discharge a certain debt
by compensation and prohibitions to use a certain debt as
a means of compensation-thus concerning compensation
against a debt and through a debt. But both groups defy
the double-law theory.
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On one side, certain claims are privileged so that they
cannot be extinguished without consent of the creditor except by actual payment or equivalent satisfaction. Thus,
according to the various systems, a debtor may not be discharged by setoff, for instance, from a debt grounded on
tort (or intentional wrong, or unlawful possession) ; from
a judgment debt; from restitution of a deposit (or a bank
deposit); from an unattachable debt such as an obligation
to pay wages may be, etc. The debtor may not set off against
such a claim. It is not true, however, that the obligation
in these cases is not "susceptible of compensation." The
creditor of such an obligation based on tort, deposit, or
wages is not prohibited, in principle, from extinguishing it
by using a debt of his own; this is permitted by the law
governing his privilege, and a fortiori by a law without
such prohibition.
An exception confirms the rule. Although the provisions
concerning compensation merely state that there can be no
unilateral compensation against an unattachable debt or
a debt of certain wages, it has been inferred from other
sources of law in Switzerland that a wage earner cannot
dispose of his wages insofar as they represent his minimum
living standard. 39
Even so, it is exclusively the law governing the employment which prevents the employer, and by exception the
employee, from disposing of the claim for wages.
Illustrations. (i) A, an employee of B, owes B repayment of a loan. Under the law governing the employment,
B is not entitled to satisfy his claim by withholding wages.
A, under the law governing the loan, is entitled to compensate it by setting off his wage claim, usually even including future claims. But, by exception, the law governing
the employment also precludes A from resorting to this
right of compensation.
39 v. TUHR, Allg. Teil Schweiz. Oblig. R. § 78 n. 76;
BERGI!R 638 III.

I
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(ii) A has deposited a sum of money with B. Under the
French Civil Code, article r 293 n. 2, a depositary is not
allowed to set off any claim of his own. French law, however, permits the depositor to set off his own claim. German
law has no such prohibition. It has been deduced from the
double-law theory that B cannot set off, even though the
deposit be governed by German law, if B's counterclaim
against A is under French law. This result has been advocated, although in this case either law would permit the
compensation. 40

It seems logically and practically sufficient, however,
that a prohibition by a law should apply to the case for
which it is meant.
On the other side, claims of a certain origin or affected
by certain occurrences, are considered too weak to discharge
a normal claim. Thus, a debtor may not compensate for
his debt through a claim barred by limitation of action, or
by an exception of fraud or informal release. Again, it
appears that the law of the claim to be discharged, here the
blameless claim, is alone material.
Illustration. Jackson sued his employer for back salary
and commissions; the defendant moved for setoff by crossaction on a claim for conversion; this claim was not yet
barred by limitation at the time of the action, but the period
lapsed during the trial. Under such circumstances, two
Texas decisions have held setoff accomplished by operation
of law; two are of the contrary opinion. 41 If there were
equally different solutions in two civil law jurisdictions,
the law under which the suit is brought alone could decide
the time when limitation will bar counterclaim.
Hence, prohibitions on compensation, either against or
through a. claim of a certain nature, are determined in
principle by the law of the principal claim.
supra n. 1, 40.
See Birk v. Jackson (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) 75 S. W. (zd) 918 and Note,
13 Tex. L. Rev. (1935) 540.
40 DoLLE,
41
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(b) This principle is not adequate for the requirement
of reciprocity, that is, the condition that claim and counterclaim should exist between the same parties or persons
equivalent to them.

Illustrations. ( i) Suppose the principal debt is governed
by New York law, whereas the surety has bound himself
under the law of Cuba. The former law prohibits, 42 the
latter allows, 43 the surety to use a counterclaim of the debtor
against the suing creditor. We have found earlier that the
relationship between the principal and the surety should
be consulted, in addition to the law of the suretyship. 44
(ii) Under German law, a debtor may compensate against
a subassignee such counterclaims as he acquired against the
assignee before notice of the subassignment, even though
he did not know of the assignment until he heard of the
subassignment. 45 He cannot do so if his debt is governed
by English law and the subassignee was without notice of
the counterclaim. 46
Should he be permitted to discharge his German-governed debt by an English-governed counterclaim against
the assignee? It is repugnant to the common law that a
creditor should free a debtor against his will.
In all such cases where three parties are involved, mere
observance of the law governing the principal debt is
insufficient.
(c) Exclusion of unliquidated debts from setoff, as provided in the Latin systems, under the influence of the Corpus
Juris, has led to the following problem:

Illustration. A has a German-governed claim against B
who opposes an Italian-governed unliquidated counterclaim.
42

Gillespie v. Torrance (1862) 25 N. Y. 306.
Cuba: C. C. art. II97·
44 Supra Ch. 47 ns. 48-51.
45 Commentaries to BGB. § 406.
Switzerland: v. TuHR, Allg. Teil Schweiz. Oblig. R. 752.
See also Wyman v. Robbins (1894) 51 Ohio St. 98, 37 N. E. 264.
46 In re Milan Tramways Co. ( 1884) 25 Ch. D. 587.
United States: Restatement of Contracts§ 167 (3); x8 Minn. L. Rev. (1934)
73343
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The latter is available for compensation under German law,
though possibly needing special procedural treatment until
verification; this would suffice under the theory invoking
only the law of the debt to be discharged. 47 Compensation
has been declared excluded, however, under the two-laws
theory, because Italian law is supposed to require "liquidity"
in the interest of both parties. 48
Historically, the requirement of liquidity served the purpose that plaintiffs should be protected from being exposed
to vexatious delay of the suit by fictitious or unsubstantiated
allegation of exceptions. More emphasis has been attributed
in modern times in France to the idea that compensation is
a means of abbreviated double payment-"paiement
abrege." This theory excludes debts of uncertain existence
or amount from the function of paying as well as being paid.
But such an idea does not necessarily affect compensation
against a debt governed by a law admitting illiquid debts.
Since liquidity is generally regarded also in Latin laws
as a substantive requirement for legal compensation, the
one-law theory seems to suffice.
A different aspect is presented by the Anglo-American
requirement of liquidity excluding from setoff debts which
must be assessed by a jury. As a matter of procedure, the
common law requirement pertains to the law of the forum.
And so does the French judicial compensation, which may
intervene after the defendant's counterclaim has been ascertained in the proceedings.
Conclusion. In most respects, it would seem that the
law of the principal debt should exclusively permit or prohibit the use of compensation against the principal debt
and determine the availability of the specific opposite claim
for compensation. This theory is, however, not correct in
all respects. More research is necessary to clarify this
subject.
47 RAAPE, D. IPR. 290.
48 DE NovA 167 n. 2.
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CoNTRACT OF CoMPENSATION

Nothing in the above-discussed doctrines affects voluntary agreements providing for the compensation of either
existing or future debts. They have not always been held
licit/9 but are now everywhere permitted, and subject to
their own law or that of the main contract to which they
are ancillary.
The Continental writers are almost unanimous in following the intention of the parties. 50 In England, the right
of setoff has been recognized when based on an express
term of the original contract but it is not settled whether
it may subsequently be agreed. 51
The most prominent example is afforded by running
accounts. The working of book accounts with periodical
balances and acknowledgments is extremely controversial
in theoretical construction, and certainly shows fundamental
differences between common law and Continental practices. 52
It would seem that these multiple differences ought not
to affect the formation of a conflicts rule. But this is an
unsolved problem, 53 except for one important case. When
a private individual keeps a running account with a bank,
his relationship is covered as a whole by the law of the
place where the bank office or branch involved is situated. 54
The Swiss Federal Tribunal has clearly stated this solution
with regard to the relation flowing from a current account. 55
49

Crews v. Williams (1810) 2 Bibb (Ky.) 262 and other old decisions.
DIENA, 2 Dir. Int. Com. 152 § 124; id., 2 Principi 263; DESPAGNET 921
§ 316; Tosi-BELLUCCI, supra n. r, 73 n. 2; 2 MElLI 36 speaks of the contractual exclusion of compensation.
51 FOOTE 556; HIBBERT 189.
52 See the excellent article by ULMER, "Kontokorrent," 5 Rechtsvergl.
Handworterbuch 194, 216.
53 2 BEALE § 322.1 argues exclusively from the viewpoint of lex loci
50

contractus.
54 Cf. supra Ch. 34 ns. 56 ff. and FICKER, 4 Rechtsvergl. Handworterbuch
473 No. 4·
55 BG. (Nov. 22, 1918) 44 BGE. II 489, 492; (Oct. 26, 1937) 63 id. II 383,
385.
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It was embarrassed, however, when both parties to the
account were professionally engaged in banking; in the
particular case, the court clung to the law of the forum
invoked by both attorneys. 56
fie BG. (Oct. 26, 1937) 63 BGE. II 383, 386.

CHAPTER
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Statutes of Limitation
I.
I.

PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS

The Problem

T

HE conflicts law with respect to limitation of action
by lapse of time has been discussed since the thirteenth
century, and in this long history, "all possible and
also impossible ideas have found advocates." 1 "Few arguments have been so much discussed and have occasioned so
many varied and disparate opinions as that concerning
the law controlling limitation of action." 2 Although the
truth of these statements is all too apparent to students of
conflicts laws, only two main systems have stayed in competition. They correspond almost exactly with the division
between common law and civil law. In British jurisdictions
and in the United States, in principle "limitation of actions"
is said to affect the "remedy" only and to belong to the
procedural law of the forum; every court applies the domestic statute of limitation, in principle excluding all foreign
statutes. In the countries of the civil law, after long drawnout debates, it is at present uniformly recognized that limitation of "action" is a misnomer and that it affects the
substantive right; prevailingly, it is determined by the law
governing the obligation.
This contrast is notorious. Excellent surveys of the world
literature in older and recent writings have tended to uniform conclusions in favor of the substantive classification. 3

I VAREILLES-SOMMIERES 26I; quoted by DE NoVA 96 § I7.
DrENA, I Dir. Com. Int. 440.
3 On the present doctrine in Continental literature, particular mention
is due to }EAN MICHEL, La prescription liberatoire en droit international
1

2
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At least one energetic article has come forth to vindicate
the viewpoint of the common law. 4 The Institute of International Law in 1926 reached a sensible proposal for uniformly applicable rules. 5 Must we go again over all this
territory?
Unfortunately, it is still necessary to do so. Too much
in the debates going on for so many centuries has been a
strange mixture of obsolete legal terminology and concealed policy considerations; the policies have been too
often one-sided or confused; and the provincial lawyer's
thinking has usurped undue privilege. The subject, thus,
has become an outstanding illustration of the necessity for
an unbiased and supernational discussion.
Our inquiry, however, has to start with the municipal
law. This exception from the habits of this present work
does not include an inconsistency of methods. Although conflicts law ought to have its own standards and evaluations,
analytical research serving the formation of uniform conflicts rules always requires investigation of similarities and
dissimilarities of the various systems, and furnishes a particularly useful help when it reveals substantial analogies.
In this matter, objective criticism discovers vital analogies
despite different labels, concepts, and characterizations,
which, together with their influence on practical solutions,
must be questioned as a first step to a sound conflicts law.
It is to be borne in mind that we are here concerned exprive (These, Paris, I9II) (second edition, Paris, unavailable), the substance of which Michel has condensed in r Repert. 292 ff; DE NovA, L'estinzione della obbligazioni convenzionali (1931) 97-137; Batiffol §§ 575 ff., 586.
Other (selected) special treatments: WUNDERLICH, Zur Lehre von der
Verjiihrung nach internationalem Rechte, in Festschrift fiir Ernst Reinitz
(Berlin 1926) 481-512; ScHOCH, Klagbarkeit, Prozessanspruch und Beweis
im Lichte des internationalen Rechts ( 1934) 52 ff., no ff.; ScHLINK, "Die
internationalprivatrechtliche Behandlung der Verjahrung in den Vereinigten
Staaten," 9 Z.ausi.PR. (1935) 418; PHILONENKO, "De Ia prescription extinctive
en droit international prive," Clunet 1936, 259, 513.
4 I am speaking of the impressive article by AILES, "Limitation of Actions
and the Conflict of Laws," 31 Mich. L. Rev. (1933) 474-502.
5 Viennese Meeting, 1924, 31 Annuaire (1924) 182.
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elusively with the rules concerning ordinary obligations, and
not claims flowing from property rights or obligations arising out of family relations or succession.
2.

Historical Note

In order to gain an objective view of the problem, a few
historical facts should be kept in mind.
In the ancient Roman common law (ius civile), most
actions were "perpetual," whereas the praetorian actions
were often limited to a year ( annus utilis) .6 Greek practice
developed a rebuttable presumption against the existence of
a debt after a long time, 7 probably the model of a late
Roman practice known to us by an imperial edict for Egypt. 8
Theodosius II subjected the old perpetual actions to a
praescriptio longi temporis, resulting in their "extinction"
of the action and this prescription went over into Justinian's
compilation. 9 Almost all features of the modern provisions
on "limitation of actions"-the English term itself is borrowed from Theodosius and Justinian-are contained in
the Corpus Juris: commencement of the period when the
action is born, causes and effects of suspension and interruption, revival, and so forth.
An important modification, however, was worked out in
England after the civil war10 and in secular disputes in civil
law ;11 the effect of the lapse of time, originally operating
6

See, e.g., BUCKLAND, A Textbook on Roman Law ( ed. 2, I932) 689.
PARTSCH, Longi temporis praescriptio u8 f.
8 Papyrus Flor. No. 6I, I, 45 (85 A. D.); for an application, see Papyrus
Oxyrhynchos No. 68 (I3I A. D.).
9 C. Theod. 4, I4, I, 3 (A. D. 424); C. Just. 7, 39, 3, 2: hae autem actiones
annis triginta continuis extinguentur, quae perpetuae videbantur, non illae
quae antiquitus fixis temporibus limitantur.
10 See ANGELL 3IO § 285 on the development through Brown v. Hancock
( I628) Cro. Car. II5, 79 Eng. Re. 70I; Tankersley v. Robinson ( I629)
Cro. Car. I63, 79 Eng. Re. 742; Stile v. Finch (I634) Cro. Car. 38I, 79 Eng.
Re. 932.
11 In canonist procedure since the end of the fourteenth century, the court
took notice ex officio. The German doctrine adopted the defense theory as
late as the nineteenth century. See ERNST HEYMANN, Das Vorschiitzen der
Verjiihrung (I895) and KIPP, 45 Z. Handelsr. (I896) 6o8.
7
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automatically, was changed into a mere defense to be
pleaded by the defendant at his pleasure. The influence of
canon law and English equity jurisdiction may be neglected
in a discussion restricted to obligations.12
Byzantine, Continental, and English sources all speak of
"action" as the object of limitation. The meaning of the
word is indicated by the long and firm doctrinal tradition
coming from classical Roman law and represented by the
category of jus quod pertinet ad actiones, 13 co-ordinate with
the law of persons and the law of things. Roman and
English professional legal practice started from a few
formulas of procedure to be used in certain cases. The
progress consisted in increasing the number and refining
the use of these formulas until the procedure extra ordinem
in one system and equity in the other became the means of
new developments. But not withstanding the dissolution of
formalism and the enrichment of the system, the ancient
jurisconsults and the English jurists until the nineteenth
century 14 considered the decision of lawsuits as the object
of all their efforts, and the question under what conditions
a petition (action) could be judicially recognized and enforced as their central problem.
Actio, hence, technically the acting of the plaintiff in
introducing and pursuing his claim, in the classical texts
covers both the procedural activity of the plaintiff and his
right to win his cause. An actio in personam particularly is
12 The comparatively few cases in which laches has been applied not to
property claims but to suits for restitution, do not directly apply the statute
of limitation, see Restatement of Restitution § 148. The recent judgemade
German "Verwirkung" (see comments on § 242 BGB.) is analogous and
clearly substantive. Whether also the equitable institution of laches is
substantive-as I assume and a Note in 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev. (1931) 341 evidently implies-and whether therefore it is to be applied by foreign judges,
is an interesting question to be discussed under the general problem of
broad judicial discretion exercised upon foreign authorization.
13 GAlUS IV x ff.; Just. Inst. 4, 6 ff.
14 PLUCKNEIT, A Concise History of the Common Law (ed. 4, 1948) 361 f.
defines the process of separation of law and procedure since the eighteenth
century and concludes: "Much experimentation is going on, both in England
and America."
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a formulary means of proceeding, but it is also an obligatory right: ({Nihil aliud est actio quam ius quod sibi
debeatur, iudicio persequendi." 15
The pandectists, though slowly continuing the work
of the Corpus Juris in the transformation of the system of
actions into a system of rights, nevertheless retained the
double-sided concept of action. In the nineteenth century,
the "law of actions" was conceived as the borderland between private and procedural law, including the effects on
the right in issue of the commencement of a suit and the
judgment. The development of "action" in the English technical language seems obscure, but may have followed similar
lines. A late testimony, however, is furnished by the English
Sale of Goods Act and its American parallel. After having
described in four parts the sales contract and its contents,
these acts in a "Part V, Actions for Breach of the Contract"
include the "remedies" of the seller and the buyer as to the
price, recission, general damages, etc., but contain almost
nothing referring to procedure. Breach of contract, just as
commission of a tort, produces rights for the injured party.
While these rights are referred to as actions and remedies,
these terms consider the rights as objects, but not as means,
of procedure.
Holdsworth, it is true, thinks that it is reasonably clear
from the words of James I's statute "that the statute
affected not the right under a contract but the right to enforce it." 16 This can scarcely have been the idea. By prescribing that the actions should be commenced and sued
upon within six years, or otherwise its enforcement would
be denied, the statute destroyed the only form in which the
right appeared in the legal world. When later, in r 698, the
court of the King's Bench said of a claim, "It is a debt
though barrable by pleading of the statute, " 17 it meant only
15 CELSUS,

16
17

Dig. 44, 7,

51;

Just. lnst. 4, 6 pr.

8 HOLDSWORTH 6 5•

Wainford v. Barker (1698) 1 Raym. (ed. 4, 1790) 232.
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to save the claim for accounting in an administration proceeding before an ecclesiastical court. Subsequently, other
effects of the debt were recognized. But the contrast between right and remedy was superimposed on the statute.
The two elements of "action" were finally disjoined by
the German Pandectist, Windscheid. 18 He distinguished
"Anspruch"-claim or pretense in precarious translationsand right to sue or "Klagerecht." Klageverjahrung, limitation of action, thenceforth was replaced by A nspruchsverj(ihrung, limitation of claim. The ensuing German and later
the Italian scholars have devoted an enormous amount of
thought to both of these basic concepts. The German Civil
Code, precisely at the place where it indicates the object
of limitation of action, defines the Anspruch as "the right
to demand from another person an act or a forbearance."
(§ 194). While this means, in application to property, that
the various rights flowing from a violation of property
right are barred in contrast to the ownership, mortgage,
etc., which is not necessarily affected, in the better opinion
an obligatory right is identical with an Anspruch and object
of limitation. Recent literature leaves no doubt that in any
case the object affected by limitation is the right and not the
procedural power of a plaintiff. Rather, it has been emphasized that the attempt of Windscheid and the German Code
to save the elements of the Roman actio by inserting the
"claim" between the substantive right and the procedural
right of enforcement, has failed; it would simply be the
right that is affected by limitation. 19 But this is immaterial
for our purpose.
What matters is that the law of limitation as well as the
meaning of action have undergone important modifications,
WINDSCHEID, Die Actio 1856.
See CARNELUTII, "Appunti sulla prescrizione," 10 Riv. Dir. Proc. Civ.
{1933) I 32; BErn, Diritto processuale civile italiano (1936) 166 f.§ 38.
The literature on the procedural part of actio has produced an overwhelming variety of opinions.
18
19

STATUTES OF LIMITATION

although the Anglo-American legal language has persisted.
N a1ve students of the statutes of limitation are continuously
misled by this terminology, although erudite jurists certainly should not need to be warned.
It seems opportune to make one more general observation. American discussions have shown meritorious endeavors to clarify the relationship between substance and
procedure. Through Walter Wheeler Cook's writings, it
has been recognized that the line of delimitation between
these two fields may vary according to the purposes of the
rules of law to be subordinated. From this acknowledgment
of the relativity of terms, seemingly some scholars have
concluded that the concept of procedure is flexible to the
degree that it does not possess any general meaning. A
further inference may be that a domestic statute of limitations is "procedural" in the meaning of conflicts law, although a foreign statute may be substantive. All this is
mistaken. There is no ground for contending that for the
purpose of conflicts law-that is, for the question whether
domestic or foreign law should apply-several concepts of
procedure are necessary or useful. The main, and probably
the exclusive reason for discussing the scope of procedure
in this field is afforded by the universally recognized principle that foreign private law is potentially applicable but
foreign procedural law is not. The idea underlying this
principle is simple and although it needs certain exceptions,
it does not call for subtle conceptual distinctions. The idea
is this: Every court wants to administer justice in the forms
and methods regulated for proceedings at the forum. Court
and parties are not to be disturbed in their observance of
the legal rules prescribing the steps to be taken for instituting, pursuing, and terminating lawsuits. This includes,
indeed, rules limiting the time in which a procedural act
such as pleading, objection, offer of evidence, or appeal must
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be made. 20 Whether it also includes the right of a defendant
to withstand the exercise of a superannuated substantive
right by opposing to the cause of action a counterright on
the same plane-"A plea of limitation is an answer to the
merits" 21- , is the problem of conflicts law to be discussed
in the next chapter.
II.
1.

MuNICIPAL CoNCEPT

Main Features of Limitation

The specialists of conflicts law sometimes seem to be
entirely unaware of the fact that limitation of action has
the same structure under all the statutes of the world.
Whatever the influence which the Corpus Juris or the
statutist doctrines may or may not have exercised on
English courts, it is a strange mistake to attribute the rift
in the conflicts rules to a substantial cause. There are local
deviations from the over-all picture 22 but, roughly, the
institution is universally organized on the following lines.
(a) Lapse of time. The period of limitation starts to
run when the cause of action is completed (actio est nata).
The march of time is suspended by infancy and other individual incapacity to litigate. It is interrupted, in the language of Justinian, when debtors "acknowledge the debt
whether by payment or otherwise" (debitum agnoverint vel
per solutionem vel per alios modos, C. J. 8, 39, 4).
(b) Defensive remedy. Contrary to original ideas, the
court takes notice of a completed limitation only if the defendant avails himself of the bar, in the form prescribed
2 0 Unanimous opinion, relating to the "peremption d'instance," see for
France, 2 ARMIN JON 345, VALERY 1010; for Italy, DE NovA 120, 193 n. 1;
for the Netherlands, MuLDER 232. In Louisiana, the term seems to be used
as equivalent to a time period destroying the right, cf. Hollingsworth v.
Schanland ( 1924) 155 La. 825, 99 So. 613, that is, "decheance" in the French
language, below.
2 1 Wooo, 1 Limitations 304 § 63a.
22 For the United States, cf., e.g., Credit Manual of Commercial Laws
( 1945) 267.
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by the procedural law, such as a special plea. 23 The German
Code, emphasizing the substantive character of this defense,
expresses it in the terms of a private law "exception," that
is, the debtor's right to refuse performance, 24 which operates outside judicial proceedings as well as in court.
Even apart from extrajudicial acts employing the defense, the procedural disposition of the effect of limitation
is a most characteristic point of the law of limitation. Under
the influence of moralistic and natural law conceptions, it
has become traditional to explain that it must be left to
the conscience of the debtor whether he will resort to a
defense regarded as immoral by some social philosophers.
However, barons returning from exile after the English
civil war, probably had good reasons for acknowledging
their old debts. 25 Preserving credit, desire for a test, and
other considerations looking to the future usually are active
motives.
With all statutes recognizing the defendant's right to
dispose of the bar, 26 it is difficult to believe that the state
claims a paramount interest in avoiding stale claims so as
to insist on the application of its own statute of limitation.
Certainly, courts are glad to be spared the difficult ascertainment of old causes of action. But a public policy so
stringent as has been vindicated in support of the Angl~
American theory is scarcely reconcilable with the fact that
the protection of the statute is in the discretion of the defendant. As it is said in France:
Prescription is not absolutely a means of public policy; it
does not go beyond the sphere of the particular interests
Woon, I Limitations (ed. 3) § 7·
BGB. § 222 par. I.
25 This is a suggestion by HESSEL E. YNTEMA.
26 England: See POLLOCK, Contracts 638 f.
United States: 53 C. J. S. 958 § 24 n. 49; 34 Am. J. 3I8 § 405 n. 9·
Austria: Allg. BGB. § I 50 I.
France: C. C. art. 2223; cf. DALLoz, Repert., Prescription Civile Nos. 47 ff.
Germany: BGB. § 222: right to refuse performance.
23

24
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of the creditor and debtor. Moreover, it involves an evaluation of moral nature; certain consciences would not admit
they were liberated without having paid, whatever the age
of the debt. If, then, the debtor insists on paying, it would
be wrong to consider that he contracts a new debt or that
he makes a gift to the creditor .27
(c) Waiver. This character of the bar by limitation is
confirmed by the almost universal rules that a debtor is free
to waive a completed limitation by agreement 28 and the
widely held opinion that parties may in advance agree on a
shorter period than the statutory period. 29 Although the
codes usually do not allow the parties to enlarge the period
or to waive the bar before it is acquired, courts have often
favored party autonomy. 30
(d) Effect. What is the effect of a judgment dismissing
the claim on the ground of limitation? Fine considerations
of this problem were expounded by Story in his personal
remarks in Leroy v. Crowninshield. 31 But in his treatise,
Story borrowed from Boullenois 32 the idea that such judgment merely abates the action, since it denies but the
remedy. 33 This was mistaken. The old scholars disputed the
RADOUANT in Planiol et Ripert, 7 Traite Pratique 715 § 1380.
Austria: AIIg. BGB. § 1502.
France: PLANIOL et RIPERT, 7 Traite Pratique § 1387.
Italy: C. C. ( 1942) art. 2937 par. I.
Switzerland: C. Obi. art. 141 par. I (a contrario).
Anticipatory waiver of prescription is invalid.
29 United States: Order of Travelers v. Wolfe (1947) 331 U.S. 586, 6o8 n.
20 emphasizes the extraterritorial effect.
France: Constant practice; BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE et TISSIER § 96; "an
astonishing permission," PLANIOL et RIPERT, 7 Traite Pratique § 1349·
Germany: BGB. § 225 sent. 2.
Italy: On the controversy, see DE NovA 98 n. 2.
Switzerland: On the possibility of extinguishing the debt of contractual
limitation, see 0SER-SCHOENENBERGER art. 129 n. I.
3 For France, see PLANIOL et RIPERT, 7 Traite Pratique 683 § 1350.
On evasion through choice of law, permitted by German courts, see infra
p. 515 n. 103, cf. p. 503.
31 (1820) 2 Mason I5I, Fed. Cas. No. 8269.
32 BoULLENOIS, I Traite de Ia personnalite et de Ia realite des loix (1766)
82 ch. 3 obs. 23 p. 530.
33 STORY § 576.
27

2s

°
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question whether the defense of prescription belonged to the
exceptiones ordinatoriae (procedural) or to the decisoriae
(substantive). The first were objections to the court taking
cognizance of the complaint because a prerequisite condition of the proceeding was missing. The latter exceptions
went to the merits. Some authors considered prescription
as substantive for the reason that it was an exceptio peremptoria; this argument was correctly refuted by Boullenois,
whom Story quoted comprehensively. 34 But on the other
hand, this exception was also not to be stamped as procedural because of its preliminary character, i.e., preventing
the court from looking into the other merits. 35
Since Baldus, old and modern Italian and French authors
have prevailingly categorized this exception among the
decisoriae and the judgment as going to the merits. 36
Boullenois was part of a minority to which, it is true, Ulric
Huber belongs. 37 Story38 was perhaps misled by Pothier's
remark 39 that in France the judgment of dismissal took the
form of ufin de nonrecevoir." The category of a nonreceivable demand half-way between an action ((mal fondee" and
an action udeboutee d'instance" corresponds with defenses
various in nature, which were joined together by the French
science of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries for certain procedural ends. 40 It happens that this complex group
34

STORY § 579 p. 720, giving a translation.
Correctly, Wooo, r Limitation 304 § 63a.
On Baldus, Salicetus, Paulus de Castro, Dumoulin, and the entire literature to the end of the r6th century, MICHEL 27-31; Burgundus, MICHEL 39;
the great majority of successors of d' Argentre, id. 63 f.; the 19th century,
id. 137-142.
37 HUBER, De conflictu legum § 7 (Guthrie tr. Savigny 511). On VoET,
father and son, see infra Ch. 52 ns. rz, 13.
38 STORY § sSo and notes.
89 PoTHIER, Prescriptions, Introduction, sect. II § 30 par. I ; Obligations
§ 687. Pothier did say, however, that the creditor conserves his claim but
has no action any more, a proposition that puzzled Bugnet; cf. PoTHIER's
description of fins de non-recevoir, Procedure Civile, sect. I § 35·
4 0 See the informative article by BEQUET, "Etude critique de Ia notion de
fin de non-recevoir en droit prive," 47 Revue Trim. D. Civ. (1947) 133.
35
86
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of defenses, affected by a procedural reform of 1935,41 has
recently been the object of a new discussion and apparently
approaches its dissolution. There is no doubt where in this
new development prescription belongs. The Court of Cassation has expressly declared it to be "a means of defense on
the merits" (uun moyen de defense au fond") .42
This is the universal practice, including the United
States. 43 Only because in England and this country limitation has territorial effect, this res judicata is said to be
restricted to the forum. 44 Correspondingly, when an action
is dismissed by a foreign court on the ground of limitation,
the action may be brought again at the forum. 45 Evidently,
this reasoning is wrong when the foreign court means to
dismiss the suit with prejudice.
Merely "procedural" obstacles to a favorable decision
have no effect on the cause of action. With the traditional
antithesis of remedy and debt or cause of action, there can
be no doubt that a judgment on the merits affects more than
the remedy.
Perhaps, the question may be raised how a dismissal on
the ground of failure of jurisdiction should be characterized.
But thus far, this question seems outside discussion of our
subject.
(e) Natural obligation. Finally, in all systems the true
kind of limitation leaves intact some important effects of
the debt. There remains in the language of natural law and
Lord Mansfield 46 a "moral" obligation, usually designated
41

Decret-Loi, Oct. 30, 1935, D. I935+42I; C.
Cass. civ. (Feb. 23, 1944) S. I944.J.II7 at
43 United States: WooD, I Limitations 304 §
1538 § 726.
Civil law: MICHEL 144.
44 Bank of United States v. Donnally (1834)
Buffalo Drydock Co. (C. C. A. zd 1933) 67 F.
330·
45 Harris v. Quine (1869) L. R. 4 Q. B. 652;
46 See 8 HOLDSWORTH 26.
42

Civ. Proc. art. 192, amended.
120 with note by MoREL.
63a; FREEMAN, 2 Judgments

8 Pet. S. C. 361; Warner v.
(2d) 540; CHEATHAM, Cases
DICEY 856 No. 14.
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by the Romanistic term a natural, or by some pandectists
and Sir Frederic Pollock an imperfect, obligation. The
debtor may still discharge the barred debt by payment, not
as a gift; he cannot recover such payment at all or only
under specified conditions. He can revive it to full effect
by a new promise or an acknowledgment (at common law
without new consideration) ;47 also, the debt may be secured
by pledge, mortgage, suretyship, or insurance, etc.
Anglo-American lawyers have assumed that these residual effects are due to the fact that the debt is intact and
only the remedy is affected. American decisions have, for
instance, concluded that the creditor may still claim foreclosure of a mortgage as only the remedy is alleged to be
eliminated. 48 But the German Code which more than any
other has accentuated that the debt itself is affected by the
exception, fully recognizes this particular effect after the
debt is barred. 49 Legal effects cannot depend on how we
describe the weakening of the creditor's right. "A statute
transforming an enforceable debt into a natural obligation,
is not a procedural rule. " 50
2.

Limitation and Preclusion

Modern Continental laws have developed in contrast
with limitation (prescription) a concept of preclusive
periods of time ( decheance or delai fixe, Ausschlussfrist).
Preclusion seems to me a good term to indicate this group.
Its most typical characteristics are that the time runs without suspension and interruption, as in the ancient actiones
47 On the change of background in history, see HOLDSWORTH, 39 Law Q.
Rev. (1923) 146 and 8 History 39·
48 First Nat'l Bank of Madison v. Kolbeck (1945) 247 Wis. 462, 19 N. W.
(zd) 908, Note, 161 A. L. R. (1946) 886. The concurring vote of Fowler, J.,
is significant: as long as there is no payment of the debt, there is no extinguishment of it; without a debt there can be no mortgage.
49 BGB. § 223 par. I.
50 DREYFUS, L'acte juridique en droit prive international (These 1904) 377·
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perpetuae, and that judicial notice is taken of the preclusion
of action, at least when the lapse of time is on the face of
the pleadings. 51 Usually these periods are short and intended to precipitate some act such as giving notice of
defects, consent, or an overdue performance. Where the
bringing of an action is conditioned by a time limitation,
the distinction of this group from limitation is the more
delicate as many transitory types exist in between. Suspension because of impossibility of suing, for instance, may be
excluded in limitation cases and allowed in preclusion cases.
Each single statute must be properly investigated. 52 Continuous attempts, it is true, have been made in the common
law countries, in conflicts law, to distinguish an operation
of the law "extinguishing the right" from limitation as
restricting the exercise of the right, a contrast that has
retained a few followers also on the Continent. 53 This served
to establish the possibility for a period of time to affect the
right. But the formula is wrong.
What is more, conflicts law cannot establish any distinction between the varying shades of municipal institutions. No satisfactory line can be drawn to determine which
of the foreign statutes responds to the usual, domestic, type
of limitation of "action" and which not. Carrying out such
a distinction "would lead to incertitude and injustice." 54 It
is unnecessary if all limitations are classified into the scope
of the law governing the contract. 55
Evidently, the convenience of a simple comprehensive
51

France: PLANIOL et RIPERT, 7 Traite Pratique 735 § 1402 f.
Germany: ENNECCERUS, Vol. I, I § 2II III.
Italy: C. C. (1942) arts. 2964 ff.; ENRICO GIUSINI, Decadenza e prescrizione
(Univ. Torino, Memorie dell'lstituto Giuridico II No. 54) 63.
52 BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE et TISSIER §§ 36 ff.; PLANIOL et RIPERT, 7 Traite
Pratique 737· VAN BRAKEL, I Nederl. Verbintnissenrecht ( 1942) 263.
53 12 AUBRY et RAU 534, 535 n. 9; BAUDRY-LACANTINER!ll et T!SS!ER 35·
Apparently also MoDicA, I Teoria della decadenza (1906) 178 (according
to GrusiNI, supra n. 51, at n).
54 BATIFFOL 455 § 578.
55 MICHEL 150 ff.; DE NovA 192 (120).
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rule has also motivated a provision of the Treaty of Versailles. Each state participating in a clearing of prewar
debts was declared to be responsible for the payment of
debts due by its nationals, except-among other cases"in a case where at the date of the outbreak of the war
the debt was barred by the laws of prescription in force
in the country of the debtor." 56 This English draft, intending to reproduce .the French version (ula dette hait
prescrite"), included not only a "debt due" in the case of
a limitation of action under English concepts but also all
other time restrictions. 57
In American law, limitation of action is sharply distinguished in theory from time periods for the exercise of
a right, the lapse of which extinguishes the right. But in
practice the difficulties of classification are certainly not less
than in Europe. Where the distinction has become significant in conflicts law the result is unhappy. 58
3· Right and Remedy
Although customarily used by Anglo-American courts
and noncritical lawyers, the antithesis of right and remedy
was employed in the nineteenth century only by a few Continental advocates of the lex fori. 59 In fact, the entire idea is
unique. Who would describe the debt of a minor as a right
unimpaired by the fact that he cannot be sued on it?
For a sound construction of the legal phenomenon presented in our case of an actionless debt, its two sides ought
to be considered. A debt that can be enforced in court if the
defense of limitation is not affirmatively pleaded, certainly
56

Treaty of Versailles, Annex § 4 to art. 296 (b) ; Annex § 4 par. I.
RABEL, Rechtsvergleichung vor den Gemischten Schiedsgerichtshofen
( 1924) 55 f.; followed by WuNDERLICH, supra n. 3, 492.
58 Cf. GooDRICH 203 on the difficulty of determining whether a limitation
is on the right; and infra pp. 507-508.
59 RADOUANT in Planiol et Ripert, 7 Traite Pratique 654 § 1325 remarks
that this is a rather muddled idea.
57
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survives the running of the period of time. 60 But if it is
awkward after the lapse of time to deny the existence of a
right, it is still less reasonable to think it unaffected by the
absence of the faculty of unconditional judicial enforcement. The correct description of the situation is very simple.
uLe droit du crediteur n' est pas iteint mais transforme." 61
The German and Swiss Codes express the same truth by
stating that limitation of action affects the "claim." 62
A rapidly increasing number of leading Anglo-American
scholars have professed their disapproval of the procedural
or remedial theory. Lorenzen has expounded his criticism in
an authoritative article. 63 Westlake was in opposition. 64
Falconbridge calls both right and remedy ambiguous and
misleading terms. 65 Stumberg considers procedure to be the
method of presenting the facts, whereas limitation concerns
the legal effect of a fact upon a right. 66 Cheshire 67 and
Beckett, 68 as well as Goodrich 69 and several judges 70 have
declared to the same effect. From Story in his first decision 71
so PoLLOCK, Contracts (ed. 12) 504.
61 RADOUANT in Planiol et Ripert, 7 Traite Pratique 726 § I 393·
62 BGB. § 194; cf. ENNECCERUS-NIPPERDEY § 212.
Switzerland: See OsER-SCHOENENBERGER 640 f.
63 LORENZEN, "The Statute of Limitation and the Conflict of Laws," 28
Yale L. ]. (1918) 492, Selected Articles 352.
64 WESTLAKE § 238. See also GuTHRIE in his translation of Savigny 267 ff.
65 FALCONBRIDGE, Conflict of Laws 242.
66 STUMBERG 141.
67 CHESHIRE (ed. 3) 830: "English law is at the moment unfortunately
committed" to this view.
68
BECKETT, 15 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1934) 66, criticized by MENDELSSOHN BARTHOLDY, 16 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1935) at 31 n. 2, by
arguments opposed in the present book.
69 GooDRICH 201.
70
Gilpin v. Plummer (C. C. D. C. 1812) Fed. Cas. No. 5451; Cochburn,
C. ]., in Harris v. Quine ( 1869) L. R. 4 Q. B. 652. See also Note, 9 U. of
Chi. L. Rev. ( 1942) 723.
71 LeRoy v. Crowninshield (1820) 2 Mason 151.
A curious attempt to refute Story's doubts has been made by Mr. Justice
Wayne in M'Eimoyle v. Cohen ( 1839) according to the report by ANGELL
59, but the passage is not included in 13 Pet. S. C. 324, 327 (38 U. S. 169,
172). Angell's praise of these polemics against the better informed Story
seems unaccountable.
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to Wharton 72 and the just-mentioned writers, the rule has
been upheld exclusively because it "is now too firmly settled
to be shaken" (Wharton). But knowing the truth ought
to have consequences.
American doctrine has utilized this inveterate antithesis
of right and remedy for various purposes, but quite unnecessarily. Thus, the requirement that a time limit on the
"remedy" must be pleaded specially, has not been extended
to the defense of "extinction" of the right by lapse of time. 73
In reality, the difference is that between an exception opposed to a correct cause of action and the denial of the
cause of action. Both positions are taken in purely procedural manner. They might not have been distinguished
at all if the historical special treatment of limitation of
action had not been looked upon with disfavor.
Also the fact that federal courts in diverse citizenship
cases have now to follow the substantive law of the state
courts but preserve their procedural rules, has nothing to
do with the opposition of right and remedy. The proof is
that the state statutes on limitation apply. 74 Even when a
federal statute creates a liability without adding a time
limitation, the general state statute is resorted to. 75 Federal
law may incorporate state "remedies" as well as "substance."
2 WHARTON 1271 § 545·
Lewis v. Mo. Pacific R. Co. (1929) 324 Mo. 266, 23 S. W. (2d) 10o;
and see 54 C. J. S. 491 § 357 n. 21.
74 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York (1945) 326 U. S. 99, 105, 107, III; see
cases cited by Goodrich, }., in Anderson v. Andrews (C. C. A. 3d 1946)
156 F. (2d) 972; PUTMAN, 1945 Annual Survey 53, 1946 id. 62.
75 Federal antitrust laws:
Seaboard Terminals Corp. v. Standard Oil
Co. of N. }. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1938) 24 F. Supp. 1018; federal liability of
National Bank stockholders: Helmers v. Anderson (C. C. A. 6th 1946) 156
F. (2d) 47; Anderson v. Andrews (C. C. A. 3d 1946) 156 F. (2d) 972; and
see Holmberg v. Armbrecht ( 1946) 327 U. S. 392; cf. PUTMAN, 1946 Annual
Survey 62.
72
73
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4· Contrasting Legislative Policies
It has been an easy temptation to explain the AngloAmerican doctrine by a peculiar conception of the purpose
of limitation. Following other propositions of this kind,
it has recently been said that in civil law an exception based
on limitation flows from the obligation itself, but at common
law a plea of limitation is made in the interest of justice. 76
This contrast begs the question of the conflicts law. The
municipal regulations contain nothing to cause any difference in the relation between limitation statutes and conceptions of justice.
Another recent writer asserts that a deep-seated difference exists throughout French, English, and German laws
between short and long periods of limitation; although short
limitations are unmistakably a part of substantive law, the
long periods, in his opinion, concern procedure. 77 Again,
no proof is afforded.
Indeed, as usual, it is not true that different policies
govern in the several jurisdictions or in the variants of the
same institution. All municipal laws in this matter are
guided by a complex of motives. It is in the public interest
that peaceful situations should not be disturbed after a long
time. A debtor should not be forced to answer claims of
obscured origin. He should not have to preserve instruments, receipts, and accounts for an unlimited time. Witnesses and documents may disappear. The courts should not
be troubled with difficult determinations of fact. The creditor
may have been negligent in the enforcement or be deemed
to have waived his claim. The debt may have been discharged in fact without receipt. This mixture of considera76 MENDELSSOHN BARTHOLDY, "Delimitation of Right and Remedy," 16 Brit.
Year Book Int. Law (1935) 20 at 31 n. 2. He adds another distinction, contrary to the facts found here.
77 PHILONENKo, "De Ia prescription extinctive en droit international prive,"
Clunet 1936, 259, 513 at 527, 532, 545·
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tions prevails everywhere without discernible variants. 78 It
also colors all particular statutes with only one known
exception. 79

5. Comparative Conclusion
In municipal law, limitation of action always affects the
right, and the degree of this effect is no suitable criterion
for distinctions. In this domain of internal effect, statutes
of limitation belong to substantive, as contrasted with
adjective, law. If the common law theory as formulated by
past undeveloped scholarship is to be justified, and not
respected simply because it exists, the reasons must be found
in the field of conflicts policy.
On the side of the literature supporting the Continental
theory, however, some unfounded views have been expressed. It has often been claimed that in contrast to England, Continental limitation of action "extinguishes" the
obligation 80 and this term, as used in fact in the French
Civil Code, has found much favor in other codes. 81 But as
we have seen, it can only be said in French law that the defendant may avail himself of the bar and that the judgment
dismissing the action is res judicata on the merits. There
are little-noted problems in modern law concerning the time
when the obligation finally becomes ineffective in and outside
of court. Yet an obligation enforceable so long as the debtor
does not react, or generating any of the effects of a natural
obligation, is not dead.
It has also been contended in supporting the Continental
This is also the opinion of BATIFFOL 455 § 576.
Infra Ch. 53 p. 502 on French C. C. art. 2275.
80 E.g., DIENA, 1 Dir. Com. Int. 443; DE NovA 132.
8 1 C. C. art. 1234: "Les obligations s'eteignent. . . . Et par Ia prescription,
qui fera !'objet d'un titre particulier."
The new Italian Code starts its provisions on "prescrizione e decadenza,"
saying "Every right is extinguished by prescription, when the holder does
not exercise it during the time determined by law," art. 2934·
78

79
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conflicts rules that the debt carries in itself from its beginning the germ of its destruction through lapse of time. 82
This argument could correctly be denied from the American
side; it is a "false premise that there is some immutable,
preordained duration" of the effectiveness of a debt. 83 The
proof is that the law governing limitation may change,
which is an important point for the doctrine of conflicts.
In view of the structure of this legal institution, there is
also no reason in the arguments of Savigny that failure to
incur the lapse of time is a condition of the validity of the
obligation, 84 or of Laine that limitation is a modality inherent in the obligation. 85
In fact, the right of a debtor to bar the action of his
creditor, by invoking its limitation by lapse of time, is always
a substantive right, even though the lapse of time does not
extinguish the claim and is not inherent in the debt.
82 E.g., I FRANKENSTEIN 595; DE NOVA 132 § 24.
83 AILES, supra n. 4, 500.
84 SAVIGNY § 574 at notes (t) ff.; his specified arguments, however, are
still excellent.
8 5 LAINE, 19 Bull. Soc. Legis!. Camp. (1889-90) 55·
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Statutes of Limitation: Comparative Conflicts
Law
I.
I.

THE CONFLICTS THEORIES

Procedural Theory

(a) Anglo-American principle. The English courts have
laid down the principle generally followed in all common
law jurisdictions as well as in Scotland. 1 An English court
applies exclusively the English statutes of limitation. An
action barred by these is not allowed, even though the claim
is governed by foreign law under which no bar is incurred ;2
correspondingly, a claim barred only under the governing
foreign law is admissible ;3 this even when the claim has been
dismissed abroad on the ground of limitation of action
there. 4 The abundant American authority has unhesitatingly
followed this model. 5
(b) Former Continental following. The territorial conception, which the English approach suggests, once induced
numerous scholars and courts in France, Germany, and else1

DICEY, Rule 203 (3) and p. 856; GooDRICH 201 § 82.
British Linen Co. v. Drummond {1830) 10 B. & C. 903; The Alliance
Bank of Simla v. Carey (188o) 5 C. P. Div. 429·
Scotland: Don v. Lippmann {1837) 5 Cl. & F. 1.
Canada: Rutledge v. U. S. Savings & Loan Co. (1906) 37 S. C. R. 546;
Quaker Oats Co. v. Denis (1915) 8 W. W. R. 877, 24 D. L. R. 226.
3 Huber v. Steiner {1835) 2 Bing. N.C. 202.
Scotland: Fergusson v. Fyffe {1846) 8 Cl. & F. 121.
Canada: Bowes Co. v. American Ry. Express Co. (1924) 26 0. W. N. 290.
4 Harris v. Quine {1869) L. R. 4 Q. B. 652.
5 WHARTON 1245 § 535 n. 4; MINOR§ 210; 3 BEALE 1620 § 603.1. On the
early cases, see AILES, "Limitation of Actions and the Conflict of Laws," 31
Mich. L. Rev. ( 1933) 474 at 488; Restatement §§ 603, 604.
2
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where, to profess a procedural doctrine. 6 Their influence
has practically disappeared. 7
(c) Present following. It is difficult to ascertain in what
countries the old theory, expressed in decisions and by
writers, has been maintained to the present time. This has
been reported for the Czechoslovakian in contrast to the
Austrian construction of their identical codes, 8 and is probably the practically prevailing attitude in the Soviet Union. 9
It has also been contended for Hungari 0 and the Islamic
states. 11
2.

The Situs Theory

It has been taken for granted since Story's writings that
the Anglo-American conflicts theory in this matter continues
the doctrine of the Dutch statutists. This is not entirely
exact. And the true story seems to explain the strange attitude preserved by the French courts. Paul Voet, discussing
the standing question involving the case where the statutes
of limitation at the domicils of the debtor and the creditor
state different periods of time, gave this opinion:
"Respondeo, quia actor sequitur forum rei, ideo extraneus
petens a reo, quod sibi debetur, sequetur terminum statuti
praescriptum actioni in foro rei. Et quia hoc statutum non
6 See the list of writers and decisions in MICHEL III If.; WEiss, 4 Traite
399 n. I; MICHEL, IO Repert. 296 Nos. 33, 34· The most influential of these
writers was LABBE, Note, S. I869.1.49.
7 Infra n. 30. The German courts, applying German common law, defied
the procedural theory of the Prussian Supreme Court, FoRSTER-Eccxus, I
Preussisches Privatrecht 67.
8 LAUFKE, 7 Repert. 208 No. I76.
9 MAKAROV, Precis 262 f.; and more simply, for interterritorial law, in
7 Z.ausi.PR. (I933) I65.
1 Kurie P. IV 464I/I933, II Z.ausi.PR. {1937) I73 No. 4, in a special
case; and generally as reported in OLG. Miinchen (Feb. 2, I938) H. R. R.
I938, I402. However, SzA.szy, Droit international prive compare (I940) 553
mentions Hungary among countries following the law of the contract.
11 2 ARMIN JON 350.
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exserit vires extra territorium statuentis, ideo, etiam reo
alibi convento, tale statutum objicere non poterit." 12
The first sentence says that the court at the debtor's
domicil applies its own statute of limitation because it is the
law of the place where the debtor must be sued. This is confirmed by Jan Voet:
" . . . spectandum videtur tempus, quod obtinet ex statuto
loci, in quo reus commoratur," 13
and explained by the latter through reference to his distinction between movable and immovable property. 14 A
personal action is a movable, hence deemed situated at the
domicil of the creditor. However, for the purposes of bankruptcy proceedings and limitation of action, the contrary
position is preferable because the judge of the place where
the creditor must sue the debtor, has the power to prevent
the creditor from exacting the debt:
"N am et debitum necdum exactum magis esse in potestate
judicis, ubi debitor, quam ubi creditor domicilium fovet vel
ex eo manifestum est, quod creditor forum competens et
judicem debitoris sequi debeat."
This discussion, couched in traditional terms of a standard
problem, is not yet based on the procedural construction of
limitation, but clearly on the doctrine placing immovables
under the lex rei sitae, movable chattels under the lex domicilii of the owner, and disputing whether personal actions
belong to the latter group. In his second sentence, Paul Voet
started to consider a case outside of the alternative of the
creditor's and the debtor's domicils, where the debtor is
sued at a place other than his domicil, but he contented him12 PAUL VoET, De statutis, s. IO, cap. un., § I, citing only GABRIEL, Commun.
conclus., lib. 6, conclus. 11.
13 }AN VoET, Comm. ad Pand., lib. I4, tit. 3, § I2.
14 /d., lib. I, tit. 8, § 30.
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self with the statement that the statute of the debtor has no
application! 5
In theN etherlands, it was only Huber who on the strength
of two Frisian decisions and contrasting the forum with the
lex loci contractus rather than with the domicil of the
creditor, acceded to the theory that ((praescriptio" like
((executio" does not belong to the "validity" of the contract
but to the time and mode of bringing an action. 16
In France, Boullenois, the chief authority relied upon by
Story, argued on the lines of the situs theory, leaving it
doubtful whether he recommended the lex fori or rather
the law of the domicil of the debtor. 17 With him, the two
doctrinal currents, of situs and procedure, united in a mixed
flow of ambiguous reasoning18 which persisted in some
French writings throughout the nineteenth century and has
prevailed in the French courts up to the present. Quite
clearly, Pothier at one place follows the situs theory ;19 it
should not be controversiaP0 that this passage means to
apply the law of the creditor's domicil.
In this literature, the principle that the debtor's ordinary
forum is at his domicil has been kept in mind. 21 As in the
doctrine of assignment, 22 however, the emphasis has shifted
to the protection of the debtor; the defense of limitation
is granted in his interest, and therefore is to be based on
the law of his domiciJ.2 3 Some French courts 24 and consis15 Contrarily, MICHEL 40 reads this passage as though it declared expressly the lex fori competent and indicated the basic theory of both Voets.
16 HUBER, De conflictu legum § 7·
17 MICHEL s6.
18 "Au XIX• siecle !'equivoque persiste," MICHEL 91.
19 PoTHIER, Prescriptions, Pt. II art. V § 251, cf. supra n. 1.
20 See for the controversy, e.g., SURVILLE 384; VALERY 1010; 2 ARMIN JON
346; BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE et TISSIER 783 § 977· It is well known to historians
that compilers are in danger of following divergent views according to the
predecessors they have before their eyes.
21
BROCHER, Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (1873) 142; 2 BROCHER 408.
22 Supra pp. 391-392, 398, 420.
23 For the French authors, see MICHEL 91 ff.; DE NovA 101, 103 § 19. In
Germany, GRAWEIN, Verjiihrung und Befristung (188o) 56, 201; THoL,
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25

tently the Court of Cassation, repeating the same words,
have sanctioned this view. When the question arose what
time should be taken to ascertain the law, the debtor's
domicil at the commencement of the suit, rather than that
at the time of contracting, was held decisive. 26 No doubt,
this doctrine approaches closely the application of the law
of the forum. Criticism, therefore, points out the same
defects as are charged to the lex fori theory: the rule interferes with the natural scope of the law governing the obligation and allows the debtor arbitrarily to choose the applicable law. 27 Also, the effect of prescription is to liberate
the debtor but not to protect him. 28
At present, no theoretical follower of this rule seems to
exist. The classification of limitation of action, in the meaning of the French courts themselves, is very probably that
it is a substantive institution and a protection of the debtor
rather than an application of lex fori. 29
3· Substantive Theory
For decades the overwhelming authority of the European
Continent and Latin America has considered limitation of
action as a part of substantive law with extraterritorial
applicability. 80 Agreement is practically complete that the
law of the contract governs.
Einleitung in das deutsche Privatrecht (1850) § 85 n. 9· As an optional
defense, 2 BAR 101.
24 NIBOYET § 709 recognized four diverse judicial solutions, including those
of the 19th century.
25 Cass. civ. (Jan. 13, 1869) S. 1869.1.49; (July 28, 1884) D. r885.1.300;
(Jan. 9, 1934) D. 1934.1.22, S. 1934·1.201, Revue Crit. 1934, 915, Clunet
1934, 672; (July r, 1936) Revue Crit. 1937, 175, Clunet 1937, 302; Cour
Paris (Jan. 13, 1947) Revue Crit. 1947, 297, and Note, BATIFFOL.
26 Cour Paris (July 6, 1937) Clunet 1938, 78.
27 See lastly, Note, BATIFFOL, to Cour Paris (Jan. 13, 1947) Revue Crit.
1947, 297· The arguments go back to Hertzius, Wachter, and Savigny. See
WALKER 325.
28 2 ARMIN JON § 158 (2); see especially DIENA, 1 Dir. Com. Int. 441.
29 See following note.
3 Citations have been collected by MICHEL 137-142; LoRENZEN, 28 Yale
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(a) Antiquated theories. In the long history of this
subject, various suggestions have been advanced in favor
of some special laws. The sheer variety of all these theories
aroused a false sense of superiority in some advocates of
the lex fori, but they now belong to the past. As there have
been frequent critical reviews of these opinions, 31 a few
words will suffice.
L. J. ( 1919) 493, 496 n. 21; AILES, supra n. 5, 478. See in addition the cit a·
tions for:
Canada, Quebec: Wilson v. Demers (Montreal 1868) 12 L. C. ]. 222;
see, however, on the provisions of Quebec C. C., "a complex hybrid," 3
jOHNSON 596 n. I.
Austria: WALKER 325; OGH. (Dec. 29, 1930) SZ. xu No. 315.
Belgium: Inconsistent, see MICHEL 10, some courts following, with the
French courts, the law of the debtor's domicil.
Denmark: BoRUM and MEYER, 6 Repert. 225 No. 84, citing a Supreme
Court decision (June 19, 1925).
Estonia: App. Tallinn (Nov. 20, 1931) Clunet 1936, 665.
France: Cass. civ. (July 1, 1936) Clunet 1937, 302, Revue Crit. 1937, 175;
NIBOYET 824 § 706, Revue Crit. 1934, 915; BATIFFOL § 585 and Traite 543
§ 541; the Notes (by PRUDHOMME?) in Clunet 1937, 302; 1938, 278 and 279;
LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE (ed. 4) § 358.
Germany: Cases from 14 ROHGE. 258 to (July 6, 1934) 145 RGZ. 121,
Clunet 1935, 1190; (March 20, 1936) 151 RGZ. 201; I RGR. Kom., Vorbem.
before § 194; RIEZLER in I Staudinger n. 9 before§ 194; LEWALD §§ 96-10o;
RAAPE, 2 D. IPR. 273·
Greece: Aeropag (1931) No. 21,42 Themis 194; (1934) No. 303,45 Themis
794; 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 131 n. II.
Italy: Cass. (Jan. 29, 1936) Foro !tal. 1936 I 1033, Giur. Ital. 1936 I 202,
Riv. Dir. Proc. Civ. 1936 II 100; (March 6, 1940) Riv. Dir. Pub. 1940 II
467, cf. Note, BRUNELLI, id. 468.
The Netherlands: App. den Haag (March 15, 1910) W. 8984, I VAN
HASSELT 301; Rb. Rotterdam (Nov. I, 1917) N. J. 1918, 952, I VAN HASSELT
302; Rb. Utrecht (April 4, 1928) W. 11895, MULDER 232; App. Amsterdam
(Oct. 24, 1946) N.J. 1947, No. 229 (English law of the contracts).
Norway: CHRISTIANSEN, 6 Repert. 580 No. 159; S. Ct. (June 12, 1928)
NRt. 1928, 646, 7 Z.ausi.PR. (1933) 946.
Poland: S. Ct. (May 30, 1933) Clunet 1936, 702.
Sweden: S. Ct. (Jan. 29, 1929) Nytt Jur. Ark. 1929, 1; 1930, 692 No. 198;
see BAGGE in Festskrift tillagnad Erik Marks von Wiirtemberg (1931) 19
(cf. 5 Z.ausi.PR. (1931) 740, 7 id. (1933) 933 No.2).
Switzerland: (Nov. 13, 1886) 12 BGE. 682; (Jan. 19, 1912) 38 id. II 36o;
(Sept. 26, 1933) 59 BGE. II 355, 8 Z.ausi.PR. (1934) 825; (Dec. 5, 1940)
66 id. II 234; (Dec. 3, 1946) 72 BGE. II 405, 414.
Treaty of Montevideo on Int. Civ. Law (1889 and 1940) art. 51.
C6digo Bustamante, arts. 229, 295.
Brazil: PONTES DE MIRANDA, Recueil 1932 I 625.
31 Notably, WILHELM MuLLER, Die Klageverjahrung im internationalen
Privatrecht (Diss. Erlangen 1898); DIENA, I Dir. Com. Int. 439 If. (merely
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Law of the debtor's domicil. In addition to the abovementioned French views regarding the significance of the
debtor's domicil, it is worth remembering that during a certain period the Scotch courts "looked not to the debtor's
domicil at the time of the action but rather to his domicil
during the whole currency of the term of limitation." 32
Scandinavian courts, of course, include limitation of action
in the law of the debtor's domicil 33 because they consider
this the law of the contract. 34
The nationality of the debtor was taken as a test by the
special provision of the Peace Treaty of Versailles which
puzzled us in the 192o's. 35 The treaty excluded from government guaranty in clearing proceedings the debts "barred
by the laws of prescription in force in the country of the
debtor." Evidently it was felt necessary to establish a conflicts rule otherwise lacking in the international forum. Significance of the debtor state's law for the liability of the
same state may have seemed natural.
Lex loci solutionis. The literature has amply dealt with
the idea of Troplong that loss of action by limitation is a
punishment to the negligent creditor and therefore depends
on the law governing performance 36 and other propositions
to the same effect, that limitation rests upon the presumption
that the payment has in fact been made at the place where
it was due. 37
repeated by MASSART, Della prescnz10ne estmtlva in dir. int. priv., Pisa
1930) ; MICHEL and DE NovA, supra Ch. 52 n. 1.
32 Lord Justice Clerk McQueen in Cheswell v. York Buildings Co. ( 1792)
Bell Oct. 364, 377, Mor. Diet. 4528; GuTHRIE in Savigny tr. at z69.
33 See, e.g., the Norwegian S. Ct. decision, supra n. 30; a Danish decision
of 1932, 7 Z.ausi.PR. ( 1933) 923 No. 3·
34 Vol. II p. 474 n. 178.
35 DoLLE, Das materielle Ausgleichsrecht des Versailler Friedensvertrages
(Berlin 1925) I38-140.
36 TROPLONG, I Prescription § 38. Contra: the authors cited by MICHEL
85 f.; DE NOVA 99·
31
LEHR, 13 Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (1881) 516. Contra: DE NovA 101.
The same result was based on the public interest by 8 LAURENT 334 § 234·
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Such a presumption of a payment is at present a visible
element only in certain short limitations, the model of which
are the provisions of the French Civil Code (articles 227 I
ff.) that teachers, innkeepers, physicians, attorneys, shopkeepers, etc. must sue for their fees within six months to two
years; the law assumes that in such cases payment is often
made without receipt. 38 Not even these special provisions
suggest a reason why the place of payment should control
the termination of the debt. They raise another problem,
though. The defense of limitation may be countered by the
plaintiff's tendering an oath "on the question whether the
thing has been really paid" (article 227 5). This procedural
act cannot be produced in a court unfamiliar with the ancient
deferment of oath, 39 while its formalized effect cannot be
entirely reached by ordinary means of evidence. Should,
therefore, the forum substitute its domestic statute, which
usually also prescribes short periods in similar cases ?40
It would seem that rules of the forum on evidence for the
rebuttal of a presumption de facto come nearer to the
applicable provision than a domestic statute of limitation.
Transition from the legal effects of the ancient procedure by
party oath to modern rules of evidence is a well-known historical development analogous to the suggested substitution.
Lex loci contractus. Writers believing that the law of the
place of contracting governs contracts either by natural
law or by the presumable intention of the parties have advocated this device especially for limitation of actions. 41
(b) Lex contractus. By overwhelming consent in most
civil law countries, the law governing the contract as such
controls limitation of action. However, doubts have been
raised respecting the role of party autonomy.
38

See RADOUANT in Planiol et Ripert, 7 Traite Pratique 726 § 1394.
Contra: I FRANKENSTEIN 369 who would have the court use the foreign
procedure.
40 Thus, NEUNER, Der Sinn 124 f.
41 See the citations in DE NovA § 23.
39
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Choice of law by the parties. Two questions must be
distinguished:
If the parties agree on an applicable law for the contract,
does it include limitation of action? This has been wrongly
denied by some writers, even supporters of party autonomy
in general, because of the allegedly imperative effect of the
statutory period of time. Hence, the predestined law, preferably lex loci contractus, re-enters the picture. 42 But imperative municipal law is far from being identical with
stringent public policy. 43
Illustration. Willy and Roger de Perrot concluded in
N eucha tel a contract with the company, Suchard S. A.,
giving them the exclusive right to manufacture and sell the
Suchard products (chocolate, cocoa, and sweets) in the
United States and Canada. The contract provided for the
application of the usages and laws of the United States.
The Swiss Federal Tribunal, therefore, in a suit for breach
of contract, applied American law, identified with the law
of Pennsylvania, to the question of limitation of action,
although the contract was made in Switzerland, the defendant company was Swiss, and the plaintiff had returned
to Switzerland seventeen years before. BG. (March 15,
1949) 75 BGE. II 57, 65.

May the parties stipulate specifically for a special law
to prolong the period of limitation allowed by the law of
the contract? This is a practically important question.
American courts have raised various objections to any party
agreement modifying legal limitations of time for bringing
suits and are prone to override a clause backed by foreign
42 DIENA, I Dir. Com. Int. 444-446; id., 2 Principi 264; MICHEL I 59; French
decisions cited by I FRANKENSTEIN 597 n. I52 seem to join in this view.
43 Infra pp. 5I3 If. Even the French Supreme Court has recognized the
faculty of the parties to eliminate the alleged socially necessary protection
of the debtor by his domiciliary law, by stipulating another law in the contract, Cass. req. (March 5, I928) D. I928.I.8I, S. I929.I.2I7, cf. the reference to this decision by a French tribunal in Clunet I938, 281.
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law but disapproved by local policy. 44 However, such clauses
have been upheld against the lex fori. 45
We have to concentrate on the main subject. 46
II.

CoMPROMISES

(a) Basic Anglo-American exception. From 1726, English
courts recognized in theory that foreign law could discharge
a debt so as to make its enforcement at the forum impossible. 47 The procedural principle, laid down in the leading
cases for limitation, hence, was always accompanied by the
exception that a foreign statute "extinguishing" the substantive right, or imposing "a condition upon the right"
was to be recognized at the forum. 48 This might have resulted in broad application of foreign limitations. 49 But
nothing of this sort developed. In fact, the courts seldom
find foreign general statutes of limitation answering that
description. The writers explain this by observing that
English and American statutes scarcely ever expressly declare the right extinguished, 50 or that the courts are keen
on discovering a reason for not making an exception. 51 This
tendency, we may add, is greatly aided by the formula of
the exception. Genuine statutes of limitation never "ex44 See for the cases, Note, 48 Col. L. Rev. (1948) at qo f., speaking of a
confused picture.
45 See infra ns. 89, 131.
46 For the same reason, no attention will be given to the "saving" and
"tolling" statutes caused by the procedural theory.
47
Burrows v. Jemino (1726) 2 Strange 733, 93 Eng. Re. 815; see for the
subsequent decisions, AILES, supra n. 5, 491.
48 Huber v. Steiner (1835) 2 Bing. N. C. 202, citing STORY who himself
spoke of time limitation extinguishing claim and title, which, as well as his
case material on the distinction between the title and the right of action,
"belongs to property and not to obligation," WESTLAKE § 239·
Scotland: Don v. Lippmann (1837) 5 Cl. & F. 1, 7 Eng. Re. 304.
Canada: Bryson v. Graham (1848) 3 N. S. R. 271, and decisions supra
n. 2.
49
Optimistically so understood by DE NovA n6, construing a system of
twofold characterization.
50
AILES, supra n. 5, 493·
51 STUMBERG 143·
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tinguish" the right, even though they may use this expression. Thus the statute of Louisiana, identical with the
French, has been construed as procedural according to the
British model in Louisiana itself, 52 and in Missouri. 53 The
French Code was read in the same manner by Tindal, J.,
in Huber v. Steiner in 1835 54 and by Judge Learned Hand
in 1930. 55 Whether the New Jersey statute restricting to
three months the time for recovering the amount of a deficiency after foreclosure of a mortgage on New Jersey
land, extinguishes the right, has been a riddle in the courts
of New Jersey and New York for a long time. 56
The general statutes of limitation of Wisconsin 57 and
the Maryland 58 statute on bills, bonds, and judgments have
been recognized as "extinguishing the right," but although
the Wisconsin court seems to reject the British doctrine,
in the Maryland case it was only stressed that the debt
could not be revived by subsequent acknowledgment. Also,
a Czarist Russian ten-year limitation has been applied as
terminating the right. 59
Special statutory liabilities. American courts feel more
52 This seems proved by Erwin v. Lowry ( 1847) 2 La. Ann. 314; Newman
v. Goza (1847) 2 La. Ann. 642, 646; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Haack
(D. C. W. D. La. 1943) 50 F. Supp. 55, 64 f.
53 McMerty v. Morrison (1876) 62 Mo. 140, 144.
54 Tindal, C. }., in Huber v. Steiner, supra n. 3· MENDELSSOHN BARTHOLDY,
46 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1935) 31 n. 2 and AILES, supra n. 5, 499
approve Tindal's construction of C. C. art. 1234 as "procedural." Cf. infra
n. us.
55
Wood & Selick v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique (C. C. A. 2d
1930) 43 F. (2d) 941; HARPER and TAINTOR, Cases 282.
56
Stumpf v. Hallahan ( 1905) 101 App. Piv. 383, 91 N. Y. Supp. 1062;
Hutchinson v. Ward ( 1908) 192 N. Y. 375, 8S N. E. 390; Apfelberg v. Lax
(193t) 2SS N.Y. 377, 174 N. E. 7S9; following these precedents, Paterno v.
Eager (1943) 179 Misc. 966, 40 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 46s (substantive), reversed (1943) 180 Misc. 582, 45 N.Y. Supp. (2d) 22S because of the contrary construction of the statute by the highest local courts.
57
Brown v. Parker (1871) 28 Wis. 21; Rathbone v. Coe (1888) 6 Dak.
91, so N. W. 620.
58
Baker v. Stonebraker (1865) 36 Mo. 338; see other cases in ArLES,
supra n. s, 493 n. 110.
59
In re Tonkonogoff's Estate (1941) 32 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 661.
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secure ground when a special rather than a general foreign
statute is in issue. Death statutes have been an example of
provisions creating a substantive right not known at common law and simultaneously ending it within a specified
period. 60 Analogous cases have concerned the liability of
trustees of a business trust or of stockholders in corporations61 and the Federal Employers' Liability Act. 62 This
recognition of applicable foreign limitations has been extended to statutes specifically qualifying a right created by
another statute. 63
A characteristic controversy has developed around the
effect of statutes of the forum creating a right similar to
the foreign-governed claim in issue but limiting it to a
period of duration shorter than the foreign statute. Logic
seems to advise that the local prescription is restricted to
the domestic-governed right; in this sense, some cases have
admitted that nothing prevents the application of the foreign
statute even if its period is longer than that of the forum. 64
However, in a contrary view, the statute of the forum expresses public policy barring all suits of the type in question. 65 This division of opinion demonstrates the futility
60 The Harrisburg (1886) 119 U. S. 199; for other cases, and particulars,
see HANCOCK, Torts 134; AILES, supra n. 5, 495 f.; recently, e.g., Summar v.
Besser Manufacturing Co. (1945) 310 Mich. 347, 352, 17 N. W. (2d) 209.
61 Davis v. Mills ( 1904) 194 U. S. 451; Norman v. Baldwin ( 1929) 152
Va. 8oo, 148 S. E. 831, 833.
6 2 Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Burnette (1915) 239 U. S. 199; AILES,
supra n. 5, n. 129. See also State ex rei. Winkle Terra Cotta Co. v. U. S.
Fidelity & Guaranty Co. (1931) 328 Mo. 295, 40 S. W. (2d) 1050 (contractors' bonds) and cf. Note, 48 Col. L. Rev. (1948) at 139.
63 Mr. Justice Holmes in Davis v. Mills ( 1904) 194 U. S. 451; Osborne
v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co. (1913) 87 Vt. 104, 88 Atl. 512. Restatement§ 605
comment a.
64Theroux v. Northern Pacific R. Co. (C. C. A. 8th 1894) 64 Fed. 84;
Negaubauer v. Great Northern R. Co. (1904) 92 Minn. 184, 99 N. W. 62o;
Keep v. Nat') Tube Co. (C. C. N. J. 1907) 154 Fed. 121; Cristilly v. Warner
(1913) 87 Conn. 461, 88 Atl. 711; Maki v. George R. Cooke Co. (C. C. A.
6th 1942) 124 F. (2d) 663, cf. Wilson v. Massengill (C. C. A. 6th 1942)
id. 666, 669; see Note, 9 U. of Chi. L. Rev. (1942) 727 n. 31.
65PARMELE in 2 Wharton 1264 § 54ob; Hutchings v. Lamson (C. C. A.
7th 1899) 96 Fed. 720; Tieffenbrun v. Flannery (1930) 198 N. C. 397, 151
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of both approaches. Evidently, public policy may as well
reside in genuine limitation as in preclusion by lex fori, and
the decisions are visibly veering to the identification of
both. 66
In their embarrassment, the courts take it as a favorable
indication when the foreign statute is called substantive in
its own state. This self-characterization may occur for
various purposes, such as in order to decide whether interruption of the running time by suing or revival through
acknowledgment is possible ;67 whether the statute may act
retroactively ;68 whether special pleading is necessary ;69
whether a foreign judgment is enforceable despite domestic
bar ;70 or a judgment is dead. 71 The inference for extraterritorial applicability may be more or less convincing.
Insecurity, however, is very natural with such nebulous
criteria and the fundamental inadequacy of the distinction
between "extinguishing the right" and only affecting the
"remedy." The courts must be aware that they speak in a
concerted language. What is their real impulse? Not only
S. E. 857, seemingly approved by 3 BEALE 1629 § 605.1; Rosenzweig v.
Heller (1931) 302 Pa. 279, 153 Atl. 346, noted, 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev. (1931)
IIIZ; Broderick v. Pardue (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) 102 s. w. (2d) 252;
White v. Govatos (1939) 40 Del. 349, xo Atl. {2d) 524.
66 In the Maki Case of 1942, supra n. 64, the foreign limitation of six
years was contained in a Minnesota statute covering all actions commenced
"upon a liability created by statute, other than those arising upon a penalty
or forfeiture." The domestic (Michigan) restriction of three years to recovery
of injuries to person or property is a clear limitation of action. Both provisions thus appear to be genuine limitations of action, rather than "extinguishing" devices.
67 Hollingsworth v. Schanland (1924) 155 La. 825, 99 So. 613
("peremption").
6 8 McCracken County v. Mercantile Trust Co. (x886) 84 Ky. 344, I S. W.

s8s.
69 Cooper v. Lyons {1882) 9 Lea (Tenn.) 596; Wood & Selick v. Compagnie Transatlantique {C. C. A. 2d 1930) 43 F. (2d) 941; HARPER and
TAINTOR, Cases 282; Lewis v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. ( 1929) 324 Mo. 266, 23
S. W. (2d) xoo; Carpenter v. United States (C. C. A. 2d 1932) 56 F. {zd)
8z8.
70 Brown v. Parker {1871) z8 Wis. zx.
11Angell v. Martin {x88o) 24 Kan. 334·
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a European writer, 72 but also Mr. Justice Holmes 73 has
declared:
"In cases where it has been possible to escape from that
qualification (as procedural) by a reasonable distinction
courts have been willing to treat limitations of time as
standing like other limitations and cutting down the defendant's liability wherever he is sued."
It may be preferred to assume with Ailes that "statutes
are often labelled 'substantive' or 'procedural' depending
upon the result sought," 74 but this does not give a much
different impression. Hancock points to the courts of North
Carolina and Pennsylvania refusing to recognize the distinction between special statutory provisions and general
statutes of limitations, because they are satisfied with the
results of the procedural principle:
"The distinction, though groundless, is probably symptomatic of dissatisfaction with the general principle and of
a desire to limit its sphere of operation." 75
The above-mentioned controversy concerning foreign
limitations that are longer than the domestic periods, led a
federal circuit court in 1942 to reasoning which sounds like
the end of the tortuous development of the procedural construction:
"Why should not this limitation accompany the new right
created by the statute wherever enforcement of the right
is sought, if the substantive law of a sister state is by comity
to be recognized and enforced ?" 76
(b) Borrowing statutes. The application of the lex fori indeed has been finally cut down to half size by statutory
72 MICHEL

157·
Davis v. Mills ( 1904) 194 U S. 451, 454·
74 AILES, supra n. 5, at 493 n. n6 in fine.
75 HANCOCK, Torts 135·
76 Martin, C. J., in Maki v. George R. Cooke Co., supra n. 64, at 666.
73
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clauses, now adopted in a great majority of the states. 77
Their general intention is to protect the defendant against
a plaintiff "shopping around" for a forum with a limitation
long enough to allow suit. Therefore, they recognize under
certain conditions foreign-limitation or extinction of a cause
of action brought to the forum.
Unfortunately, these statutes are of different types, and
all of them are awkwardly drafted. Most of them identify
the competent foreign statute by pointing to the law of the
place where the cause of action "arose" or "occurred," a
language adequate only for tort actions. Some recognize
the statute of the state where the defendant resided when
the action originated, irrespective of where this happened.
In application to contractual and other nondelictual obligations, the courts have assumed that the cause of action
arises at the place of performance. 78 What sort of reasoning is required thereby, has been illustrated by a recent controversy necessitating a decision of the Supreme Court of
the United States. A federal statute of 1913 obligated the
stockholders of an insolvent national bank to make additional payments, without prescribing a time of limitation.
The state statutes of limitation of the forum, including its
borrowing statutes, had to supply the rules, but what statutes were to be borrowed, i.e., in what state did the cause
of action arise? On the direction of the Comptroller in
Washington, the receiver in Louisville, Kentucky, where
the defunct bank had at all times actually carried on its
transactions, issued the summons. The Sixth Federal Circuit
Court declared that the cause of action was the failure to
pay the amount at the receiver's place and therefore the
Kentucky statute applied. 79 The Third Federal Circuit
77

Note, 75 A. L. R. ( 193 r) 203; Restatement § 6o4 is thereby abrogated,
183, 213.

YNTEMA, 36 Col. L. Rev. (1936)
78 Cf. STUMBERG 142 n. 55·
7 9 Miller, C.
(2d) 47·

J.,

in Helmers v. Anderson (C. C. A. 6th 1946) 156 F.

510

MODIFICATION OF OBLIGATIONS

Court, however, held that the cause of action, created by a
federal law and dependent on the act of federal authority
did not arise in one particular state more than in another. 80
It resorted to the law of Pennsylvania as law of the forum.
The Supreme Court approved the first opinion, agreeing
with the prevailing construction of the place where the
cause of action arises. 81 However, it is never correct simply
to localize a right flowing from a breach of contract or the
violation of a legal obligation at the place where the performance is due, rather than where the obligatory relationship is centered. The supporting reason should have been
what was incidentally mentioned, i.e., that the liability in
virtue of the federal statute inhered in the membership in
the former banking corporation and could have been better
localized, under the circumstances, at the central office than
in the charter state.
The borrowing statutes, moreover, refer, in one or another respect, to the (factual) residence of the defendant at
the time of the origin of the cause of action; in part require
that both parties resided in the same state during the full
period; and establish more conditions of residence at the
time of the action. The complications, doubts, and variety
so accomplished are astonishing. 82
The New York statute distinguishes, like a few others,
between residents and nonresidents of the forum, and in
particular excludes from the bar such causes as originally
accrue in favor of residents of New Y ork. 83 Where howso Goodrich, C. ]., in Anderson v. Andrews (C. C. A. 3d 1946) 156 F.
(2d) 972. The criticism in Notes, 6o Harv. L. Rev. ( 1946) 303 and 32
Cornell L. Q. ( 1946) 276 fails to censure the technique of the borrowing
statutes.
81 Cope v. Anderson ( 1947) 331 U. S. 461. Approved by HARPER, "The
Supreme Court and the Conflict of Laws," 47 Col. L. Rev. ( 1947) 883,
910-912.
82 See the surveys, 75 A. L. R. (1930) 203-232; 149 A. L. R. (1944) 12241238; 53 c.]. s. (1948) Q77 ff.
83 New York: Civil Practice Acr § 13, as amended by law of April 15,
1943·
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ever, a nonresident sues a resident on a foreign cause of
action, the shorter foreign limitation is observed. 84 The Wisconsin lawmakers exclude the application of a foreign limitation if a claimant for personal injuries was a resident of
the forum at the time of such injury. 85
As a whole, this broad exception to the procedural principle is a half measure, the statutes, with the exception of
that of Kentucky, 86 leaving intact all domestic bars in addition to those foreign. Such theories have been called irrational, because a more incisive foreign statute is applied
and a weaker one is refused effect. 87 On the other hand,
complaint has been raised against them as an unwarranted
departure from the procedural principle. 88
In fact, the borrowing statutes are intended to protect
the debtor against the obvious iniquity that, having once
acquired repose, he should be again vulnerable to attack
merely because he changed his residence. However, it is
still less equitable that a creditor should lose his action
simply because the debtor changes the place where he can
be sued.
(c) Continental proposals. Arguments on exactly the
same topic have been much discussed in the European orbits.
The authors following the procedural principle themselves
felt the desire to restrict the hazards just mentioned. On
the other hand, writers of the adversary school of thought
sometimes conceded overriding considerations of the forum.
All these compromises, however, have been more or less
openly established on the ground of public policy which will
be presently discussed.
84 Dictum in Kahn v. Commercial Union of America Inc. (1929) 227
App. Div. 82, 237 N. Y. Supp. 94, where a six-month limitation of New
York is applied against a thirty-year period of French law, an application
in itself understandable. See infra ns. 97, 100.
85 Wisconsin: Stat. (1947) § 330.19 (5).
86 Smith v. Baltimore & Ohio Ry. Co. (1914) 157 Ky. 113, 162 S. W. 564.
87 BAR, Book Review on Wharton quoted in 2 WHARTON 1245 n. 3·
88 AILES, supra n. 5, 501 in fine.
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(d) Contractual and corporative limitations. The Supreme Court of the United States, in a recent majority
opinion, enumerates the various modifications imposed on
the general principle that lex fori governs limitation, and
among them mentions contractual stipulations limiting the
time for bringing an action, recognized in a long line of
cases. 89 The decision adds that limitation of time for suit
by the constitution of a fraternal benefit association is protected by the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 90 Among other
possible implications, it is doubtful whether the argument
is equally valid for all suits between a corporation and its
members.
(e) Federal characterization. Nothing is more indicative
of the awareness, in the United States, of the true character of limitation of action than its recognition first in a
hint, 91 then a straight decision, 92 by the Supreme Court of
the United States. For the purpose of application of state
statutes to lawsuits before federal courts in diverse citizenship cases, the statutes of limitation are expressly termed
substantive law, and this has even been extended to equity
cases where an exception may have been expected. 93 It should
not be objected that characterization for this purpose may
soundly be distinguished from conflicts characterization.
The manner in which the opinion of the Supreme Court is
motivated, 94 refutes any such distinction; indeed, there is
Order of United Commercial Travelers of America v. Wolfe (1947)
586, 6o7, 6o8 n. 20.
90 Id. 624. The dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Black, by a kind of
argumentum ad absurdum, extends the scope of the majority decision very
far. His criticism is shared by HARPER, "The Supreme Court and the Conflict of Laws," 47 Col. L. Rev. ( 1947) 883, 895-900.
On the special subject of the insurance companies, cf. supra pp. 324-325.
91 Ruhlin v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. ( 1938) 304 U. S. 202.
9 2 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York ( 1945) 326 U. S. 99·
93 TUNKS, "Categorization and Federalism, etc.," 34 Ill. L. Rev. (1939) 271.
9 4 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 326 U. S. 109: "And so the question is not
whether a statute of limitations is deemed a matter of 'procedure' in some
sense. The question is whether such a statute concerns merely the manner
89

331

u. s.

STATUTES OF LIMITATION

513

no reason why the contrast of substance and procedure
should not be exactly the same in both cases. 95
III.

THE RoLE OF PuBLIC PoLICY

The Anglo-American conception of limitation survives in
this country in a vastly reduced and amorphous shape. Its
only real support is not procedural characterization but the
British territorialism of former centuries which at present
must take the appearance of public policy of the forum.
This is probably the general opinion, although theoretical
considerations are scarce and usually mix the points of view
regarding remedy and policy. The former Continental literature, on its way from the same basic conception, took
more opportunity for emphasizing, by arguments pro and
contra, the role of local ordre public.
Around the turn of the century, a considerable group of
authors believed they had discovered a sound compromise
between the law of the forum and that of the contract in
reserving for the court its domestic statute when the period
prescribed by it was shorter than that of the lex causae. 96
Some proposals restricted this concession to the longest
period known to the forum, usually thirty years. Others have
distinguished all "long" and all "short" periods. Finally,
Rolin, reporter to the Institute of International Law, allocated to the law of the forum also certain limitations such
and the means by which a right to recover, as recognized by the State, is
enforced, or whether such statutory limitation is a matter of substance in
the aspect that alone is relevant to our problem, namely, does it significantly affect the result of a litigation for a federal court to disregard a law
of a State that would be controlling in an action upon the same claim by
the same parties in a State court?"
Cf. ESTEP, Note, 44 Mich. L. Rev. (I945) 477·
95 In the United States, constitutional control for the protection of foreign
limitation statutes has only been exercised in a few special cases, on which
see Note, 48 Col. L. Rev. ( I948) I36 at I42-I46.
96 I AUBRY et RAU I65 and n. 69; DESPAGNET 925 § 3I7, citing cases;
WEiss, 4 Traite 407; RoLIN, I Principes §§ 338 f.; VALERY IOI4 § 703; Bosco,
Rivista I93I, 4I3. Also PHILONENKO, Clunet I936, 259, 5I3; }!TTA, Methode
355·
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as the French period of five years for rents (C. C., article
2277), in contrast to the very short limitations which in
French law rest on a presumption of payment made. 97 Bar,
to protect the defendant, allowed him an option between
the local statute and the law of the contract, if sued at his
domicil. 98
Wherever in these suggestions the lex fori was maintained, its clear ground was the reaction of public policy
against claims regarded at the forum as superannuated.
This idea was directly formulated so as to form the
only exception to the law of the contract, in the resolutions
of the Institute of International Law:
Liberatory prescription may also be deemed acquired by
the courts seized of litigations by virtue of their own law
of the forum, if the invoked limitation, according to this
law, constitutes an institution of absolute public policy, preventing the application of any foreign statute, even that
normally competent to govern it as, for instance, in the
interest of third persons, on consideration of humanity, etc. 99
This proposal was an attempt to include the common law ·
courts in a universal rule. However, in Europe itself all
such far-reaching exceptions to the law properly governing
the obligation are entirely and deservedly discarded. 100 A
public policy, not strong enough to be enforced by the court
except when pleaded by the defendant should not be a
reason to shield one who changes his abode arbitrarily to
the forum, nor should it be a ground to remove limitation
from many other important incidents of the governing law.
True, statutes of limitation are usually "imperative" in
municipal law so that the parties are not allowed to agree
in advance to waive the statute or prolong its period of time.
31 Annuaire ( 1924) at 161.
2 BAR 99 1 101,
99 31 Annuaire (1924) 182 art. III.
100 DE NovA § 130; 2 SCHNITZER 536.
97 ROLIN,

98
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But, as the Italian Supreme Court has put it, terminating
a long-continued controversy in that country:
Although it cannot be denied that limitation of action is
founded also on considerations of public order (which are,
however, joined by other, not less important, reasons), this
does not mean that it belongs to the international public
order. Therefore, limitation is not considered by the court
without party request; it can be waived after the time has
lapsed; and the time is suspended if impossibility to sue is
proved. 101
The Italian Court still left open (in 1933) the question
whether a foreign period of time longer than the domestic
period may offend the public policy of the forum. 102 The
better-elaborated German doctrine of courts and writers
sharply rejects such inconsistency. Whether a period of
limitation is longer 103 or shorter 104 than the local statute
admits makes merely a technical, but not a moral, and certainly not a fundamental, difference. 105 In France, the same
view seems to prevail after the long controversy. 106
The domain of stringent public policy, thus, shrinks to
the extent of extreme cases: The Reichsgericht once held
the Swiss rule that a deficiency certificate against an in101 Italy: Cass. (Nov. I3, I93I) Foro Ital. I932 I 2332, and (March 3,
I933) Riv. Dir. Priv. I934 II 67, Clunet I936, 697. Accord, Cass. (Jan. 29,
I936) Foro Ital. I936 I I033, 1040, applying an American statute.
102 Cass. (March 3, I933) supra n. IOI. Such offense was contended by
CERETI in Fedozzi 736, and repeatedly; DE NovA I96; App. Milano (March
28, I9I6) Riv. Dir. Com. I9I6 II 896; App. Frenze (June 8, I927) Rivista
I928, 245·
103 RG. (July 8, I88z) 9 RGZ. 225; {Nov. 22, I9I2) Leipz. Z. I9I3, 550
{Dutch thirty years instead of German two years); OLG. Hamburg (July I,
I9I2) 25 ROLG. 2I8, 23 Z.int.R. {I9I3) 342 (English six years instead of
German three years to six months).
Switzerland: App. Bern (Nov. 3, I927) Bl. IPR. I928, 286.
104 LEWALD 29 § 33·
105 MICHEL 227, 239 j I FRANKENSTEIN 209, 597 j WUNDERLICH, supra Ch.
52 n. 3, 486.
Accord in Switzerland: z ScHNITZER 535 f.
Brazil: ESPINOLA, Lei In trod. 628, citing MACHADO VILLELA, 0 Direito
internacional privado no C6digo Civil brasileiro (I92I) 334·
106
MICHEL, IO Repert. 305 Nos. 79-83, 307 No. 87; BATIFFOL 459 §§ 585 f. j
with more reservations, NIBOYET § 708.
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solvent debtor is not subject to limitation107 "contrary to
the purpose of German legislation," because the statutes
of limitation serve also the public welfare, viz., peace and
security. 108 But embarrassment followed as to the rule
positively to apply, and it was not true that every debt must
be prescriptible/ 09 Occasionally, it has been contended that
a foreign period should not apply when it is unreasonably
short, 110 or, under reference to National Socialist intransigence, that a Hungarian thirty-two year period was unacceptable in face of a German two-year period. 111
Is it worth while to introduce an element of uncertainty
for the sake of such rare discrepancies? Curiously enough,
we may point to an American decision which did not hesitate
to apply the Ohio borrowing statute in favor of the Pennsylvania statute ending in two years the right to sue for an
injury committed in the latter state. Under Ohio law, the
plaintiff, only 3i years old at the time of the injury, would
have enjoyed suspension and could have sued after eighteen
years. 112 Consideration of domestic protection of citizens
could have been expected to work in this case, if anywhere.
But the court acted wisely in maintaining the rule. Do
American courts, as it has been contended, really feel it
unbearable that Continental general limitation periods
usually are of thirty years ?113 If so, this would be the only
understandable concession to public policy.
1 07

Switzerland: Law on Enforcement and Bankruptcy, art. 149.
RG. (Dec. 19, 1922) 106 RGZ. 82, Revue 1926, 278. In an analogous
case, the French App. Colmar (Mar. 31, 1933) Revue Crit. 1934. 468, 2 Giur.
Comp. DIP. (1937) 127 No. 85, held the Swiss provision not offensive
to French public order, but stressed the fact that the French thirty-year
limitation had not yet run out.
109 WUNDERLICH, supra Ch. 52 n. 3, 481, 506.
110 RAAPE 825.
111 OLG. Miinchen (Feb. z, 1938) H. R. R. 1938, 1402.
112 Hilliard v. Pa. R. Co. (C. C. A. 6th 1935) 73 F. (zd) 473, cert. denied,
294 u. s. 721.
113 Suggested by Note, 9 U. of Chi. L. Rev. (1942) 724 at n. II.
108
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IV. THE INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM

The earliest attitude of Story and approval by most
modern Anglo-American scholars have not prevented their
acknowledgment of the existing principle, short of legislative reforms. On the Continent, conformingly, courts and
authors have taken this procedural theory at its face value
as the law of the Anglo-American countries, ignoring such
important exceptions as the American and Canadian borrowing statutes. The two groups, almost neatly divided on the
lines of common law and civil law, thus face the problem
how to treat the opposite conception of the statutes of
limitation. Here, the three theories of characterizationapplying the conception of the forum; of the foreign law;
and of analytical jurisprudence-demonstrate their most
significant consequences. 114
I.

Characterization According to Lex Fori

We have seen that the English courts remain fixed on
the axiom that any foreign statute of limitation is inapplicable, excepting conceivable but rarely recognized
statutes "extinguishing the right." This distinction was
applied to the French prescription, and it was found that
it also did not "extinguish the right" 115 and hence did not
affect a French note. One hundred years later, an outstanding American judge repeated this investigation and reached
the same result. 116 He ascertained in a perfectly correct
statement that the French institution is of exactly the same
nature as the American general statutes of limitation. But
114 See 5 Z.ausl.PR. (1931) 241, 278; Vol. I pp. 64, 65. On the occasion
of a German decision of 1932, the three theories were advanced simultaneously in 1 Giur. Comp. DIP. ( 1932) x6o If. No. 40, the first being advocated by the decision and the Note by SIEBERT, and the second with ill-placed
vehemence by AGo, the third, my own, being explained by LuowiG RAISER.
115 Tindal, C.]., in Huber v. Steiner (1835) 2 Bing. N. C. 202.
116 Judge Learned Hand in Wood & Selick v. Compagnie Transatlantique
(C. C. A. 2d 1930) 43 F. (2d) 941, HARPER and TAINTOR, Cases 282.
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when, for this reason, he again classified French limitation
as procedural and therefore inapplicable, he demonstrated
the inherent vice of characterization according to the lex
fori. Not only has a wrong municipal theory transgressed
into conflicts law, so that the similarly constructed statutes
of the sister states have become inapplicable, but this theory
is extended to foreign limitations considered in their own
countries as substantive.
The same approach, however, has marked the entire
German doctrine. 117 It seemed to provide escape from other
egregious blunders. 118 Exactly like the English and American judges mentioned above examined the French Code,
the courts investigated English law with the identical clear
result that limitation of actions was subject essentially to
the same rules as German Anspruchsverjahrung. 119 The
German courts and writers now unanimously state that what
imports is only that in the German view limitation is substantive and for this reason the New York statute does
operate in a German court. Also, in other countries this
form of characterization has found favor. 120
On the European side, it is true, the effect is reasonable.
But the underlying theory is less admirable, as has been
shown just above, on the common law side. So long as the
117 ROHG. (June I5, I875) I5 ROHGE. I86; RG. (May 8, I88o) 2 RGZ.
I3; OLG. Hamburg (July I, I9I2) 23 Z.int.R. {I9I3) 342; RG. (July 6,
I934) I45 RGZ. I2I, IPRspr. I934 No. 29, Revue Crit. I935, 447; 6 Giur.
Comp. DIP. No. I30.
KAHN, I Abhandl. I03 ff., n9; 2 BAR 95 f.; LEWALD 73 § 98; ScHOCH,
Klagbarkeit etc., supra Ch. 52 n. 3, I IO and n. 2.
us Infra n. I22.
119
OLG. Hamburg (Jan. 13, I932) IPRspr. I932 No. 28 at 59; RG.
(July 6, I934) supra n. n7; cf. ECKSTEIN, 6 Giur. Comp. DIP. I52.
120
Denmark: S. Ct. (July I9, I925) 6 Repert. 2I5 No. Io.
France: 2 ARMIN JON 346.
Italy: FEDOZZI-CERETI 736.
Sweden: Decision of the Swedish Supreme Court, and BAGGE, supra n. 30.
Switzerland: {Semble) App. Tessino {Sept. 23, I929) and Bezirksgericht
Zurich (Dec. 19, 1928) 5 Z.ausl.PR. ( 193I) 725; {probably) 2 SCHNITZER
536, and definitely BG. (March I5, I949) 75 BGE. II 57, 66.
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English and American courts believe in construing a Swedish
statute by the method which they learned for the interpretation of the Statute of James I, we shall have no harmonious
conflicts solution. And the reader should take a moment to
consider the law of a world where an admittedly identical
phenomenon is termed, classified, and treated in opposite manners by the two chief legal groups of western
civilization!
2.

Characterization According to Lex Causae (Secondary
Characterization)

Reputable authors advise a compromise to the effect that
the forum should apply its domestic statute of limitation
in principle to all cases decided at the forum, but recognize
a foreign-governing law with the content given it in the
foreign country. Characterization by lex causae and secondary characterization agree on this point. 121 The Swedish
statute is applicable since it is considered substantive in
Sweden, and the Ontario statute is not applied because it
is construed as procedural in Ontario. Thus, while theory
( 1) provides the German courts with satisfactory decisions
and leaves the American courts in the dark, theory ( 2)
rescues the latter courts from their predicament. However,
it immediately puts the Continental courts back in an insoluble puzzle. We are again where the Reichsgericht was
in 1880. 122
At that time, the German Supreme Court hearing an action
on a note issued in Tennessee, speculated that it could neither
apply the Tennessee statute because it was procedural nor
the German statute because it was intended only for a German-governed contract. Hence, a Tennessee note could never
121 AILES, supra n. 5, 482; CHESHIRE (ed. 3) 74-75, 834; RoBERTSON, Characterization 64, 248 ff.; PoNTES DE MIRANDA, Recueil 1932 I 625 § 7·
122
RG. (Jan. 4, 1882) 7 RGZ. 21, 24; (May 18, 1889) 24 RGZ. 383, 393·
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be prescribed as far as the German courts were concernedan outcome amazing even to the hardboiled specialists of
conflicts law. Corrections have been attempted. Thus, it was
assumed that American law refers the question of limitation
to the domestic law of the forum exercising jurisdiction of
the claim and this renvoi ought to be accepted. 123 Also the
Anglo-German Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, in a most involved
reasoning, so argued. 124 Another escape was discovered by
scrapping the entire conflicts rule and reverting to the domestic statute on the ground of public policy. 125 Also this
solution, curiously to say, was followed in a decision of the
Anglo-German Mixed Arbitral Tribunal on the basis of
the German conflicts rule referring to Scotch law. 126
But how awkward is a treatment that requires such precarious counteractions! Are we compelled to use in the two
groups d~fferent approaches for reconciling divergent rules?
The situation is not really similar to the conflict between
domiciliary and nationality principles that calls for two
methods of employing renvoi. The German doctrine has
abandoned the entire approach,-a fact that should have
given thought to the recent advocates of this artifice.
123 OLG. Darmstadt (Nov. 2, 1906) cited by LEWALD 73 No. 98; 1 FRANKENSTEIN 596; WUNDERLICH, supra Ch. 52 n. 3, 503, 506. PACCHIONI 331 rejects
the renvoi but asserts that the lex fori enters into a gap of the foreign law.
Contra: The Swedish Supreme Court, see BAGGE, supra n. 30.
124 Weiser & Co. v. The Heirs of Ludwig Diirr, 6 Recueil trib. arb. mixtes
632, 634: German conflicts law declared applicable refers to English law
of contracts which excludes limitation of actions as procedural. Hence,
nothing is left but to apply the German provisions on limitation. ScHOCH,
Klagbarkeit etc., supra Ch. 52 n. 3, II6 n. 3, criticizes this decision because
it looks at once to a conflicts law instead of asking the preliminary question what is procedural and what substantive law. But how can this be
done by a court not having a lex fori, if no characterization can be evaluated as right or wrong, but only as inherent in a determinate system, as the
same author contends (at 112 n. 3) ? The tribunal followed its course:
(July 22 and Oct. 6, 1927) C. G. Baron et Salaman v. Hugo Schnetzer, 7
Recueil trib. arb. mixtes 427; (June 12, 1929) C. A. Rebus v. Theodora
Hennig, 9 id. 19.
1 25 RG. (Dec. 19, 1922) 106 RGZ. 82, Revue 1926, 278.
126 Cook v. Kutscher (May 31, 1926) Case No. 2263, 6 Recueil trib. arb.
mixtes 540.
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3· Characterization According to Comparative Analysis
Although we have to recognize the existence of the territorial Anglo-American rule, so far as it reaches and so long
as it survives, we need not recognize any mistaken characterization. We apply a foreign "law" in its entirety without regard to its own categorizations. 127 Once a court,
whether American or European, knows that limitation is
always a part of the substantive law, although it may not
be applied in all courts in the same way as other parts are
applied, there is no obstacle to the desired application. An
American court has to apply Dutch or German statutes of
limitation because they belong to the governing law, not
only in the eyes of Dutch and German courts but also in
correct American theory. Swiss or Argentine courts ought
to apply the New York statute for the same reason.
Of course, the force of this view is restricted by the
positive Anglo-American law. That it should be reformed,
is unquestionable.
4· Conclusion
In theory it should be frankly acknowledged by any
court in this country and abroad that the effect of lapse of
time on an obligation is an incident of the law governmg
it. Foreign statutes of limitation are therefore applicable
to a foreign contractual or legal obligation.
This theory is for the time being restricted in British
jurisdictions, and to an essentially lesser extent in the United
States, through the age-old thesis that a court ought to
apply its domestic statute of limitation. The resolutions of
the Institute for International Law have recognized this
phenomenon as an exception based on public policy, 128 but
127
128

Vol. I p. 66.
31 Annuaire (1924) 182 art. III, quoted supra p. 514.
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go so far as to perpetuate the excuse of common law courts
for not applying statutes of civil law countries. At most,
common law courts may reciprocate with other common law
jurisdictions when the other statutes prescribe a longer
period than the forum does. Even this is anachronistic.
It would seem easy to enlarge the borrowing statutes in
the field of obligations by replacing them through a very
brief uniform rule. The uniform statute has simply to provide that an obligation governed by the law of a foreign
state or country is exclusively subject to the effects of
lapse of time, as imposed by that law on the rights of the
creditor. This would end a.n overcomplicated and unjust
legal situation.
V.

ScoPE OF THE RuLE

Whether and when a cause of action arises, is naturally
determined by the law governing the obligation, even in
common law courts. 129 The conditions of effective lapse of
time depend, conforming to the respectively adopted principles, in this country on the lex fori or the borrowed
statute/ 30 and in Continental courts, except the French, on
the law governing the obligation. This law determines also
whether the parties are permitted to agree on a longer ot
shorter period of time. 131

Illustration. A German buyer sued an Austrian seller for
rescission on the ground of implied warranty and for damages on the ground of express warranty. According to the
splitting method, the Appeal Court of Hamburg applied
German law to the rescission and Austrian law to the damages. In consequence, the question whether the time of
limitation was interrupted by a formal expert inspection
1 29
130

Glenn v. Liggett (1890) 135 U.S. 533·
With all preliminary questions, see 75 A. L. R. (1890) 203.
131 1nst. of Int. Law, 31 Annuaire (1924) 182 art. II; DE NovA 170 n. 2;
BATIFFOL 455 § 578. But see for the American decisions, supra pp. 504 n. 44,
512 n. 89.
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of the goods, was answered affirmatively as respects rescission, under the German BGB., § 477 par. 2, and negatively,
with respect to the damages, 132 under the Austrian All g.
BGB., § 1977, and an Austrian Supreme Court decision.
With a better choice of law, only Austrian law would have
been applicable; under the common law approach, only German law.
The Railway Convention of Bern, 133 however, took the
usual easy way out, by limiting action for total loss of
goods to one year but referring the causes of interruption
and suspension to the law of the country in which the action
is brought. 134 This example has been followed by other conventions of unification. 135
German courts have repeatedly dealt with the case where
a claim was sued upon in a foreign court; did this act interrupt the period of limitation established by the law of the
debt? The answer has been affirmative on the condition that
a judgment following the action would be recognized in
the forum. 136 This questionable solution, however, has been
restricted to the case where German law governs the obligation,137 and is criticized in the literature where it has been
recently suggested that the effects of foreign lawsuits on
132

OLG. Hamburg (April 28, I92o) Hans. GZ. I92o, Hbl. 182 No. 9I.
Of Oct. 23, I924, art. 45 § 4, HuDSON, 2 Int. Legislation I448, revised
Nov. 23, I933, HUDSON, 6 id. 556, in force since Oct. I, I938.
134 For an application of the then art. 45, see Trib. com. Seine {Nov.
25, I905) Clunet I906, 837.
135 E.g., Warsaw Convention on international air transportation, of I929,
art. 29 {2) (HUDSON, 5 Int. Legislation u4); Brussels Convention on collisions
on the high seas, of I910, art. 7 par. 3 (BENEDICT, 6 American Admiralty 5);
Geneva Convention on collisions in inland navigation, of Dec. 9, 1930, art.
8 (3), not in force {HUDSON, 5 Int. Legislation 8I8). The Uniform Laws on
bills of exchange and on checks chose another more complicated method,
see Annex II art. I7 and Annex II art. 26, respectively {HUDSON, 5 Int.
Legislation 547 and 913).
136 OLG. Hamburg (March 13, 1906) Hans. GZ. I906, Hbl. No. so; OLG.
Celie (Dec. u, I907) I ROLG. 158; RG. {Sept. I8, 1925) I29 RGZ. 385,
389, Clunet I926, 737·
1 3 7 OLG. Breslau (Dec. I9, 1938) JW. 1939, 344, H. R. R. 1939, No. 375,
approved by 2 ScHNITZER 538.
133
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limitation of action should be subordinated to the rule,
locus regit actum. 138
138 KATINSZKY, 9 Z.ausi.R. (1935) 855, cntiCizes confusion of substantive
requirements for conflicts law and procedural requirements for recognition;
an unjust and inconsistent result. On this basis, KALLMANN, "L'effet sur Ia
prescnpt10n Jiberatoire des actes judiciaires intervenus en pays etranger,"
Revue Crit. I948, I ff., esp. 3 I, undertakes to formulate a theory.
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Corrections to Volumes One and Two
VOLUME ONE
PAGE

Substitute: theory.
Substitute: judge.
Omit: "note 2I".
Substitute: domicil.2 1 Under.
Omit: "Argentine principle of."
Add : C. C. art. I 7 I has been
repealed by Law of March 10,
1938.
Omit: "France C. C. art. 151".
Substitute: p. 280 n. I57·
Substitute: and not as.
Omit: "not".
Omit: "Bolivia".
Add: provided that in addition,
to satisfy the lex fori.
Substitute: Salvioli.
Substitute: I75-I78, 558, 587,

6I, paragraph 3: "invention".
73, line 6: "court".
75, line 16.
75, line 23: "domicil. Under".
79, (c), line 3.
228, note I I4.

226,
279,
338,
338,
387,
438,

note go.
note I 55: "pp. 29 I ff."
line I : "and".
line 2.
line 18.
line 10.

7 43: "Salviole".
744: "Status unknown to the
forum".

6so.

VOLUME TWO
PAGE

55, paragraph 2, line 9: "no".
124, note I: "Machen".
248, note 83: "Poullett."
289, line 5 from bottom, last
word : "now".
325, line 3: "an action".
357, last line: "the Appellate Di-

Substitute:
Substitute:
Substitute:
Substitute:

its.
Machem.
Poullet.
not.

Substitute: no action.
Substitute: Judge Shientag.

. . ,,

VISIOn •

Add: reversed, H. R. (June 13,
1924) cited infra p. 388 n. 120.
Substitute: courts in New York
have.

387, note I 18.
423, paragraph 2, line I : "New
York Court of Appeals has".
593

594

CORRECTIONS

PAGE

440, note 3 I.
458, last 3 lines, and 459, line I.
463, note II9, line 4: "Chapter
28 n. 45 and Chapter 29 n. 33".

Add: Italy: Disp. Prel. C. C.
( I942) art. 25.
.. "§ 312 . . . " through
0 m1t.
"The same is true".
Substitute: pp. 370-373 and p.
40I n. 33·

Index
[References are to pages. For citations of enacted conflicts rules, see
the Table of Statutes, supra.]
Accident Place
affreightment, 244 n. 49, 2S7·
insurance, 2o6, 439.
land transportation, 299 n. 33·
workmen's compensation,
Chapter 42.
Accounts Receivable, 387, 419,
43o-432.
Actio and Action, 47S, 478-480.
Actor Engaged for U. S., I 89
n. 29.
Adjustment, general average, 382.
Administrator, power, ISO.
Agency Contract, Chapter 41,
181-184, 194-203. See also
Agent.
concept, 122, 123-129, 140.
Agent. See also Authority, Representation.
concept, 181, cf. 122-129,
140.
acting on account, 129-130.
acting on behalf, 129-130.
attorney, I9S·
authorized, 123-130 and Chapter 40.
broker, 198-203.
commercial agents, I9S-I97·
contract with principal, 194203.
contract with third party, 132,
14o-141.
fiduciary relation, 140.
general, 174.
insurance, 173-174, 321, 33o333, 340.
instructions, 140.
occasional, 198.
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permanent, IS6-IS7, 166, I9SI97·
physician, I9S·
public professions, I9S·
real-estate broker, 202-203.
of seller, S7-s8.
soliciting, 176-178.
traveling, IS8, 172, 187.
types, 136, IS6-178.
unauthorized, 141-142.
Air Transportation, 302-307.
death of passenger, 30S-307.
international, 304.
through carriage, 307-310.
Warsaw Convention, 302-307.
American Loans, 1920's, 9, I 113, IS.
A nspruch, 480.
Apparent Authority, 128, 138139, 140, 171-174·
Arbeitsvertrag, 182.
Argentina. See also Table of
Statutes.
compensation of debts, 464 n.
22.
general average clause, 379·
through carriage, 299 n. 3 7.
Artist, rights, 74-7S·
Assignment, Voluntary, of Simple Debts, Chapter 49·
concept, 388-390.
accounts receivable, 387, 419,
43o-432.
assignability, 387, 4o6-409.
assignment of contract, 390.
capacity, 386, 404-4os.
cause, 412.
classification of problems, 4oo416.

INDEX
Assignment (continued)
conditional debts, 4I4-4I5.
conflicts rules
England, 393-394·
France, 392, 398-399, 403,
405, 424·
Germany, 396-397, 423424, 433·
Netherlands, 399, 4I2.
New York, 404.
United States, 407, 4I8420, 430--432.
contacts
assignor's place, 39I, 432434·
contracting, 400, 4.05, 422433·
debtor's place, 392, 394,
424-426, 430, 434·
law of original debt, 397,
400, 423-424, 433·
place of performance, 426.
proper law, 426-428, 433434·
situs, 39I-393·
counterclaim, 409-410.
creance, 390.
debtor in good faith, 4I7, 420-428, 434·
debtor's defenses, 409-4IO.
emptio venditio nominis, 388.
equitable, 388.
form, 40I-403.
formality stipulated, 407.
future debts, 4I4-4I5.
gambling debts, 411 n. 99.
insurable interest, 405, 411 n.
100.
interest in trust, 411 n. 97,
428 n. I76.
interests involved, 385, 4I 74I8.
legal restrictions, 4o6.
lex Anastasiana, 408.
life insurance, 394-395.
municipal laws, 385-386, 420-422, 428-429.
nature, 388-390.

notice to debtor, 387, 403, 42I428.
partial, 408, 4I6.
priority of assignees, 387, 4I8,
428-432.
procurator in rem suam, 388.
promise to assign, 389, 400,
4I0--4IJ.
protection of good faith, 4I74J2.
provision, 4I 5·
relationships involved, 39I,
409-4I3, 434·
retrait litigieux, 408.
right to sue, 388.
situs, 39I-393·
subassignee, 4 7 I.
subrogation, 413.
to surety, 355·
transfer, 4I3-416.
formation, 4I3-4I5.
scope, 4I5-4I6.
U. S. Treasury bonds, 407408.
validity, 4I I.
wages, 407 ns. 8I, 82.
warranty, 387, 389, 4IJ.
wife beneficiary, 406 n. 78.
Ausschlussfrist, 487.
Austria. See also Table of Statutes.
warranty of solvency, 387, 4I3
ns. 106, 107.
Authority, Chapter 40. See also
Agent, Representation.
concept, 128-129, I39-I40,
141.
administrators, I 50.
and agency, I23-IJO.
apparent, 128, IJ8-I39, 140,
17I-I74•
capacity, I 70.
conflicts rules
England, I 53-I 54·
France, I54·
Germany, I56-158.
Latin America, I 56.
United States, I54-156.

INDEX
Authority (continued)
contacts, I29, I39-I40.
place of agent, I44, I5I ff.
determined, I62-I65.
place of principal, I43, I5oI5I, I6I-I62.
proposed, I 67.
rationale, I5I-I52, I65-I68.
contract with third party, I4II42, I63, I65.
death of principal, I 79·
extent, I58-159·
form, I41, I68-I70.
history, I21, I23-I28.
implied, 171-174.
incident of main contract, 122123, I63, 165-I68, 170.
independent concept, I 23, 126,
130, 135·
interest involved, 143-145,
148, I5I.
intrinsic requirements, I 7o171.
lack of, 141.
by law, 149.
legal, I48-I50.
officers of corporation, 149ISO.
principal's intent to authorize,
I6I-I62.
procura, 149·
ratification, I 74-I 78.
requirements, 141, I68-I7I.
. revocation I79-I8o.
scope, I68-I8o.
shipmaster, I46-I48.
special, I4I.
termination, I78-I8o.
terminology, 129-I30.
unauthorized, I4I-I42.
unnamed principal, I30.
undisclosed principal, I22 n. 2,
126-I30, I35·
voluntary private, I5I-I8o.
Average
general, 378-382.
particular, 270.
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Banks
current accounts, 473-474.
deposits, I 6- I 7.
Barcelona Convention and Statute on the Freedom of Transit, of April 14, 192I, 296.
Bareboat Lease, 233-234·
Beneficium cedendarum actionurn, 355, 435·
excussionis personalis, 353.
Bern Conventions. See Table of
Statutes.
Bills of Lading, 235, 236.
and transportation contract,
238-239·
endorsement, 274·
forms, 247, 273·
goods not shipped, 276-277.
obligation to issue, 27I-272.
person of debtor, 273-274.
rights of holder, 273-279.
through carriage, 285.
Bondholder
equality, I2-I3.
rights, I 1-IS.
Bonds, Io-15, 29, 33.
U. S. Treasury, 407-408.
Borrowing Statutes, 508-su,
516.
Branch of Insurer, 33o-333.
Brazil. See also Table of Statutes, Latin America.
air law, 303.
assignment, 421 n. 140.
employment, 184 n. 14, 188
n. 27.
sale of immovables, I03 n. 10.
workmen's compensation law,
206 n. 2.
Broker, 198-203.
grain, I98-2oo.
insurance, I 54·
real estate, 202-203.
ship, I63.
stock exchange, 198-202.
Brokerage Contract, 198-202.
Bruck, Ernst, 330.
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INDEX

Brussels Conventions. See Table
of Statutes.
Burden of Proof, 354·
Bustamante Code. See Table of
Statutes.
Canada. See also Table of Statutes.
employment, I88 n. 29.
insurance, 32G-32I, 327.
workmen's compensation, 206
n. 2, 220.
Capacity
assignment, 386, 404-405.
authorization, I 70.
immovable, 102, !09.
married women, I02, u6 n.
60, I32, I34-I35, I52-I53·
surety, 352 n. 43·
Carriage, Maritime Transportation of Goods, Chapters 4344, Other Transportations,
Chapter 45. See Maritime,
Transportation.
Carrier, 237-238.
liability exemption, 239 n. 28.
Causa, 78-85, 4Io-4I3.
Cesser and Lien Clause, 273.
Characterization
agent, I36.
employment, I8r.
immovable, IOI.
implied authority, I 7 I-I 72.
limitation of action, 5 I7-522.
common law, 505, 507, 5I7.
comparative, 52 I.
continental, 518, 5I9.
federal, 5 I2, cf. 49!.
lex causae, 519-520.
lex fori, 517-520.
secondary, 519-520.
Charter Party, 234, Chapters 43
and 44· See Maritime Transportation of Goods.
form important, 247, 251-252,
254n. 104.

Chatenay v. Brazilian Submarine
Telegraph Co., 128, I46,
153, I54, 158, 162.
C. I. F. Sales, 61-62.
Classification
agency and employment, I83.
contract and title, 78-85.
contract and workmen's compensation, 2II-214.
limitation and preclusion, 487489.
private and public law, 19o193.
problems of assignment, 391,
40G-41 6, 434·
property and risk, 88.
three relationships in agency,
I39-142.
tort and workmen's compensation, 209-210, 228.
Collective Bargaining, 191-192.
Commissionaire, 237.
Compensation, Chapter 5 I. See
Setoff.
contract of, 473-474·
Concurrence of Actions
contract and tort, 271 n. 56.
workmen's compensation, 222228.
Conditional Debts, 414-415.
Conditional Sales, 82-85.
forfeiture, 100.
redemption, 83 n. 24.
repossession, 83-84.
Contacts. See Law.
Contract and Transfer, 78-85,
102-103, 389, 400, 41G413.
Contract and Transfer of Title,
76--77, 78-91, IIG-II7.
Contrats d' adhesion
affreightment, 262 n. 19.
in general, ix-x.
loan, 8-ro.
Conversion of Foreign Money,
25-29.
date, 27, 28, 378.

INDEX
Copyright, Sale of, 74-75.
Corporation, powers of principal
officers, I49-I50.
Counterclaim
assignment, 409-410.
by surety, 354, 47I.
Covenants for Title, no-117.
Currency Restrictions, 48-50,
357-359·
Custody
after transportation, 286-287.
of rejected goods, 95.
Damages, sales, 98
Death
of principal, I 79·
statutes, 506.
Debentures, 10.
Debt
discharge, Chapters 5o-53.
transfer, Chapters 49 and 50.
Debtor, protection, 391-392,
398, 400, 434, 498-499·
Decheance, 487.
Deed, delivery, I04.
Delivery
of deeds, I04.
of documents, 9o-9I, 96-97.
of goods
concept, 62-65.
of insurance policy, 32I, 339·
Demise, 233.
Deposit, I6-17.
Devaluation, r8 ff.
Divorce, effect on insurance, 443444·
Doctrine of Mandate, I22, 123130.
Documents, In Sales
tender, s6 n. 25, 9o-9I, 94·
Doing Business, 321.
Domicil, replaced by ordinary
residence, 71.
Employment Contract, Chapter
4I, I8I-I93·
concept, I81-183.
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for foreign country, 185, I87,
I88-I89.
occasional or temporary work,
I86.
private and public law, I9oI92.
by state, 190 n. 34·
traveling salesmen, I87 n. 23.
working place, 186-r8g.
Encumbrances, I 12, IIS.
Enrichment, 366-379. See Unjust Enrichment.
Equitable
assignment, 388.
remedies, I07-I08.
"Establishment," 7 I.
Estoppel, IJ6.
Exceptio rei venditae et traditae, II6-II7.

Exchange
order for, I98-202.
sales on, 7 I.
Exchange Restrictions, 48-so,
357-359·
Extracontractual Obligations,
Chapter 48, 36I-382.
Fair, sales on, 53 n. 12.
Fair Labor Standards Act, 193.
Fiction of Identity, 131-135.
Fin de recevoir, 485-486.
Fluvial Transportation, 296-298.
F. 0. B. Sales, 6o-61, 81 n. 17,
91-92.
Foreign Money Debts, 25--29,
41-42.
Form
assignment, 401-403, 407.
authority, 141, 168-170.
bill of lading, 273.
charter party, 27 I.
examination of goods, 94-95·
sale of immovable, 108-109.
suretyship, 352 n. 42.
Forwarding Agent, 237-238,
253·

6oo

INDEX

France. See also Table of Statutes.
assignment, 3g2, 3g8-3gg.
compensation, 464.
employment, 18g n. 2g, IgO.
garnishment, 45D-45I.
insurance, 327, 330, 335-336.
in foreign money, 26.
international payment, 24-25,
38-3g.
lesion, I 18-120.
limitation of action, 4g8-4gg.
mandate, 122, 125-126, 127.
privilege of seller, 85-87.
tender of documents, go.
transfer of property, 77.
workmen's compensation, 210.
"Francs," 43.
Fraternal Benefit Associations,
324-325, 512 n. gg.
Freight
after delivery, 28 I.
distance freight, 280.
Future Debts, 414-415.
Gambling Debts, 411 n. gg.
Garnishment, 448-457.
Geiszler v. De Graaf, I 13.
General Average, 378-382.
foreign adjustment, 382.
last port, 380.
law of adjuster, 382.
York-Antwerp Rules, 37g.
General Maritime Law, 241242, 247·
Geneva Conventions. See Table
of Statutes.
Germany. See also Table of Statutes.
affreightment, 25 I-253·
assignment, 3g6-397.
authorization, 156-158, 163164.
bill of lading, 275-277.
compensation system, 465.
currency restrictions, 48-so,
359-360.
employment, 18g, 191.

foreign money debts, 38, 42·
garnishment, 451 f., 456-457.
splitting the contract, 52, 8ggo, 94 n. 78.
stipulated place of performance, 61.
tender of documents, go.
title theory, 78, 82.
workmen's insurance, 2o6,
219-220, 437·
Gold Clauses, 2o-25, 35-46.
bullion clause, 23.
coin clause, 2o-22.
prohibitions, 24-46.
value clause, 22.
Grainbroker, 198-200.
Great Britain. See also Table of
Statutes.
affreightment, 245-249.
garnishment, 453-454·
insurance, 328.
tender of documents, go.
workmen's compensation, 205206.
Guaranty, 344·
Hague Committee Drafts, 1g28,
on Conflict of Laws (Sales),
51 n. I.
Hague Draft, 1931, on Conflict
of Laws (Sales), 51 n. J,
Handlungsagent, 183, 196 n. 59·
Handlungsgehilfe, 183.
Holmes, 102, 109, 131.
Immoral Contract, II9 n. 75·
Implied Authority, I7I-I74·
Inhabitants, 339.
Inspection of Goods, g4-95.
Insurance, Chapter 46.
accident, 2o6, 340.
American Constitution, 322324, 325, 337 n. 95·
American courts, 3II-3I7·
assignment, 386.
automobile, 326, 342.
branch office, 33D-333·

INDEX
Insurance (continued)
contacts
branch office contracting,
3II-3I6, 327.
by correspondence, 341.
party autonomy, 318, 337338.
place of insured, 313, 318.
place of insurer, 313, 329334, 339-341.
proper law, 318.
situation of risk, 326, 335336, 341-342.
supervising state, 334-336.
delivery, 321, 339·
doing business, 321 and n. 30.
double insurance, 336 n. 96.
draft of Uniform Law, 325326, 340, 342 ns. 104, 105.
fire insurance, 321 n. 35, 338,
341-343·
in foreign money, 26.
fraternal benefit association,
324-325.
government control, 318-321,
334-336.
health insurance, 342.
inhabitants, 339.
immovables, 341-342.
insurable interest, 405, 4I I n.
100.

interest of state, 323.
license, 34o--341.
life insurance, 3I4-316, 326,
339-341, 394-395·
local agent, 32o--32I, 340.
marine insurance, 317, 327 n.
56, 328-329.
party autonomy, 318, 337-338.
proper law, 3I8.
property, 3I8, 321 n. 35, 326,
335-336, 338, 341-342risk situation, 326, 335-336,
341-342.
standard policy, 3 1 g.
statutes, 317-321.
subrogation, 439·
supervision, 318-321, 334-336.
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Uniform Law draft, 325-326,
340, 342·
workmen's compensation, 206,
207, 219-220, 342Inter-American Convention on
the Rights of the Author in
Literary, Scientific, and Artistic Works, of July 22,
1946, 75·
Interest of a State, 226-228, 323.
International Labour Code of
1939, 207, 2I7, 221.
Interpretation, affreightment,
272-273, 285.
Issue
of bonds, I 3- I 4·
of insurance policy, 32 I, 340·
Italy. See also Table of Statutes.
compensation of debts, 464 n.
22.
employment, 184 n. IO, 188 n.
28, I9o n. 85.
lapse of time, 488 n. 51, 493
n. 81.
law of the flag, 258-259.
representation, I 2 7.
sales of immovables, 103 n. ro.
workmen's compensation, 211,
220.
Jason Clause, 248.
Joint Resolution of Congress on
Gold Clauses, I9, 23 n. I I,
32, 36-4!, 44-45·
Jurisdiction for Garnishment,
448-457·

Klauder Case, 419, 431.
Laband, on authority, 125-126.
Labor Courts, 208.
Labor Law, Chapters 41 and 42.
Land Transportation, 296-302.
of baggage, 296.
contract and tort, 302.
free pass, 301-302.
of goods, 298-301.

6o2

INDEX

Land (continued)
of persons, JOI-302.
through carriage, 307-310.
Latin America. See Table of Statutes for individual countries.
agency, I56.
contracts of adhesion, ix, 255,
299 n. 32, 327.
extracontractual
obligations,
369 n. 30, 372.
general averages, 380 ns. 74,
76.
insurance, 327.
sale of immovables, 10I, 103.
situs of debts, 392.
transportation, 255-256, 270,
292, 298-300, JOI n. 44·
Law of the Agent
authority, 144, I5I-I68.
contract of agency, I95-202.
determination of this place,
I62-I65.
rationale, I5I-I52, I65-I68.
scope, r68-I8o.
Law of the Buyer, 56, 59, 68.
Law of the Country of Currency,
32-33, 35·
Law of Creditor's Domicil
loan, 5, 10.
suretyship, 348-349.
Law of Debtor's Domicil
borrower, 4-5.
surety, 350 n. 32.
Law of Financial Market, 1 I-IJ.
Law of the Flag
employment, Igo.
maritime affreightment, 24o24I, 244 n. 47, 245-247,
258.
Law of the Insurance, 439·
Law of the Insured, 3I3, 3I8.
Law of the Insurer, 3I3, 329334, 339-34I.
Law of Nationality Common to
Parties, 189 n. 32, I90 n. 33,
250, 252 n. 92, 254 n. 103,
327.
Law of a Party, 7o-7 I.

Law of the Place of Contracting
agency, I94·
authority, I54-I55, I59, I77.
conditional sales, 82 n. 22.
employment, 184-I85.
insurance, 3 1 I -3 I 6, 322, 324,
327.
loan, 4·
maritime transportation
baggage, 295.
goods, 242-245, 248-256,
263-264.
persons, 291-292, 295.
qualified by additional circumstances, 53, I06, I 15, I85,
187, 338.
sales, 51-52, 58, 103-I04, I 19
n. 77·
surety, 348.
workmen's compensation, 21 I 212.
Law of the Place of Destination
land, 300.
maritime, 249 n. 78, 25I, 255,
264, 274-276.
Law of the Place of Dispatch,
243 ff., 248, 25o-253, 265267, 276-279, 294, 295,
298-299·
Law of the Place of Employment
authority, I57, I6o-I6I.
master and servant, I87-I88.
workmen's compensation, 2I4220.
workmen's compensation insurance, 342 and n. 106.
Law of the Place of Loss, 206,
244 n. 49, 257, 299.
Law of the Place of Performance
affreightment, 249 n. 78, 25I,
255,264,274-276,283-286.
currency restrictions, 50.
insurance, 328 n. 6o.
loan, s-6.
sales, 52, 61 n. 44, 94, 105.
subrogation, 438-439.

INDEX
Law of the Place of the Principal
authority, 143, 150-151, 161162.
employment, 186-189.
Law of the Principal Debt, 349350, 436-437, 467.
Law of Two Debts, 466-467.
Law of the Seller, 54-56, 68.
Law of the Shipowner, 261-263.
Law of the Suretyship, 436.
Legal Authority, q8- I so.
Legal Tender, 25, 32, 33·
Letter of Credit, 97-98.
Lex Anastasiana, 408.
Lex fori, 307, 46o, 466, 495,
500.
Lex loci delicti
affreightment, 244 n. 49, 257·
insurance, 206.
workmen's compensation, 209,
222.
Lex pecuniae, 32, 35·
Lex situs, 78.
repossession, 84-85
sale of immovable, 7.
compulsory, 101-103, I 16.
subsidiary, 104-107, I 15II7, 120.
Liability
bank, 16-17, 473-474·
carrier, in general, 270-271,
see Chapters 43-45.
employer, Chapters 41 and 42.
exemption clauses, 239 n. 28,
270 n. 54·
stockholder, so6 n. 6r, 509510.
transfer of, 444-446.
License
insurance business, 3 I 7-321,
334-336, 340.
patent, sale of, 73.
Limitation of Action, Chapters
52 and 53.
nature, 482.
actio, 478-479.
action, 475, 479-480.

action arising, 522.
affreightment, 289.
Anglo-American principle,
495·
Anspruch, 480.
Ausschlussfrist, 487.
borrowing statutes, 508-5II,
5I6.
characterization, 5 I 7-522.
characterization proposed,
52I-522.
concepts, municipal, 482-487.
conflicts rules
Anglo-American, 495-496.
civil laws, 496-504.
contacts, 500 ff.
domicil of debtor, 498-499,
50 I.

forum, 495-496, 523 ns.
134, I35·
party autonomy, 503-504.
death statutes, 506 n. 6o.
dechfance, 487.
defensive character, 477-478,
482-4-84.
effect, 484-486.
exceptiones decisoriae, 485.
extinguishing the debt, 488,
490, 49I, 493, 504-508.
federal law, 49I, 512.
fin de recevoir, 485-486.
fraternal benefit association,
5I2 n. 99·
French courts, 498-499.
general statutes, 505.
history, 477, 496-498.
international problem, 5I 7.
interruption, 423, 524.
Klageverjiihrung, 480.
lapse of time, 482.
liability of employer, Chapters
41, 42.
liability of stockholder, so6 n.

6r.
liability of stockholder of national bank, 509-510.
main features, 482-487.

INDEX
Limitation (continued)
mixed theories, 504 ff.
municipal comparison, 493494·
municipal theories, Chapter 52.
natural obligation, 486-487.
periods of time, short and long,
492, 5I3-5I4.
policies, 492-493.
preclusion, 487-489.
prescription, 483.
presumption of payment, 501502.
procedural exceptions, 5045I3.
procedural theory, 475, 481,
49 I, 49 5-496.
procedure, concept, 481-482.
protection of debtor, 498-499.
public policy, 5 I3-5 I6.
remedy, 475, 479, 487, 489491.
res judicata, 484-486, 493·
rescission, 522-523.
scope, 522-524.
situs theory, 496-499.
special pleading, 49 I.
special statutes, 505-507.
statutes, borrowing, 508-5 I I,
516.
statutes, extinguishing 488,
490, 49I, 493, 504-508.
statutes, general, 505.
statutes, special, 505-507.
stipulated, 484 n. 30, 503-504,
5I2, 522 n. I3I.
stockholders, so6 n. 6r, 509510.
Story, 484, 498.
substantive theory, 485-486,
493, 499-504.
theories, 495-504.
transforming effect, 489.
treaties, 523.
uniform statute suggested, 522.
waiver, 484.
Liquor Prohibition, 54 n. 18,

I77.

Literary Rights, 74-75·
Lloyd v. Guibert, I05, I47, 173,
240, 246, 247, 269, 380.
Locatio conductio operarum, I82.
Locatio conductio operis, 182,
233 n. 2.
Locatio conductio rei, 233 n. 2.
Louisiana
agency, merger of persons, I33·
authority, concept, I22 n. 2.
lesion, I I 7.
seller's privilege, 86.
statute of limitation, 505.
warranty, 9I, 92 n. 68.
workmen's compensation, 213.
"Main Contract" of Agent, 141.
Mandate, I23-I30.
Maritime Assistance and Salvage,
365-366.
Maritime Transportation
of baggage, 294-295.
of goods (see Maritime Transportation of Goods).
of persons, 29I-294·
Maritime Transportation of
Goods, Chapters 43 and 44·
affreightment, 234-236.
ordinary, 268.
bareboat lease, 233-234.
carrier, 237-238.
cesser and lien clause, 273.
charter parties, 234-235, 268270.
conflicts rules, 239-256.
Codigo Bustamante, 255.
France, 249-250.
Germany, 251-253.
Great Britain, 245-249.
Netherlands, 253-254·
United States, 24o-245.
contacts
accident, 244, 257.
arrival, 272 n. 63.
contracting, 263-264, 272 n.
63.

INDEX
Maritime (continued)
contacts (continued)
destination, 264, 274-276,
283-286.
dispatch, 265-267, 276-279.
flag, 258-261.
forum, 267.
owner, 261-263.
proposed, 268-270.
consignee, rights, 287-289.
custody, 286-287.
demise, 233-234.
distant freight, 280.
form of bill of lading, 273.
form of charter party, 271.
forwarding agent, 237.
freight, 280, 281.
general maritime law, 241242, 257·
general ship, 235-236.
goods not shipped, 276-277.
holder of bill, 273-279.
interpretation, 272-273, 285.
lease of vessel, 232-234.
limitation of action, 289.
notice of loss, 287-288.
obligation to issue bill, 271272.
party autonomy, 239-240, 243·
person of debtor, 273-274.
port regulations, 281-283.
private carrier, 237 and n. 23.
public policy, 255, 256, 267268, 277, 287, 28g.
rights of consignee, 287-289.
rights of holder, 273-279.
scope of contracts rule, 270289.
stipulation for time of claim,
28g.
through carriage, 285, 307JIO.

time for claim, 289.
types of contracts, 232-237.
unification, 232.
Market, sales on, 53 n. 11.
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Married Women, 102, II 6 n. 6o,
132, 134-135, 152-153·
Maryland, statute of limitation,
505.
Master and Servant, 127, 131,
181-182, 184-193·
contacts
contracting, 184-185.
master's domicil, 186-187.
servant's working place,
187-189.
public law, 190-193.
public policy, 192-193·
Metallistic Theory, 19-20.
Michigan, statute of limitation,
507 n. 66.
Milliken v. Pratt, 132, 134-135,
152, 155, 353·
Minnesota
statute of limitation, 51 7 n. 66.
workmen's compensation, 215216.
Missouri, In re, 247.
Mixed Arbitral Tribunals
title transfer, 81-82.
unjust enrichment, 376-377.
voluntary agency, 365-366.
Mode of Performance, money
debts, 33, 39, 41-43.
Money of Account, 34·
Money Deposits, 16-17.
Money Loans, Chapter 34·
bonds, 10-15.
borrower's duties, 4·
contacts, 4-7.
damages, J.
finance agency, g.
individual loans, 7.
lender's duties, 4, 10.
mass loans, 8.
rationale, 7-10.
state as debtor, 10, 14-15.
state structure, J.
Money Obligations, Chapter 35.
contacts, 32 ff.
conversion, 26-29.
judicial, 27-29.
currency of debt, 33.
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Money (continued)
default, 34·
devaluation, I8-20.
exchange restrictions, 48-50,
357-359·
foreign money debts, 25-29.
French doctrine, 24-25, 38-39.
gold clauses, 35-4I.
bullion, 23.
coin, 2o-22.
prohibition, 24-25, 36-45.
value, 22, 35-45·
inflation, I9.
international bonds, 29-32.
international payment, 24-25,
38-39·
Joint Resolution of Congress
(gold clauses), 19, 23 n. II,
32, 36-4I, 44-45·
lex pecuniae, 32-33.
modalities of payment, 4I-43·
money of account, 33-34·
money loans, 3- I 7.
municipal laws, 18-32.
nominalism, I 8-20.
option of collection, 31-32,
4G-4I.
option of currency, 3o-3r, 4346.
public policy, 4o-4r.
revalorization, 34-35.
stipulations for protection, 2o24·
Montevideo Conventions. See
Table of Statutes.
Moratorium, 46-48.
Multiple
Currency
Clauses,
30 ff.
Nationality Common to Parties,
I89 n. 32, 190 n. 33, 250.
Natural Obligation, 486-487.
Negotiorum gestio, 361-366.
The Netherlands. See also Table
of Statutes.
assignment, 399, 412.
employment, I84 n. 12, I88 n.
28, 190 n. 35·

mant1me law, 236, 253-254,
258, 299·
seller's privilege, 87.
New York. See also Table of
Statutes.
workmen's compensation, 189
n. 3I, 2I5, 2I7, 218 n. 5I.
Njegos, The, 239, 246-248, 26I,
278-279·
Nominalism, I 8.
Notice
of defect, 93-95·
of loss, 287-288.
Novation, 446-448.
Ocean Bill of Lading, 307-310.
Ohio, borrowing statute, 5I6.
Option of Collection, 3I-32, 33,
40.
Option of Currency, 3o-3r, 33,
43·
Ownership, Transfer of, 78-82.
between the parties, 78.
confused with contract, 77, 79,
82.
Paris Peace Treaty between Italy
and the Allied and Associated Powers, of February
10, 1947, 332.
Party Autonomy, vii.
affreightment, 239-240, 243,
247. 251, 254. 289.
air transportation, 303-304.
insurance, 328, 337-338.
sales of goods, 8r, roo.
sales of immovables, 105, II5.
workmen's compensation, 212,
213 n. 27.
Patent Rights, sales of, 73-74·
Patterson Committee on Conflicts
Rules for Insurance, 325326, 340, 342.
Pennsylvania, law of the place of
damage, 244 n. 49.
Permanent Court of International Justice, Brazilian and
Serbian loans, I 4 n. 46, 2 I,
31 n. 49, 40, 46.

INDEX
"Place" of a Party, 7o-7 1.
Polson v. Stewart, 102, 10g n. 41.
Possession vaut titre, 77.
"Pound Sterling," 43.
Power of Attorney. See Authority, Authorization.
Preclusion, 487-48g.
Principal
and agent, 127, 140.
authorization (see Authorization).
death, 17g.
intention to authorize, I6II62.
revocation of authority, I7gz8o.
Principal and Agent, 127, Chapter 41.
Priority of Assignees, 378, 387,
418, 428-432.
Privilege of Seller, 85-87.
Procedure, concept, 48I-482.
Promise of Transfer, 78 ff., 82.
Protective Stipulations against
Devaluation, 2o-24, 36-45.
"Provision," 4I5-4I6, 44I-443·
Public Policy
affreightment, 253-254, 255256.
bonds, 4o-41.
currency restrictions, 4g-50.
employment, Ig2-Ig3.
limitation of action, 5I3-5I6.
sales, 87 n. 47, IOO.
Quasi Contracts, 361.
Ratification, I74-I78.
Registration, ships, 72.
Repossession by Seller, 83-84.
Representation, Chapter 3g. See
also Agent, Authority.
concept, I26, I30, I35·
and agency, I23-I30.
common law, 128-I2g, I35·
external relationship, I35, I4GI4I.
fiction of identity, I3I-I35·

history, I2I, 123, 135.
internal relationship, 135, J4GI4I.
municipal theories, I2I-I37·
theory of mandate, I22, I23I27.
unauthorized, 141-I42.
Repurchase, gg-100.
Res judicata, 484-486, 4g3.
Rescission, 83-84, 376-377, 522523.
Restatement of the Law of Agency, 128-I30, 138, I40, 15g,
161, Ig4.
Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws §§ 257-258,79,
So; id. § 340, 102 n. 8; id.
§ 34I, III; id. § 342, 138,
I94 n. 53; id. § 343, I44,
159, 160, I6I; id. § 344,
144, I5g, I6o, I64, 172; id.
§ 345, I30 n. 26, I45, I59I6o, I6I, I64, I66; id.
§§ 348 ff., 389, 3go n. 13,
3g6; id. § 3g8, 20g; id.
§ 3gg, 20g, 2I I; id. § 400,
2I6 n. 45, 218.
Restatement of the Law of Contracts § 14g, 38g; id. §§ I66
ff., 428 n. 175.
Restatement of the Law of Security §§ 82-83, 345; id.
§ I33, 354·
Retribution, 356-357.
Revalorization, 34-35.
Revocation of Authority, I7gI8o.
Right to Sue
assignee, 388.
subrogee, 43g.
undisclosed principal, I35-136,
I4I.
Risk of Loss, 87-gi.
Roman Law
Codex Just. 4·44·2, II8 n. 68;
id. 7.3g.3.2, 477 n. g.
Codex Theod. 4·I4.I.3, 477
n. g.
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Roman (continued)
Digesta 6.r.23.3, 374 n. 56;
id. I2.I.Ig.I, 375 n. 57; id.
12.1.32, 375 n. 57; id. 16.
2.1, 458 n. 1; id. 16.2.21,
464 n. 21; id. 18.1.8, 415 n.
116; id. 19.2.13.1, 233 n.
2; id. 19.2.13.2, 233 n. 2;
id. 1g.2.19.7, 233 n. 2; id.
19.2.62.11, 233 n. 2; id.
21.2.6, 117 n. 62; id. 41.1.
9-2, 374 n. 56; id. 44·7-51,
479 n. 15.
Gaius, Inst. II.78, 374 n. s6;
id. VI. I ff., 478 n. 13; id.
IV.64-68, 464 n. 21.
Inst. Just. 2.1.34, 374 n. 56;
id. 4.6, 478 n. 13; id. 4.6
pr., 479 n. 15.
Rome Institute for the Unification of Private Law, draft
of international sales law,
51 n. 1, 63.
Rosen, In re, 419, 427, 430, 432.
"Sale," 76-77.
Sale of Immovables, Chapter 38,
101-120.
applicable law, IOI-Io8.
capacity, 109.
covenants for title, 110-117.
form, 108-Iog.
laesio enormis, 117-120.
warranty of title, IIQ-117.
Sale of Movables, Chapters 35
and 36.
by agent, 57-58, 156-I58.
on approval, 99-100.
c. i. f., 61-62.
conditional, 82-85, 100.
contacts, 51-71.
buyer's place, s6-sg, 68.
contracting, 51-53.
"delivery," 62 ff.
seller's place, 54-56, 68.
shipping place, 59-67.
proposed, 62-71.

of copyright, 73-74·
custody, 95.
damages, g8.
delivery, 62-67.
on exchange, 71.
on fair, 53 n. 12.
f. o. b., 6o-61, 81 n. 17, 9192.
inspection, 94-95.
letter of credit, 97-98.
of license, 73·
on market, 53 n. I I.
notice of defect, 93-94, 95·
party autonomy, 100.
of patent, 73-74·
privilege of seller, 85-87.
public policy, 100.
of registered chattel, 72.
on repurchase, 99-100.
rescission, 83-84.
risk of loss, 87-9 I.
of ships, 72.
specific performance, 98-99.
tender of documents, 56 n. 25,
90-91, 94·
and title, 78-85.
types, 63.
unpaid seller, 85-87.
warranty of quality, 91-96.
Seizure
of debts, 453-454·
of goods, 82.
Setoff and Counterclaim, Chapter 51.
concepts, 458-460, 464-465.
Anglo-American laws, 458464.
civil laws, 458, 464-472.
compensation, 458.
in common law courts, 461462.
contacts
lex fori, 466.
law of principal debt, 467.
laws of both debts, 466467.
ipso iure compensatur, 464.
liquidity, 471-472.
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Setoff (continued)
procedural application in civil
law courts, 462-464.
procedural theory, 459-464.
prohibitions, 468-470.
rationale, 468-472.
reciprocity, 47 I.
surety, 354-355, 409-410.
Shipmaster, authority, 146-148,
246, 248 n. 68, 273-274.
Shipmaster and Crew, hire, 190
n. 35·
Shipment to Carrier, 62-67, 68.
Ships, sales, 72.
Situs Theory
assignment, 391-393.
limitation of action, 496-499.
restitution, 37 4·
sale of immovable, IOI-I07,
IJQ-117.
Smith v. Ingram, I IS •
Soliciting Agent, I76-I78.
Soviet Maritime Law, 236, 240,
265, 266, 267, 271, 293 n.
I3.
Spain, sale of immovables, 103
n. g.
Specific Performance, 98-99.
Spediteur, 237, 253.
State
as debtor, 10, 14-I5.
as employer, zgo.
interest, 226, 323.
Status of Employment, 2I5.
Statute of Frauds, 54 n. I 7.
Stockbrokers, 198-202.
Stockholders, 506 n. 6I, 509-510.
Stiickgiitervertrag, 235, 236.
Subrogation
of insurer, 413, 439.
of surety, 355, 436.
Substance and Procedure, 48I482.
Sunday Contracts, 54 n. 19, 177.
Suretyship, Chapter 47.
concept, 344-345·
accessory nature, 345·
assignment to surety, 355·
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beneficium cedendarum actionurn, 355·
beneficium excussionis personalis, 353.
burden of proof, 354·
capacity, 352 n. 43·
contacts
contracting, 348.
creditor's place, 348-349.
law of principal debt, 349350.
proposal, 352.
surety's place, 350 n. 32.
surety's place of payment,
350 n. 33, 351.
cosureties, 357-359.
counterclaim, 354, 471.
currency restrictions, 359360.
defenses, 354·
diligence, 353-354.
exoneration, 356-357, 378.
extent, 346-347, 353-355.
form, 352 n. 42.
guaranty, 344·
independent law, 345·
negotiorum gestio, 357.
plurality, 357-359·
retribution, 356-357.
scope, 352-360.
setoff, 354-355.
subrogation, 355.
sureties, several, 357-359.
termination, 356.
terminology, 344-345.
Switzerland. See also Table of
Statutes.
currency restrictions, 49 n. I 30.
sale of immovables, 103 n. 10.
unilateral obligations, 5, 350,
360.
Through Bills of Lading, American and Canadian, 68.
Through Carriage, 68, 285, 297299, 307-3 10,
Third Party Contract with
Agent, I41, 143.
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Time for Claim. See Limitation
of Action.
affreightment, 289.
limitation of action, 503-504,
5I2, 522 n. I3I.
Time for Notice
affreightment, 289.
sale, 95·
Title and Contract
conditional sales, 82-85.
sales, 78-85, I02-103.
Tort Actions
liability of shipowner, 271.
workmen's compensation, 204,
207' 222-224.
Traditio, system of, 76, 78, 8I,
82.
Tranches, 14, 32.
Transfer of Claims by Law,
435-444·
accident insurance, 439.
beneficium cedendarum actionurn, 435·
bill of exchange, endorsement,
44I.
contacts, 436-439.
divorce, effect, 443-444·
insurer subrogee, 4I3, 439·
provision, 44I-443·
rank of subrogees, 440-441.
right to sue, 439.
subrogation, 435 ff.
surety, 355, 436.
Transfer and Contract, 78-85,
102-103, 389, 400, 410-413.
Transfer of Liability, 443-446.
Transfer of Simple Debts
of claims, by law, 435-444·
of claims, voluntary, Chapter
49 (see Assignment) .
of liability, 444-446.
Transportation
air, 302-307.
of baggage, 294-295, 296.
fluvial, 296-298.
of goods, Chapters 43-44·
land, 296-302.
maritime, Chapters 43-45.

mixed, 307-310.
of persons, 291 ff., 301-302.
Traveling Salesman, 158, 172.
Undisclosed Principal, 122 n. 2,
I26-I30, 135·
contrast to civil law, 135-136.
right to sue and be sued, 135136, 141.
Uniform Statute (Draft), Insurance Conflicts Law, 325326, 340.
Unilateral Contracts, 5, 350 and
n. 35·
United States. See also Table of
Statutes.
agency, Chapters 39-4I.
authority, 122-123, 154-156.
conditional sales, 82-85.
contract and title, 79, I02.
divorce effect, 443·
foreign money conversion, 2829.
fraud by seller, So.
garnishment, 454-457.
gold clause stipulation, I9, 20.
insurance, 3 I I-325.
Constitution, 322-324, 325.
decisions, 3 I 1-3 I 7.
reform, 325-326.
statutes, 3 I 7-32 I.
Joint Resolution of June 6,
1933 on gold clauses, I9, 23
n. II, 32, 36-4I, 44-45·
lex situs, 83.
maritime transportation of
goods, 240-245.
rescission, 8o-8 I.
right to sue, 439.
sale of immovables, 10I-106.
subrogation effect, 440.
suretyship, 348-350.
workmen's compensation statutes, 205-206, 208.
theories, 209, 2I2, 2I4-220.
Constitution, 225-229.
United States Shipping Board,
236 n. 14.
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Unjust Enrichment, 366-379.
conflicts rules, 368-372.
contacts, 368-372.
enriching act, 368-369.
other contacts, 369-370.
relationship causing, 370372.
conversion, 378.
history, 375·
illustrations, 376-379.
legacy invalid, 376.
municipal laws, 366-367.
pre-existing obligation, 377378.
priority, 378.
rationale, 372-37 5.
rescission, 376--377.
surety, 378-379.
theoretical approach, 372-375.
Unpaid Seller, 85-87.
Versailles Treaty between the Allied and Associated Powers
and Germany, of June 28,
I9I9, 332, 364, 396, 489,
SO I.
Vienna
Draft, I926, of conflicts rules
on sales, 5I n. I.
loan of I902, 30, 45.
Rules, I926, on rate of exchange, 27 n. 32.
Voluntary Agency, 36I-366.
conflicts rules, 362-365.
preceding relationship, 363365.
Wager, 199, 200 n. 75·
Wages
assigned, 407 ns. 8I, 82.
setoff, 469-470.
H7 ahrungsstatut, 33.
Warranty of Quality, 9I-96.
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Warranty of Title, 104.
assignment, 387, 389, 4I3.
history, I I2-I I 7·
Warsaw Convention on the Unification of Certain Rules regarding International Air
Transport, of October I 2,
I929, 232, 302, 303, 304,
305, 306, 307, 523.
Warsaw-Oxford C. I. F. Rules,
63, 97 n. 87.
Wisconsin, statute of limitation,
505.
Workmen's Compensation, Chapter 42.
American Constitution, 225229.
contract theory, 209-2IO.
incidental work, 2I6--2I7.
insurance, 206, 207, 229.
interest of state, 226.
multiple claims, 222-228.
municipal systems, 204-206.
occasional work, 2I6-217.
optional acts, 205, 2I2, 213.
place of employment theories,
2I4-220.
several claims, 222-228.
status of employment, 2I5.
temporary work, 216-217,220.
tort action, 222-224.
tort theory, 209-210.
treaties, 207, 22I-223.
recent French (not ratified),
with Belgium (Brussels)
Jan. I7, I948, with Italy
(Rome) March 31, 1948,
with
Poland
(Paris)
June 9, I948, 2I7 n. so.
workman's outside service, I 86,
2I6, 220.
York-Antwerp Rules, 379.
Young Loan, I 5.

